Judgment :- (RAMAPRASADA RAO J.) 1. The State of Madras represented by the District Collector of Ramanathapuram at Madurai, is the appellant. The respondent-plaintiff filed the suit against the appellant-defendant for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 18,845/= being the sum payable, according to the plaintiff, by the defendant in relation to services rendered and work done by the plaintiff as a contractor in the matter of the construction of a bridge on the highway at 10/5 mile from Madurai to Tondi. Under Ex. B.8, dated 25th February, 1956 a contract was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant in the matter of the construction of the various projects. This contract attracted the Madras Detailed Standard Specification Rules. The case of the plaintiff is that the site for construction of the aforesaid project was handed over to him only on 7th March 1956. According to the plaintiff he officers of the Engineering Department, who were in charge of the supervision work, took a hostile attitude against him from the very beginning Under Ex. A.6, 23rd May, 1956, the execution of the contract was stopped Under Ex. A.8 dated 21st June, 1956 the Divisional Engineer asked the plaintiff to resume work Under Ex. A.11 dated 11th October, 1956, the plaintiff was accused of being slow in the matter of execution of the work. The plaintiffs case was that there was sufficient reason for the slow progress of the work, as it was due to non-supply of essential materials to him for purposes of executing the work. Under Exs. A-15, A-17, A-18 and A-19, the plaintiff was asked to start work and expeditiously complete the same. Under Ex. A.24 the time for performance of the contract was extended till 30th September 1957. During the course of construction the plaintiff brought to the notice of the higher authorities under Ex. A.27 about the attitude of the Assistant Engineer in relation to the particular contract. The plaintiffs case is that he secured a copy of the contract (the agreement Ex. B-8) which included the Madras Detailed Standard Specification Rules also, only in April, 1956 and that too on a request made by him for that purpose, under Ex. A.29 Curiously enough the work was again stopped in April, 1957 and when the plaintiff protested, he was directed to complete the work within 15 days. Ultimately under Ex. B-8) which included the Madras Detailed Standard Specification Rules also, only in April, 1956 and that too on a request made by him for that purpose, under Ex. A.29 Curiously enough the work was again stopped in April, 1957 and when the plaintiff protested, he was directed to complete the work within 15 days. Ultimately under Ex. A.36 dated 24th June, 1957 the contract was terminated. He appealed to the Divisional Engineer under Ex. A.38 and finally under Ex. A.52 dated 21st October, 1957 the plaintiffs appeal was rejected. In Ex. A.52, the Superintending Engineer, Highways as the appellate authority says that the request of the plaintiff for increased rates could not be entertained by the Department and when the contractor was asked to resume his work, he did not express his willingness to do so and it was in those circumstances, the plaintiffs appeal against the order of cancellation of the contract was rejected. According to the plaintiff the termination of the contract was illegal and he, therefore, filed an arbitration petition on 10th April 1958, before the Superintending Engineer, Madras, on 10th June, 1959 he was informed that the Superintending Engineer, Madras, was not the authority 10 arbitrate over the matters touching the contract and that the Superintending Engineer, Sivaganga, was the proper authority. The petitioner thereafter filed an arbitration claim before the Superintending Engineer, Sivaganga and also the Superintending Engineer, Tiruchi, and claimed moneys for work done under the contract and also included therein a claim for damages for premature termination of the contract, was illegal. From the records, it appears that the matter was once again taken up by the Superintending Engineer for arbitration by the Madras Division who under Ex. A.70 dated 29th May 1961 passed an award on the arbitration claim made by the petitioner as above before the various authorities already referred to. The plaintiff was dissatisfied with the award, he was of the view that the award passed by the Superintending Engineer, Madras was not in accordance with law, as the same was passed beyond the period prescribed under the Arbitration Act. He therefore, filed O.P. No. 34 of 1961 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga to set aside the same. Ultimately, under Ex. A-73 dated 29th November 1965 this court by its order set aside the award. He therefore, filed O.P. No. 34 of 1961 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga to set aside the same. Ultimately, under Ex. A-73 dated 29th November 1965 this court by its order set aside the award. Whilst the proceedings to set aside the award of the Superintending Engineer, Madras, were pending, the plaintiff filed a suit on 2nd August 1963 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Sivaganga, claiming a sum of Rs. 18,845. This amount includes a sum of Rs. 13,789 as the amount payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for works already done and the balance as interest due on the same from 24th J me 1957 the date of the termination of contract till the date of plaint. 