JUDGMENT.-The interesting question that is involved in this second appeal is who is the preferential heir between an illegitimate daughter and a ligitimate son to the stridhana property of their mother. 2. One Thulasi Animal had purchased the suit property under Exhibit A-1 dated 14th November, 1914 along with some other property. The said Thulasi Ammal had a legitimate son, Easwaraiah Naidu and an illegitimate daughter, Mani-ckammal. Thulasi Ammal died in or about 1947. Manickammal, the illegitimate daughter purported to sell the suit property under Exhibit B-1 dated 10th September, 1953 to the defendant’s father claiming herself to have become entitled to the said property by way of inheritance from her mother. The plaintiffs who are the widows of the legitimate son, Easwaraiah Naidu have filed the suit out of which the second appeal arises for a declaration of their exclusive title to the property and for recovery of possession of the same from the defendant. 3. The trial Court held, without much discussion, that Thulasi Ammal’s legiti-mate son Easwaraiah Naidu had inherited the suit property and that the plaintiffs the widows of Easwaraiah Naidu had succeeded to the same after his death. The lower appellate Court did not accept the finding of the trial Court that Easwaraiah Naidu being the legitimate son of Thulasi Ammal was her legal heir but came to the conclusion that Manickammal though an illegitimate daughter is a preferential heir to succeed to the property left by her mother, Thulasi Ammal in preference to the legitimate son, Easwaraiah Naidu. The lower appellate Court took that view following the decision of the Bench of this Court in Y. Venkanna v. N. Narayanaamma1, and the following is the passage relied on as supporting that view: “Neither the language of the Mita-kshara text nor the application of any reasonable rule of interpretation would justify the exclusion of the illegitimate children of a Hindu married woman from succeeding to their mother’s estate. Illegitimacy is no bar to succession to woman’s stridhana. Whatever may be the rules regarding succession of illegitimate sons to their putative father’s property, in so far as illegitimate stridhan heirs are concerned, either daughter or daughter’s daughter or son or son’s son, they would be entitled to succeed to their mother’s estate in preference to the other heirs. Illegitimacy is no bar to succession to woman’s stridhana. Whatever may be the rules regarding succession of illegitimate sons to their putative father’s property, in so far as illegitimate stridhan heirs are concerned, either daughter or daughter’s daughter or son or son’s son, they would be entitled to succeed to their mother’s estate in preference to the other heirs. All the illegitmate children of a woman take in accordance with Hindu law, the daughters first and failing them the sons, and that if a woman has a legitimate daughter and an illegitimate daughter, they will both, in conformity with the ancient Hindu texts, take equally”. In this second appeal the unsuccessful plaintiffs contend that their husband, Easwaraiah Naidu who was the legitimate son of Thulasi Ammal was a preferential heir and that he should be pre-ferred to her illegitimate daughter, Manickammal through whom the defendants claim title. The learned Counsel brings to my notice another decision rendered by a Bench of this Court in Meenakshi v. Muniandi2which directly dealt with the rival claims to heirship between a legitimate son and an illegitimate daughter and upheld the preferential claim of the legitimate son. In that case it was specifically held that except in the case of Sudras, among whom illegitimate sons have a right of succession, illegitimate children are not heirs under the Hindu Law, especially under the Mitakshara system, to succeed to the property of any kind left by either of their parents, and that therefore, a legitimate son of a Sudra woman, born in lawful wedlock, succeeds to the property acquired by his mother even by prostitution after the death of his father in preference to her illegitimate daughter. According to the learned Judges in that case the illegitimate daughters have no place at all not even to succeed to their mother’s estate, and they can come in, if the Crown does not intervene, only as blood relations, and the word “daughter” in the rule of Mitakshara, (Chapter II, section XI of Vignaneswara dealing with the separate property of a woman) which allows daughters to succeed to their parents’ property in certain cases, means only legitimate daughter. This decision was not cited before the lower appellate Court. This decision was not cited before the lower appellate Court. Though the decision in that case directly applies to the facts of this case, the observations of the Bench in Y. Venkanna v. N. Narayanamma1, throw