JUDGMENT R. L. Gutati, J. - The petitioners in this and in the connected writ petition own and ply public carrier vehicles for transporting goods to areas comprising district Pithoragarh and onwards. The second respondent, namely, the Municipal Board, Pithoragarh (hereinafter referred to as the Board) made certain amendments in the Bye-laws of the Board by a notification No. 42/23-242 dated October 14, 1970 levying entry and parking fee, halting charges etc. on the vehicles passing through the territorial limits of the Board. This notification has been challenged in these two writ petitions and hence they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Earlier the Deputy Commissioner, Pithoragarh by a notification No. 1052/23-197 dated 5th March, 1965, issued under Sec. 298 (2) List I A. H. B. of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 framed bye-laws in exercise of the powers conferred under Sec. 301 (2) of the said Act. This notification is material and is reproduced below :- "Bye-laws u/s 301 (2) of the said Act. The motor vehicles, cars shall park at the motor stand and shall not park in any other place unless permitted by the Board. 2. For loading and unloading purposes the motor vehicles and cars can enter in the market. The time limit for the loading and unloading has been fixed as an hour after this time the vehicle shall go back to the motor stand for parking. 3. The motor vehicles shall not enter in the following roads :- (1) Dharamshala Road from the junction below the Civil Hospital to Bazar towards Sanskrit Pathshala and D. S. S. and A- Board Office Building. (2) Khari gate road in between Old Bazar and New Bazar. PENALTIES In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 298(l) of the U. P. Municipalities Act the Board thereby directs that any breach of bye-laws mentioned shall be punishable on conviction with the fine which may extend to Rs. 500/-". It is clear that under this notification the motor vehicles were required to be parked at a parking place provided by the Board. They were allowed to enter the market for loading and unloading purposes for a period of one hour only and lastly, vehicles were not permitted to enter certain localities, and for contravention of these rules penalties were provided. By the impugned notification the bye-law Nos. They were allowed to enter the market for loading and unloading purposes for a period of one hour only and lastly, vehicles were not permitted to enter certain localities, and for contravention of these rules penalties were provided. By the impugned notification the bye-law Nos. 2 and 3 of the old bye-laws were deleted and the following rules were substituted in their place :- "2. No Driver of Motor Bus, Lorry, Truck, Jeep, Station Wagon plying on commercial basis will be allowed to park the vehicles within the limits of Nagar Palika unless he pays Rs. 2/- (two) will be levied after twenty-four hours. 3. No Driver of Motor Bus, Lorry, Truck, Jeep, Car Station Wagon plying on commercial basis will be allowed to enter for loading and unloading purposes in Similagir Bazar, Naya Bazar, Dharamshala Road from Junction below Civil Hospital to D. S. S. and A Board's Office, Khari Gali Road in between Old and New Bazar unless he pays Rs. 5/- (five) in advance as fee at respective barriers. Successive charges of Rs. 2/- (two) will be levied for each continuing hours." These amendments purport to have been made according to the provisions of Sec. 298 (2) I-II (b) (m) of the U. P. Municipalities Act. As a result of these amendments a minimum parking fee of Rs. 2/- was to be paid for every motor vehicle parked within the limits of the Board and restrictions on the motor vehicles to enter certain localities was removed but entry in certain localities was permitted only on the advance payment of Rs. 5/- on the barrier and a charge of Rs. 2/- for every hour of halting. The penalty clause for breach of the rules was abolished. 4. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that Rule 2 of the impugned notification seeks to levy a parking fee and, as such, is ultra vires of the provisions of Sec. 298 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. That provision does not authorise the levy of any parking fee. It has further been submitted that the petitioners do not use any parking place provided by the Board and, as such, they are not liable to pay any parking fee if they park their vehicles on roadside or other places within the limits of the Board. That provision does not authorise the levy of any parking fee. It has further been submitted that the petitioners do not use any parking place provided by the Board and, as such, they are not liable to pay any parking fee if they park their vehicles on roadside or other places within the limits of the Board. The amended rule no longer prohibits the parking of vehicles at a particular place and, as such, they are not even liable to penalty, for breach of any rule. 5. Sec. 298 (1) of the U. P. Municipalities Act provides that a Board by special resolution may and where required by the State Government shall, make bye-laws applicable to the whole or any part of the municipality, consistent with this Act and with any rule, for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitant of the municipality and for the