JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of india by a Councillor of the Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur, wherein the petitioner seeks to have set aside the order of the Mayor, namely, respondent no. 1, dated 15-3-1974, refusing to put before the House the petitioners resolution, dated 12-3-1974, censuring the first respondent, on the ground that there is no provision in the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, for moving a censure motion. ( 2. ) THE first respondent is a Mayor of the Jabalpur Municipal Corporation, while the second respondent, Shri Anilkumar Sharma, is the Deputy mayor. Ten Councillors of the Jabalpur Municipal Corporation on 2-3-1974 (Vide Petitioners Annexure -A) gave a notice of the censure motion to be moved against the Mayor and the Chairman of the Standing Committee. It may be relevant to reproduce the resolution, which is as follows : Translated in English, the resolution would read as follows : "due to administrative slackness employees are dissatisfied, officers are dissatisfied, Councillors are dissatisfied and the general public is dissatisfied. But to this there is a lot of discontent and corruption has increased. There is dereliction of duty. For this sorry state of affairs the Mayor and the Chairman of the Standing Committee are to be blamed. This House censures both these office bearers. " ( 3. ) THIS requisition was addressed to the Mayor, who from 2-3-1974 to 1-3-1974 was away from Jabalpur. Therefore, in the absence of the Mayor, the Deputy Mayor (respondent 2) purported to pass four orders on 2-3-1974 (Petitioners Annexures-B/l,b/2, B/3 and B/4), wherein he purported to exercise powers under section 25 (2) of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and stayed certain actions being taken and further he directed that the matters thus suspended be put up for consideration before the next Meeting of the Corporation. ( 4. ) IN accordance with the requisition, dated 2-3-1974 (Petitioners Annexure -A), the Municipal Commissioner of the Corporation, as per section 30 of the Act, issued a notice of a Meeting of the Corporation scheduled to be convened on 12-3-74 to consider the censure motion proposed by the Councillor, Shri Rajabahadursingh. Notices of the proposed Meeting were sent to all the Councillors. ( 5. ) THE petitioner has filed a newspaper report of the proceedings dated 12-3-1974 (petitioners Annexure- D ). Notices of the proposed Meeting were sent to all the Councillors. ( 5. ) THE petitioner has filed a newspaper report of the proceedings dated 12-3-1974 (petitioners Annexure- D ). On behalf of the first respondent the actual proceedings (Respondents Annexure-1) have been filed. In view of the authoritative version of the proceedings, we shall ignore the newspaper report. As per the authoritative proceedings 33 Councillors, including the respondents, participated in the Meeting, Twenty four Councillors were absent. The Corporation considered the four stay orders (Petitioners Annexure-B/1, B/2, B/3 and B/4) passed by the Deputy Mayor. During the Meeting some of the Councillors started raising slogans. However, the business was transacted for sometime and ultimately by a huge majority the four stay orders passed by the deputy Mayor, were set aside. Again there was disturbance and the councillors started raising slogans. As the proceedings of the Corporation could not be carried on, the Mayor declared the Meeting closed saying that there was no provision in the Act for bringing a censure motion of the kind and as there was no other subject for consideration. ( 6. ) THEREAFTER the Councillor, Rajabahadursingh on 15-3-1974 (Vide petitioners Annexure-E) requested the Mayor to re-convene the Meeting under section 36 of the Act, which had been adjourned due to disturbance on 12-3-1974. In reply the Mayor said that there is no provision in the Act for bringing such a censure motion. The Meeting had been declared closed and not adjourned and as such, there was no question of reconvening the same under section 36 of the Act. It is this order of the Mayor that is challenged by the petitioner in the present proceedings. It may be relevant to note the reliefs that the petitioner has claimed in the present writ petition. They are as follows : " (a) quash the order dated 15-3-1974 of the respondent No. 1 by a writ in the nature of Certiorari; (b) direct the respondents by a writ in the nature of Mandamus or some other writ or direction to convene the meeting for discussing the resolution already included in the agenda of the meeting dated 12-3-74. (c) quash the minutes and the decision of the meeting dated 12-3-1974 in so far as they relate to matters contained in Annexures B-1 to B-4, which were not included in the agenda of the meeting. (c) quash the minutes and the decision of the meeting dated 12-3-1974 in so far as they relate to matters contained in Annexures B-1 to B-4, which were not included in the agenda of the meeting. (d) and any other writ/writs, order/orders or direction/directions, which this Honourable Court might deem fit may also kindly be given. " ( 7. ) ON behalf of the first respondent a preliminary objection was raised to the effect that as the Jabalpur Municipal Corporation has not been impleaded as a party to these proceedings, relief No. (c) claimed in the writ petition, cannot be granted and the proceedings of the Corporation, dated 12-3-1974 cannot be quashed. In reply to this, the petitioner filed an application, dated 8-4-1974, for permission to implead the Municipal Corporation through the Mayor. