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1974 DIGILAW 47 (RAJ)

Dharam Chand v. State of Rajasthan

1974-01-18

M.L.JOSHI

body1974
JUDGMENT 1. - These five writ petitions involve the challenge to the validity of the scheme No. 480 whereby amongst others Bikaner - Jaisalmer and Bikaner - Churu routes have been nationalised. Dharamchand, Sanwarmal and Ganeshmal are said to be operators on Churu-Sujangarh routes, whereas Girdharilal is an operator on Bikaner Sardarsahar route. They seek to challenge the scheme for nationalising Bikaner-Churu route on various grounds which shall be referred to hereinafter. Mohan Lal seeks to challenge the nationalisation of Bikaner-Jaisalmer route. It is not in dispute that routes of the petitioners are partially over lapped and thereby affected on account of the nationalisation of the aforesaid two routes. They therefore, challenge the nationalisation of the aforesaid two routes on various grounds many of which are common. 2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the aforesaid five writ petitions it will be appropriate to give material facts which are : The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, hereinafter called the Corporation published a draft scheme No. 480 in the Rajasthan Rajpatra dated 5th of February, 1973, under section 68. C of the Motor Vehicles Act, hereinafter called the Act for nationalisation of the following 7 routes:- (1) Bikaner - Jaisalmer (2) Bikaner - Kolayat (3) Bikaner - Pokaran (4) Bikaner - Phalodl (5) Bikaner - Kadamsar (6) Bikaner - Gajner (7) Bikaner - Churu Objection were invited in the said notification from the interested persons affected by the scheme. I am concerned here only with the nationalisation of the Bikaner-Churu and Bikaner-Jaisalmer routes. In response to the said notification Dharmachand, Sanwarmal and Bhoorsingh who is alleged to be the predecessor-in-title of Ganeshlal (the petitioner in writ petition No. 1849 of 1973) and Mohan Lal lodged objections with the Home Department of the State of Rajasthan which were forwarded to the Deputy Legal Remembrancer No. 1 for disposal. Girdharilal petitioner in writ petition No. 1822 of 1973 however did not choose to prefer any objection to the said scheme. The Deputy Legal Remembrancer after recording the evidence of the parties and after giving them hearing came to the conclusion that the impugned scheme would provide efficient, adequate, economical and coordinated road transport services and shall be in public interest. The Deputy Legal Remembrancer after recording the evidence of the parties and after giving them hearing came to the conclusion that the impugned scheme would provide efficient, adequate, economical and coordinated road transport services and shall be in public interest. He accordingly approved the schemes for the aforesaid two routes to the total exclusion of the private operators on the whole route or portions thereof by his order dated 2nd November, 1973. All the five writ petitioners feel aggrieved by the impugned order dated 2nd November, 1973 and have, therefor, come up in this Court by way of application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and inter-alia prayed for quashing the impugned order and further to restrain the non-petitioners from publishing the impugned draft schemes. It has also been prayed by the petitioners that the non petitioners be restrained from giving effect to the said schemes and further to restrain the concerned authorities from cancelling/curtailing their permits. The Corporation has opposed the petitions on various grounds which shall be referred to in the course of dealing with the arguments of the parties. 3. Mr. J.C. Ghhangani has addressed me in the writ petitions Nos. 1808 and 1820 of 1973, and Shri B.L. Maheshwari has addressed me in writ petitions No. 1821, 1822 and 1849 of 1973 on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. R.N. Munshi has addressed on behalf the Corporation. As already stated many grounds of attack on the impugned schemes are common. I propose to deal the common grounds of attack first and shall then address myself to additional grounds which were raised by the learned counsel for the parties. 4. The first common ground of attack is that the scheme was not prepared by the Corporation nor was the resolution required by section 68 C of the Act passed by the Corporation. It was argued that the Corporation was superseded and it was not in existence and, therefore, no scheme for nationalisation could be undertaken in the absence of a resolution by the Road Transport Corporation. It is true that the Corporation was superseded by the State Government and an Administrator was looking after the affairs of Corporation on the material date. The administration of the Corporation vested in the Administrator who was competent to discharge the functions of the Corporation including those referred to in section 68 C of the Act. It is true that the Corporation was superseded by the State Government and an Administrator was looking after the affairs of Corporation on the material date. The administration of the