considerable doubt as to the correctness of the view expressed therein. In the latter case the contest was between an illegitimate daughter and the husband’s heirs to succeed to the stridhana property of a widow. While upholding the claim of the illegitimate daughter in preference to her husband’s heirs the Bench considered the view expressed in Meenakshi v. Muniandi2and expressed an entirely different view that neither the language of the Mitakshara text nor the application of any reasonable rule of interpretation would justify the exclusion of the illegitimate children of a Hindu married woman from succeeding to their mother’s estate. According to the later decision the words “son and daughter” used in the Chapter in the Mitakshara governing succession to stridhana must be understood in their ordinary sense; an illegitimate daughter being an offspring of a woman cannot be excluded from the expression “daughter”, the intention of the Hindu Law givers was to given the words “ son and daughter”, a different and liberal sense from that in which they appear in the chapter relating to inheritance to a male propositus, and there is no reference to illegitimacy in the rule of Mitakshara, relating to succession to Hindu woman’s stridhana so that it is not possible to make any distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children in so far as succession to stridhana is concerned. Ultimately the Court in that case held that illegitimacy is no bar to succession to woman’s stridhana and that even if a legitimate daughter survived, she could not exclude the illegitimate daughter but would only be entitled to share equally with her. Ultimately the Court in that case held that illegitimacy is no bar to succession to woman’s stridhana and that even if a legitimate daughter survived, she could not exclude the illegitimate daughter but would only be entitled to share equally with her. If the law enunciated in T. Venkanna v. N. Narayanamma3, is to be accepted as correct, then it is in conflict with the law as laid down in Meenakshi v. Muniandi4, As a matter of fact in Subbayya v. Chandrayya5, where the illegitimate daughter was held entitled to succeed to the estate of a Brahmin married woman in preference to her illegitimate son, Abdul Rahman, J., referred to the decision in Meenakshi v. Muniandi4, and observed that the statement of the law in that case would have to be closely examined, though it was not necessary for the decision of the case before the learned Judge. As there is obviously a conflict between the view expressed in Meenakshi v. Muniandi4, and the one in Y. Venkanna v. N. Narayanamma 3 . I am of the view that the conflict can only be set at rest by a decision on this question by a fuller Bench. I therefore direct the papers to be placed before My Lord the Chief Justice for orders. This Second appeal having been posted this day for hearing in pursuance of the order of reference from the Honourable Mr. Justice Ramanujam, the Court delivered the following Judgment: (The Judgment of the Court was delivered by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice). 4-5. This reference raises an interesting question of Hindu Law: Whether the widows of a legitimate son are entitled to succeed to his mother’s stridhana property in preference to her illegitimate daughter? 6. Thulasi was the mother who died in 1947 leaving her legitimate son who died in 1949 and an illegitimate daughter by name Manickam. The two widows of the son survived. During her lifetime, Thulasi made over portions of certain properties which she had purchased earlier, to Manickam. The defendant’s father purchased a small extent of property from the daughter which was not covered by the conveyance of Thulasi in her favour. The suit was brought by the two widows for title and recovery of possession. The first Court decreed the suit. The defendant’s father purchased a small extent of property from the daughter which was not covered by the conveyance of Thulasi in her favour. The suit was brought by the two widows for title and recovery of possession. The first Court decreed the suit. But it was Reversed by the lower appellate Court on the view that Manickam, though an illegitimate daughter, was entitled to succeed to Thulasi as her stridhana heir. The second appeal arising out of the first appellate Court’s decree has been referred on a Bench of three Judges because there was a conflict of opinions between Meenakshi v. Muniandi1, and Venkanna v. Narayannamma2. 