JUDGMENT K. N. Singh, J. - This is a second appeal against the judgment of the District Judge, Dehradun, dismissing the appellants, appeal and allowing the objection of judgment-debtor filed before the Munsif, Dehradun in Execution proceedings of decree passed in suit No. 157 of 1967. 2. The Punjab and Sind Bank Ltd., plaintiff-appellant filed a suit No. 157 of 1962, against Hari Ram Sawhney defendant-respondent for recovery of money in the court of the Munsif, Dehradun. The suit was decreed in terms of a compromise arrived at between the parties and the compromise was made a part of the decree. The plaintiff-appellant was awarded costs and pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum to be charged on monthly rests and the payment of the decretal amount was required to be made in instalments. Hari Ram Sawhney, respondent-judgment-debtor, could not pay the decretal amount in accordance with the terms of the decree, whereupon the appellant-decree-holder put the decree into execution for arrest and detention of the judgment-debtor. The respondent raised objections that the execution application did not disclose the principal amount and that the court had no jurisdiction to award compound interest. The Munsif before whom the execution proceedings were pending upheld the objection of the respondent judgment-debtor. The learned Munsif held that in pursuance of Sec. 34, Civil Procedure Code, interest could be allowed only on the principal sum and pendente lite and future interest could not be allowed at compound rate, he allowed the judgment-debtors object on and directed the decree-holder to amend the applicant on for execution of the decree. The appellant decree-holder appealed before the learned District Judge, Dehradun. The appellate court by its order dated 18th February, 1970, dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the learned Munsif. Aggrieved, the decree-holder has preferred the present appeal before this Court challenging the orders of the courts below. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that since the decree was passed in terms of compromise arrived at between the parties, the decree being consent decree was binding on the parties and no objection against that decree could legally be raised in execution proceedings. The principle that a consent decree is binding on the parties cannot be disputed. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that since the decree was passed in terms of compromise arrived at between the parties, the decree being consent decree was binding on the parties and no objection against that decree could legally be raised in execution proceedings. The principle that a consent decree is binding on the parties cannot be disputed. In Shanker Sitaram Sontakke v. Bal Kishan Sitaram Sontakke, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 352, the Supreme Court held that a consent decree was as much binding on the parties thereto as a decree passed by invitum. A consent decree passed in a prior suit has the binding force of res judicata in subsequent suit in respect of the same subject-matter. In Sailendra Narain Bhanja Deo v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 346, the Supreme Court laid down that a judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel between the parties as a judgment whereby the court exercises its mind on a contested case. Thus the principle is well settled that a consent decree passed in pursuance of a compromise between the parties is binding like any other decree passed in a contested case. All consequences which ensue under a decree passed in a contested case are available to the parties under a consent decree. No doubt in Messrs Silver Screen Enterprise v. Devki Nandan Nagpal, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 669, the Supreme Court laid down that a consent decree is binding between the parties and even no appeal lay against such a decree. But the Court further observed that a consent decree can, however, be challenged in appeal on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation but in the absence of any such allegation the decree is binding on the parties. It is thus well established that a consent decree is as much binding between the parties as any other decree passed after contest. 4. The question then arises whether a compromise decree even if binding can be challenged in execution proceedings on the ground that the decree was passed by the court without jurisdiction. It is a settled principle that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity can be set up wherever and whenever that decree is sought to be enforced or relied upon even at the stage of appeal or even in collateral proceedings. It is a settled principle that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity can be set up wherever and whenever that decree is sought to be enforced or relied upon even at the stage of appeal or even in collateral proceedings. If the court which passed the decree had no jurisdiction and the error is apparent it is open to a party to challenge the validity of the decree in execution proceedings. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 340, the Supreme Court held that a defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether its subject-matter in respect of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass a decree and such a defect cannot be cured even with the consent of the parties. Thus decree even if passed by content of the parties can be challenged in execution proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1475, in support of his contention that a court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree passed between the parties or their representatives and that the execution court has no jurisdiction to consider the question of jurisdiction in execution proceedings. It is true that in this case the Supreme Court made observation that a court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree between the parties or their representatives and it must take the decree according to its tenor and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. The court further observed that until the decree is set aside by appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision the decree even if erroneous is still binding between the parties. But in that very case the Supreme Court further observed that when the decree is made by a court which has no jurisdiction to make, it, object on as to its invalidity may be raised in execution proceedings provided the object on appears on the face of the record. But in that very case the