Corporation vested in the Administrator who was competent to discharge the functions of the Corporation including those referred to in section 68 C of the Act. The contention need not detain me any longer as it stands concluded by the Division Bench Authority of this Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1218 of 1973 (Kulwant Rai v. State of Rajasthan and others) decided on 26th September, 1973 . In the aforesaid Division Bench case it has been held that the Administrator who looks after the affairs of the Corporation is competent to discharge the functions of the Corporation. As a necessary corollary the Administrator is competent to initiate and prepare the scheme as contemplated under section 68.C of the Act. 5. It was then contended that the opinion as required under section 68. C of the Act was not formed by the Administrator nor was the scheme prepared by him. It was further submitted that the publication of the scheme was also not according to the provisions of section 68.C of the Act. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this behalf is that first of all the competent authority before preparing scheme should form an opinion that for the purposes of providing efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport services it is necessary in the public interest that the road transport service in general or any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the State Road Transport Undertaking to the exclusion complete or partial of other persons or otherwise. After forming the requisite opinion the competent authority is then to undertake the task of preparation of the scheme giving particulars of the nature of the service proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed to cover and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed. When the scheme is prepared as mentioned above, then such scheme shall cause to be published in the official Gazette and also in such other manner as the State Government may direct. When the scheme is prepared as mentioned above, then such scheme shall cause to be published in the official Gazette and also in such other manner as the State Government may direct. Learned Counsel urges that the formation of opinion, the preparation of the scheme and the publication thereof were not in accordance with the provisions of section 68.C of the Act and therefore the scheme is bad in law and deserves to be quashed. 6. The first point that falls for consideration is whether the requisite opinion as contemplated by section 68.C of the Act was formed by the Administrator or not. Both the learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the opinion was nor formed by the Administrator as the scheme was prepared by the officers of the Corporation before formation of the opinion by the Administrator. After examining the record I am of the opinion that there is no substance in this contention. It is to be remembered that the Administrator has to carry on multifarious functions and the great volume of work entrusted to him, it becomes essential for him to take the assistance of subordinates in the department in the matter of collection of necessary data draft work and other official acts, facilitating the task of the Administrator to take decision on relevant point referred to under section 68.C of the Act. From Ex. R/1 it appears that in pursuance of the policy to expand operation providing efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport services broad survey of certain areas of the State was carried out by Satendranath the officer of the Corporation along with one Shri D.R. Madan Depot Manager Planning. As a result of that survey Shri Statendranath put a proposal that the various routes mentioned in Ex. R/1 if nationalised would be conducive to achieve the four fold objects referred to in section 68.C of the Act and shall also be in public interest. The impugned schemes also found place in this proposal. This proposal was also countersigned by Deputy General Manager on 30th of January, 1973, and came to be placed before the General Manager. The General Manager observed that before submitting the proposal to the Administrator he would like to discuss with the Regional Manager (Commercial). The impugned schemes also found place in this proposal. This proposal was also countersigned by Deputy General Manager on 30th of January, 1973, and came to be placed before the General Manager. The General Manager observed that before submitting the proposal to the Administrator he would like to discuss with the Regional Manager (Commercial). The Regional Manager after discussion submitted the proposal for the approval of the Administrator as will appear from the paras from 1/N to 7/N in Ex. R/1. These proposals came up for consideration of the Administrator on 1.2.1973 vide para 6/N in R/1 and the Administrator after examination the matter observed that the draft scheme for nationalisation of the routes mentioned in the Regional Manager (P's) note be prepared. Shri Mangal Behari in his affidavit dated 11th November, 1973, deposed that after some time on the same day i.e. on 