7. There is no text directly governing the matter. Chapter I, section 11 of Mitak-shara dealing with the separate property of women only lays down that, if a woman dies without issue, that is to say, without a daughter, or a grand-daughter, or daughter’s son, or son or son’s son, her property shall be taken by her kinsmen, namely, her husband and certain others mentioned in the text. We also find it stated in the text that in all forms of marriage, if the woman leaves a progeny, that if she has an issue, her property devolves on her daughters, which term would also include grand-daughters. Gautama points out that a woman’s property goes to her daughters unmarried or unprovided or provided as is implied by the conjunctive particle in the text. On failure of daughters, the grand-daughters in the female line take the succession under the text. At the Bar too, it was not suggested that there was any other text of Hindu Law which dealt with the rights of an illegitimate daughter. 8.Meenakshi v. Muniandi1, held that except in the case of illegitimate sons of Sudras, illegitimate children have no right of succession under the Mitakshara. Law. That was a case of a woman leaving a legitimate son and an illegitimate daughter. Sesharigi Aiyar, J., if we may say so with respect, took an extreme view-that illegitimate children had no place in Hindu Law, at least under the Mitakshara system, except in the special cases he referred to. He thought that section 11, which we referred to earlier, should be interpreted in the normal sense, that is to say, reference to a daughter there means only a legitimate daughter. The. He thought that section 11, which we referred to earlier, should be interpreted in the normal sense, that is to say, reference to a daughter there means only a legitimate daughter. The. learned Judge observed: “If the words son and daughter are used in Chapter II, section 11, placita 8, 9 and 19 in their ordinary and natural sense, it is clear that there is no foundation for the suggestion that an illegitimate daughter is within those rules”. He pointed out that if by a son in the text, only a legitimate son is understood, the word ‘daughter’ must be similarly understood. Oldfield, J., substantially agreed with Seshagiri Aiyar, J., and said: “It was then contended that references to daughters in the Mitakshara should be read as including all daughters, both legitimate and illegitimate, and that all alike should be preferred to the legitimate son as heirs to their mother. But, firstly, that is not the primary sense of these references and is unauthorised by the rules of interpretation recognised by both English and. Hindu Law”. There were other approaches to the succession there, one of which was the unchastity of the woman to whose estate the succession was in dispute. We are not concerned, with that question, Meenakshi v. Muniandi1, has thus clearly-ruled that an illegitimate daughter should give way to a legitimate son in the matter of succession to the stridhana property of their mother and this result was arrived at by what the learned Judges described as interpretation by the primary sense of the word "daughter" as indicative of only a legitimate daughter. 9.Venkanna v. Narayannamma2, was a case of a contest to a woman’s stridhana property between her husband’s brother and her illegitimate daughter. Mack and Krishnaswami Nayudu, JJ., held that an illegitimate daughter was entitled to succeed. The learned Judges in their judgments referred to Meenakshi v. Muniandi1, and though the decision was not overuled, as they could not possibly, they definitely differed from it in effect. Mack and Krishnaswami Nayudu, JJ., held that an illegitimate daughter was entitled to succeed. The learned Judges in their judgments referred to Meenakshi v. Muniandi1, and though the decision was not overuled, as they could not possibly, they definitely differed from it in effect. Both Mack and Krishnaswami Nayudu, JJ., examined the texts and the decided cases as well as leading text books on Hindu Law and opined that the property which the daughter succeeded to being stridhana, there could not be any nearer heir than the daughter and the illegitimate daughter being held entitled to succeed, any condition as to there being no nearer heirs could not have any force and the daughter’s right to succession to their mother was not based on any other basis except that she was an issue born to the mother and, therefore heir to her stridhana. Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., after referring to textual and decided cases and leading publications on Hindu Law summed up: "Neither the language of the Mitak-shara text nor the application of any reasonable rule of interpretation would justify the exclusion of the illegitimate children of a Hindu married woman from succeeding to their mother’s estate". In fact they have felt that a legitimate daughter and an illegitimate daughter should be placed equally in the mater of succession to their mother’s stridhana property. Mack, J., in this connection, stated if a woman has a legitimate daughter and an illegitimate daughter, they will both in conformity with the ancient Hindu texts, take equally". This means that the learned Judges were not prepared to apply Meenakshi v.Muniandhi1, which regarded that in the primary sense of the word daughter it had reference only to a legitimate daughter. 