ORDER - The present petitioners were impleaded as original non-applicants Nos. 2 and 3 in proceedings initially started by respondent Godubai, since deceased, now represented by her legal representative one Kamalabai. To those proceedings, which sought a negative declaration against the present petitioners that they were not the tenants of Survey No. 69/1, area 2.37 acres of mouza Nimba by invoking the provisions of section 100 (2) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the tenancy Act), the respondent No.2 Janardan was impleaded as non-applicant No.1 on the basis that he had no title or interest in the said land in any capacity whatsoever. Originally, the property belonged to Laxmibai the mother of the applicant since deceased by the year 1942. Laxmibai had two daughters, i.e. the applicant Godubai and said Kamalabai, who became the owners and as such title-holders of the said survey number. Certain allegations are to be found in the application against non-applicant Janardan in that he was having all amoral relations and was also acting in fraud. It was further the specific case that non-applicants Nos. 2 and 3 were not tenants of the. applicant on the said property, though they claimed to be the protected lessees. It was pleaded that none of the non-applicants could be recognised as the tenants. It was further averred that their present possession was unlawful. On this basis the applicant prayed for a declaration against all the non-applicants and particularly non-applicants Nos. 2 and 3, i.e. the present petitioners. Along with this application the applicant produced certified extracts of the record of right with respect to the Survey number in question, i.e. exhibited as A-4, and it shows that as far as revenue records are concerned the applicant was admittedly the tenure-holder or landlady along with her sister one Kamalabai. 2. The non-applicant No.1 Janardan filed a written statement denying the title of the applicant Godubai and further stating that he was the putative, father of the applicant and her sister Kamalabai. He further averred that non-applicant No.2 only was the tenant of the said field. He asserted that he himself was the owner of the field and further pleaded that he was in exclusive possession thereof for the last 40 years. He, however, admitted that the suit field was not leased out to either of the non-applicants, i.e. non-applicants Nos. 1 to 3. He asserted that he himself was the owner of the field and further pleaded that he was in exclusive possession thereof for the last 40 years. He, however, admitted that the suit field was not leased out to either of the non-applicants, i.e. non-applicants Nos. 1 to 3. Thus from the plea of the non-applicant No. 1 he raised a defence on the footing of his own title and owner-ship. Non-applicant Nathu, i.e. the present petitioner No. 1 only filed written statement. Other non-applicant has not filed any statement. By that statement, Nathu denied the title of applicant Godubai and her claim that the property originally belonged to her mother Laxmibai. He tried to assert that his lease was through non-applicant No.1 and further stated that the said non-applicant No. 1, i.e. Janardan, is in possession of the property as the owner thereof. 3. By these pleading eminently matter arose as to the respective claims by Nathu and Janardan as to the lease in favour of the former by the latter and further it contained implicit admission that none of them had any relationship under a tenancy claim as far as applicant was concerned. In addition they sought to deny the title of the applicant herself and asserted the same in favour of Janardan. It is patent and clear that record of right maintained under the provisions of the concerned Land Revenue Code does not in any way support the plea in defence. 4. It appears that in support of her case, Godubai filed the documents of title, i.e. the original gift-deed of December 21, 1925 and two other document of the year 1936 and 1940 which showed that the property was leased by Laxmibai. She further produced receipts for payment of land-revenue till about 1957. Godubai examined herself in support of her case and ~as also cross-examined or all issues. She asserted that none of the non-applicants have any tenancy rights in her field. When she was asked about Janardan's title, she specifically denied the same and stated ignorance as to whether Janardan had given any patta or lease-deed in favour of the other non-applicants. 5. Exhibit A-1, which is the deed of gift, ex facie indicates the title of Laxmibai, so also the document Exh. A-2 which appears to have been scribed by non-applicant Janardan himself. Exhibit A-3 also mentions Laxmibai as the tenure-holder or land-holder. 6. 5. Exhibit A-1, which is the deed of gift, ex facie indicates the title of Laxmibai, so also the document Exh. A-2 which appears to have been scribed by non-applicant Janardan himself. Exhibit A-3 also mentions Laxmibai as the tenure-holder or land-holder. 6. The non-applicant purported to produce documents which at one place showed Janardan as the person giving lease .under a Kabulayat Patta Exh. D-1. 