1st of February in compliance with his directions given in 6/N, the General Manager of the Corporation vide para 7/N of R/1 submitted a draft of the draft scheme along with data obtained on the basis of survey as referred in R/1 for the approval of the Administrator in respect of the seven routes mentioned in the note including the two disputed routes. This draft of the draft scheme was submitted before Shri Mangal Behari on 1.2.1973 and was examined by him on 2nd of February, 1973, and after perusing paras 1/N to 7/N in R/1, Shri Mangal Behari came to form a requisite opinion necessary for a valid scheme under section 68.C of the Act. It will be useful to reproduce the extract of N/8 from Ex. R/1 which has got a material bearing on the controversy raised before me. "I have looked into the proposal put up to nationalise the routes in para 1/N to 7/N." I am of the opinion that for providing efficient, adequate, cononomical and properly coordinated road transport services of Bikaner-Jaisalmer, Bikaner-Kolayat, Bikaner-Pokaran. Bikaner-Phalodi, Bikaner-Kadamsar, Bikaner-Gajner and Bikaner-Churu routes should be run and operated by the State Road Transport Undertaking (R S R T C) to the complete exclusion of other persons." The above extract will completely negative the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the opinion was not formed by the Administrator. Bikaner-Phalodi, Bikaner-Kadamsar, Bikaner-Gajner and Bikaner-Churu routes should be run and operated by the State Road Transport Undertaking (R S R T C) to the complete exclusion of other persons." The above extract will completely negative the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the opinion was not formed by the Administrator. As already stated, merely because the Administrator used the materials collected by the subordinate agencies of the Corporation is not destructive of the fact that the Administrator did not form the opinion. The materials were before the Administrator and he was free to turn down the proposal made by the subordinate agencies or modify it. Administrator after duly examining the proposal was of the view that the proposed scheme in regard to the 7 routes including the two disputed routes would fulfil the four fold object of providing efficient, adequate and properly coordinated road transport service and was in public interest. This is enough for constituting a valid opinion by the Administrator for initiating the scheme for nationalisation of the routes. Heavy burden lies on the party alleging that no opinion was formed by the Administrator, which the petitioners have failed to discharge. There is, therefore, no substance in this contention. 7. The next ground of attack on the scheme is that the scheme was not prepared by the Administrator but by the General Manager who was not competent to prepare the draft scheme under section 68.C of the Act. The submission of the learned counsel in this behalf is that the draft scheme of nationalisation should have originated from the Administrator who should have actually prepared the scheme. This contention has also no force. It may be recalled that the draft of the draft scheme in the instant case was prepared by the General Manager who submitted the same along with a detailed note regarding the survey of various routes for the consideration of the Administrator. The Administrator after examining it gave his approval to the draft of the draft scheme. According of consent by the Administrator is nothing but adopting the draft of the draft scheme and when he put the seal of his approval then for all intents and purposes it will be taken that the scheme was prepared by the Administrator himself. The Administrator after examining it gave his approval to the draft of the draft scheme. According of consent by the Administrator is nothing but adopting the draft of the draft scheme and when he put the seal of his approval then for all intents and purposes it will be taken that the scheme was prepared by the Administrator himself. Once the draft scheme is approved by the Administrator there is no gain saying the fact that it becomes the scheme prepared by Administrator himself. When the Administrator after considering the draft scheme adopted it then it will be quite legitimate to hold that the scheme had originated from him. Even otherwise, in view of Rules 3 and 4 of the State Road Transport Service (Development) Rules 1965, hereinafter to be referred to as the Rules, the General Manager is also competent to prepare the scheme as held in Sitaram v. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 281 of 1971) . 