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Corporation can be represented through the Mayor. In this connection we might observe that section 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, provides that the Corporation shall be named after the name of the City having the Corporation as "the Municipal Corporation. . . . . . . . . . . . "it shall by this name be a body corporate, and have perpetual succession and a common seal, and shall by that name sue and be sued". Section 8 provides that the Corporation may acquire and hold movable and immovable property. Section 9 provides for constitution of the Corporation, which will consist of elected and selected Councillors as also representatives of the Zila Panchayat and Janapada Panchayat. Section 8 provides that the Corporation may acquire and hold movable and immovable property. Section 9 provides for constitution of the Corporation, which will consist of elected and selected Councillors as also representatives of the Zila Panchayat and Janapada Panchayat. Section 400 of the Act is as follows :- "s. 400.-Legal Proceedings-Power of Commissioner to institute legal proceedings and obtain legal advice, (1) The Commissioner may on behalf of the Corporation- (a) Institute, defend or withdraw from legal proceedings under this Act, or under any rule or bye law made thereunder or any other enactment for the time being in force; (b) compound any offence under this Act or under any rule or bye-law made thereunder and charge such fees for compounding of offences as may be prescribed by bye-laws by the Corporation; (c) admit, compromise or withdraw any claim made under this Act or under any other enactment of the time being in force; and (d) obtain such legal advice and assistance as he may from time to time think it necessary or expedient to obtain, for any of the purposes referred to in the foregoing clauses of this section, or for securing the lawful exercise or discharge of any power or duty vesting in or imposed upon the Corporation, the Standing Committee or any Municipal officer or servant: provided that the Commissioner shall not admit, compromise or withdraw any claim in a suit in which the whole amount claimed exceeds five hundred rupees without the previous sanction of the Standing Committee, or where the total amount claimed exceeds two thousand rupees, without the previous sanction of the Corporation. (2) Money received by way of composition under this section shall be credited to the municipal fund. " Section 401 of the Act is as follows : "s. 401.-Notice, limitation and tender of amends in suit against Corporation, etc. (2) Money received by way of composition under this section shall be credited to the municipal fund. " Section 401 of the Act is as follows : "s. 401.-Notice, limitation and tender of amends in suit against Corporation, etc. (1)No suit shall be instituted against the Corporation, the Standing Committee, or any Corporation Officer or servant, or any person acting under the direction of the Corporation, the Standing Committee or any Municipal Officer or servant, in respect of any act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act or any rule or bye-law made thereunder until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing has been delivered or left at the Chief Corporation Office or at the residence of such officer, servant or person standing with adequate particulars- (a) the cause of action; (b) the name and residence of the intending plaintiff and of his advocate, pleader or agent, if any, for the purpose of the suit; and (c) the relief which he claims. (2) Every such suit shall be commenced within six months after the accrual of the cause of action, and the plaint therein shall contain a statement that a notice has been delivered or left as required by sub-section (1 ). (3) If the Corporation or any person to whom any notice is given under sub-section (1)has tendered sufficient amends to the plaintiff before the suit is instituted, the suit shall be dismissed. (4) If the defendant in any such suit is the Commissioner or any other Corporation officer or servant, payment of any sum or part thereof payable by him in or in consequence of the suit may, with the sanction of the Standing Committee, be made from the Municipal fund. " ( 8. ) THE clear implication of these sections is that the Municipal Corporation is a legal entity and is a distinct identity apart from the office-bearers of the Corporation and it is the Municipal Commissioner, who can represent the Municipal Corporation in the legal proceedings and any notice of legal proceeding has to be given to the Municipal Commissioner. Therefore we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Corporation be permitted to be impleaded through the Mayor. Therefore we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Corporation be permitted to be impleaded through the Mayor. In our opinion, the Mayor cannot represent the Corporation, but he can represent himself only. ( 9. ) DURING arguments it was suggested that the petitioner might implead the Municipal Corporation through the Municipal Commissioner, but as the petitioner refused to do it and insisted on pressing his application and continue proceedings as they are, we have no other option except to reject the said application of the petitioner. Thus, the position is that the Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur, is