JUDGMENT O. P. Trivedi, J. - These are seven connected second appeals arising out of judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Bahraich, dated 10-1-1966. They have been filed by Abdul Jabbar, Tarsem Lal Bugga, Mukhtar Ahmad, Noor Mohammad, Abdul Razzaq, Gulam Mahmood and Tillan and others. The appellants are tenants of certain shops of which respondents 1 and 2 of these appeals are owner-landlords. Respondent No. 4 of these appeals is Municipal Board, Bahraich and respondent No. 5 is the Executive Officer. A notice was served by the Executive Officer, Municipal Board. Bahraich, under Sec. 263 of the U. P. Municipalities Act (Thereafter referred to as the Act) on the owner-landlords of these shops directing them to demolish the shops on the ground that they were dangerous and in ruinous condition. Intimation of this notice was passed on by the owners to all these appellants who are in occupation of these shops as tenants. Thereupon the present appellants filed suits for injunction against the Municipal Board and the Executive Officer challenging validity of the notice issued under Sec. 263 of the Act on the ground amongst others that the notices had been issued by the Executive Officer in collusion with the landlords; that the shops were in safe, sound and habitable condition and not in a dangerous condition. 2. On all these counts the Munsif found against the appellants holding definitely that the shops were in dangerous and ruinous condition. Validity of the notice was in the result upheld and the suits dismissed. The appellants then took the matter in appeal to the Civil Judge, who affirmed the decision of the trial court on all the above points and dismissed the appeals. It is in these circumstances that they have come to this Court in second appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants Sri Shafiq Mirza urged before us the following points; Firstly, it was submitted that the notice issued under Sec. 263 of the Act was bad in law because it was not preceded by a show cause notice to the tenant-appellants; secondly, that the notice was illegal because the Board should have satisfied itself of the conditions required by Sec. 263 and the satisfaction of the Executive Officer, Municipal Board, is not sufficient in law. Thirdly, that the notice was bad because it was issued only to the owner-landlords and not to the occupiers and finally it is urged that the provision contained in Sec. 263 of the Act is unconstitutional as it transgressed the fundamental right of the appellants to hold property and offended Art. 19 of the Constitution. 4. Having heard the learned counsel we propose to deal with these points in the above serial order. 5. As to the first point it cannot be disputed that the notice was issued under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 263 of the Act because when immediate action is contemplated under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 263 notice is not necessary. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 263 expressly dispenses with prior notice before action when there is imminent danger to any person and property and immediate action is called for. But when immediate action is not called for action may be taken as provided for in Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 263 in which case prior notice either to the owner or to the occupier is required to be given. The notice contemplated by Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 263 is in the nature of a show cause notice, for it is a sort of warning to the person served with notice of certain action which may be taken by the Board in case the notice is not complied with. That being so, every such notice provides an opportunity to the owner and to the occupier to raise such objection before the Board as he may deem fit. There could be no question, therefore of a show cause notice being issued by the Board before issuance of a notice in terms of Sec. 263(1) of the Act. We find no force in this argument and accordingly reject it. 6. Coming to the second submission that it is the Board which should be satisfied of the conditions for issue of a notice under Sec. 263 and not the Executive Officer, we may refer to schedule II of the Act which contains a list of powers of the Executive Officer of a Municipal Board. Sec. 263 is included in this schedule of powers of the Executive Officer and empowers the Executive Officer to require by notice building etc. in a dangerous or ruinous state to be demolished or repaired. Sec. 263 is included in this schedule of powers of the Executive Officer and empowers the Executive Officer to require by notice building etc. in a dangerous or ruinous state to be demolished or repaired. It is clear, therefore, from this schedule that it was a matter for the objective satisfaction of the Executive Officer and not the Board and, therefore, reject this argument also. 7. As for the third argument that the notice under Sec. 263 should be issued both to the owner and the occupier in our judgment the language of Sec. 263 does not lend itself to such a construction. The section reads as follows : "A Board may require by notice an owner or occupier of any land or building..." The word `or' is not conjunctive as urged by the learned counsel for the appellants but is plainly disjunctive and gives an option to the Board to serve the notice either on the owner or occupier. A notice under Sec. 263 need not be served both on the owner and the occupier. 