8. It was then argued that the scheme was not validity published as required under section 68.C of the Act. It is said that the scheme was approved by the Administrator on 5.2.1973 whereas it was published in the Gazette on 3.2.1973. Strong reliance has been made on the observation of the Deputy Legal Remembrancer in his impugned order wherein the Deputy Legal Remembrancer has observed that the opinion was formed on 2.2.1973 by the Administrator whereas the draft scheme contained in the notification meant for publication was approved by the Administrator on 5.2.1973. It is contended that the Administrator did not apply his judicial mind to the draft scheme as the same was sent for publication before receiving approval by the Administrator on 3.2.1973. As will be shown hereinafter the contention has no legs to stand. Before the Legal Remembrancer only paras N/8 and N/17 of Ex. R/1 were produced and it appears that none of the parties including the Deputy Legal Remembrancer had been able to correctly comprehend the import of paras N/8 and N/17. The Deputy Legal Remembrancer was in error when he took para N/8 in Ex. R/1 to be merely an opinion resolution. In fact N/8 is a composite document embodying in it, the fact of formation of opinion, the preparation of the scheme and direction for its publication as well. The Deputy Legal Remembrancer was in error when he took para N/8 in Ex. R/1 to be merely an opinion resolution. In fact N/8 is a composite document embodying in it, the fact of formation of opinion, the preparation of the scheme and direction for its publication as well. The remaining portion of N/8 which has not yet been extracted deserves to be reproduced here to bring out its true import. "I, therefore, approve the preparation of the scheme of nationalisation for the said routes and authorise the General Manager (R S R T C) to publish the same scheme in the official Gazette as required under section 68.C of the Motor Vehicles Act." 9. From the above extract it will appear that Shri Mangal Behari the Administrator gave the his approval to the draft scheme and also directed to publish it. This fact is further corroborated by the affidavit of Shri Mangal Behari wherein it has been deposed that a proposal for nationalising 20 routes mentioned in note-sheets vide paras 1 to 5 was put before him on 1.2.1973 and he after considering the proposal directed for the preparation of the draft of the draft scheme on 2.2.1973. The General Manager of the Corporation in compliance with the direction submitted the draft of the draft scheme in respect of 7 routes including the routes in dispute, which was approved by the Administrator on the same day and authorised the General Manager for publication of the draft scheme in the official gazette as required under section 68.C of the Act. The notification containing the draft scheme was submitted to the Administrator on the same day which was approved by him and after his approval the same was sent to the State Government for publication vide No. 400 on 3.2.1973 and was accordingly published in the Rajasthan Rajpatra Extraordinary dated 5.2.1973. From the foregoing facts it is established that the approval was given by the Administrator to the draft scheme in dispute on 2.2.1973 prior to its publication and not on 5.2.1973 as erroneously mentioned by the Deputy Legal Remembrancer No.1. Learned counsel for the petitioner then drew my attention to para N/17 in Ex. R/1 to suggest that the draft scheme was sent for publication prior to its having received approval from the Administrator. Apparently para N/17 of Ex. Learned counsel for the petitioner then drew my attention to para N/17 in Ex. R/1 to suggest that the draft scheme was sent for publication prior to its having received approval from the Administrator. Apparently para N/17 of Ex. R/1 gives some support to the petitioners' contention but on a careful examination, it appears that the mistake had crept in on account of defective nothing on the part of the General Manager which had resulted in the endorsement in regard to the publication of the notification in respect of the scheme in dispute. It may be recalled that the Administrator vide his para N/17 in R/1 gave his consent to the preparation of the scheme for nationalisation for as may as 20 routes. The draft of the scheme for nationalisation in regard to the disputed scheme had already been approved and so also the notification for its publication on 2.2.1973. Indeed the notification has been despatch for publication vide No. 400 dated 3.2.1973, to the State Government. The General Manager while submitting the draft schemes for remaining 13 routes and notification in that behalf also made reference to the notification in regard to the disputed draft scheme and the same was repeated by the Administrator in para N/17. Much cannot be made out by the Petitioner from para N/17, in as much as the notification in regard to the disputed scheme was sent as back as on 3.2.1973 for publication after its approval by the Administrator and therefore, there is no justification for the argument that the notification for publication of the draft scheme in question was sent prior to the according of approval by the Administrator to the draft scheme. It was then contended that para No. N/8 and some other paras in Ex. R/1 were subsequently fabricated. