ORDER.-(Mr. Justice Kailasam made the following Order (3-10-72) of reference to a Full Bench. This petition is filed against the order of the Election Commissioner dismissing the application of the petitioner under Order 9, rule 9, Civil Procedure Code, to restore the election petition which was dismissed for default. The Election Commissioner held that Order 9, rule 9, Civil Procedure Code, is not applicable to the Election Court, and therefore he cannot restore the petition wihch was dismissed for default. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that all Tribunals when they exercise judicial functions should be held to possess inherent powers to review their judgments where due cause is shown- In order to answer the question whether an Election Court has got powers under the Panchayats Act to restore a petition which was dismissed for default, the relevant provisions have to be considered. Rule 6, relating to the decision of Election Disputes relating to panchayats, which is relevant runs as follows: “6 (1) Every Election petition shall be enquired into by the Election Court as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to the trial of suits: Provided that it shall only be necessary for the Election Court to make a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of any witness examined by it. (2) The Election Court shall have the powers which are vested in a Court under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matter:- (a) discovery and inspection; (b) enforcing the attendance of witnesses and requiring the deposit of their ex-penses; (c) compelling the production of documents; (d) examining witness on oath; (e) reception of evidence taken on affidavit; and (f) issuing commissions for examination of witnesses, and may summon and examine suo motu any person. whose evidence appears to it to be material.” The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that under rule 6 (1), above, the Election Court is empowered to enquire into an election petition as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil Procedure Code, to the trial of suits, and that rule 6 (a), provides that the Election Court shall have powers which are vested in a Court under the Civil Procedure Code, when trying a suit, inrespect of matters enumerated in clauses (a) to (f) above. While the contention on behalf of the petitioner is that the general power conferred under rule 6(1), is not in any way restricted by rule 6 (2), where clauses (a) to (f) are enumerated, the contention of the respondent is that rule 6 (2) enumerates the powers that are to be exercised under rule 6 (1), and therefore rule 6 (2) is restrictive of the general power conferred under rule 6 (1). The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of a Bench of this Court in Natarajan v. State of Madras1, where in dealing with the powers of a Tribunal constituted under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act and the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, it was held that the Tribunal had the right to review its own decision. The Rules under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act are more or less similar to the Rules framed under the Panchayat Act relating to the election Rule 2 of the Rules framed under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act as per notification dated 7th January, 1950 (as subsequently amended) is: “Every Tribunal constituted under section 8 (i) and every special Tribunal constituted under section 51 (i) of the Act shall have all the powers exercisable by a civil Court in the trial of suits and in appeals.” Rule 2 runs thus: “The proceedings of a Tribunal shall be summary and shall be governed as far as practicable by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, particularly in regard to: (a) the issue and service of summons; (b) the examination of parties and witnesses; (c) the production of documents; (d) the payment of compensation or any other money to one person on behalf of another under disability and in particular to a guardian on behalf of a minor; and (e) the passing of orders.” 3. The learned counsel for the respondent strongly relied on a decision of a Bench of this Court in Koti Reddi v. Venkayya1, which related to an election dispute. The point that fell to be determined was whether the Election Court had power to set aside its own orders either by way of review or by way of an application under Order 9, Civil Procedure Code. The point that fell to be determined was whether the Election Court had power to set aside its own orders either by way of review or by way of an application under Order 9, Civil Procedure Code. After referring to rule 6 of the Rules which provided that every election petition shall be enquired into by the Election Commissioner as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil Procedure Code 1908, to the trial of suits, the Bench held that though no doubt R. 6 rendered the procedure under the Civil Procedure Code, to the trial of suits applicable also to the enquiry of election petitions, they were not prepared to hold that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code which deal with matters arising after the final disposal of the suit would also apply to an election petition. The Bench further held that the Election Commissioner will not have the right to set aside a final order on the ground that one of the parties was prevented by sufficient cause from taking part in the trial of the election petition. It is unfortunate that this decision, Kati Reddi v. Venkayya1, was not brought to the notice of the Bench which decided Natarajan v. State of Madras2. It is difficult to reconcile both the decisions. 4. Mr. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner, also cited a decision of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh3. In that case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the powers of the ElectionTribunal under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is difficult to reconcile both the decisions. 4. Mr. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner, also cited a decision of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh3. In that case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the powers of the ElectionTribunal under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In dealing with section 90 (2) which provided that subject to the provisions of that Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the Tribunal, as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to the trial of suits, and section 92 which defined the powers of the Tribunal by stating that the Tribunal shall have powers which are vested in a Court under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, when trying a suit in respect of matters which are enumerated in Clauses (a) to (g) therein," the Supreme Court held that the power of the Tribunal under section 90 (2) to try an election petition in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, was only subject to the provisions of the Act (Representation of the People Act, 1951) and the rules made thereunder, while the power under section 92 was an overriding one in that it was not subject to the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder. The Supreme Court was of the view that the Election Tribunal had power under Order 6, rule 17, Civil Procedure Code, to allow an amendment of the election petition. This decision of the Supreme Court would support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. After this decision of the Supreme Court, the decision in Koti Reddi v. Venkayya1, may not be good law. 5. As there is a conflict of views between two Benches of this Court, that is, the Bench which decided Koti Reddi v. Venkayyal, and the Bench which decided Natarajan v. State of Madras2, and as the decision in Koti Reddi v. Venkayya1, has to be reconsidered in view of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh3, and as this question is of considerable importance, it is necessary that the papers should be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for orders as to reference to a Full Bench. 6. One other contention that was raised may also be disposed of. 6. One other contention that was raised may also be disposed of. It was submitted that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is restricted and that a dispute of the nature as has arisen in this petition cannot be dealt with by the High Court. I am unable to accept this contention, for it has been held that the powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India relate not only to right of administrative superintendence but also to judicial superintendence. In Waryam Singh v. Amarnath1, the Supreme Court held that Article 227 restored to the High Court the power of judicial superintendence it had under section 15 of the High Courts’ Apt and section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, but cautioned that the power of superintendence should be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting more errors. In Hari Vishnu v. Ahmed Ishaque2, after referring to. Waryam Singh v. Amamath1, and confirming that the High Court’s power of judicial superintendence was restored, observed: “It may also be noted that while in a certiorari under Article 226 the High Court can only annul the decision of the Tribunal, it can, under Article 927, do that, and also issue further directions in the matter.” In Nagendra Nath v. Commissioner of Hills Division3, after referring to Waryam Singh v. Amarnath1, the Supreme Court held: “It is clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” The Supreme Court has also in Jijabai Vithal Rao Garire v. Pathankhan and others4 and in The Ahmedabad Mfs. and Calico Ptg. Co. Limited v. Ramtabel Ramanad and others5, dealt with the powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. and Calico Ptg. Co. Limited v. Ramtabel Ramanad and others5, dealt with the powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. 7. From all these decisions there cannot be any dispute that the High Court has got power of judicial superintendence over the decisions of the Tribunals which are subject to its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. There can be no doubt that the power of the High Court to decide a question as to whether the Election Court has a right to set aside an ex parte order passed by it would fall within Article 227. The contention is therefore rejected. 8. (This petition coming for final hearing this day in pursuance of the above order of reference, the order of the Lower Court and the record in the case and upon hearing the arguments of Mr. M. Srinivasan, advocate, for petitioner and of Mr. R. Balasubramaniah, advocate for respondent the Court made the following Order):- (The Judgment of the Court was delivered by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice) 9. The civil revision petition in the first instance came before Kailasam, J. An election petition under the Panchayats Act and the election rules framed thereunder was filed contesting the election. That petition was dismissed for default of appearance. An application under Order 9, rule 9, Civil Procedure Code, was also dismissed, the Election Commissioner being of the view that the rule was not applicable to Election Court and he could not, therefore, restore the election petition. Two points were urged before Kailasam, J. One was that, in view of rule 6 of the Election Rules, the Election Court had power under Order 9, rule 9, Civil Procedure Code to set aside the order of dismissal for default; Koti Reddi v. Venkayya6, decided by the then learned Chief Justice and Somasundaram, J., held that Order 9 did not enable the Election Court to restore the election petition. But, there, the disposal of the election petition was on merits. Natarajan v. Stale of Madras7, which was decided by Ramaswami, J., and Ananthanarayanan, J., held, however, that, in order to render justice by Tribu nals such as the Tribunal set up under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, so long as they exercise judicial functions, the Tribunals should be held to possess inherent power to review their judgments, where due cause was shown. That was a case of an Estate Abolition Tribunal giving a decision in the first instance on the question whether a certain village was an inam estate or not within the ambit of the definition in section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. The ryots were not parties to that case. Subsequently, the same Tribunal rendered a different decision after the ryots were brought on record. The question was whether the Tribunal had the power to review its own order. The Court opined that it had such power. This view