7. Oral evidence was given by both the parties. On behalf of Godubai one Namdeo and Prabhakar were examined. As against that, Nathu examined himself on his own behalf and Janardan examined himself on his own behalf. Nathu's claim on oath was that he was cultivating the land for the last 25 years and Janardan was the owner". He admitted that Godubai was the daughter of Janardan. He further admitted that she has sister by name Kamalabai. In Cross-examination he stated that it was only on 5-5-1957, he gave the document of lease. He executed a document of lease for a period of four years in favour of Janardan and paid him Rs. 400 /-. He had not enquired as to whether Janardan had any title to the suit field. He admitted that there 'were no receipts with him as to the payment of land-revenue. He could not say whether the property belonged to Laxmibai, though he said that he does not accept Laxmibai as the owner. He had no crop statements to support his say. He admitted that he had no other evidence to show that he is in cultivation of the land. He stated that prior to his cultivation Janardan was cultivating the same. He admitted that he is not cultivating the same with the consent either of Godubai or Kamalabai. He further went on to say that the person who appeared in Court was not known to him nor he knows the relation of Janardan with her. He contradicted himself when his written statement to that effect was pointed out to him. 8. Janardan on oath stated that he had purchased this property and it was he who was the owner having taken the same in the name of one Jankubai. He admitted that there had been a gift-deed in favour of Laxmibai but asserted that he was, inspite of that, in possession. 8. Janardan on oath stated that he had purchased this property and it was he who was the owner having taken the same in the name of one Jankubai. He admitted that there had been a gift-deed in favour of Laxmibai but asserted that he was, inspite of that, in possession. First he cultivated the same at home for the last 25 years and then handed over the same on rent to non-applicant Nathu. He had not given to any other person the said field on rent. He asserted that he had taken the leas-deed dated 7-4-58. He denied that Laxmibai was the owner. When confronted with the gift by Jankubai to Laxmibai, he denied the knowledge about' it. He did not claim any leasehold rights. His cross-examination shows that the property was originally purchased by Jankubai. There was no document in his favour showing him to be the owner of the property. Though the property is recorded and mutated in the name of Jankubai, he has never taken any steps to get the record of rights corrected. In fact, he has admitted that he had no document whatsoever to show that he is the owner of the said property. All this clearly established that originally title was with Janku who had made a valid gift in favour of Laxmibai and Janardan had hardly any semblance of right or claim. 9. All this evidence clearly shows that the original applicant had put ample material to show that she was the landlady and the revenue records, i.e. the record of right produced at Exh. A-4, also recognised her and her sister Kamalabai as the tenure-holders or land-holders of the land. As against this the present petitioner, who was claiming through opponent Janardan, had no documentary evidence to the claim setup by, them and Janardan's testimony Was liable to be rejected as not borne out by any record. 10. This being the pci6ition and further the present petitioners having not claimed any tenancy rights, vis-a-vis the applicant Godubai or her sister., the negative declaration under section 109 (2) of the Tenancy Act was required to be granted. Such a declaration could be granted by the revenue authorities is not in dispute. There was ample material to support such a declaration. Such a declaration could be granted by the revenue authorities is not in dispute. There was ample material to support such a declaration. Thus the present petitioners here cannot have any grievance nor can ask this Court to set aside the order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal which is made with jurisdiction and which is supportable even on the review of evidence. 11. However, a generic debate is raised that this order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal should be set aside the same being without jurisdiction. It is submitted that the tenancy Tahsildar empowered by section 100 to grant such declaration was not entitled to decide the disputed question of title and the only course left open because of the controversy raised in defence was, to ask the parties to get their title decided by civil Court. The arguments proceed on the footing that Civil Court is the only Court of exclusive jurisdiction to determine and pronounce upon title of persons to property. Section 100 thus, according to the argument, should be read as excluding the jurisdiction to try the matters of title, though they may be raised even by way of defence. The learned counsel pointedly relied Upon the two decisions in support of his submission, being Savalaram Krishnaji v. Mukund Keshao Gaikwad and another1, Potu Bhawani v. Udhao Vithoba Khade2. 12. Now the decisions referred to by the learned counsel are not apposite. In both those cases the matter arose before the Civil Court in a suit upon an issue of tenancy and it was observed that Civil Court having the jurisdiction to decide the title could have done better to decide the same and then referred the matter to tenancy Court. In Potu Bhawani's case the observations in the matter of such reference are made to the effect that the question of title being pending before the Civil Court, the revenue authorities could have properly stayed the proceedings and awaited the decision of the Civil Court in respect to bona fides of the alleged lease. 