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the affidavit of one Vimal Prakash who has deposed that he had been attending the hearing in regard to the nationalisation of the routes in question and that he had perused the record of the proceedings of the Corporation in connection with the forming of the opinion on the date of hearing of the preliminary objections. He has further stated that he also perused the concerned records on 20th of October, 1973, but it was not the same record as it stood at that time and has been substantially improved/replaced. He has further tried to controvert the version of Shri. Mangal Bihari to the effect that he accorded approval to the scheme on submission of note (Para No. N/17 by the General Manager on 2.2.73. The affidavit of Vimal Prakash does not carry conviction with me. First it is vague as it does not particularise in what manner the changes have been made in the record of the Corporation Secondly Vimal Pakash is an interested person. He has been controverted by Shri Narain Hihari Adv. who is alleged to have been shown the record. Narain Bihari in his affidavit dated 27.11.73 has refused the allegation of Vimal Prakash. Vimal Prakash's say cannot be accepted in preference to the say of Narain Bihari. The suspicion in this regard appears to have been created in the minds of the objectors on account of para N/17 in Ex. R/1 but such suspicion as explained earlier is not well founded. 10. It was next contended that the opinion formed as to nature of services was in respect of Road Transport Service but the General Manager while sending the scheme for publication altered the nature of services to stage carriage and contract carriage which he had no jurisdiction to do. It was argued that the opinion as to the nature of services and area and the route has to be formed by the Administrator and the General Manager was not competent to modify the scheme in regard to nature of services. It is submitted that the scheme was bad as the opinion formed as to the nature of services was in regard to road transport services in general while the draft scheme sent for publication was restricted to passenger services i.e. stage carriage and contract carriage and that too by the General Manager. There is no substance in this contention either. It is true in the opinion so formed there is a reference to Road Transport Services which according to learned counsel includes passenger or goods service both. It cannot be disputed that Road Transport Service includes stages carriage as well as contract carriage vide Premchand v. State of M.P., AIR 1965 M.P. 196 (207) . It is true in the opinion so formed there is a reference to Road Transport Services which according to learned counsel includes passenger or goods service both. It cannot be disputed that Road Transport Service includes stages carriage as well as contract carriage vide Premchand v. State of M.P., AIR 1965 M.P. 196 (207) . Moreover the words 'road transport services' referred to in the opinion resolution para N/8 of the Administrator if read in the context of para N/1 of Ex. R/1 cannot but mean passenger services which include stage carriage and contract carriage. In para N/1 while dealing with nature of services there is reference to number of passenger buses. This clearly indicates that the nature of service had reference to passenger service & not to transport service in general. It is also incorrect to say that nature of services were limited by the General Manager. The notification containing the draft scheme was approved & considered to by the Administrator before it was sent for publication and that had specific reference to stage carriage and contract carriage only in order & it has not been prejudiced on this score. The contention is therefore rejected. 11. Mr. B.L. Maheshwari contended that the three stages in regard to (i) formation of opinion, (ii) preparation of scheme and (iii) its publication should have been evidenced by separate resolutions and para N/1 in Ex. R/1 is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of section 68.C of the Act. I am unable to accept this contention. These three stages can be complied with by one resolution so long as the requirements of section 68.C of the Act are fulfilled. It is to be borne in mind that the Administrator had formed the opinion first on the materials supplied by its subordinate staff and then he had directed for the preparation of the draft scheme which later on being submitted to him was approved by him and then there was a direction for its publication. As these things had taken place on the same day the resolution came to embody all the three stages as contemplated under section 68.C of the Act. There can therefore be no room for argument that the resolution dated 2.2.1973 referred to at para N/8 of Ex. R/1 is not sufficient to meet the requirements of section 68. C of the Act. 12. There can therefore be no room for argument that the resolution dated 2.2.1973 referred to at para N/8 of Ex. R/1 is not sufficient to meet the requirements of section 68. C of the Act. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners then raised some objections on merits of the impugned scheme. First it was contended that the impugned scheme relating to Bikaner-Churu did not provide for efficient, adequate, economic and coordinated transport services as the number of services catering on the affected route were more than those provided in the scheme. Previously the affected routes were catered by more services where as under the impugned scheme lesser services have been provided. This matter has been dealt with by the Deputy Legal Remembrancer who had after considering the evidence of the objectors Sanwarmal and Dharamchand and their two witnesses, namely, Ramesh Chand Mishra and Kishanchand and other factors has recorded the following finding:- "Thus after considering all the factors and the evidence produced by the parties I am of the view that the scheme shall provide efficient, economic, coordinated and adequate passenger road transport services and shall be in public interest. No modification is required." 13. This finding has been arrived at after appreciation of the evidence and is not liable to be questioned in the writ of certiorari, as it has not been shown that it is manifestly erroneous. Learned counsel in this behalf urged that it was for the Corporation to demonstrate that the scheme in question was efficient, economic, adequate and would provide co-ordinated transport passenger service. It is difficult to concede to this contention. It is not for the Corporation to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the objectors. The burden lies on the objectors to show that the impugned scheme will not serve the four fold objects contemplated under section 68.C and is not in public interest. The main grievance of the petitioner in this behalf is that the number of services provided in this scheme are deficient to meet the requirements of the travelling public. No proof has been led as to the actual requirement of the travelling public and how it shall be deficient. Merely because number of services have been curtailed by itself will not be sufficient to come to the conclusion that the services to be provided by the Corporation are not adequate. No proof has been led as to the actual requirement of the travelling public and how it shall be deficient. Merely because number of services have been curtailed by itself will not be sufficient to come to the conclusion that the services to be provided by the Corporation are not adequate. It has not been brought on the record what was the sitting capacity in the existing operation buses and what accommodation is going to be provided by the Corporation buses. In the circumstances it is difficult to interfere with the finding of fact of the Dy.Legal Remembrancer in this regard. No suggestion has even been attempted to be made by the petitioners that the scheme will be uneconomic or inefficient. 14. Next it was contended that the scheme in question will disintegrate the existing route by curtailing them into such small routes which will not be viable. It was further contended that the breaking of the existing route shall also cause inconvenience to the travelling public who shall be deprived of the direct services over the existing routes. This argument is without any force. The Corporation is within its competence to cover whole routes or areas or part of the routes or areas. If the scheme operates partially some transhipment would be necessary but coordination would still be there because where the Corporation buses would come to a halt, the private buses will take the passengers. I am fortified in this view of mine by C.P.C. Motor services v. State of Mysore, AIR 1986 SC 1661 and Vishwanath Rao v. State, AIR 1966 Mys. 104 . As regards the argument that the curtailed routes will not be viable routes and the private operators will not ply on such routes thereby the public will be left without travelling facilities on such routes is based on fear of hypothetical nature. Even if such a contingency might arise, the Corporation has by its resolution dated 25.5.73 resolved that in such contingency it will ply its buses on such routes and the general public will not be put to any inconvenience on account of want of travelling facilities on such routes. 15. Another attack on the validity of the scheme was that the scheme did not specify the portions of the routes which are being over lapped and thus adversely affected by the scheme. 15. Another attack on the validity of the scheme was that the scheme did not specify the portions of the routes which are being over lapped and thus adversely affected by the scheme. Reference in this regard has been placed on Shrinivas v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 SC 350 . In that case the scheme was for the routes or any portions thereof. The discretion was thus left with the Government to cater services on a route or portion thereof according to its sweet will and consequently there was a likelihood of discrimination being practised as Government had an option to implement the scheme in a piece-meal manner without having obligation to provide services on the routes specified in the scheme. It was on that account that the Supreme Court struck down the scheme. It cannot be inferred from that case that it is obligatory on the Corporation to specify the existing routes which are being adversely affected by the disputed