not a party to these proceedings and consequently, relief no. (c) mentioned in the writ petition about quashing the minutes of the meeting, dated 12-3-1974, cannot be granted in the absence of a necessary party. Thus, the petition is confined to reliefs (a) and (b) only, which can be granted against the Mayor and the Deputy Mayor, as the case may be. ( 10. ) WE may take note of some of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh municipal Corporation Act, 1956, relating to convening of the Meetings for different purposes. Section 27 of the Act provides that the Corporation shall meet at least once every month for the transaction of business. Section 28 provides for the first meeting to be convened after the general election. It is section 29 of the Act, which is relevant for our purposes. It is as follows : "s. 29. Convening of meetings.-A meeting of the Corporation shall be either ordinary or special. (2) The date of every meeting, except the meeting referred to in section 24 or section 28, shall be fixed by the Mayor, or in the event of his being incapable of acting, then by the deputy Mayor, and in the like event in this case then by the Commissioner. (2) The date of every meeting, except the meeting referred to in section 24 or section 28, shall be fixed by the Mayor, or in the event of his being incapable of acting, then by the deputy Mayor, and in the like event in this case then by the Commissioner. (3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 2 4, notice of every meeting specifying the time and place thereof and the business to be transacted thereat shall be despatched to every Councillor and exhibited at the Municipal Office seven clear days before an ordinary meeting and three clear days before a special meeting: provided that if the notice, other than a notice of meeting under sub-section (2) of section 24, has been exhibited at the Municipal Office, failure to serve it on a councillor shall not affect the validity of a meeting. (4) No business other than that specified in the notice relating thereto shall be transacted at meeting except with the consent of two-thirds of the members present. " Section 30 of the Act reads as follows :- "section 30. Power of Mayor and Deputy Mayor to call special meeting.-The Mayor, or in any such event as aforesaid, the Deputy Mayor may, whenever he thinks fit, call a special meeting, and shall be bound to do so within two weeks of the receipt of a written requisition signed by not less than one sixth of the total number of members of the corporation". ( 11. ) IT is to be noted that under section 29 (2) of the Act an ordinary meeting can be convened by the Mayor or in his absence by the Deputy mayor or in his absence by the Commissioner. But, as regards section 30 of the Act, it is the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor only, who has the power to convene a special Meeting. In the present case the Mayor was away from jabalpur between 2-3-1974 to 4-3-1974. Consequently, the Deputy Mayor was competent to convene a special Meeting and the notice issued by the Commissioner was in compliance with the order of the Deputy Mayor. As such, convening of the Meeting cannot be said to be illegal. It was warranted by the provisions of section 30 of the Act. Consequently, the Deputy Mayor was competent to convene a special Meeting and the notice issued by the Commissioner was in compliance with the order of the Deputy Mayor. As such, convening of the Meeting cannot be said to be illegal. It was warranted by the provisions of section 30 of the Act. However, a special Meeting requires a notice of seven days and it is certainly open to the Corporation to consider the subjects mentioned in the agenda. Such a requisitioned Meeting can be called by a requisition signed by not less than 1/6th of the total number of the councillors. At present the Corporation has 57 members. Consequently 10 members could sign a requisition and could call For a special Meeting to be convened. However, the further question is as to what matters could be considered in that special Meeting. In this connection it is pertinent to note that there is a special provision in the Act for removal of a Mayor and Deputy mayor. In this behalf section 24 of the Act provides as follows: - "section 24. Removal of Mayor and the Deputy Mayor.-A motion of no-confidence may be moved against the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor by any councillor at a meeting specially convened for the purpose under sub-section (2) and if the motion is carried by a majority of two-thirds of the councillors present and voting and if such majority is more than half of the total number of councillors constituting the Corporation for the time being, the office of the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have become vacant forthwith. (2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), a meeting of the Corporation shall be held in the following manner, namely: (i) the meeting shall be convened by the Commissioner on a requisitions signed by not less than one-sixth of the total number of councillors constituting the Corporation for the time being: (ii) the notice of such a meeting specifying the time and place shall be despatched by the Commissioner to every councillor ten clear days before the meeting; (iii) the Mayor or Deputy Mayor, as the case may be, against whom the motion of no-confidence is to be moved, shall not preside over the meeting. " ( 12. " ( 12. ) THEREFORE, for