13. The observations found in these authorities cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner. Here there was no reference by the Civil Court which was seized of any suit based on title. 13. The observations found in these authorities cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner. Here there was no reference by the Civil Court which was seized of any suit based on title. On the other hand, as indicated earlier, the question was pre-eminently raised under section 100 of the Tenancy Act by the applicant seeking a negative declaration as to the tenancy of an agricultural land. 14. The provisions of the Tenancy Act are indicative of creation of certain exclusive and somewhat comprehensive jurisdiction in the authorities indicated expressly so as to decide all matters that may arise between the landlord and tenant in relation to the agricultural land. The matrix and the spread of the law is dominant with an intent to create as encompassing as possible the area upon which the wheels of this power should have all pervasive and ambit. It is manifest from the purpose of the Act as is stated by its preamble that the statute was enacted to provide for several matters including the regulation of the relationship of landlord and tenant of the agricultural lands. In this effort, new rights in preferance to old ones have been cast out and even a bare look at the several provisions is enough to indicate that somewhat old wood is chopped off so as to inculcate new blood in the life vein of the agricultural society. Every effort, therefore, has to be made to understand the pragmatic processes upon which these new legal authorities have eminent and exclusive domain. 15. While examining the provisions of the Act in this effort to find out the conspectus of the jurisdiction of the authority the approach must be that the obvious dynamics provided by the statute should be allowed to have a full efficient and unhampered interplay. No doubt, there are well grounded presumptions which inhibit constructions or interpretations having effect to erode the general and universal jurisdictions vested in the Civil Courts in such matters. It is pre-eminent in the scheme of our Jurisprudence that all civil rights can be worked out through the mechanics provided by the civil laws and machinery of the Courts of civil jurisdiction in that sense has been contemplated to inhere all such power to decide upon the questions of title and ownership in property. It is pre-eminent in the scheme of our Jurisprudence that all civil rights can be worked out through the mechanics provided by the civil laws and machinery of the Courts of civil jurisdiction in that sense has been contemplated to inhere all such power to decide upon the questions of title and ownership in property. Land being an item and object of property, the title and ownership to it is very much and still is within the jurisdiction of the' Civil Court. 16. However, with these principles restated, one has to turn to the basic concept of jurisdiction itself. Jurisdiction means and connotes "legal authority" or "extent of power". It means, authority to decide. In Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of U. P. and another3, Das J. observed that the question whether a tribunal has jurisdiction depends not on the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it has to enquire, or upon the correctness of its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, and it is determinable at the commencement of the matter (See also Choube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad so also Brij Raj Krishna v. Shaw and Bros.5). 17. Shaw C. J., in Hopkins v. Commonwealth6 said: "Jurisdiction in Courts is the power and authority to declare the law; the very word in its origin really imports as much. It is derived from 'Juris' and 'dico' "r speak by the law" and that sentence ought to be inscribed in living light on every tribunal of criminal power. It is the right of administering justice through the laws by the means which the law has provided for that purpose." 18. In Amritrai Krishna Deshpande v. Balkrishna Ganesh Amrapurkar7, the learned West J. observed that "jurisdiction", according to the exact conception of it formed by the Roman Lawyers, consists in taking cognizance of a case involving the determination of some jural relation, in ascertaining the essential points of it and in pronouncing upon them; and that an enquiry into whether the jurisdiction exists is not an exercise of jurisdiction over the case itself, but an investigation of another question altogether, that of whether the conditions of cognizance are satisfied. (emphasis added.) 19. These authorities brilliantly enlighten the cul-de-sac of the problem and bring out its mark and open-endedness with regard to the matters having bearing on jurisdictional thinking. (emphasis added.) 