JUDGMENT K. B. Asthana, J. - This Special Appeal is directed against the judgment of brother H. N. Seth who dismissed the writ of the appellant for directions in the nature of mandamus and certiorari. The appellant is a Squadron Leader in the Indian Air Force and at the material time was posted in Allahabad under the Central Air Command. On 28-3-1970 instructions were issued from the Air Headquarters, New Delhi, to the effect that all personnel of the Air Force were required to wear crash helmet with effect from April 1 of the year while riding on two wheeled motorised vehicles. This Order became effective and applicable in the Central Air Command at Allahabad and all the Air Force personnel, including the petitioner appellant posted at Allahabad, were required to wear crash helmet while riding two wheeled motorised vehicles. Admittedly the petitioner appellant had a scooter and he used to ride on it while going on official duty and as well as when going out on private business. The petitioner appellant, as averred in this petition, felt that these instructions the observance of which was made compulsory, was obnoxious and he contended that the Air Force authorities had no power to regulate how he will use his scooter and what headgear he will put on while riding the scooter outside his duty hours. The petitioner appellant did not procure for himself a crash helmet and sometimes rode his scooter without wearing the crash helmet. As the counter-affidavit shows the was caught many times in the past riding his scooter without wearing a crash helmet and was warned. On 4-7-1973 the petitioner appellant was asked to explain his conduct in riding his scooter without wearing the crash helmet. As the counter-affidavit shows the was caught many times in the past riding his scooter without wearing a crash helmet and was warned. On 4-7-1973 the petitioner appellant was asked to explain his conduct in riding his scooter without wearing the crash helmet. The petitioner appellant submitted a written explanation, inter alia, stating that the warning regarding wearing a crash helmet issued to him earlier was not acceptable to him and the intimation of his unwillingness to obey the order was intimated to the Air Commanding Officer that he had stopped using the scooter from the date the warning was issued but it so happened that he found it difficult to carry on his duties without recourse to a vehicle, hence he again used his scooter but as the crash helmet was not available in the canteen or in the city of Allahabad, due to non-availability of it he could not wear it and that there was no intention on his part of disobeying any existing order and the lapse on his part in this regard was regretted and be condoned. The authorities, it appears, were not satisfied with this written explanation and called the petitioner appellant for interrogation and before the investigating Officer the petitioner appellant accepted the fact that he was riding the scooter on 4-7-1973 without wearing crash helmet. He also admitted that he was aware of the instructions for wearing the crash helmet. When asked why did he not wear a crash helmet while riding the scooter contrary to the existing instructions, the petitioner appellant, replied that due to urgency of the work he had faded to carry the crash helmet. The petitioner appellant further admitted before the investigating Officer that he had been previously warned for not obeying the instructions for wearing a crash helmet. The investigating officer also examined witnesses to establish the fact that the petitioner appellant was found riding a scooter without wearing crash helmet. 2. On a consideration of the material on record, the Commanding Officer passed the following orders on 27-7-1973 : "Reference is made to Headquarters Central Air Command. IAF Letter No. CAC/C/2708/245/P 1 dated 26 July, 19 73. 2. A formal investigation was held at this wing to investigate into the circumstances under which you were found riding a scooter without wearing crash helmet on 4th July, 1973. IAF Letter No. CAC/C/2708/245/P 1 dated 26 July, 19 73. 2. A formal investigation was held at this wing to investigate into the circumstances under which you were found riding a scooter without wearing crash helmet on 4th July, 1973. The investigating Officer found you to blame for not wearing crash helmet while riding a two-wheeled motor vehicle. 3. For this lapse, you, Squadron Leader G.N. Raju (7167) F (N) of No. 48 Squadron, Air Force, have incurred 'Displeasure' of the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Central Air Command." 3. The petitioner appellant became apprehensive that the displeasure expressed by the Air Officer Commanding in-Chief of Central Air Command may entitle evil consequences and he being fortified by the warning of the Commanding Officer in his latter dated 7-7-1973 thought such lapse on the petitioner appellant's part would be reflected in his confidential report which fact has been accepted by the respondents in the counter-affidavit, Before this Court the petitioner took the plea in the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing of order of the Commanding Officer, on the substantive ground that the instructions issued by the Air Headquarters for compulsorily wearing of crash helmet by the personnel of the Air Force while using and riding two-wheeled motorised vehicles were unauthorised and without jurisdiction and they not being Regulations under the Law, no Air Force Officer or other personnel could be penalised for disregarding such instructions. In the writ petition Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Central Air Command, Officer Commanding of the petitioners Command and the Chief of the Air Staff Air Headquarters. New Delhi, were impleaded as opposite parties. The stand taken by the opposite parties before the Court was that the instructions issued by the Air Headquarters under the authority of the Chief of the Air Staff were Regulations binding on the personnel of the Air Force, any breach and disobedience thereof would amount to breach of Regulations and would entail penalties according to the rules. 