scheme in question. The scheme in question is that of a total exclusion and there is no necessity of specifying the affected intermediary routes in it. 16. Another argument of Mr. Chhangani is that there were three schemes, namely 3184 dated 13th September, 1972, No. 480 dated 3.2.1973 and No. 502 dated 5.2.1973 which according to the learned counsel they were inter connected schemes as they affected some of the connected routes and should have been decided simultaneously but instead the disputed scheme was picked out and decided which was in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and also against the principles of natural justice and fair play. The contention is based on the observations of the Supreme Court in Shrinivas v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 SC 350 where in the Supreme Court has disapproved the power of the Corporation to carry the scheme in a piecemeal manner and thereby practise discrimination against some operators. This case has been distinguished in Kondala Rao v. Andh. Pra. S.R.T. Corporation, AIR 1961 SC 82 wherein the Supreme Court has categorically said that its observations in Shrinivas v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 SC 350 never meant that there could not be any phased programme in the nationalisation of the transport services in the State or in the District. Pra. S.R.T. Corporation, AIR 1961 SC 82 wherein the Supreme Court has categorically said that its observations in Shrinivas v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 SC 350 never meant that there could not be any phased programme in the nationalisation of the transport services in the State or in the District. The three schemes referred to above by the learned counsel were published on different dates and relate to distinct routes and I do not see any legitimate objection to the decision of the scheme in question without deciding the remaining two schemes simultaneously. It has not been shown by the learned counsel for the petitioners that there will be any violation of the principles of natural justice or fair play on account of not deciding the remaining two schemes simultaneously. 17. Mr. B.L. Maheshwari attempted to make an ingenious attack that the approved scheme could result in discrimination as it gives unfettered discretion to the Corporation to ply its vehicle on the route or portion thereof. In this connection the learned counsel has referred to me to the operative portion of the impugned order dated 2nd November, 1973, which runs as follows:- "The scheme is approved for the total exclusion of all private operators on the whole routes or portion thereof. No private operator shall ply any stage carriage or contract carriage on the route/highway underlying these routes or portions thereof." Much is being made out from the words "or portion thereof" occurring in this operative paragraph. The contention is based on the misapprehension of the words imported from operative portion of the order. The impugned order does not give unfettered discretion to the Corporation to ply the buses at its sweet will. All that the operative order meant is that the private operators shall be debarred from plying any stage carriage or contract carriage on the route/highway or portions thereof. The words 'portions thereof' in this operative portion has reference to the restriction put on the private operators in the matter of plying their vehicles on the routes covered by the scheme & do not confer any discretion on the Corporation to ply buses on the portion of a route covered by the scheme. 18. Mr. Chhangani raised additional contention on behalf of the petitioner Mohanlal in respect of Jodhpur-Jaisalmer route covered by the scheme. 18. Mr. Chhangani raised additional contention on behalf of the petitioner Mohanlal in respect of Jodhpur-Jaisalmer route covered by the scheme. The learned counsel urged that the scheme in regard to this route is not adequate as the services to be rendered by the Corporation were lesser in number than those being rendered by the private operators. It was urged that as many as 20 passenger services were being provided on this route. This contention is not based on correct facts. As will appear from Ex. P.9 in Mohan Lal's petition, only 16 services are being provided on the affected route whereas under the scheme with regard to that route there is a provision for 24 services as will appear from Ex. 8 in the said writ petition. The contention that the scheme is not adequate is, therefore, without any valid basis and deserves to be rejected. 