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1974 DIGILAW 457 (ALL)

Eimal Kishore Paliwal v. State of U. P. (Department of Civil Supplies, Rent Control Section), Lucknow.

1974-11-08

R.L.GULATI

body1974
JUDGMENT Gulati, J. This petition arises out of proceedings under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act.) The petitioner, Bimal Kishore Paliwal is the owner of house No. 117, M.G. Sarwat Gate, Ansari Road. Muzaffarnagar. The house is occupied by two tenantsShanti Swarup, Advocate and the 4th respondent, Virendra Verma. The petitioner moved an application on April 16, 1963 before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, respondent No. 3 for permission to file a suit for ejectment of his tenants. This application was rejected on September 18, 1963. The petitioner then filed a revision petition before the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut. The revision petition was allowed and the permission was granted to him. The State Government also refused to interfere with the order of the Commissioner under Section 7F of the Act. Thereafter Virendra Verma filed a writ petition in this Court. The writ petition was allowed, the order of the State Government was quashed as it did not contain the reasons and the matter was remanded to the Commissioner for rehearing. This time the Commissioner rejected the application of the petitioner. Thereafter he approached the State Government under Section 7F and the State Government has also refused to interfere. The petitioner has now approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constiution. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Sri Virendra Verma had not put the accommodation to his personal use and as such he was not entitled to retain the same. It is stated that he was using the accommodation first as an office of the Congress party to which he belonged and thereafter as an office of the B.K.D. which he joined later. It is argued that since the accomodation is not in the personal use of Mr. Verma, he was liable to be ejected. I am unable to accept this argument. Personal use of an accommodation is not restricted to its use as a residence or as a shop or as an office in connection with his own business or profession. If a person uses an accommodation as an office of an organisation of which he is a member, the user can be said to be personal as much as when houses it for his personal residence or office. If a person uses an accommodation as an office of an organisation of which he is a member, the user can be said to be personal as much as when houses it for his personal residence or office. The Commissioner in an elaborate order has considered the need of the petitioner and has compared it with the need of the tenant. After such a comparison he has come to the conclusion that while the need of the petitioner is not genuine, the need of the tenant is both pressing and genuine. This is a finding of fact and based as it is on relevant material cannot be assailed in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The order passed by the State Government also does not suffer from any infirmity. This is an order of affirmance and, as such, it was not necessary for the State Government to reproduce the reasons recorded by the Commissioner. Lastly, the learned counsel put forward a plea of mala fide. His contention is that Mr. Verma was once a Cabinet Minister in the State of Uttar Pradesh and is now a sitting M.L.A. and as such he exercises considerable influence. May be that Mr. Verma wields considerable influence, but no material has been placed on the record to show that the impugned order was secured by him through his influence. Merely because Mr. Verma happens to occupy a high office does not mean that he must have influenced the judgment of the Commissioner and the State Government. There has to be an allegation to that effect and the allegation has to be proved by evidence which is lacking in the instant case. In the result the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.