2. The defendant in its written statement denies that the department took an unreasonable attitude towards the plaintiff. If the plaintiff was found fault with, it was on legitimate grounds. It was the plaintiff, who failed to carry out the work in spite of notices given to him to expedite the work. It is contended that the award is a valid one and that the suit is barred by time. In the additional statement a plea that the notice under S. 80 C.P.C. was invalid was also taken. 3. On the pleadings the following issues were framed. 1. Whether the State of Madras could have validly terminated the suit contract? 2. Has the State of Madras been in order in forfeiting the deposit? 3. Is the plaintiff entitled to claim value of work done quantum meruit basis and if so, in What amount? 4. Is the plaintiff entitled to claim damages and if so, in what amount? 5. Is the plaintiffs claim barred by limitation? 6. Is the suit notice hit by S. 80 of C.P.C.? XXXX 4. The learned Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga, found that the notice Ex. A.1. issued under S. 60 C.P.C. was valid and that the suit was not barred by limitation. On the question whether the contract has been validly terminated and whether time was the essence of the contract, the trial Court held that time was not the essence of the contract and that the plaintiff was not totally in fault, when he did not carry out the work as contemplated and ultimately found that the plaintiff was willing to perform his contract. 5. 5. On the issue whether the plaintiff was entitled to claim the value of work done on the principle of quantum meruit , he answered it partly in favour of the plaintiff and ultimately decreed the suit for a sum of Rs. 11,020.81 with proportionate costs? but denied the claim for damages. It is as against this, the present appeal has been filed. 6. We may at the outset make it clear that on the merits, the learned counsel for the appellant did not and could not challenge the findings of the trial court. We are not, therefore, disturbing the findings of the court below on the merits. 7. The main and the only argument of Mr. Thiagarajan, learned counsel, on behalf of the Government Pleader, is that the suit as laid is barred by limitation. According to him the cause is governed by Art. 113 of the Limitation Act and not Art. 120. He would vehemently urge that S. 14(1) of the Limitation Act has no application to the facts of the case and the time taken by the plaintiff-respondent in seeking a decision from the Arbitrator, whoever he may be under the contract Ex. B-8, ought not to be excluded as the proceedings before an Arbitrator or Arbitrators are not civil proceedings and in any event not proceedings in the Court of Original or appellate jurisdiction. It is only in cases where a cause is litigated in a wrong forum and that too in a court duly constituted by the State that the exclusion of the time involved in such misguided proceedings can be excluded for the purposes of reckoning the period of time within which a lis can be laterly brought before the appropriate and correct forum. As Art. 115 of the Act is a special article governing the situation, the residuary Art. 120 of the Act has no application. 8. No argument was addressed before us about the invalidity of the notice issued by the plaintiff under S. 80, C.P.C. 9. We have already referred to the fact that in the appeal before us no argument was addressed on merits. 8. No argument was addressed before us about the invalidity of the notice issued by the plaintiff under S. 80, C.P.C. 9. We have already referred to the fact that in the appeal before us no argument was addressed on merits. In a well considered judgment, the trial court analysed the documentary evidence and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages for the alleged breach of the contract but found that he was entitled to a decree in the sum awarded on the basis of quantum meruit . We have no hesitation in accepting that part of the judgment of the court below, on merits. It needs no modifications. 