the purpose of removal of the Mayor or Deputy mayor, a Meeting has to be called in the manner prescribed by sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act. It is pertinent to note that neither the Mayor nor the Deputy Mayor has the power to convene such a Meeting. But it is the commissioner alone who has the power to convene such a Meeting. The meeting of 12-3-1974 was undoubtedly convened by the Commissioner in compliance with the order passed by the Deputy Mayor in the absence of the mayor. Thus, by no stretch of imagination could the Meeting dated 12-3-1974 be construed to be a Meeting for removal of the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor, as contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act. Section 24 is the only provision in the Act wherein any motion of no-confidence against the mayor and the Deputy Mayor can be moved, which would result in the removal of the said office bearers. There is no provision in the Act for merely censuring the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor and the attempt of the ten requisitionings to censure the Mayor and the Chairman of the Standing Committee in a special Meeting convened under section 30 of the Act, would not be warranted by any provision of the Act. Of course, in a special Meeting the subjects mentioned in the agenda can certainly be considered. One of the grievances of the petitioner is that the subjects not mentioned in the agenda were considered in the Meeting of 12-3-74, while the only subjects mentioned in the agenda, namely, censuring the Mayor and the Chairman of the Standing committee were not at all considered and the Mayor refused to put the said censure motion before the house. ( 13. ) IN this connection we might observe that the resolution was a combined censure motion against the Mayor and the Chairman of the Standing committee. ( 13. ) IN this connection we might observe that the resolution was a combined censure motion against the Mayor and the Chairman of the Standing committee. So far as removal of the Chairman of the Standing Committee is concerned, there is a special provision in the Act and section 39-A of the Act, which makes a provision in this behalf, is as follows: "section 39-A. Removal of Chairman.- (1) A motion of no-confidence may be moved against a Chairman of a Standing Committee by any member thereof at a meeting of the standing Committee specially convened for the purpose under sub-section (2) and if the motion is carried by a majority of two-thirds of the councillors constituting the Standing committee for the time being, the office of the Chairman shall be deemed to have been vacant forthwith. (2) For purposes of sub-section (1) a meeting of the Standing Committee shall be in the following manner, namely: (i) the meeting shall be convened by the Commissioner on a requisition signed by not less than one-third of the total number of members constituting the Standing Committee for the time being; (ii) the notice of meeting specifying the time and place shall be despatched by the commissioner to every member thereof ten clear days before the meeting; (iii) a copy of the notice shall be sent to the Mayor; (iv) the meeting shall not be presided over by the Chairman. " Evidently, this was not a Meeting convened in accordance with sub-section (2) of section 39-A of the Act. Moreover, such a motion of no-confidence has to be moved in the Standing Committee. We are not required to pronounce whether such a resolution can be brought before the general Meeting of the corporation, but it has necessarily to be first considered by the Standing Committee itself. Under the circumstances the Meeting of 12-3-74 could not have considered the question of censure against the Chairman of the Standing Committee and, therefore, that part of the resolution was not in order. ( 14. ) THEREFORE, the only question is whether the Meeting convened on 12-3-1974 was bound to consider a censure motion against the Mayor. Under the circumstances the Meeting of 12-3-74 could not have considered the question of censure against the Chairman of the Standing Committee and, therefore, that part of the resolution was not in order. ( 14. ) THEREFORE, the only question is whether the Meeting convened on 12-3-1974 was bound to consider a censure motion against the Mayor. In this connection we might observe that there is no provision for considering a mere censure motion against an office-bearer such as the Mayor or the Deputy mayor or the Chairman of the Standing Committee except when the censure motion or the no-confidence motion is aimed at removing the office bearers. A mere censure as per the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, is absolutely meaningless and such a resolution cannot at all be considered by the Corporation except in accordance with the provisions of section 24 or section 39-A of the Act. We think that the action of the deputy Mayor in convening a Meeting for consideration of such an untenable resolution, which is not warranted by the provisions of law, was not proper. Of course, it was open to the Deputy Mayor to have convened a special Meeting for transacting the business of the Corporation or for considering any subjects, which might be warranted by the provisions of the Act. In this view, we are clearly of the opinion that the Mayor was perfectly justified in refusing to consider such a motion in the Meeting of 12-3-1974. It is another matter that the orders of the Deputy Mayor (Petitioners