10.Meenakshi Ammal v. Murugayya Mooppanar3, notices that an illegitimate daughter is an heir to her mother’s stri-dhana property, though it held that she could not succeed to stridhana property of her maternal grand-mother. But the process of reasoning by which they arrived at that conclusion, we are not concerned with in the present case as it is confined to the conflict between a legi-timate son and an illegitimate daughter of a married woman with reference to her stridhana property. 11. Mulla on Hindu Law, Fourteenth Edition, points out that the illegitimate children of a Hindu woman are not excluded from inheritance to their mothers stridhana. 11. Mulla on Hindu Law, Fourteenth Edition, points out that the illegitimate children of a Hindu woman are not excluded from inheritance to their mothers stridhana. But he would add on the authority of Meenakshi v. Muniandi1that when a woman dies leaving both legitimate and illegitimate children the legitimate children are preferred to the illegitimate. The textual Hindu Law as well as decided cases have clearly laid down that succession to stridhana property is quite different and distinct from succession to the pro-perty of a male Hindu and the differences in the lines of succession is based on different theories or concepts. Succession to stridhana property is based on the blood relationship of the mother to her stridhana heirs. There is no legitimate reason why when the blood relation-ship is the basis for stridhana succession, we should interpret the word daughter in the original text above referred to as confined only to a legitimate daughter. As Trevelyan in his book on Hindu Law, Edition 3, at page 500, observed “illegitimacy is not a bar to the succession of children to their mother’s property”. It is true that he also stated that in a competition between legitimate and illegitimate children, the rights of the former prevail. Perhaps that would be so and we doubt its correctness when the competition is between a legitimate and an illegitimate daughter. But this point we do not decide in this case as it does not arise. When once an illegitimate daughter is recognised as an heir both by interpreting the word in the original text as including an illegitimate child and also on the basis of decided cases, there is no reason why the stridhana line of succession should be entirely departed from, with a view to favour the son exclusively. It is only when the stridhana line of succession is unavailing that it is permissible to go to the other line of succession. 12. On the question which we are called upon to answer where there is no inhibition expressly or impliedly to be found in the original text, Courts cannot lose sight of the progressively changing views of social outlook and insist upon only applying time-old notions. We are, with great respect, unable to concur with Seshagiri Aiyar, J., that an illegitimate daughter has no place at all under the Hindu Law except in limited cases which he pointed out. We are, with great respect, unable to concur with Seshagiri Aiyar, J., that an illegitimate daughter has no place at all under the Hindu Law except in limited cases which he pointed out. The change in the social outlook in respect of succession is reflected in the recent legislations, particularly the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which has done away with the distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy within certain limits in the matter of succession either to property of a male or a female, dying intestate. We also note that section 3 (J) which defines the word “related” has a proviso according to which illegitimate children shall be deemed to be related to their mother and to one another. In fact it goes further and says that their legitimate decendants shall be deemed to be related to them and to one another and any word expressing relationship or denoting a relative shall be construed accordingly. It seems to us that having regard to this trend of legislation reflecting the changing social approach to succession, we will be justified in interpreting the word daughter in the original text as including an illegitimate daughter as well. We are also of opinion that once an illegitimate daughter is an heir, as we hold she is, to succeed to her mother’s stridhana property, so long as she is available, the son, who is not in the nearer line of stridhana heirs, cannot have preference and exclude an illegitimate daughter. On that view, we are of opinion that Meenakshi v. Muniandi1, should be overruled. 13. The second appeal is dismissed with costs throughout.