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1974 DIGILAW 451 (ALL)

State of U. P. v. Rais Ahmad

1974-11-05

K.B.SRIVASTAVA, ONKAR SINGH

body1974
JUDGMENT K.B. Srivastava, J. - This revision raises an interesting question of law as to the interpretation of Subsection (4) of Section 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, though, in view of the repeal of that Code by Section 484 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the decision will have a purely academic importance only. 2. The facts giving rise to the revision, may now be stated, in brief. One Rais Ahmad, an accused in a case under Section 25, Arms Act, was refused bail by the SubDivisional Magistrate. Sitapur and, therefore, he made a similar application before the Sessions Judge onJuly 8, 3972 and the same was ordered to come up for hearing on July 14. The Sessions Judge, who was handing over charge on that date, in view of his transfer to another Sessions Division, passed an order 'which in so far as it is relevant, reads thus: ''As I am handing over charge today in the forenoon, under Section 17 (4)........, I authorise Shri I. P. Mittal, Civil and Sessions Judge,...... to remain incharge of all urgent....... Criminal ........ work including disposal of bail applications of the Court of District Judge, ....... till my successor takes over." 3. It is in the aforesaid circumstances that the bail application of Rais Ahmad was received by the Civil and Sessions Judge on July 14 and was ordered to be taken up on July 15. On the latter date, the Public Prosecutor challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil and Sessions Judge to hear the bail application on the ground that an order under Section 17(4) will be competent only if the Sessions Judge continues to be in office and such an order would be beyond the ambit of that section, if it is passed in view of the transfer of the Sessions Judge. The hearing of the bail application was postponed on July 15, and after hearing the learned counsel on both sides on a subsequent date, the learned Civil and Sessions Judge passed the impugned order on July 18 directing that that particular bail application, and all other similar application be placed before the new Sessions Judge when one was appointed and took over charge of his office. 4. 4. We may give a general outline of the scheme of the Code with regard to the constitution of a Court of Session and its jurisdiction and powers, before interpreting the scope and amplitude of Section 17(4). 5. There are to be five classes of Criminal Courts under Section 6, and Courts of Session constitute one such class. Section 7 deals with the formation of Sessions Divisions. Under Section 9 (1), the State Government has to establish a Court of Session for Every Sessions Division, and to appoint a Judge of such Court. Under Section 9 (3), the State Government may also appoint Additional Sessions Judge, and Assistant Sessions Judges to exercise jurisdiction in one or more such Courts. Under Section 9(4), a Sessions Judge of one Sessions Division may be appointed by the State Government to be also an Additional Sessions Judge of another division and in such a case he may sit for the disposal of cases at such place or places in either division as the State Government may direct. It will thus flow from a consideration of Sections. 6, 7 and 9 that there can be only Court of Session for every Sessions Division and only one Sessions Judge of such a Court, though Additional Sessions Judge and or Assistant Sessions Judges may also be appointed for exercising jurisdiction in the same Court of Session. 6. We may now deal with the question of exercise of jurisdiction in such a Court of Session, and for this purpose, we may divide Criminal matters into district classes, namely, (1) trials, in the exercise of the original jurisdiction. (2) appeals, in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction, (3) reference and revisions, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and (4) other criminal matters, in the exercise of general criminal powers. 7. By Section 193(1), no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless an accused has been committed to it by a Magistrate. Under Section 193 (2), Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges shall try such cases only as the State Government by general or special power may direct them to try or as the Sessions Judge of the Division, by general or special order, may make over to them for trial. Under Section 193 (2), Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges shall try such cases only as the State Government by general or special power may direct them to try or as the Sessions Judge of the Division, by general or special order, may make over to them for trial. Thus, in the matter of trials, even the jurisdiction of a Sessions Judge, is somewhat limited and is dependent upon the commitment of an accused for trial, unless there are express provisions to the contrary. A further limitation on the jurisdiction of an Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge has been placed by law in as much as they can try 'such cases only' as the Government directs them to try or the Sessions Judge makes over to them for trial, either by general or special order. An Additional or an Assistant Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to try merely on the basis of a commitment: their jurisdiction is derivative: and it follows that while a Sessions Judge alone can deal with an order of Commitment, the trial can take place either before him, or if he transfers it, a case may be tried either by an Additional Sessions Judge or by an Assistant Sessions Judge; but the transfer order can only be passed by the Sessions Judge himself, and no Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge can allocate that power to himself and transfer a case from the file of a Sessions Judge to his own. Section 408 regulates the right of appeal. Any person convicted by a Magistrate under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, has a right of appeal to the High Court only. However, any person convicted on a trial held by an Assistant Sessions Judge, a District Magistrate or any other Magistrate, or any person sentenced under Section 349 or in respect of whom, an order has been made or a sentence has been passed under Section 380 by any Magistrate, may appeal to the Court of Session: provided that when an Assistant' Sessions Judge or a Magistrate empowered under Section 30 passes any sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding four years, the appeal shall lie to the High Court. This section thus makes provision to regulate the right of appeal, and says that it will either lie to the High Court or to a Court of Session. This section thus makes provision to regulate the right of appeal, and says that it will either lie to the High Court or to a Court of Session. No appeal can lie before an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge, even though they preside in the same Court of Session; indeed, no Assistant Sessions Judge can entertain an appeal by a person convicted by himself. Section 409 deals with the jurisdiction and power to hear appeals, in contradistinction with the jurisdiction and power to entertain appeals which, as stated above, is governed by Section 408. Under Section 409, an appeal to the Court of Session or Sessions Judge shall be heard by the Sessions Judge or by an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge. An Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge shall hear only such appeals as the State Government may, by general order or special order, direct or as the Sessions Judge of the Division may make over to him: provided that no such appeal shall be heard by an Assistant Sessions Judge unless the appeal is of a person convicted on a trial held by any Magistrate of Second or Third Class. The necessary conclusion is inescapable, namely, a Sessions Judge can hear any appeal filed in his Court, while an Additional or an Assistant Sessions Judge can hear such appeals only as are directed by the State Government to be heard by them or as are made over to them for disposal by the Sessions Judge. The power of an Assistant Sessions Judge in the matter of hearing an appeal is further restricted to those appeals only which arise against the judgments of a Magistrate of Second or Third Class, with the further inhibition that such appeals are transferred to their files by the Sessions Judge or directed to be heard by the State Government. No Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge can entertain any appeal, and much less hear it by transferring it themselves. Their jurisdiction is again derivative. No Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge can entertain any appeal, and much less hear it by transferring it themselves. Their jurisdiction is again derivative. With regard to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Sections 435, 436, 437 and 438, an Assistant Sessions Judge has absolutely no power, though under Section 438(2), an Additional Sessions Judge shall have and may exercise all the powers of a Sessions Judge in respect of any case which may be transferred to him by or under any general or special order of the Sessions Judge. Here again, the revisional jurisdiction of an Additional Sessions Judge is dependent upon the transfer of a revision before him by the Sessions Judge. Again, whether in the matter of trial, or in the matter of an appeal, or revision, the Sessions Judge has the power to pass two types or orders, that is to say, either a general order or a special order, that is to say, he may either pass an order with regard to a particular case or may regulate transfers of particular class or classes of cases, depending upon territorial jurisdiction, or nature of the case, or the competency in regard to extent of sentences. Furthermore, the State Government can issue directions only in respect of trials and appeals and not in respect of revisions. 