Annexures-B/1 to B/4) were considered in the Meeting and were set aside inspite of the fact that the subject matter was not mentioned in the agenda. It is beyond the scope of inquiry in the present writ proceedings to inquire into the fact whether two thirds of the members present had consented or not. It would only be of an academic nature as we are unable to set aside the proceedings of the Meeting, dated 12-3-1974 in the absence of the Municipal Corporation being impleaded as a respondent through the Commissioner. ( 15. ) IN this connection a reference to the bye-laws is necessary. Bye-law no. It would only be of an academic nature as we are unable to set aside the proceedings of the Meeting, dated 12-3-1974 in the absence of the Municipal Corporation being impleaded as a respondent through the Commissioner. ( 15. ) IN this connection a reference to the bye-laws is necessary. Bye-law no. 37 of the Jabalpur Corporation Conduct of Business Bye laws, 1963, framed in exercise of powers conferred by section 430 read with section 46 (I) and section 427 of the Act, is as follows :- "procedure at Special Meeting.-37. At a meeting called on a requisition of urgency and during the discussion at any meeting of a budget estimate, no business shall be transacted and no substantive proposition shall be transacted and no substantive proposition shall be made or discussed which does not directly relate to the business for which the urgent meeting was called, or to the budget estimates, as the case may be; and no proposition involving any change in the taxes which the Standing Committee proposes to impose or an increase or decrease of any item of expenditure in a budget estimate, shall be made or discussed at any meeting at which such budget estimate is under consideration, unless such proposition is specified in the notice of agenda of the meeting. " ( 16. ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner urged that as this was a special meeting convened under section 30 of the Act, the bye-law read with section 29 (4) of the Act would preclude consideration of any other subject except the one mentioned in the agenda. So far as this contention is concerned, it may be correct. But, as indicated earlier, we are unable to quash the proceedings of the Meeting dated 12-3-1974 for the reason that the necessary party, namely, the Municipal Corporation has not been impleaded through the Commissioner. We have already rejected the petitioners application for impleading the Corporation through the Mayor. ( 17. ) CONSIDERING the legality of the requisition, dated 2-3-1974 (Petitioners Annexure- A), it was clearly not a requisition for moving a no-confidence motion against the Mayor or against the Chairman of the Standing committee so as to remove them from office. Such a Meeting requires ten days notice. In the present case the notice was only of seven days because notices were sent on 4-3-74 and the Meeting was convened on 12-3-1974. Such a Meeting requires ten days notice. In the present case the notice was only of seven days because notices were sent on 4-3-74 and the Meeting was convened on 12-3-1974. There being only seven days, the Meeting could only be a special Meeting as contemplated by section 30 of the Act. As regards the subject-matter, there is no provision in the Act for a mere censure without removal of the Mayor or the deputy Mayor or the Chairman of the Standing Committee. Under the circumstances the subject matter mentioned in the requisition and the notice could not at all come up for consideration before the Meeting of 12-3-1974. As such, the action of the Mayor in refusing to put the said resolution for consideration before the Meeting of the Corporation was perfectly justified in law and we do not find any illegality in that behalf. ( 18. ) AS regards the demand of the Councillor, Rajabahadursingh dated 15-3-1974 (Petitioners Annexure-E) for re-convening the adjourned Meeting of 12-3-1974 under section 36 of the Act is concerned, we are unable to hold that such a Meeting could be re-convened under section 36 of the Act. Section 36 of the Act is as follows: "section 36. Preservation of order - (1) The presiding authority shall preserve order and may direct any councillor whose conduct in his opinion is disorderly to withdraw immediately from the meeting of the Corporation and any councillor so ordered to withdraw shall do so forthwith and shall absent himself during the remainder of the days meeting; and if he is ordered a second time within 15 days to withdraw, the Presiding authority may suspend him for any period not exceeding 14 days and he shall absent himself from meeting accordingly: provided that the Presiding authority may remit the suspension on receiving apology to his satisfaction from the councillor under suspension: provided also that the suspension shall not prevent any councillor from serving on any committee. (2) The Presiding authority may, in case of grave disorder arising in the meeting, suspend the meeting for a period not exceeding three days. (3) If any person who has been ordered to withdraw, unlawfully remains in the meeting the Presiding authority may take such step as he may deem fit to cause him to be removed. " ( 19. (2) The Presiding authority may, in case of grave disorder arising in the meeting, suspend the meeting for a period not exceeding three days. (3) If any person who has been ordered to withdraw, unlawfully remains in the meeting the Presiding authority may take such step as he may