4. On the narration of the facts above it is clear that there is hardly any controversy between the parties on the questions of fact. The petitioner appellant himself admitted that he had not worn the crash helmet when he used his scooter. 4. On the narration of the facts above it is clear that there is hardly any controversy between the parties on the questions of fact. The petitioner appellant himself admitted that he had not worn the crash helmet when he used his scooter. No doubt in the writ petition may be at the advise of his lawyer, the petitioner had taken a stand that the instructions were obnoxious and ridiculous and not binding on him and he did not like it but as appears from his conduct when he was called for explanation, he had regretted his conduct in not wearing the crash helmet. He had tried to explain that the procurement of it was difficult as they were not available. Again, no doubt, the petitioner in the writ petition had characterised that such compulsory instructions regulating the headgear were outside the scope of the Air Force Regulations and were unreasonable as each officer had to procure for himself the crash helmets by paying the costs from his own pocket. The trend of the petitioner's affidavit filed in support of the petition reflects a feeling of grievance and betrays a sense of frustration, but there appears to be a thin string that he came to his Court put of fear-rather than professing himself as a champion of liberty and freedom. Had the letter of the Commanding Officer dated 7-7-1973 not Contained a warning that entries may be made in his confidential records for the lapse on his part, perhaps this writ may not have been presented by the petitioner. Before the learned Single Judge it appears all the points arising were forcefully urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner and equally with gravity defended by the opposite parties. 5. The principal question which arose before the learned Single Judge revolved round the statutory force behind the impugned instructions. The learned Single Judge seemed to be of the view that instructions regulating the conduct of the personnel of the Air Force issued by the. Chief of the Staff, Air Headquarters would be binding as an order, the disobedience of which could be visited by penalties. The learned Single Judge further held that after affording due opportunity to the petitioner the opposite parties had found him guilty and whatever action was taken either as a measure of punishment or discipline was justified. On these findings the petition was dismissed. 6. The learned Single Judge further held that after affording due opportunity to the petitioner the opposite parties had found him guilty and whatever action was taken either as a measure of punishment or discipline was justified. On these findings the petition was dismissed. 6. When we heard this petition at an earlier stage, we deferred the hearing to enable the learned counsel for the respondents to furnish all such material before us on the basis of which we could as a Court of Law come to a certain conclusion on the statutory nature of the instructions issued by the Air Headquarters making it compulsory for Air Force personnel to wear crash helmet when using two-wheeled motorised vehicles even outside their duty hours. Despite the best effort of the learned counsel for the respondents we have not been able to procure any such materials from the Air Headquarters and we are not in a position thus to find out under what authority did the Air Headquarters issue such instructions. It was equally difficult for us to trace out the source of power or authority from the Indian Air Force Act, 1950 and the Rules and Regulations made thereunder. But we think that exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution by this Court being discretionary, we are not bound to afford any relief to the petitioner merely on the ground that the said instructions have no statutory force. There is no denying the fact that the instructions are useful, beneficial and for the protection of the Air Force Personnel. They are reasonable also as the wearing of a crash helmet by a rider of two-wheeled motorised vehicles, such as motor cycle or scooter would save the rider from unnecessary head injuries in any unfortunate accident which the vehicle might meet. It has often been noticed that in many an accident which may not be so serious by themselves but a bare-head rider even if he receives the slightest injury in the head it may affect his brain and the whole system thus afflicting the unfortunate man throughout the rest of his life if not actually resulting in fatality. The wearing of a crash helmet is a safety device and its use must be re-commended to all riders of two-wheeled motorised vehicles. The