19. Mr. B.L. Maheshwari also raised an additional ground in regard to Ganeshmal's writ petition. It was urged that Ganeshmal was a transfree from one Bhoorsingh who had filed representations against the scheme but the same were not decided by the Deputy Legal Remembrancer. It is true that Bhoor Singh had submitted objections on 7th March against the disputed scheme. The question, however, is whether those objections will ensure for the benefit of the petitioner Ganeshmal. Mr. Rajnarain has contended that Ganeshmal had no locus standi to bring the writ petition. His submission is that there is no evidence to show that Ganeshmal is a transferee from Bhoor Singh In para 8 of the writ petition Ganeshmal of course averred that he is a transferee from one Bhoorsingh. The Corporation has denied the fact of transfer in its reply. No permit has been produced by Ganeshmal in his favour nor there is any document evidencing transfer in his favour. Ganeshmal therefore has no right to challenge the scheme by way of writ petition. All the contentions raised by the petitioners, therefore, do not warrant any interference. 20. It may also be mentioned that the three writ petitions, namely, that of Girdharilal, Sanwarmal and Dharamchand deserve to be dismissed on another ground also. Girdharilal did not file objections to the scheme before the Deputy Legal Remembrancer as required by Rule 5 of the Rules. All the contentions raised by the petitioners, therefore, do not warrant any interference. 20. It may also be mentioned that the three writ petitions, namely, that of Girdharilal, Sanwarmal and Dharamchand deserve to be dismissed on another ground also. Girdharilal did not file objections to the scheme before the Deputy Legal Remembrancer as required by Rule 5 of the Rules. Rule 5 of the Rules prescribes the manner in which the objection has to be filed to contest the scheme by an affected party. Rule 6 (5) of the Rules provides for the consequences for failure to file the objection by debarring the persons from contesting the scheme. Admittedly Girdharilal did not file the objections before the Deputy Legal Remembrancer. When a party having right to file objections fails to avail it, it is not open to him to subsequently contest the scheme under Article 226 of the Constitution vide D.T. Officer v. S.T.A. Tribunal, AIR 1962 Kerala 335 . Girdharilal's writ petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed on this score alone. 21. It was further urged by Mr. R.N. Munshi that Sanwarmal and Dharamchand had no subsisting right to challenge the disputed scheme as their permits had exhausted during the pendency of the writ petitions. It was submitted by Mr. Munshi that it has not been shown nor it has been alleged in the writ petitions that the above referred two petitioners had made an application for renewal of their permits before the concerned authority. It was further submitted that even assuming that applications for renewal are pending before the concerned authority, in the absence of a prayer for mandamus for a direction for renewal of permits no relief can be granted and the petitions have become infructuous. In this connection my attention has been invited to Green Bus v. State, AIR 1968 Raj 169 . That is a Division Bench Decision. In that case also, the permits of some of the petitioners had exhausted during the pendency of the writ petition. The point was raised by the learned Deputy Government Advocate in the case that the writ petition had become infructuous as the petitioner had not asked for mandamus for directing the concerned authority to renew their permit. In that case also, the permits of some of the petitioners had exhausted during the pendency of the writ petition. The point was raised by the learned Deputy Government Advocate in the case that the writ petition had become infructuous as the petitioner had not asked for mandamus for directing the concerned authority to renew their permit. That point found favour with the Division Bench in the above case & it was held that in such a case petitions had become infructuous as the permits of the petitioners had expired during the pendency of the writ petitions and the petitioners had not made a prayer for mandamus for issuing direction for renewal of their permits. That is exactly the position in the above mentioned two petitions before me. The petitioner Dharamchand and Sanwarmal's permits had exhausted during the pendency of the writ petitions and in the absence of any material to show that they had applied for renewal and further in the absence of a prayer for direction by way of mandamus for renewal of the permits, the writ petitions of the aforesaid two petitioners have become infructuous and the same deserve to be dismissed as having become infructuous also for the simple reason that a right to maintain a petition postulates subsisting personal right in the claim which the petitioner makes and in the protection of which he is personally interested. It has been held in Kalyan Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 1183 that even if the petitioner at the date of petition filed in the High Court held a permit which was to ensure ensure till a certain date, if the permit was validly terminated from the date specified he will not be entitled to any relief. As stated earlier in the above mentioned writ petitions the permits had expired during the pendency of the writ petitions and, therefore, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief on this ground also. 22. In view of the foregoing discussion there is no force in all these writ petitions and the same are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs. *******