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1974 DIGILAW 474 (MAD)

Vaidyalinga Ambalaganar v. W. P. No. 3555 of 1974

1974-10-29

RAMANUJAM

body1974
Judgment :- 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari from this court to quash the proceedings of the first respondent herein in R.C. No. 3649/74 dated 26th August, 1974, confirming the order passed by the second respondent in his PTCTR 202 dated 19th June, 1971. The circumstances under which the petition for a writ of certiorari has been filed are these: The petitioner took up on lease from Pudukottai Devasthanam 84 acres and 93 cents of lands. Apart from the said extent, the petitioners family owns 59 acres 90 cents ancestrally. The second respondent, at the instance of the Executive Officer, Pudukottai Devastanam, issued a notice to the petitioner on 16th December, 1968 proposing to initiate proceedings under S. 7 of the Tamil Nadu Public Trusts (Regulation of Administration of Agricultural Lands) Act, 57 of 1961, (herein after referred to, as the Act). The petitioner submitted his objections to the said notice. In his objections, he stated that only 4 acres out of 84.93 acres taken on lease were under actual cultivation and that the rest of the lands were either used as tope or used exclusively for growing fuel trees. He had also stated that as regards the ancestral property, his sons are entitled to claim their share therein and that, therefore, the entire 59.90 acres owned by the family cannot be taken as his holding. The second respondent, however, did not accept any of the objections raised by the petitioner, but proceeded to determine the extent of the petitioners holding as follows: Original acre Standard acre A. As a owner 59.90 23.264 B. As a lessee of the Public trust 84.93 24.621 144.83 47.885 On the above calculation, the second respondent directed that the entire lands 24.,621, standard acres belonging to the Devastanam should revert to it, as it is in excess of the cultivating tenants ceiling area as defined in S. 2(6) of the Act. 2. Aggrieved against the order of the second respondent, the petitioner filed an appeal to the first respondent. The first respondent substantially agreed with the view taken by the second respondent and dismissed the appeal. In this writ petition, the petitioner seeks to challenge the order passed by the second respondent as confirmed by the first respondent in appeal. 3. 2. Aggrieved against the order of the second respondent, the petitioner filed an appeal to the first respondent. The first respondent substantially agreed with the view taken by the second respondent and dismissed the appeal. In this writ petition, the petitioner seeks to challenge the order passed by the second respondent as confirmed by the first respondent in appeal. 3. The contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner are three-fold: (1) The petitioner is not a cultivating tenant, as he does not contribute his own physical labour or that of any member of the family in the cultivation of any land belonging to another, and, therefore, no order could be passed under S. 7 as against him. (2) In respect of the lands taken on lease from the public trust the petitioner is entitled to get exemption under S. 51(v) as they are being used exclusively for growing fuel trees and if such of those lands as are exclusively used for growing fuel trees are excluded from the computation, then, there will not be any excess for S. 7 to operate. (3) In any event, the order of the second respondent directing the entire lands of 24.621 standard acres to be reverted to the public trust is unsustainable as it has not taken note of the provisions in S. 7 of the Act, under which it is only the excess lands over and above the cultivating tenants ceiling area that could be ordered to be reverted. On a due consideration of the matter, I am of the view that all the above three contentions are not tenable. As regards the first contention, it is seen that the explanation to S. 7 is applicable to the facts of the petitioners case. The explanation specifically provides that even if a tenant does not contribute his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of the land, still, he can be taken to be a cultivating tenant, if he is in actual possession of the land, for the purpose of S. 7. It is not in dispute that the petitioner in this case is in actual possession of the lands taken on lease. It is not in dispute that the petitioner in this case is in actual possession of the lands taken on lease. Therefore, even if the petitioner is not contributing his own physical labour or that of the members of his family in the cultivation of the land, he has to be taken as a cultivating tenant for the purpose of S. 7. 4. As regards the second contention that the petitioner is entitled to claim exemption in regard to the leasehold lands in S. 51(v), the authorised officer had clearly held that the petitioner did not produce any evidence to show that the leasehold lands in his possession are used exclusively for growing fuel trees. Except making an assertion, the petitioner had not adduced any evidence, and, therefore, the second respondent has held that in the absence of any evidence, the petitioner is not entitled to claim exemption in S. 51(v). If the lands could not be exempted under S. 51, they have naturally to be included in the petitioners holding. 5. The last contention is that the second respondent, in any event, erred in directing the entire leasehold lands to be reverted to the public trust, that such cultivating tenant is entitled to retain the cultivating tenants ceiling area as fixed in S. 2(6), and that it is only the excess over such cultivating tenants ceiling area that could be ordered to be reverted. In effect, what the learned counsel says is that the petitioner is entitled to have the cultivating tenants ceiling area of 5 standard acres apart from the lands owned by him, and that it is only the balance extent of the leasehold land that could be ordered to be reverted, and that therefore, he is entitled to retain 5 standard acres as his cultivating tenants ceiling area out of the leasehold lands, and it is only the balance the public trust could claim. But this, contention in my view, overlooks the definition of ‘cultivating tenants ceiling area’ in S. 2(6). The said provision fixes 5 standard acres as the cultivating tenants ceiling area. The definition of the cultivating tenants ceiling area takes in the lands held by a particular person both as the cultivating tenant and as owner or as possessory mortgagee. But this, contention in my view, overlooks the definition of ‘cultivating tenants ceiling area’ in S. 2(6). The said provision fixes 5 standard acres as the cultivating tenants ceiling area. The definition of the cultivating tenants ceiling area takes in the lands held by a particular person both as the cultivating tenant and as owner or as possessory mortgagee. Therefore, for determining the cultivating tetants ceiling area, the lands owned by the petitioner as well as the lands taken on lease by him should be taken as aggregate. If so taken, the petitioners holding comes to 47.885 standard acres. S. 7(1) of the Act says that where on the notified date, any cultivating tenant is in possession of land in excess of the cultivating tenants ceiling area the possession of land which is held by the public trust and which is in excess of the cultivating tenants ceiling area shall revert to the public trust subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf. In view of the fact that the petitioner is holding land, in excess of the cultivating tenants ceiling area, the excess lands belonging to the public trust have been directed to be reverted. Therefore, the order is found to be in accordance with the provisions in S. 7. The impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity as alleged by the petitioner. 6. The writ petition is dismissed.