furtherance of municipal administration under this Act. Then sub-Sec. (2) sets out the various subjects in respect of which a municipality may make rules. These subjects are mentioned in List I. Clause (H) of List relates to public safety and convenience. This clause has several sub-clauses. Clause (b) provides for the framing of rules for regulation or prohibition of any description of traffic in the streets where such regulation or prohibition appears to the Board to be necessary. Then Clause (m) similarly provides for framing rules with a view to promote the public safety or convenience, any act which occasions or is likely to occasion a public nuisance and for the prohibiting or regulation of which no provision is made under this heading. It is clear that Clause (b) relates specifically to the regulation of traffic including prohibition of vehicles to enter any particular locality or street. Clause (m) is a general provision authorising the making of a rule prohibiting or regulating any act which occasions or is likely to occasion public nuisance and for the prohibiting or regulation of which no other rule is made under the said Act. The impugned rule can, therefore, rightly be attributed to these two clauses provided the rule really purports to regulate or prohibit the traffic or regulates or prohibits the parking of vehicles. In my opinion, the impugned rule 2 does nothing of the kind. The impugned rule can, therefore, rightly be attributed to these two clauses provided the rule really purports to regulate or prohibit the traffic or regulates or prohibits the parking of vehicles. In my opinion, the impugned rule 2 does nothing of the kind. It merely seeks to collect revenue in the shape of parking fee, there being no restriction with regard to any locality or street where vehicles are not permitted to be parked. Prima facie the provision under which the impugned rule purports to have been made does not envisage the charging of parking fee. The earlier rule which has now been replaced did purport to regulate traffic and to restrict the parking of vehicles to a particular place provided or indicated by the Board and if breach was committed of such regulation, penalties were provided. But the amended rule abolishes the penalties and concentrates only on the realisation of certain fees. 6. Another aspect of the matter is that a fee can be charged only for some kind of service rendered by the Board. In other words, a fee must be based on the principle of quidpro quo. If no service is rendered a fee cannot be charged and any such levy without being backed by quid pro quo would in reality be a tax. A municipality no doubt has been authorised to levy taxes also but that power is contained in Chapter V of the Act. Sec. 128 under that Chapter specifically deals with the taxes which may be imposed. Clause (iv) of sub-Sec. (l) of Sec. 128 authorises the levy of tax on, "vehicles and other conveyances plying for hire or kept within the municipality or on boats moored therein." But a tax can be imposed only after going through the procedure prescribed in Secs. 131 to 135 of the Act. Admittedly the procedure prescribed in these provisions has not been followed, obviously because the Board never purported to levy a tax. 7. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents it has been asserted that the Board has provided a motor stand and a parking place for trucks and buses. This parking place is fitted with lights, is daily cleaned and sanitary facilities have also been provided for the convenience of the passengers. 7. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents it has been asserted that the Board has provided a motor stand and a parking place for trucks and buses. This parking place is fitted with lights, is daily cleaned and sanitary facilities have also been provided for the convenience of the passengers. In other words, the case set up on behalf of the respondents is that the parking fee is being charged by the Board for the facilities provided by the Board. But the trouble, as already pointed out is that Sec. 298(1) (H) and (M) do not at all relate to the providing of parking places and levying fees for their use. Dealing with a similar matter under the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Council, Bhopal v. Sindhi Sahiti Multipurpose Transport Co-operative Society Ltd., A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2420, held that the M. P. Municipalities Act does not empower a Municipality to pass a bye-law declaring certain place as a Municipal bus stand and cannot compel the persons plying motor buses for hire not to park buses anywhere within the municipal limits except at the Municipal Bus Stand for the purpose of taking up and setting down of passengers. Neither Sec. 349 (ii) nor Sec. 358(7) are relevant for the purpose. The Supreme Court further held that specific provision in this regard is made in Sec. 68(2) (r) and (s) of the Motor Vehicles Act, and further if a municipality provides for a bus stand without compelling everybody to use it, a fee can be charged on bus operators using it voluntarily. 