Supreme Court further observed that when the decree is made by a court which has no jurisdiction to make, it, object on as to its invalidity may be raised in execution proceedings provided the object on appears on the face of the record. But in a case where objection as to the lack of jurisdiction of the court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the question after it is raised and decided or which could have been but had not been raised, the execution court will have no jurisdiction to entertain any objection to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. In Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2391. The Supreme Court observed that where the court inherently lacked in jurisdiction, pleas as to jurisdiction could be raised at any stage by the affected party even in execution proceedings on the ground that the decree was a nullity. These authorities clearly lay down the principle that a decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity and it is permissible for a party to raise the question of lack of jurisdiction even in execution proceedings but if the court passing the decree did not lack inherent jurisdiction, and if the question of jurisdiction depends upon investigation of facts, in that case it will not be open to raise the question of lack of jurisdiction before the execution court. The question of jurisdiction, therefore, must be apparent on the face of the record and it need not depend on the investigation of facts. 6. In the present case, the judgment-debtor raised objection that the court had no jurisdiction to award compound interest in violation of Sec. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question of jurisdiction, therefore, must be apparent on the face of the record and it need not depend on the investigation of facts. 6. In the present case, the judgment-debtor raised objection that the court had no jurisdiction to award compound interest in violation of Sec. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sec. 34 of the Code confers power on Civil Court to award interest at such rates as the court deems reasonable on the principal sum ajudged from the date of the suit to the date of decree in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit with further interest at such rates not exceeding six per cent per annum as the Court, deems reasonable on such principal sum from the date of decree to the date of payment or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit. This provision confers power on the Court to award interest to a plaintiff in a suit for money. The interest can be awarded which may have accrued due prior to the institution of the suit on the principal sum. The Court is further empowered to award additional interest on the sum adjudged at such rate as the Court deems reasonable. Further the Court may award interest on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the decree to the date of payment but the rate of interest cannot exceed six per cent per annum. The power of the Court to award interest is thus curtailed by the express provision of law that in exercising its power the court shall not award interest exceeding six per cent per annum and the principal sum adjudged from the date of the decree to the date of payment. The rate of interest to a plaintiff prior to the institution of the suit may be contractual but the right to claim interest during the pendency of the suit or after the decree of the suits a procedural right which is regulated by the provisions of Sec. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the discretion of the court awarding the decree is restricted by the provisions of Sec. 34. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to award interest exceeding 6 per cent per annum on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the decree to the date of payment. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to award interest exceeding 6 per cent per annum on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the decree to the date of payment. It, therefore, follows that a decree passed by the Court awarding interest at a rate exceeding 6 per cent per annum on the principal adjudged from the date of payment would be in violation of Sec. 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure and would thus be without jurisdiction, in the instant case, the Courts below have held that the decree-holder was awarded compound interest at a rate exceeding 6 per cent which was in contravention of Sec. 34 of the Code. This defect of jurisdiction was apparent, it required no investigation of facts. It would thus follow that the decree passed the learned Munsif awarding interest in violation of Sec. 34 was without jurisdiction. 7. As already discussed, a decree even though passed by consent of the parties is a nullity and is not binding on the parties if the court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree. The rule is based on the principal that what is not permissible by law cannot be allowed to be done by consent of the parties through the machinery of courts. In Smt. Kaushalya Devi v. K.L. Bansal, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 838, an objection relating to the validity of a decree was upheld in execution proceedings although the decree for ejectment of the defendant had been passed in pursuance of a compromise between the parties. The Supreme Court held that the decree of ejectment passed by the Court in pursuance of the compromise was in contravention of Sec. 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act and as such the decree of ejectment was without jurisdiction and a nullity. The Court observed that the court below was forbidden to pass a decree in contravention of Sec. 13 (1) and, therefore, the decree even though passed on compromise between the parties was a nullity, consequently it was open to the judgment-debtor to raise the question of lack of jurisdiction in execution proceedings. The principle laid down in Kaushalya Devi's case is fully applicable to the instant case. The principle laid down in Kaushalya Devi's case is fully applicable to the instant case. As already discussed, the Civil Court was forbidden by law to award interest in excess of 6 per cent and, therefore, the decree passed in suit No. 157 of 1902 was a nullity to the extent it awarded interest in excess of 6 per cent per annum and it was permissible for the judgment debtor to raise the question of jurisdiction before the execution court. 8. In the result, I find no illegality in the orders of the Courts below. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.