was expressed not on the basis of any particular rule, but upon a consideration that a Tribunal exercising judicial functions should, in order to render justice, have inherent power to review its own judgment, where due cause was shown. Kailasam, J., found conflict of opinion in these two cases and regretted that Koti Reddy v. Venkayya1, had not been brought to the notice of the Court in Natarajan v. State of Madras2. The learned Judge was also of opinion that after Harish Chandra v. Trilokhi Singh 3 , no longer could Koti Reddy v. Venkayya1 be the law. On that view he referred the question to a Full Bench, to wit, whether the Election Tribunal under the Panchayats Act had power to restore the election petition which was dismissed for default of appearance. The second point that was raised before the learned Judge was whether the application to set aside the order of the Election Tribunal declining to restore the election petition could be brought for attack under Article 227 of the Constitution. The learned Judge held that point in favour of the petitioner and it no longer arises before us. 10. We may at once state that, in our opinion, Natarajan v. State of Madras2, was not right in its view that every Tribunal discharging judicial functions should, in order to enable it to do justice, have inherent power to review its own judgment where proper cause was shown. The Rules framed under Madras Act XXVI of 1948 did not confer any such power. But the learned Judges spelt out inherent power from the nature of the functions discharged by the Estates Abolition Tribunal. The Rules framed under Madras Act XXVI of 1948 did not confer any such power. But the learned Judges spelt out inherent power from the nature of the functions discharged by the Estates Abolition Tribunal. We must observe that, where, a statute creates a Tribunal and vests powers in it prescribing the procedure for the exercise thereof, it is confined to such powers and procedure as had been conferred upon it. This is because the Tribunal is but a creature of the statute which, having brought it into existence , has also limited its powers. If by necessary intendment of a particular provision made in that behalf the Court is of the view that such power is available, that is a different matter. But that was not what was held in Natarajan v. State of Madras2. The Court was prepared to say that every Tribunal should have inherent power to set aside it’s own order where proper cause was shown, provided the function discharged by it was judicial. We are unable to concur with this view. We may also point out that Natarajan v. State of Madras2 was not a case of dismissal of a petition for default. It was concerned, as we said, with a decision which the Tribunal had rendered first and which it had sought to review on a subsequent occasion. Koti Reddi v. Venkayya1, does not also appear to be apposite in deciding the instant case, because that was also a case of an election petition decided on merits. It is evident from the judgment therein that, though the party had not appeared, the election petition was proceeded with, evidence was taken and a conclusion was arrived at, on the basis of which the election petition was disposed of. The Court pointed out that having regard to rule 6 (1) and the enumeration of specific powers under the second limb of that Rule, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, more particularly Order 9, rule 9 relating to restoration of a suit dismissed for default where sufficient cause was shown would not be applicable. The Court pointed out that having regard to rule 6 (1) and the enumeration of specific powers under the second limb of that Rule, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, more particularly Order 9, rule 9 relating to restoration of a suit dismissed for default where sufficient cause was shown would not be applicable. In other words, the learned Judges, view was that rule 6 (1) should be confined to the powers under the Civil Procedure Code which pertain to trial and disposal of a suit and that, once the election petition had been disposed of, thereafter the powers under the Civil Procedure Code would not be available to the Election Tribunal. But the Court had no occasion to consider whether the Election Tribunal had at all power to dismiss an election petition for default of appearance without going into merits after taking evidence. Our attention has been invited to a judgment in W.P. No. 595 of 1960 which was rendered by one of us and which was a case of dismissal for default of appearance in an election petition. An application to restore the petition was dismissed on the ground that the Election Commissioner had no power and this order was sustained. In doing so, the Court followed Koti Reddi v. Venkayya1. When Mallappa Basappa v. Basavaraja Ayyappa2 was relied on, the Court examined the scheme of the Election Rules under the Panchayats Act and ruled that it was different from that of Representation of the People Act. In this case too, the Court had no occasion to consider whether at all the Election Court had. the power to dismiss an election petition for default of appearance without going into the merits of the petition. 11. It is contended before us for the respondent that if as held in Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh3, the Election Court had power to amend the petition, it should follow that the Election Court had also the power to dismiss an election petition for default of appearance without going into merits. We are unable to accept this contention. 12. The question of power to dismiss for default without going into merits will have to be examined the light of the Rules read as a whole. We are unable to accept this contention. 