10. The question that survives, therefore, is whether the suit is barred by limitation. We shall now refer to the appropriate sections and articles in the first schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908. S. 14(1) of the Limitation Act, 1908, with which we are concerned, runs thus: “In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court, which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature is unable to enter it.” Art. 115 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, says that for compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not herein specially provided for, suit has to be laid within a period for, a suit has to be laid within a period of three years from the date when the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs, or (where the breach is continuing when it ceases.) Art. 120. which is ordinarily known as the residuary article provides that a suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the schedule, ought to be brought within six years when the right to sue accrues. 11. The relevant provision of the Arbitration Act may be referred to immediately for the purpose of ready reference. which is ordinarily known as the residuary article provides that a suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the schedule, ought to be brought within six years when the right to sue accrues. 11. The relevant provision of the Arbitration Act may be referred to immediately for the purpose of ready reference. S. 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is a special provision in that Act dealing with limitations. Under Sub-S. (1) of S. 37 of the Arbitration Act, all the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply to arbitration as they apply to proceedings in Court. Sub-S. 5 of S. 37 of the Arbitration Act runs as follows: “(5) Where the Court orders that an award to be set aside or orders, after the commencement of an arbitration, that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect with respect to the difference referred, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the Court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, for the commencement of the proceedings (including arbitration) with respect to the difference referred.” 12. In spite of the above provisions, what is contended is that as an arbitration proceeding is not a civil proceeding and it is not certainly a proceeding in a court of first instance or in a Court of appeal, the exclusion of the time of such proceedings bona fide or otherwise before an arbitrator is not available in the instance case. Reliance is placed upon the decision in Balasubramania and Company v. Penukonda Radhakrishuamurthy & others (1949) 1 M.L. 518; 62 L.W. 288, and Venkatachari & others v. L.A.R. Arunachalam Pillai & others A.T.R. 1967 Mad. 410; 80 L.W. 552. But in all fairness Mr. Thiagarajan himself referred to the decisions of the other Courts including the Privy Council and the Supreme Courts and wants to contend that the suit is out of time. 13. We have already seen that the contract was terminated under Ex. A.36 dated 24th June, 1957. The appeal agains the order of termination was confirmed by the appropriate authority under Ex. A.52 dated 21st Obtober, 1957. The suit was admittedly filed on 2nd August 1963. 13. We have already seen that the contract was terminated under Ex. A.36 dated 24th June, 1957. The appeal agains the order of termination was confirmed by the appropriate authority under Ex. A.52 dated 21st Obtober, 1957. The suit was admittedly filed on 2nd August 1963. If, therefore, the residuary Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, applies to the facts of the present case, then the suit is within time The question is whether that article would apply or Art. 115 thereto. If Art. 115 is sought to be applied, then the three years rule would automatically come into operation. The contract, according to the plaintiff, was broken unilaterally by the act of the defendant under Ex. A-52 dated 21st October, 1957. The suit for compensation for breach of such a contract ought to have been filed within three years from October, 1957. This was not done. On the other hand, the plaintiff was pursuing his remedies before certain Arbitrators, who, according to the plaintiff, were the named Arbitrators, under Ex. B-8 read with Madras Detailed Standard Specification Rules. Such Arbitration proceedings went on till 29th May, 1961, when the Superintending Engineer, Madras, parsed an award under Ex. A.70 dated 29th May, 1961. This award was set aside by the High Court under Ex. A-73 dated 29th November, 1965. In any event when the suit was filed, the application to set aside the award was pending before the appropriate Court, which had seisin of the matter in O.P. No. 34 of 1961, Sub Court, Sivaganga. In this context the suit filed in August 1973, would be in time, if the time taken by the plaintiff by initiating arbitration proceedings before one or the other Arbitrators referred to already is excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Art. 115 of the Limitation Act, 1908, read with S. 14(1) of the said Act and S. 37(1) of the Arbitration Act. 14. 