8. Having dealt with trials, appeals and revisions, we shall now deal with other criminal matters. Section 123 deals with security matters in certain circumstances. Such security matters have to be placed before the Sessions Judge, in given circumstances, under Section 123(2) and Section 123 (3A). Section 123 (3B) confers the power of transfer upon a Sessions Judge and says that he may transfer any proceeding lying before him to an Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge and upon such transfer, such Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge may exercise the powers of a Sessions Judge in respect of such proceedings. Here, again such a matter has .to originate before a Sessions Judge and any other Judge can deal with it only on the authorization of the Sessions Judge. Section 408 has reference to the power to direct admission to bail or reduction of bail. Here, again such a matter has .to originate before a Sessions Judge and any other Judge can deal with it only on the authorization of the Sessions Judge. Section 408 has reference to the power to direct admission to bail or reduction of bail. It says that a Court of Session may, in any case, whether there be an appeal on conviction or not, direct that any person be admitted to bail, or that the bail required by a Police Officer or Magistrate be reduced. There is no provision for the transfer of any other Judge for disposal. We have seen above that whenever the Legislature intended that an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge may exercise the powers of a Sessions Judge, it made a special provision to enable them to do so, as will be clear from Sections 123, 193, 409 and 438; but no such power in the matter of hearing of application for bail has been made in Chapter XXXIX, which deals with bail. It follows that a Sessions Judge cannot, by a general or special order, transfer or make over an application for bail for disposal to an Additional or an Assistant Sessions Judge, except in a case which falls within the four corners of Section 17(4). This observation of ours, however, does not mean that an Additional or an Assistant Sessions Judge has no power whatsoever in a matter of bail; indeed, they have, if they have seizing over the case itself in which such an application is moved. The same appears to be true with respect to an application for cancellation of bail. Under Subsection (5) of Section 497 where a person has been ordered to be released on bail by a Court other than a Court of Session, the Court of Session and. in the case of a person released by itself, any other Court may cause such persons to be arrested and committed to custody. Likewise, under subsection (2) of Section 498, the Court of Session may cause any person who has been admitted to bail by it to be arrested and committed to custody. in the case of a person released by itself, any other Court may cause such persons to be arrested and committed to custody. Likewise, under subsection (2) of Section 498, the Court of Session may cause any person who has been admitted to bail by it to be arrested and committed to custody. Thus, if the Sessions Judge has granted bail, it is he who can cancel it; if the Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge has granted bail in a case pending before him, it is he who is competent to cancel it, but an Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge cannot cancel bail, if before the transfer of the case to him, bail had already been granted by the Sessions Judge or by a Magistrate. There is no provision for the transfer of applications for bail or for applications for cancellation of bail, whether by a general or by a special order. 9. We shall now deal with the power of a Sessions Judge to transfer an application for bail for disposal by some other Judge or Court. Section 17(4) reads thus: "The Sessions Judge may also, when he himself is unavoidably absent or incapable of acting, make provision for the disposal of any urgent application by an Additional or an Assistant Sessions Judge or, if there be no Additional or Assistant Judge, by the District Magistrate, and such Judge or Magistrate shall have jurisdiction to deal with any such application." 10. This subsection confers, what we may call, a special power, to be exercised in an emergency. It can be exercised only 'for the disposal of any urgent application'. This to our mind, will exclude trials and appeals because none of them are either applications, or urgent in nature. It will exclude revisions also because they can hardly be regarded as urgent. It governs applications only and urgent applications at that. Applications would include applications for grant or cancellation of bail. An application for bail is always urgent because it involves the liberty of a citizen; an application for cancellation of bail, may not be so pressing and urgent, though in certain circumstances, it may become urgent. However, the power can be exercised when the Sessions Judge himself is (1) unavoidably absent, or (2) incapable of acting. It cannot be exercised if he is present and capable of acting. However, the