wearing of a crash helmet is a safety device and its use must be re-commended to all riders of two-wheeled motorised vehicles. This Court in another case of accidental injuries had made similar observations,in connection with an accident, in which a civilian scooter rider met with an accident with a car. Be that as it may, a slight expense incurred by the personnel belonging to the Air Force for providing themselves with crash helmets cannot be said to work upon them a hardship when compared to the avoidance of danger in accidents and for securing safety. This Court thinks that the Air Force Authorities having given such instructions will always facilitate the procurement of crash helmets at a cheap price and to the lower class personnel at subsidised price as this Court feels that this measure is to be welcomed being useful and beneficial. In this view of the matter we would decline to strike down the impugned instructions of the Air Headquarters as we are not bound under Article 226 to quash by a writ of certiorari an order even of doubtful validity if otherwise it is in the public interest or of private benefit to a particular class or individuals. 7. However, on the other question that has been raised on behalf of the petitioner appellant, we think there is scope for giving some sort of directions. We may first observe that the actual order passed by the Commanding Officer quoted above conveying to the petitioner the displeasure of the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Central Air Command cannot be said to be a punishment inflicted on the petitioner. Had the matter rested at that there would have been no necessity for this Court to give any direction. Since the averment in para 9 of the petition to the effect that the Commanding Officer by a letter dated 7-7-1973 warned the petitioner appellant that this conduct of his would be reflected in his confidential report which has been accepted in the counter-affidavit, the apprehension of the petitioner appears to be well-founded. Having perused the relevant Regulations we find that any entry reflecting upon the conduct of the petitioner in his annual confidential remarks would be adverse and may prejudice his future career. Having perused the relevant Regulations we find that any entry reflecting upon the conduct of the petitioner in his annual confidential remarks would be adverse and may prejudice his future career. Regulation 203 for the Air Force dealing with adverse remarks by its clause (b) lays down : "As far as possible, the failings of an officer are to be brought to his notice in writing well before the report is due in order to give him a chance to improve himself. If at the time of rendition of the report it is felt that the warning have been of no avail, this fact is to be specifically mentioned and is to be treated as an adverse comment." 8. A perusal of what has been quoted above would show that there are two stages prescribed before actually the adverse remarks are to be recorded. First stage is that the failings of an officer are to be brought to his notice in writing well before the report is due. that is, well before the time for recording annual confidential remarks. The purpose of such notice in writing is to give a chance to the officer to improve. Then the second stage is that when, the time for making the confidential remarks arrives and still it is found that the officer concerned despite notice in writing has not improved. It is only then that mention is to be made as an adverse comment on the officer. The letter of the Commanding Officer dated 7-7-1973 has not been brought to our notice. Since the content of that letter warning the petitioner appellant that his conduct would be reflected in his annual confidential report is admitted by the opposite parties, we proceed on the basis that the fear of the petitioner appellant that such a mention would be made, as observed above has a basis. Though, of course, we have also observed above that the actual order of the Commanding Officer conveying the displeasure dated 27-7-1973 does not make any such mention. In so far as the enquiry against the petitioner appellant was concerned, it related only to one incident of 4-7-1973. The petitioner appellant gave an explanation and regretted his conduct. The petitioner appellant after that date has not used his scooter or any kind of two-wheeled motorised vehicle or has used it without wearing crash helmet. In so far as the enquiry against the petitioner appellant was concerned, it related only to one incident of 4-7-1973. The petitioner appellant gave an explanation and regretted his conduct. The petitioner appellant after that date has not used his scooter or any kind of two-wheeled motorised vehicle or has used it without wearing crash helmet. We are sure that under Regulation 203 no adverse entry could be made against his conduct and the warning conveyed in the later of the Commanding Officer dated 7-7-1973 would be merely a hallow warning without bringing any prejudice to the petitioner appellant We think in the circumstances of the case relating to the incident of 4-7-1973 the petitioner appellant does not deserve any adverse remark within the meaning of Regulation 203. We think this observation is sufficient to safeguard the interest of the petitioner and we need not give any positive direction. 9. Subject to be observations above, we dismiss this appeal and direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.