19. These authorities brilliantly enlighten the cul-de-sac of the problem and bring out its mark and open-endedness with regard to the matters having bearing on jurisdictional thinking. In reality it is a derived mode of search to find out its very existence or the primordial power from which the authority emanates. Put it in existential form, the jurisdiction exists and therefore the exercise of legal power. The juridical diagnosis, hence, of necessity, has to be clear in an effort to reach to the shape and mould of the authentic statutory status. It may take in an empirical enquiry so as to achieve a profound synthesis of conflicting claims for the language of the statute may indicate both the subject as was the object within the purview of the power or authority of its delegates not by one but by several devices. In such a quest no crisis need be conceived in the format of the problem by trying to push forward only the existing theories which will create subject-object cleavage or a basic antilogy in the very field of enquiry. Though, therefore, there may be a pre-eminent pre-supposition In favour of the universal jurisdiction of the Civil Courts towards which an interpreter usually leans there is yet another rule of the life of law avowedly emphasising interpretation of such special, beneficent statute enacted by the Legislature to have and receive a liberal construction from the Court standing by the same. While construing such provisions the avowed object of advancement of agricultural community with all the speed evidenced by the Act cannot also be overlooked. 20. I am fortified in this approach by the observations available in Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi and others8, where the Court was considering the provisions of Orissa Tenants Protection Act and the problem of exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts was being considered. After referring to the celebrated authority of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Mask and Co,9 the Court observed that it was settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. After referring to the celebrated authority of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Mask and Co,9 the Court observed that it was settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Alluding to that principle and further having regard to the fact that ordinarily a dispute as to the relationship between the parties, such as that between a landlord and a tenant would be a dispute of a civil nature, and would fall within the competence of the Civil Court, it was held the terms of section 7 (1) of the Orissa Tenants protection Act did not exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, as that section expressly and specifically provided for five categories of disputes to the extent of which alone the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was excluded and consequently conferred upon the Collector under that Act. 21. Now turning to the present Act in section 2 various definition; of terms found and used in the text of the Tenancy Act have been codified and without making more detail I would indicate that definitions like "to cultivate" in section 2 (11), "to cultivate personally" in section 2 "(12), "land" in section 2 (17), "person" in section 2 (21), "protected lessee" in section 2 (25), "tenancy" in section 2 (31) and "tenant" in section 2 (32) deal with the matters which are co-related with the objects and purposes mentioned in the Preamble and take in the relations of persons to property. "Tenancy" is defined to mean the relationship of landlord and tenant and the word "tenant" has also been statutorily med to take within its fold a person who holds land on lease and certain other classes of persons who are conferred with statutory status of "tenants". This definition deals with civil matters operative upon the relationship of person to person as well of person to property. Specific provisions empower the authorities created to restore possession of agricultural lands in stated conditions e. g. sections 10,20 and (or 36 and invest lowers of executing the orders executable viz. section 106 of the Act. There are provisions which prohibit termination of tenancies except by or under the orders of the specified authorities, e. g. sections 19 to 36 and 38. section 106 of the Act. There are provisions which prohibit termination of tenancies except by or under the orders of the specified authorities, e. g. sections 19 to 36 and 38. There are provisions wherein all questions between tenants and landlords can be taken into account including matters of possession; and ownership can be passed on to persons who are found to be entitled as tenants on the lands. Power coupled with an obligation is vested in the authorities to effectuate this scheme of transfer of ownership. (See provisions regarding compulsory transfer of ownership found in Chapter III, (2) and (3) ). There is all power to set aside transfers in given cases and affect the rights of transferees and in stated conditions to declare certain lands available for the purpose of assumption of management by the State. The basic matrix of such and several provisions is amply illustrative and indicative to evolve a self-contained code and to have a well generated machinery having integral and vigorous power even upon civil rights. All this has to be borne in mind while considering the provisions of section 100 and several items mentioned there under and its scope and reach. The submission that effort must be to find restrictive jurisdictions inspite of clear and unambiguous nature of statute neither is wholesome nor warranted. After all jurisdictions of Courts rest on the laws that make them. The hand that confers can curtail what was first granted or conferred. No inhibitions can be conceived nor possibly attend such a course. 