14. In Balasubramania and Company v. Panukonda Radhakrishnamurthy & others 1949 I M.L.J. 518; 62 L.W. 288 Rajamannar, C.J., held that Arbitrators con-not be described as the “Court of first instance” within the meaning of S. 110 C.P.C. and the word “Court” in that section must be understood with reference to the scheme of the Code in general and referes to one of the Courts in the hierarchy of Civil Courts in the country as envisaged by the Code. This principle is relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant who says that the Court of first instance referred to in S. 14(1) of the Limitation Act, should also bear the same meaning and, therefore, it should be held that the proceedings before the Arbitrators cannot be equated to be proceedings before the Court of first instance. In the very decision, the learned Chief Justice expressed the view: “It may be that for the purpose of the Limitation Act proceedings before a Court may include proceedings before arbitrators” But the Division Bench in the context of events with which they were concerned were constrained to hold that the arbitrators cannot be described as the Court of first instance within the meaning of S. 110 C.P.C. This would mean that the question whether the proceedings before the arbitrators could be understood as proceeding? before a Court of first instance or the appellate court within the meaning of S. 14(1) of the Limitation Act, was left open by the Division Bench in that case. 15. The next case referred to is Venkatachari v. L.A.R Arunachalam Pillai & others (A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 410 80 L.W. 552.) Natesan, J. in that case has held that the defence of limitation is a creature of positive law and therefore cannot be extended to cases which do not strictly fall within the enactment and that it is an established canon of construction of the law of limitation not to enlarge the scope of statutory provisions of limitation by analony or logic. In view of the ratio in this case, it is seriously contended that as an arbitration proceeding is not a civil proceeding and as the right to exclude the time taken for fighting a civil proceeding bona fide in a wrong forum can only apply to a civil proceeding as is popularly and legally understood and as an arbitration proceeding is not recognised or equated to a civil proceeding, the benefit under S. 14(1) of the Limitation Act cannot be availed of by the plaintiff. But we have ample authority for the proposition that proceedings before the arbitrator in analogous to proceedings before a Civil Court. 16. In Ramdutt Ramakissen Dass v. E.D. Sessoon & Co. (A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 103.29 L.W. 682 which was prior to the Arbitration Act, 1940, the Privy council said that although the L imitation Act does not in terms apply to arbitration in mercantile references it is an implied term of the contract that the arbitrator must decide the dispute according to the existing law of contract, and that every defence which would have been open in a court of law can be equally propounded for the arbitrators decision unless the parties have agreed to exclude that defence. In Engineering Mazdoor satha v. Hind Cycles Ltd. (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 874.) the Supreme Court expressed the view that an arbitrator acting under S. 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is not a ‘Tribunal’ under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India even though some of the trappings of a “Court” are present in this ease. The Supreme Court made a distinction between judicial decisions and administrative orders. While courts of law established by the State decide cases brought before them judicially and the decisions thus recorded by them fall obviously under the category of judicial decisions, the decisions in several matters reached by administrative or executive bodies, fail clearly under the category of administrative or executive orders and their conclusions cannot be treated as quasi-judicial conclusions. On the basis of this decision Mr. On the basis of this decision Mr. Tyagarajan would say that the principle in S. 14(1) of the Arbitration Act, even by analogy, cannot be applied, and as an arbitrator is not equitable to a Court with the power to render a decision, the time taken by the plaintiff in approaching such arbitrators for decision, which is purely administrative in nature or quasi-judicial in the eye of law, cannot be excluded under the provisions of the Limitation Act and that therefore Art 115 of the Limitation Act is attracted automatically. If this is so, the suit laid in August, 1963 on a cause of action which arose on the basis of the Superintending Engineers decision in Ex. A52 dated 21st October 1957 would be out of time. 17. We may in passing refer to certain decisions of other Courts in India, some of which took the view that the decision of an arbitrator is a judicial decision and the proceedings before an arbitrator could by analogy be equated to civil proceedings before a Court. 