power can be exercised when the Sessions Judge himself is (1) unavoidably absent, or (2) incapable of acting. It cannot be exercised if he is present and capable of acting. The power can be used only if he passes an order for its exercise by the Judges or Magistrates specified in subsection (4) and provided further if he himself is unavoidably absent or if he himself is incapable of acting and not otherwise. In Rajagopala Prasad v. State of Mysore, 1968 Cr. L. J., 419 the District Judge of Mysore was to superannuate on November 7, 1965. The Registrar of the Mysore High Court sent a letter asking him to hand over charge to the Civil Judge, Mysore, on the civil side, and to make necessary arrangement for disposal of urgent matters on the criminal side, under Section 17 (4), by empowering the Sessions Judge, Mandya. The Sessions Judge, Mysore, accordingly, empowered the Sessions Judge, Mandya on November 4, 1965 to act under Section 17 (4) for disposal of urgent criminal matters till further directions of the High Court. The Sessions Judge, Mandya sat in camp at Mysore from November 11 to November 14 to dispose of criminal cases pending on the file of the Sessions Judge, Mysore. He heard an appeal on November 12 and dismissed it on November 14 and the convict thereupon filed a revision before the High Court challenging the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge, Mandya on two grounds, namely, that urgent matters will not include an appeal and the Sessions Judge, Mysore was not competent to pass an order under Section 17 (4) when he was to retire on November 7 and the office of the Sessions Judge was to fall vacant after that date and was to remain vacant till his successor had taken over charge. The Mysore High Court accepted both the contentions. The following observation was made with respect to the second ground: "There is another question which arises in this case. That question is whether a retiring Sessions Judge of a Division could exercise the powers under Section 17(4) of the Code and empower the Sessions Judge of an adjoining division to dispose of urgent applications. Whether the retirement of a Sessions Judge would amount to unavoidable absence or incapability of acting, is a matter which requires consideration. Undoubtedly, retirement of a Sessions Judge cannot amount to unavoidable absence. Whether the retirement of a Sessions Judge would amount to unavoidable absence or incapability of acting, is a matter which requires consideration. Undoubtedly, retirement of a Sessions Judge cannot amount to unavoidable absence. Further, a Sessions Judge who empowers a Sessions Judge of another adjoining division under Section 17 (4) of the Code must continue to be the Sessions Judge of that division and he is unavoidably absent or incapable of acting. In the instant case, from November 7, 1965, Shri ........ceased to be the Sessions Judge of Mysore Division by reasons of his retirement. Hence he could not have exercised the powers under Section 17 (4) of the Code and empower the Sessions Judge. Mandya to exercise powers as required under Section 17(4) of the Code. Such a power can only be conferred by the State Government under Section 9 (4) of the Code." The result was that the appellate order passed by the Sessions Judge, Mandya was set aside and the appeal was remanded to be decided by the Sessions Judge, Mysore. In Kalu v. State, A.I.R. 1954 Raj. 22 Kalu was granted bail by the SubDivisional Magistrate. The State filed a revision petition against it before the Sessions Judge who transferred it to the Additional Sessions Judge. The Government Advocate prayed that the petition may be treated as an application for cancellation of bail under Section 497(5) and the Additional Sessions Judge, treating it as such, cancelled the bail. Kalu filed a revision before the High Court and contended that bail could have been cancelled by the Additional Sessions Judge only if he had granted it and the order could not be treated to have been passed under Section 17(4) because the Sessions Judge could not pass a general order but only a special order transferring such a case to the Additional Sessions Judge, if he himself was unavoidably absent or incapable of acting and since this contingency had not arisen, therefore, the order cancelling bail was passed without jurisdiction. The High Court observed that, under Section 17, the Sessions Judge could only confer powers of an Additional Sessions Judge when he is himself unavoidably absent or is incapable of acting and since the order was a general order passed with a view to proper and efficient disposal of criminal cases, the order under Section 17 cannot be deemed to be valid and consequently, the Additional Sessions Judge had no power or authority to pass the impugned order. The decision is based on the principles laid down in Naung Ha Maung v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1930 Rang. 335. In State v. Mohinder Singh, A.I.R, 1964 Punj. 543 a bail application was moved before the Sessions Judge who transferred it to the