22. If one closely looks to the provisions of section 100, it is itself worded in an imperative manner and Tahsildar is obliged to decide the matters enumerated from clause (1) to clause (19) thereof. This decision is appealable under section 107 and revisable further under section 110 and for section III as may be the case. Amongst others, by clause (2) Tahsildar is enjoined to decide whether a person is or was at any time in the past a tenant, a protected lessee or an occupancy tenant. The injunction in other clauses too is similarly imperative when law speaks out by use of phrases like "to determine" or "to decide", e. g. see clause (12) "to. decide an application far possession under section 36", clause (16) "to. decide whether the transfer or acquisition is or is not invalid under section 122". The injunction in other clauses too is similarly imperative when law speaks out by use of phrases like "to determine" or "to decide", e. g. see clause (12) "to. decide an application far possession under section 36", clause (16) "to. decide whether the transfer or acquisition is or is not invalid under section 122". Far our present purpose it can be safely concluded that under clause (2) of section 100 the matter which is clearly of the nature of civil dispute see Magiti sasamal's Case supra) has been pre-eminently handed aver far decision to the Tahsildar. It follows that all matters which are necessarily required to be decided far effectively carrying out this duty must be well within the' power contemplated by this provision. 23. Further the provision of section 100 (2) is to. be read with explicit exclusion contemplated by section 124 of the Act. That provision expressly bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court in that regard. Reading section 100 and section 124 together it follows as of course that the matters which are required to be decided under section 100 by the Tahsildar are within hi exclusive jurisdiction and have been pre-eminently excepted from the jurisdiction of the civil Court. Section 125 aids this construction and requires the civil Court to stay the suit and refer the issue far decision to the authority under the Tenancy Act. 24. This analysis is enough to say that the relationship of landlord and tenant of the agricultural land is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the authorities under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. While deciding that relationship, the Tahsildar will be bound in a given controversy to find out whether a person can claim the status of landlord of a given land concerned in lease. Similarly, he will be obliged to see whether the other person can satisfy the statutory definition of the term "tenant". These two words, "'tenancy" and "tenant" have been defined in section 2 (31) and section 2 (32) and they read as follows:- "(31) "tenancy" means the relationship of landlord and tenant; (32) "tenant" means a person who holds land on lease and includes(a) a person who is deemed to. be a tenant under sections 6, 7 or 8, (b) a person who. is a protected lessee or occupancy tenant and the word "Landlord" shall be construed accordingly;" 25. be a tenant under sections 6, 7 or 8, (b) a person who. is a protected lessee or occupancy tenant and the word "Landlord" shall be construed accordingly;" 25. If a negative declaration is claimed it follows that Tahsildar will have to consider whether the person claiming such a declaration is entitled to that declaration against a person who has gat no relationship with him' under any tenancy nor can be treated as a tenant under section 2 (32) of the Act. The definition of the ward "tenant" shows that it is somewhat wider in perspective. It includes persons who might not be strictly holding any land under a lease or a demise. Those by the provisions of the statute are deemed to be tenants are also included in the definition of "tenant". Whether a person is deemed tenant or not will, in a given case, involve the question of finding out the conditions of sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Act. The provision of section 6 treats certain persons to be the deemed tenants on land. A person being lawfully an the land and cultivating the same, is the main condition far the purposes of section 6; along with that such land must be one which belongs to another person. In a given case to whom the land belongs or in wham the title of such a land vests so as to reach the requirement of section 6 as of necessity may arise far decision properly under section 100 (2) itself along with other negative factors mentioned in section 6 itself. Negative clauses indicate even further the scope of enquiry which may take in questions of possession and titles like mortgage under which it is held. The provision of section 6 throws flood of light illustrating that while doing the duty under section IOO (2) of the Act, the Tahsildar can be properly called upon even collaterally or of necessity to find upon the several civil issues to answer whether land of demise or in cultivation "belongs" or "held in mortgage". 'Can it be said that in such a controversy he has to sit folding his hands and ask the parties to get the title of the agricultural land decided by some other authority? Such a course would negative the very purpose of his statutory "self hood. 