8. Coming now to the last contention and which appears to us to be the main submission in the case, we are unable to accept the argument that the provision contained in Sec. 263 of the Act commits an inroad on the fundamental rights of a citizen to hold property and offends Art. 19 of the Constitution of India in view of clause (5) of Art. 19. Clause (5) of Art. 19 says that nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said subclauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. Sec. 263 of the Act has been enacted by the Legislature in the interest of general public and in order to protect persons from physical injury caused by the falling down of a dangerous structure. Sec. 263 of the Act has been enacted by the Legislature in the interest of general public and in order to protect persons from physical injury caused by the falling down of a dangerous structure. In view of clause (5) of Art. 19, therefore, operation of Sec. 263 of the Act shall not be affected by the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 19 if Sec. 263 imposes reasonable, restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental right of a citizen in the interest of general public. The question arises whether Sec. 263 imposes a reasonable restriction on the right of a citizen to hold properly in terms enacted by the section. Whether certain statute imposes reasonable restriction on fundamental right within the meaning of clause (5) of Art. 19 or not must always be a question of fact and must be determined on a balance of the right of the individual and the object intended to be served by the statutory restriction and with reference to the objective test whether the restriction sought to be imposed by the Legislature has a reasonable relation to the authorised purpose. The Board has been given the power to require the demolition or repair of a building, wall, tank or other structure when it appears to the Board to be in a ruinous condition or dangerous to the persons and property. Therefore, the danger posed to the life and property of the citizen by the condition of a building wall, tank or other structure has to be balanced against the individual rights of the citizen. Where a building is in such a ruinous condition that it may be expected to fall any time and thereby endanger life and property then it would be clearly reasonable to restrict the individual right of the owner or occupant of the building in order to safeguard and protect the public in general and the occupant in particular from physical injury. Individual good must give way to common or general good. Sec. 263 in our judgment, therefore, imposes a reasonable restriction within the meaning of clause (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. The question whether restriction sought to be imposed by statute is reasonable and the principles on which this question may be determined came up before American Courts in several cases. In the case of Brushaber v. Union R.R. Co., (1916) 240 U.S. 1. The question whether restriction sought to be imposed by statute is reasonable and the principles on which this question may be determined came up before American Courts in several cases. In the case of Brushaber v. Union R.R. Co., (1916) 240 U.S. 1. it was observed that the question whether the restriction sought to be imposed by the legislation is reasonable must be decided with reference to the objective test viz., "whether the restriction has a reasonable relation to the authorised purpose or is an arbitrary one". In the case of Schneider v. State, (1939) 308 U.S. 147, it was observed: "In each case the Court has to take the delicated and difficult task to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights." 9. The problem before the Court is always to hold the balance between two conflicting interests which equally demand protection from the Court. It was observed in American Communication Association v. Nouds, (1950) 339 U.S. 382 : "When particular conduct is regulated in the interect of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgement of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented." Having regard to these well recognised principles and applying the objective test whether the restriction has a reasonable relation to the authorised purpose or whether it is purely arbitrary we have no hesitation in holding that there is such a relationship clearly established between the action contemplated by the notice and the purpose sought to be served by it and further that the no lice was not the result of arbitrary action. We, therefore, hold that the provision contained in Sec. 263 of the Act does not offend Art. 19 of the Constitution and is, legal and constitutional due to clause (5) of Art. 19. 10. One of the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants in arguments was that the shops in question have not fallen down during all these years since notice was issued. 10. One of the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants in arguments was that the shops in question have not fallen down during all these years since notice was issued. In so far as this submission is concerned think it is irrelevant so far as we are concerned because it is a question of fact whether the shops have remained intact all these years or whether any portion of these shops has fallen down. No such plea was raised by the appellants in the courts below and the respondents have had no opportunity to meet it by evidence. Apart from this, even if one were to assume for a moment that the shops have remained intact that in itself cannot be a ground for interference with a finding of fact recorded by the courts below to the effect that the shops were in dangerous and ruinous condition and that the Executive Officer had jurisdiction to issue notice under Sec. 263. That finding of fact is binding on this Court in second appeal. 11. Having found that the points of law raised before us cannot be sustained these appeals must fail and are, therefore, dismissed with costs to respondents 1 and 2. This judgment shall govern all aforesaid seven second appeals. Let a copy of this judgment be placed on each of the files of Second Civil Appeal Nos. 199 of 1966, 200 of 1966, 219 of 1966, 220 of 1966, 221 of 1966 and 222 of 1966. We grant a months time to the appellants to vacate the disputed shops after which it will be open to the Municipal Board to take such action as they may be authorised to take under law. The stay order is vacated.