JUDGMENT P.N. Bakshi, J. This is an application under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for quashing an order passed in proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. attaching the subjectmatter in dispute which happens to be an educational institution situated in Mohalla Gorpar, Deoria town. On receiving a report from the police the Magistrate was satisfied that there was an apprehension of breach of peace, as such he passed the preliminary order. Considering the cases of emergency he also made an order attaching the property and appointed a Supardar. Aggrieved by this order the applicant came to this court by way of a petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. The impugned order of the Magistrate was passed on June 1, 1974. The petitioner filed the present application in this court on October 3, 19:74 and obtained an interim order staying the operation of the order of the SubDivisional Magistrate, Deoria, dated June 1, 1974. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the affidavits, counteraffidavits and rejoinder affidavits. It is admitted that the order dated June 1, 1974 has already been carried out prior to the passing of the interim stay order by this court on October 3, 1974. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion, as has been rightly contended by the learned counsel for the opposite parties, that this application has become in fructuous. It is also contended by the applicants counsel that the impugned order should be set aside on the ground of illegality. He submits that the court had no jurisdiction to attach movable property which was contained in the educational institution. I agree with the learned counsel that movable property cannot be attached in proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. but where it is a case of educational institution which has got to be run in the interest of the education of the student community, I would not be justified in interfering with the court's order, in the interest of justice, in spite of this illegality. The admitted position is that a receiver had taken possession of the institution and the same is being run If the impugned order is set aside to the extent of furniture, almirahs and other movable, the school obviously would not be able to function, on the other hand it would rather make it impossible to run the institution. The admitted position is that a receiver had taken possession of the institution and the same is being run If the impugned order is set aside to the extent of furniture, almirahs and other movable, the school obviously would not be able to function, on the other hand it would rather make it impossible to run the institution. In the interest of justice, I do not feel inclined to interfere with the order of the Magistrate, even though there is some illegality. Learned counsel then submits that the court has no power to attach the property in proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. unless a final order has been passed. I have been referred to Sections 145 (1) and 146(1) of Cr.P.C. is to the effect that: "if the Magistrate at any time after making an order under subsection (1) of Section 145 considers the case to be one of emergency......he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent court have determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof". It cannot be disputed that an order under Section 145 (1), Cr.P.C. has been passed by the Magistrate, inasmuch as after the perusal of report of the police he was satisfied that there was an apprehension of the breach of peace. As such he passed the preliminary order; and in terms of Section 146(1) he has passed an order of attachment being satisfied that the case is of emergency. Reading Sections 145(1) and 146(1), Cr.P.C. together the inference is obvious that both these sections empowers the Magistrate to pass an interim order, during the continuance of the proceedings under Section 145(1), Cr.P.C. or prior to the passing of the final order; if he considers the case of emergency. Learned counsel for the applicant next submits that under the Education Code only the District Inspector of Schools has been authorised to run an institution, but the SubDeputy Inspector of Schools has got no power to run an institution. That may be so, we are here not concerned with the provisions of the Education Code but we are concerned with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. I am of the opinion that under Section 145, Cr.P.C. any person can be appointed as a Supardar. Irrespective of the post that he holds. That may be so, we are here not concerned with the provisions of the Education Code but we are concerned with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. I am of the opinion that under Section 145, Cr.P.C. any person can be appointed as a Supardar. Irrespective of the post that he holds. For these reasons, I do not find any merit in this application which is hereby dismissed. The stay order passed by this court on October 3, 1974 stands vacated.