'Can it be said that in such a controversy he has to sit folding his hands and ask the parties to get the title of the agricultural land decided by some other authority? Such a course would negative the very purpose of his statutory "self hood. Even though title to agricultural land leased is expressly not included within the items mentioned in section 100, the several other matters mentioned by several clauses of that section may of necessity require decision on the same as the "conditions or cognizance" to be fully and initially satisfied. Tenancy being a relationship its subject-object connections are necessarily part of it. It is in law derivative mode of title for enjoyment of property. Basically its legal or juridical structure is dimensional having landlord, land and lessee. To find a lease-either proper or deemed-is to find all these three i.e. the lessor, the object of lease, and the lessee himself. Their inter se relationships which can only be founded on certain title or ownership either original or derivative is the part of the eminent enquiry as to the "tenancy" itself. All matters necessary for the final decision of such cognizable controversy between the parties will have to be found and decided by the authority enjoined to decide the same. There is neither any warrant for supposition in principle that only because a defence of denial of title is raised the jurisdiction should stand vacated and parties referred to any other forum like that of civil Court. Such a course would really frustrate the purpose of several sections to which I have made reference, however brief it is, in the earlier part of the judgment. 26. What will be the efficacy and effect of such decisions on such collateral controversy raised by the parties as far as the jurisdiction of the civil Court and parties' rights does not fall for consideration in this case. It is enough to say that all necessary and collateral issues having bearing on the main questions cognizable and which the law enjoins the Tahsildar to decide will have to be decided if properly raised by the parties. It is enough to say that all necessary and collateral issues having bearing on the main questions cognizable and which the law enjoins the Tahsildar to decide will have to be decided if properly raised by the parties. Only because such questions would be complicated involving application of several laws of property or succession or inheritance, there is no indication in the scheme of the Act that the proceeding are to be stayed and parties required to get those rights settled in any other forum. As far as possible the interpretation which will effectuate the entire scheme of the statute without any hurdle appeals to me as the proper and just interpretation. 27, I may, with utility refer to the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Kashiram v. Mah. Revenue Tribunol10 where this Court was considering the jurisdiction conferred upon the Tahsildar under section 100 (2) and the jurisdiction conferred upon the Collector under section 120. The Court observed: "We are here concerned only with the power to decide the question whether a person is a tenant...conferred by section 100 (2). To that extent the Tahsildar, it must be said, is given jurisdiction to the exclusion of the civil Court to decide whether a person is a tenant," After referring to the provisions of section 120 read with section 124 of the Act dealing with the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar, Collector and civil Court the Full Bench observed: "Therefore here the question is not of any competition between the restricted jurisdiction of the civil Court and the somewhat unrestricted jurisdiction of the Tahsildar but the question is of a competition between two equal and independent jurisdictions conferred upon two revenue authorities namely upon Collector by section 120 and upon Tahsildar by section 100 (2)." (Emphasis provided) It is no doubt true that the Full Bench was considering the competing jurisdiction under the very same Act of the Collector on the one hand and the Tahsildar on the other but had occasion to observe that the Tahsildar was given somewhat unrestricted jurisdiction retaining restricted jurisdiction with civil Court. 28. This unrestricted jurisdiction pointed out by the Fun Bench was obviously conceived out of the felt-necessity of the statutory scheme and its intendments and cannot be curtailed or ousted by raising defence based on title. 28. This unrestricted jurisdiction pointed out by the Fun Bench was obviously conceived out of the felt-necessity of the statutory scheme and its intendments and cannot be curtailed or ousted by raising defence based on title. For deciding effectively the relationship of landlord and tenant in a given controversy the matters of ownership and title of the person claiming as landholder will have to be gone into and decided. Such controversy conceivably may arise in several matters. It may arise while finding the relationship with respect to lease, with respect to its premium or land rent payable and title thereto, with respect to compensation or price and right to receive the same so as to have full discharge, and in all these and such matters various kinds of civil disputes may of necessity or collaterally arise for decision so as to make binding and effective orders. It is not necessary to enter upon in details to indicate the various provisions of the statute to substantiate this conclusion. 29. Giving my anxious consideration, therefore, to the submission made it appears to me that Janardan had raised the plea in defence and that would not and could not oust the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar to find out whether Godubai could have the status to claim the negative declaration. 30. That being the position, the present petition has no merit and would stand dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.