12. The question of power to dismiss for default without going into merits will have to be examined the light of the Rules read as a whole. The Rules for decision of election disputes relating to Panchayats say that no election held under the Panchayats Act can be called in question ex-cept by an election petition presented in accordance with those rules to an Election Court. A procedure is laid down as to how an election petition should be presented, including the period of limitation for filing and for service of summons. Rule 6, with which we are particularly concerned, is as follows: “(1) Every election petition shall be enquired into by the Election Court as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil procedure Code 1908, to the trial of suits: Provided that it shall only be necessary for the election Court to make a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of any witness examined by it. (2) The Election Court shall have the powers which are vested in a Court under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters:- (a) discovery and inspection. (b) enforcing the attendance of witnesses, and requiring the deposit of their expenses: (c) Compelling the production of documents; (d) examining witnesses on oath; (e) reception of evidence taken on affidavit; and (f) issuing commissions for examination of witnesses, and may summon and examine suo motu any person whose evidence appears to it to be material-” Sub-rule (1) read by itself is, no doubt, wide enough to cover the entirety of Order 9, rule 9, Civil Procedure Code. Whether the width of the power so conferred has been restricted by the enumeration of specific items under sub-rule 2 does not arise for our consideration. But assuming that the power under Rule 6 sub-rule (1) covers also Order 9, rule 9 in its entirety, the question will be whether this is not restricted by the scheme of the rest of the Rules. Rule 7 interdicts an election petition being withdrawn without leave of the Election Court. A procedure is indicated for grant of leave for withdrawal. In case leave is granted, the petitioner will be ordered to pay costs of the respondent as the Election Court thinks fit. Rule 7 interdicts an election petition being withdrawn without leave of the Election Court. A procedure is indicated for grant of leave for withdrawal. In case leave is granted, the petitioner will be ordered to pay costs of the respondent as the Election Court thinks fit. Rule 9 says that an election petition shall abate on the death of a sole petitioner or of the survivor of several petitioners. In other words, where there is only a sole petitioner in an election petition, his death will bring about an end to the election petition. We may pause for a moment and observe that this is not the result under the Representation of the People Act, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Mallappa Basappa v. Basavaraj Ayyappa1. Rule 11 specifies the grounds on which an election can be set aside. Rule 12 follows it up and contemplates that, at the conclusion of the enquiry, the Election Court shall declare whether the election of the returned candidate or candidates is void under Rule 11. Sub-rule (3) of this Rule makes the order of the Election Court under Sub-Rule (1) final. Equally, it makes as order of an Election Tribunal final under Sub-Rule (2) which relates to declaration of the election of the returned candidate, declaration of any other party to the petition as having been duly elected or ordering a fresh election. Rule 13 shows that the moment an election is held to be void, the seat shall be deemed to be vacant from the date of the order of the Election Court and the authority concerned shall forthwith take the necessary steps for holding fresh elections. These Rules, to our minds, suggest a scheme under which, once an election petition is filed, it has to be proceeded with to its conclusion on merits barring the two instances, namely, withdrawal of the petition with the leave of the Court or termination of the petition on the death of the petitioner who happens to be the sole one. It is also significant that, once an order is made on merits it shall be final. It is in the light of this scheme and Rules that we have to see the scope of Rule 6 (1) as to the extent to which Order 9, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code, will be available to the instant case. It is also significant that, once an order is made on merits it shall be final. It is in the light of this scheme and Rules that we have to see the scope of Rule 6 (1) as to the extent to which Order 9, Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code, will be available to the instant case. Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 6 visualises that it is only as nearly as may be that the Civil Procedure Code, applicable to trial of suits may be extended. This implies that, if the rules as we have considered contemplate a situation where an election petition has to end only on merits barring the two exceptional cases we have pointed out then there is no room for applying Order 6. Rule 9, Civil Procedure Code, in so far as it confers powers on a civil Court to set aside an order of dismissal for default of appearance. It is hardly necessary to point out that an Election Tribunal or Commissioner under the Election Rules of the Panchayats Act is but a persona designata and not a civil Court possessing all the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure. It is remarkable that even the High Court, while exercising powers under section 115, Civil Procedure Code, cannot dismiss a petition thereunder for default of appearance, and, in any case once that was done, it would have no power to restore it. . 13. As may be seen from our observations supra it is not necessary, on the view we have taken, to decide whether if the Election Tribunal had the power to dismiss the election petition for default of appearance without going into merits, it would have the power to set aside such an order. We have taken the view that the Election Rules relaing to decision of election disputes under the Panchayats act do not confer power upon an Election Tribunal to dismiss an election petition for default of appearance. The election petition could and should end only by an order under Rule 12 except in the two cases, namely: (1) where leave is granted for withdrawal; and (2) where there is the death of the sole petitioner in the election petition. Accordingly the petition will stand allowed. No costs. The election petition could and should end only by an order under Rule 12 except in the two cases, namely: (1) where leave is granted for withdrawal; and (2) where there is the death of the sole petitioner in the election petition. Accordingly the petition will stand allowed. No costs. We make it clear that by this order we mean that, the order of dismissal for default without going into merits being without jurisdiction and, therefore, a nullity, the election petition has not been disposed of at all.