deem fit to cause him to be removed. " ( 19. ) THE suggestion of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that as the Meeting of 12-3-1974 had ended in grave disorder, the Mayor was bound to convene the Meeting under sub-section (2) of section 36 of the Act. It is true that the Meeting did really end in grave disorder and as such, it could have been suspended for a period not exceeding 3 days and after that the Meeting could have been reconvened. But, as we have found that the requisition dated 2-3-74 (Petitioners Annexure-A) was itself not in order, there would be no purpose in convening such a Meeting under sub-section (2) of section 36 of the Act. Any reconvened Meeting could not have discussed the resolution of mere censure of the Mayor and Chairman of the Standing Committee without any attempt to remove them from the office. Therefore, we are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Mayor was bound to reconvene the Meeting after three days. ( 20. ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner urged that such a censure motion could be considered at the Meeting of 12-3-1974, although it may not strictly be covered by the provisions of the Act. In this connection attention was invited to the observations of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Bombay Municipal Corporation v. Ramchandra Laxman Belosay ( AIR 1960 Bom. 58 .), wherein a resolution eulogising Imre Nagy, Leader of Hungary, and his three associates as freedom fighters for their motherland was sought to be moved. It was held by the Division Bench that the resolution was perfectly in order as it would educate the public and instruct them to cherish the ideals of freedom, to love their country and to be ever ready to sacrifice even their lives for the freedom of the country and, therefore, was within the puiview of section 63 (k) of the bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. It was also laid down by the Division Bench that the Corporation would be the best judge to decide as to what would fall within the ambit of section 63 (k) of the Act and the Court will not interfere with such decisions when two views may be possible. We may observe that the case would stand on altogether a different footing. It may be that resolutions of public and general interest might be considered by the corporation at its Meeting. But, where there is a specific provision relating to the business of the Corporation or the office-bearers of the Corporation, there would be no question of educating the public or any question of general or public importance. We may observe that merely censuring the officebearers not being contemplated by the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, without removal of the office-bearers from office, especially when a specific provision has been made in the Act for such removal, will, in our opinion, not be permissible. ( 21. ) ATTENTION was further invited to the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The City of Nagpur Corporation v. John Selvage Philip (1963 MPLJ 393 = AIR 1963 SC 897 .), wherein their Lordships laid down that the consideration of a resolution whether to send some members as delegates at its expense to attend a Health conference abroad would not be beyond the powers of the Nagpur Corporation and would not be ultra vires on that ground. Such a resolution would be within the ambit of section 58 (s) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1950. We may observe that the matter was directly covered by section 58 (s) of the act and the Corporation was certainly concerned with the question whether it should send the delegates to attend the Health Conference abroad at its own expense. We have no doubt that matters of general and public importance can certainly be considered by a Municipal Corporation, but the distinction would be this that such matters might be considered by the Corporation under its general powers. But, where the matter is specifically covered by a specific provision of the Corporation Act, the same thing cannot be done except in the manner laid down by such specific provisions. In this view of the matter the said Supreme Court case also would be distinguishable. But, where the matter is specifically covered by a specific provision of the Corporation Act, the same thing cannot be done except in the manner laid down by such specific provisions. In this view of the matter the said Supreme Court case also would be distinguishable. Under the garb of mere censure without removal of an office-bearer, a resolution cannot be permitted as there is a specific provision regarding removal of an office-bearer. In this connection we might advert to the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Balram Nathuram Modi v. Corporation of City of Jabalpur (1964 MPLJ 273. ). In that case a resolution of no-confidence against the members of the Standing committee was sought to be moved. The Division Bench observed that there was no provision in the Act for the initiation or passing of a motion of no-confidence against the members of the Standing Committee. Section 70 of the Act, however, gives to the Corporation the power to call from the Standing committee any return, statement, account or report concerning or connected with any matter which the Committee is empowered to do. Therefore, the corporation was entitled to discuss any subject relating to the duties, which it was required to discharge in connection with the Municipal Administration. But