Judgment 1. This application in revision by the four accused persons is directed against the Subdivisional Magistrates order dated 14-3-1971 whereby he has taken cognizance of the offences under Sections 448, 426, 147 and 148, Indian Penal Code against them and transferred the case to another Magistrate for disposal where it is said to be still pending. 2. On 11-11-1970 the complainant Kumari Devi (opposite party here) filed a petition of complaint in the Court of the Subdivisional Magistrate. In that, she alleged that on 8-11-1970 at about 4 P.M. these accused persons along with several others came to her house armed with deadly weapons like bhala, garasa, lathi etc. and abused her and her husband and further demolished her house completely. When she objected they all ran to, assault her and she fled away to save her. She further alleged that after they had gone away from the place she reported the occurrence to the police station concerned but she was not heard. On the next day, she also went and reported the matter to the Superintendent of Police, but he also did not take any action. Thereafter, this complaint. In the complaint petition she cited the names of six persons who, according to her, had witnessed the occurrence and would be able to prove it in courts. 3. On receiving the above complaint, learned Subdivisional Magistrate examined the complainant on solemn affirmation on that very day and referred the matter to Mr. S.N. Ahmad, Magistrate, First Class, for enquiry and report. In course of the enquiry Mr. Ahmad examined four witnesses and. sent his report dated 3-2-1971 holding that on those evidence he was satisfied that a prima facie case under Sections 448, 426, 147 and 148, Indian Penal Code-has been made out against the accused persons and they should be put to trial. After perusing this enquiry report, learned Subdivisional Magistrate felt satisfied that a prima facie case was made out against the accused persons. Accordingly, he took cognizance of the offences under these sections against these petitioners. 4. Mr. Devi Prasad Sharma, who has filed power in this revision on behalf of the opposite party, has expressed his inability to advance any argument for want of instructions. Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Madhup, has alone addressed the Court. Accordingly, he took cognizance of the offences under these sections against these petitioners. 4. Mr. Devi Prasad Sharma, who has filed power in this revision on behalf of the opposite party, has expressed his inability to advance any argument for want of instructions. Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Madhup, has alone addressed the Court. In his submission the cognizance based on the enquiry report must be set aside inasmuch as the enquiry, due to Magistrates allowing the witnesses examined before him to be cross-examined, was vitiated, and, as such, it was not open to the Subdivisional Magistrate to act on that illegal report, and since he has done so. the cognizance deserves to be quashed. In this connection he has further urged that it was imperative on the enquiring Magistrate to have informed the accused persons of this enquiry so that they could be present and watch. Not only he had not done so, but he had allowed cross-examination of these witnesses to be held by a person who had nothing to do with the case and had probably impersonated these accused before him. 5. I am unable to agree with the above contentions of the learned counsel. He has not been able to lay his hand on any provision of law under which the enquiring Magistrate was obliged to send notice to the accused persons regarding the enquiry so that they could be present when it was being held. It was up to them to be present during the enquiry if they so liked. When they did not do so it was no fault of the Magistrate. As to their claim that the person cross-examined the witnesses examined in that enquiry was someone else than these accused, it is difficult to record any definite finding on this point. So also, it is not necessary to decide it this way or the other because the counsel concedes that even if they were present there at that time; they did not possess any statutory power to cross-examine the witnesses. In such a circumstance, their cross-examination, if it was really by some-one else other than these accused, was neither here nor there so far as the determination of the present question is concerned. 6. In such a circumstance, their cross-examination, if it was really by some-one else other than these accused, was neither here nor there so far as the determination of the present question is concerned. 6. His contention that the fact that the Magistrate allowed them to be cross-examined during the enquiry and that vitiated that enquiry and consequently his enquiry report, is to my mind untenable. As it appears, their cross-examination, which the Magistrate can be deemed to have allowed in some misapprehension of law, was more or less formal. The answer solicited in those cross-examination did not also seem to affect materally the evidence as given by them in their examination-in-chief, in any way. In fact, there was nothing in the cross-examination which detracted from the evidence as given by them in chief. As the enquiry report stands, the Magistrate does not appear to have been influenced by those cross-examinations. He has not even referred to the cross-examination of the first two witnesses. Regarding the third, he has referred to his answer in the cross-examination which meant to explain his presence at the site of the occurrence at the relevant time. If the enquiry report would have been against the complainant taking advantage of the answers so made in the cross-examination, there would have been some sense in complainants making a grievance thereof on the ground that that was not the stage where the Magistrate should have allowed them to be cross-examined. Here, however, the opposite is the case. The Magistrate has examined their evidence as a whole and then come to the finding that they made out a prima facie case against the accused persons. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, on his part, also seems to have examined this report and came to his own finding that a prima facie case under these sections had been made out against the accused on that basis. In the circumstances. I am unable to read any illegality or impropriety in the impugned cognizance order and the case, as it stands, would not seem to call for any revisional interference therewith. 7. In the circumstances. I am unable to read any illegality or impropriety in the impugned cognizance order and the case, as it stands, would not seem to call for any revisional interference therewith. 7. The Supreme Court decision in Chandra Deo Singh V/s. Prokash Chandra Bose alias Chabi Bose, AIR 1963 SC 1430 : ((1963) 2 Cri LJ 397), relied upon by the petitioners, for getting this cognizance quashed, with great respect, would not seem to help them because the facts leading to that Judgement can well be distinguished from the instant facts. I would not, therefore, consider it necessary to discuss this decision in any detail. Suffice it to say that on its basis the petitioners would not be justified in getting the impugned order set aside in this revision. 8. For the above reasons, I find no merit in this revision which must, therefore, fail. It is, accordingly, dismissed.