8. It is thus clear that under the U. P. Municipalities Act no power has been conferred upon a municipality to provide a bus stand or a parking place and to compel the motor vehicles to be parked at that place and nowhere else. It follows that if a Board cannot compel a person to park his vehicle only at a parking place then it certainly has no power to collect fee from a person who parks his vehicle at a place other than the parking place provided by the Board. It follows that if a Board cannot compel a person to park his vehicle only at a parking place then it certainly has no power to collect fee from a person who parks his vehicle at a place other than the parking place provided by the Board. One could understand if the Board had provided in the bye-laws that persons making use of the parking place provided by the Board shall be liable to pay some amount by way of fee, leaving the option with the vehicle owners or drivers. If in the opinion of the Board parking of vehicles at places other than the bus stand was likely to cause inconvenience or danger to public safety it could prohibit the parking of vehicles at other places but it certainly could not permit such a thing to be done on payment of fee. Thus Rule 2 of the impugned notification is clearly ultra vires. 9. Coming now to Rule 3, that rule is also open to the same criticism. That rule also does not purport to regulate the traffic so as to prohibit motor vehicles either to enter a particular locality or to stay there too long just as was the case under the earlier notification of 1965. But what it seeks to do is to levy a fee on the entry of a vehicle in certain localities within the territorial limits of the Board. This again, to my mind, is not authorised by Sec. 298(1) H(b) and (m). Clause (b) of List of Sec. 298 deals with the regulation of traffic in the street in such manner as the Board may think necessary, including total ban on entry of motor vehicles in certain localities. But it does not permit the levy of a fee on a motor vehicle at the point of its entry in the municipal limits. A similar view has been taken by a learned Single Judge in the case of Ch. Atar Singh v. State of U.P., 1970 A.L.J. 249, where it has been held that bye-laws imposing a fee for entry or plying of motor vehicles does not deal with subject-matter mentioned in Clause (b) and cannot be sustained by it. 10. The decision of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Mewa Ram v. Municipal Board, Mathura, A.I.R. 1939 Alld. 10. The decision of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Mewa Ram v. Municipal Board, Mathura, A.I.R. 1939 Alld. 466, does not deal with the question arising in the instant case. There the Municipal Board of Mathura in exercise of the powers conferred on it under Secs. 293 and 298(2) H (b) and J (d) of the U. P. Municipalities Act had set up certain places for motor stand and had laid down a scale of fee for use of these stands. In order to facilitate the collection of this fee, they put on public auction the right of collecting charges from public vehicles occupying municipal stands. The following three questions were referred to the Full Bench in that connection : 1. Whether the Municipal Board of Muttra was competent to make a bye-law that "no motor car or lorry plying for hire shall be allowed to halt or run for the purpose of searching passengers at any public street or place other than the stands fixed for the purpose?" 2. Whether the levy of any charge for the use of stands within the municipal limits of Muttra was within the competence of the Municipal Board or not? 3. Whether the right to the said charge and the right to collect it can be transferred and whether the contract for such a transfer is valid ? We are not concerned with question No. 3 in the instant case. The answer to question Nos. 1 and 2 was given in the affirmative by two Judges out of three learned Judges. As regards the right of Municipal Board to set up a bus stand or a parking place in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Council, Bhopal, it cannot be said that the Municipal Board had power to do such a thing under the U. P. Municipalities Act. The appropriate provision in that regards are to be found under the Motor Vehicles Act. Even if a Municipal Board does set up a motor stand, it can certainly charge a fee for its use by the owners and drivers of motor vehicles but no bye-law can compel such owners or drivers to use the bus stand. The appropriate provision in that regards are to be found under the Motor Vehicles Act. Even if a Municipal Board does set up a motor stand, it can certainly charge a fee for its use by the owners and drivers of motor vehicles but no bye-law can compel such owners or drivers to use the bus stand. In the interest of public convenience and safety a Board can prohibit by a bye-law the use of any street or place within the municipal limits for parking a vehicle but that again would amount to regulation of traffic. It cannot charge a fee for permitting vehicles to be parked at a place other than the bus stand. I have already shown that such a fee would really amount to a tax which cannot be levied except in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 131 to 135 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. 11. For all these reasons these writ petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned notifications dated 10th of August, 1970 and 14th October, 1970 are quashed. The petitioners are entitled to costs.