18. In Fatechand Ganesharam Agarwal v. Wasudeo Shrawan Dalai A.I.R. 1948 Nag. 334 it was held that S. 3 of the Limitation Act would apply to arbitration proceedings. The Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court held the view that the word ‘court’ in S. 14 does not mean only the statutory courts but includes arbitrators and proceedings before them are civil proceedings before a court within the meaning of that section. In that light they held that the time spent in arbitration proceedings should be excluded from computation of the period of limitation for a suit instituted subsequentl y in respect of the same subject-matter provided the other requirements of S. 14 are satisfied. They applied the rule in Ramdutt Ramkissen Dass v. E.D. Seesoon and Co. A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 103; 29 L.W. 682. 19. Another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Firm Behari Lal Baij Nath Prasad v. Punjat Sugar Mills Co., Ltd. , A.I.R. 1943 All. 162 express the view that proceedings before Arbitrator appointed by the parties are civil Proceedings in a Court within the meaning of S. 14 and therefore lime spent in those proceedings must be excluded in computing limitation in subsequent suit or proceedings in the Civil Court. 162 express the view that proceedings before Arbitrator appointed by the parties are civil Proceedings in a Court within the meaning of S. 14 and therefore lime spent in those proceedings must be excluded in computing limitation in subsequent suit or proceedings in the Civil Court. No doubt, this decision was rendered without reference to the Arbitration Act, 1940 and over a subject-matter which arose before the enactment of the Arbitration Act. In M.K. Venkatachari v. L.A.R. Arunachalam Pillai A.I.R. 1967 Mad. 410; 80 L.W. 552 Natesan, J., however, was concerned with a case arose after the passing of the Arbitration Act, 1940. It was in that context be said that the law of limitation cannot enlarge the scope of statutory provisions of limitation by analogy or logic 20. The question, however, has not been considered earlier by our court in the light of the specific provisions made in the Arbitration Act itself. In view of S. 37(5) of the Arbitration Act it is not quite necessary for us to express the view whether by analogy the baneficient intention contained in S. 14 of the Limitation Act could be extended to proceedings before an arbitrator. But we may in passing say, that it would be difficult to ignore and lightly brush aside the Court of choice of the litigant and characterise such a body as dealing not with a civil proceeding. It may be that it may render a quasi-judicial decision as was said by the Supreme Court in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd. , A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 874. But nevertheless it is a binding decision as between the parties which unless set aside, is bound to enter into the stream of enforceability by such a decision being accepted in toto by Courts of law. As all decisions of arbitrators, unless set aside in a manner known to law, are decisions which Courts of law are bound to accept and pass a decree in terms thereof, such a conclusion of the arbitrators in proceedings before them in which they hear parties and pass an order cannot lightly be brushed aside as something which for all purposes has no legal force at all. Rajamannar, C.J. in Balasubramania and Company v. Penukonda Radhakrishnamurthi (1949) I M.L.J. 518. Rajamannar, C.J. in Balasubramania and Company v. Penukonda Radhakrishnamurthi (1949) I M.L.J. 518. 62 L.W. 288 expressed the view; though by way obiter dicta , that for the purpose of the Limitation Act, proceedings before a court may include proceedings before arbitrators. We respectfully adopt this opinion of an eminent jurist as the law which ought to have prevailed even prior to the passing of the Arbitration Act, 1940. In that view, the time taken by the plaintiff before the arbitrators ought to be excluded. If this is dene then S. 14 would come to the rescue of the plaintiff and would make his suit filed in 1963 in time. But, as we said, the present situation does not call for a specific pronouncement on this subject as the case is governed by S. 37(5) of the Arbitration Act. 21. Before dealing with the above aspect we may in passing say that as there is no express provision in the Limitation Act regarding the period within which a suit could be filed after arbitration proceedings are initiated, we are of the view that the residuary Art. 120 would be the proper article which would apply to the facts of this case and in this context also the suit is in time. 22. But we have a definite answer in S. 37(5) of the Arbitration Act to the question involved. S. 37 is a new section