the Corporation had no power to consider a no-confidence motion against the Standing Committee expressly or impliedly authorised by the provisions of the Act. The Division Bench for that proposition relied on the observations of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Bombay Municipal Corporation v. Ramchandra Laxman Belosay (supra ). Therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that the resolution as contained in the requisition, vide Petitioners Annexure -A, could not at all have been considered by the Corporation, as it was meaningless resolution, which was not warranted by the provisions of the Act. ( 22. ) HOWEVER, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that moving such a censure motion would be a privilege of the opposition. In this connection attention was invited to the view as expressed by the learned Author Ermine May in his commentary on Parliamentary Practice (Eighteenth Edition) at page 277 and page 361, as follows : at page 277. ) HOWEVER, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that moving such a censure motion would be a privilege of the opposition. In this connection attention was invited to the view as expressed by the learned Author Ermine May in his commentary on Parliamentary Practice (Eighteenth Edition) at page 277 and page 361, as follows : at page 277. "opposition Motions (excluding supply ).-From time to time the Opposition put down a motion on the paper expressing lack of confidence in the Government-a "vote of censure" as it is called. By established convention the Government never fail to accede to the demand from the Leader of the Opposition to allot a day for the discussion of such a motion. In allotting a day for this purpose the Government are entitled to have regard to the exigencies of their own business, but a reasonably early day is invariably found. This convention is due to the recognized and responsible position of the Opposition as a potential Government-a position which guarantees the legitimacy of such an interruption of the normal course of business. For their part, the Government have everything to gain by meeting such a direct challenge to their authority at the earliest possible moment. " at page 361. "matters to be dealt with by a substantive motion.-Certain matters cannot be debated, save upon a substantive motion which admits of a distinct vote of the House. Among these (see p. 417) are the conduct of the sovereign, the heir to the throne or other members of the Royal Family, the Governors-General of the independent Territories, the Lord Chancellor, the Speaker, the Chairman of Ways and Means, members of either House of Parliament and Judges of the Superior Courts of the United kingdom, including persons holding the position of a Judge, such as a Judge in a Court of bankruptcy and of a county Court, or a recorder. These matters cannot, therefore, be questioned by way of amendment, or upon any motion for adjournment. For the same reason, no charge of a personal character can be raised, save upon a direct and substantive motion to that effect. No statement of that kind can, therefore, be embodied in a notice proposing to call the attention of the House to a stated matter. For the same reason, no charge of a personal character can be raised, save upon a direct and substantive motion to that effect. No statement of that kind can, therefore, be embodied in a notice proposing to call the attention of the House to a stated matter. " So far as the Parliamentary practice is concerned, it may be all right, but where the matter is governed by the specific provisions of an enactment, it is not possible to do the same thing indirectly where it is prohibited directly. That thing has to be done in the manner laid down by the specific provisions of the enactment and in no other way. Under such circumstances it is not possible to follow the Parliamentary practice and procedure. If there be no specific provision in an enactment, in that event only, the Parliamentary practice and procedure might be relevant. ( 23. ) IN this connection the learned counsel for the first respondent invited attention to the view as expressed by a learned single Judge of the Calcutta high Court in Narendra Nath v. Corporation of Calcutta (AIR 1960 Cal. 102.), wherein a resolution condemning Kerala Government and a counter resolution praising Kerala government were sought to be moved before the Corporation. D. N. Sinha J. , interpreting section 124 and section 526 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, held that the matter was not covered by the specific provisions of the Corporation. The powers of a Corporation to discuss the matters being regulated by statutes, the Corporation would have no authority to consider matters not relating to the specific provisions of the Act and they would not fall within the phrase educating or instructing the public in general. The learned Judge distinguished the Division Bench case of the Bombay High Court, namely, bombay Municipal Corporation v. Ramchandra Laxman Belosay. ( 24. ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that the Mayor could not have adjourned the Meeting at his sweet will. In this connection attention was invited to the observations of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High court in Deodutt Sharma v. Zahoor Ahmed Zaid ( AIR 1960 Raj. 25 .) and to the observations of a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court i n B. Gnanaraj v. A. M. Vedanayagam (AIR 1966 Mad 7372. ). In this connection attention was invited to the observations of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High court in Deodutt Sharma v. Zahoor Ahmed Zaid ( AIR 1960 Raj. 25 .) and to the observations of a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court i n B. Gnanaraj v. A. M. Vedanayagam (AIR 1966 Mad 7372. ). We have no doubt that a Mayor or a Deputy Mayor or a Chairman acting in their absence would have no power to adjourn a Meeting merely at his sweet will. However, in the present case the Meeting was adjourned by the Mayor on account of grave disorder as contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 36 of the Act. If, we had found that the Meeting of 12-3-1974 had been convened for considering a proper and legal subject, we might have been inclined to order a reconvening of the Meeting as required by sub-section (2) of section 36 of the Act. But, as we have found that the requisition itself and the resolution of mere censure were not in order, there would be no point in ordering a reconvening of the Meeting under section 36 (2) of the Act. In this connection we might further observe that what the requisitionings could not do directly, they cannot be permitted to have it done indirectly. They merely wanted to censure the Mayor and the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Corporation without any attempt to remove them from office. Such a resolution would, in our opinion, be barred on account of specific provisions of the Act and such a resolution would be absolutely meaningless. In this connection we might advert to the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa ( AIR 1953 SC 375 .), wherein their Lordships laid down that "if the Constitution of a State distributes the legislative powers amongst different bodies, which have to act within their respective spheres marked out by specific legislative entries, or if there are limitations on the legislative authority in the shape of fundamental rights, questions do arise as to whether the legislature in a particular case has or has not, in respect to the subject-matter of the statute or in the method of enacting it, transgressed the limits of its constitutional powers. Such transgression may be patent, manifest or direct, but it may also be disguised, covert and indirect and it is to this latter class of cases that the expression colourable legislation has been applied in certain judicial pronouncements. Thus, their Lordships laid down that if Constitution or the other laws prevented the doing of an act directly such a thing could not be done indirectly under the disguise of colourable legislation. However, on facts their Lordships were satisfied that the provisions of section 37 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952, was covered by the clear language of Entry 42, List III of Schedule VII of the Constitution and as such, it could not be branded as a colourable legislation. ( 25. ) THUS, there can be no doubt that there can be no colourable exercise of powers to do a thing which is not permitted by the specific provisions of an enactment and in respect of which the manner has been laid down by the Act. Therefore, we are of opinion that the so-called censure motion could not have been moved by its sponsors without removal of the office-bearers. ( 26. ) AS regards the action of the Deputy Mayor (respondent 2) is concerned, the learned counsel for the first respondent invited attention to the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Chokhe Singh v. Mayor, Municipal Corporation, Gwalior and others (1961 MPLJ 1410.) wherein it was laid down that section 25 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, (now known as Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956) would not authorise the Mayor to take a decision about a work or any act and order execution or stoppage of it. The Division Bench laid down that there must first be a decision of the competent authority as regards the work or the act to be done and the Mayor is only the executive authority. In this view of the matter the learned counsel for the first respondent challenged the action of the Deputy Mayor (respondent 2) in passing the stay orders, vide Petitioners Annexures-B/1 to B/4. We may observe that we are not called upon to pronounce on that aspect in the absence of the necessary party, namely, the Jabalpur Municipal. Corporation to be represented through the Municipal Commissioner. Under the circumstances, the question would only be of an academic interest. ( 27. We may observe that we are not called upon to pronounce on that aspect in the absence of the necessary party, namely, the Jabalpur Municipal. Corporation to be represented through the Municipal Commissioner. Under the circumstances, the question would only be of an academic interest. ( 27. ) AS a result of the discussion aforesaid, we are clearly of the opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to any reliefs, namely, the relief (A) or relief (B) mentioned in the writ petition for the reasons mentioned by us above on the various legal aspects. Consequently, this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, under the circumstances, we direct that there shall be no order as to costs, which shall be borne as incurred, as some doubtful questions of law were involved in the present writ petition and, therefore, it became necessary for this Court to clarify them in details. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.