Additional Sessions Judge as he was 'very busy' in an election petition. The Additional Sessions Judge, however, thought that Section 17 (4) had no application and the Sessions Judge would not have passed such an order and, therefore, he made a reference to the High Court. The High Court held that the word 'incapable' does not necessarily imply that the person rendered incapable is suffering from physical incapacity. It would also cover the case where the incapacity is caused by other causes including the pressure of other work. The order clearly conveys that because of being busy in the election petition, the Sessions Judge was not capable of disposing of the bail application himself and it was for the Sessions Judge to decide whether on account of the rush of work or otherwise, he was rendered incapable of disposing of the bail application, and his decision in this respect could not be questioned. This case is thus not very helpful because it only interprets the meaning of the word 'incapable' and says that too narrow a construction cannot be placed on it and that it includes not only physical incapability but also incapability arising out of pressure of work. The learned Assistant Government Advocate invited our attention to State v. Anirudh, 1970 C.L.T. 1296 a decision of the Orissa High Court. The Sessions Division was at Bolangir, while the Assistant Sessions Judge sat at Bhawani Patna. The Sessions Judge has passed a general order under Section 17(4) authorising the Assistant Sessions Judge at Bhawani Patna to receive applications on his behalf, and to dispose of urgent applications, in his absence. The Sessions Division was at Bolangir, while the Assistant Sessions Judge sat at Bhawani Patna. The Sessions Judge has passed a general order under Section 17(4) authorising the Assistant Sessions Judge at Bhawani Patna to receive applications on his behalf, and to dispose of urgent applications, in his absence. A bail application was moved before the Assistant Sessions Judge and he allowed it. The State challenged that order in the High Court. It was held that there is nothing in Section 17 (4) which fetters the power of the Sessions Judge to make such general provision for quick acceptance and effective disposal of urgent matters, like bail petitions. The case is also distinguishable and appears to have no particular relevancy to the controversy before us. We are of the view that Section 17 (4) comes into play only when the Sessions Judge is either unavoidably absent from Court, for example when he is on leave, or is out on tour, or is out of station in connection with local inspection, and the like, when he does not cease to hold the office of Sessions Judge; or when he is incapable of acting, for example, when he is ill, or has some pressure of work on account of some important case in hand, or when he is busy with administrative matters, and the like. Section 17 (4) is not intended to cover the case of a vacancy in office, for example, for regulation of business on account of transfer or retirement when no successor is appointed. In such an event, the only remedy is for the State Government to pass an order under Section 9(4) by appointing the Sessions Judge of one Division to look after the work of another Division. Even the High Court does not come into the picture. 11. Such an eventuality was foreseen by Parliament when enacting the new Code. Subsection (4) of Section 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 says that the Sessions Judge of one Sessions Division may be appointed by the High Court to be also an Additional Sessions Judge of another Division, and in such case he may sit for the disposal of cases at such place or places in the other Division as the High Court may direct. This power vacated in the State Government in the repealed Code, and now it has been conferred on the High Court. This power vacated in the State Government in the repealed Code, and now it has been conferred on the High Court. The contingency of a vacancy has been provided in subsection (5) of Section 9 which says that where the office of the Sessions Judge is vacant, the High Court may make arrangement for the disposal of any urgent application, which is, or may be, made or pending before such Court of Session by an Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge, or, if there be no Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge, by a Chief Judicial Magistrate, in the Sessions Division; and every such Judge or Magistrate shall have jurisdiction to deal with any such application. Thus while a Sessions Judge in office, can make arrangement for disposal of urgent applications, under subsection (3) of Section 10, in a case of vacancy in the office, the High Court can make suitable arrangement under subsection (5) of Section 9. In the result, we are of the view that the Sessions Judge, Sitapur was incompetent to pass the order in question, dated July 14, 1972 and we, accordingly, set it aside. The bail application shall be disposed off by the Sessions Judge himself. Revision allowed.