introduced in the Arbitration Act, 1940. But the text of the various sub-Sections therein point out that this section has no application to statutory arbitrations. Sub-S. (5) of S. 37 runs as follows: “Where the Court orders that an award be set aside or orders, after the commencement of an arbitration, that the arbitration agreement shall cease to have effect with respect to the difference referred, the period between the commencement of the Arbitration and the date of the order of the Court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 IX of 1908), for the commencement of the proceedings (including arbitration) with respect to the difference referred.” In view of the above distinct provision, the case law already referred to starting from the dicta of the privy council in Ramdutt Ramkissen Dass v. E.D. Sassoon & Co. A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 103; 29 L.W. 612, does not have a strict bearing on the issue under consideration. A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 103; 29 L.W. 612, does not have a strict bearing on the issue under consideration. Though we have expressed the view that the theory of analogical application of the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to private arbitrations where the arbitrators, being the court of choice of the parties ought to be considered for a limited purpose at least as a court rendering a decision having binding force, yet in view of the special provisions as above, it may not be necessary. Under Sub-S. (5) a provision very much similar to, and to use the expression of the Law Lords in the Privy Council case, analogical to S. 14 of the Limitation Act has been provided by the Arbitration Act, 1940. The period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of Court setting aside the award has to be excluded under Sub-S. (5) of S. 37 of the Arbitration Act for the commencement of subsequent proceeding which would certainly includes a civil proceeding such as a suit with respect to the same subject-matter which wa s also adjudicated upon by the arbitrators. In fact, under sub S. (5) of S. 37 a fresh arbitration proceeding also could be commenced as the words “including arbitration” appearing of the word “proceedings” would indicate. Even then the time taken during the infructuous, if such an expression can be used, arbitration proceedings undertaken by the party aggrieved, it cannot be said in the instant case that the proceeding taken by the respondent was not a bona fide proceeding. Undoubtedly, the word ‘Court’, in sub S. (5) of S. 37 would include not only the trial Court to which an application has been made to set aside the award, but also the appellate or revisional Court, as the case may be, and the time taken by the unsuccessful litigant in all such proceedings upto the stage of the Court in the highest hierarchy is certainly excludable if ultimately the award is set aside by that court. It therefore follows that even accepting the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that Art. 115 of the Limitation Act would apply and that the suit ought to have been brought up within three years from the date when the contract is broken or when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or when it ceases, even then applying the principle in S. 37(5), the suit filed in the instant case in August, 1963 would be in time. The award was passed by the Superintending Engineer, in Ex. A. 70 dated 29th May, 1961. No doubt, the respondent filed O.P. No. 34 of 1961 in the Subordinate Judges court, Sivaganga for setting aside the said award. The Subordinate Judges court did set aside the award under Ex. A.71 dated 7th February, 1964. The respondent however treated the award as a nullity as it was passed beyond the period within which only it could be passed under the Arbitration Act and took proceedings concurrently in a civil court to set aside that award which could be ignored in the eye of law. His apprehension or anticipation that the award was a nullity ultimately proved to be well founded, because the learned Subordinate Judge under Ex. A.71 set it aside on 7th February, 1964 and the High Court in C.R.P. No. 1475 of 1964 and A.A.O. No. 433 of 1964 confirmed the order of the learned Subordinate Judge under Ex. A.73 dated 29th November, 1965. When the respondent therefore entered the portals of the Civil Court by filing this suit on the same cause of action which was mooted by him before the arbitrators, he was entitled to file the suit since the award could be ignored and was a nullity in the eye of law. He filed it well within three years from the date of the award. Even otherwise, applying the essential rule adumberated in S. 37(5) of the Arbitration Act, the suit is well within time. The only contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is therefore not sustainable. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.