JUDGMENT R.N. Seth, J. - The suit giving rise to the present appeal was filed by the plaintiff appellant for ejectment of the defendant and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages on the allegations that house No. 106/625 situate to Mohalia Deputy Ka Parao, Kanpur, was a post 1951 construction and Act No. III of 1947 was not applicable. It was alleged that the defendant was a tenant of a portion of this house on the first floor on a monthly rent of Rs. 20/-. The tenancy was terminated by a notice dated 19th June 1963. 2. The suit was contested on the ground that the accommodation was constructed much before 1951 and Act No. III of 1947 was applicable. The receipt of the notice and the rate of rent was admitted but it was asserted that the notice was illegal. It was further denied that any rent was due to the plaintiff. 3. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the accommodation was constructed after 1951 and that the notice was valid. The lower appellate court reversed that decree and dismissed the suit for ejectment and recovery of pendentive and future damages. The lower appellate court recorded a finding that one room and one kitchen were post 1951 construction and tee rest were post 1951 construction and Act No. III of 1947 was applicable. It further held that the notice terminating the tenancy was invalid. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the finding recorded by the lower appellate court regarding the time of the constructions. It was urged that the defendant was a tenant of only the room and the kitchen which were post 1951 construction and with regard to the rest of the accommodation be was only a licensee and not a tenant and was, therefore, liable to ejectment. The contention that the defendant was only a licensee of the courtyard, the latrine and the pipe is untenable. Originally when the defendant entered the premises as a tenant admittedly he was the exclusive tenant of the courtyard, the latrine and the pipe alongwith an old room in 1959 the defendant gave up possession of the old room and a newly constructed room and a kitchen were in his tenancy. It was further stipulated that the courtyard, the latrine and the pipe would be shared by him with another tenant. It was further stipulated that the courtyard, the latrine and the pipe would be shared by him with another tenant. It may also be noted that before 1959 the defendant was paying Rs. 30/- per month as rent but when the courtyard, the latrine and the pipe became joint in 1959 the rent was reduced to Rs 20/- per month. Merely because after 1959 the courtyard, the latrine and the pipe ceased to be in exclusive use and possession of the defendant and he agreed to share it with another tenant would not convert his status from a tenant to a licensee. In the plaint also it has been specifically mentioned that the defendant was a tenant on the entire accommodation specified at the foot of the plaint. In view of that unequivocal admission in the plaint it is not open to the appellant to urge that for the aforesaid portions the defendant was only a licensee. The principle laid down in Laxmi Chand v. Ratan Bai, AIR 1927 Bombay 115, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the aforesaid case a privy was meant for and used by a number of tenants and it was not included in the tenancy of any one of the tenants. In the instant case the courtyard, the latrine and the pipe were originally in the exclusive tenancy of the defendant and later on he agreed to share with another tenant. The only change brought about was that instead of being the sole tenant he became joint tenant of the aforesaid accommodation along with another tenant. 5. It was urged that the defendant was liable to ejectment at least from that portion of the accommodation which was constructed after 1951. Reliance was placed on section l-A of Act No. III of 1947 which excluded the applicability of the Act to a building or part of a building constructed after a certain bate. In my opinion, however, the plaintiff cannot get any advantage of the aforesaid provision. The defendant was not a tenant of only the newly constructed portion. His tenancy included certain portions which were pre 1951 construction. The tenancy was one and indivisible. Merely because a part of the accommodation comprised in the tenancy was a post 1941 construction, the defendant could not lose the protection provided by Act No. III of 1947. The defendant was not a tenant of only the newly constructed portion. His tenancy included certain portions which were pre 1951 construction. The tenancy was one and indivisible. Merely because a part of the accommodation comprised in the tenancy was a post 1941 construction, the defendant could not lose the protection provided by Act No. III of 1947. It is not possible to decree the suit even for the post 1951 construction as that would amount to splitting up of the tenancy which would be illegal. 6. The suit of the plaintiff must fail on the invalidity of the notice also. As pointed out earlier, in the plaint the accommodation under the tenancy of the defendant was clearly specified and it included the court-yard, the latrine and the pipe. In the notice, however, only the room and the kitchen were mentioned as the accommodation under the tenancy of the defendant. In the latter part of the notice it was mentioned that his tenancy was terminated and the defendant was asked to vacate the premises. It was urged that because of the latter portion of the notice it would be deemed that his tenancy has been determined for the entire accommodation. It is not possible to construe the notice in the manner in which the learned counsel for the appellant tried to do. The notice clearly specified in the earlier part the accommodation which, according to the plaintiff, was under the tenancy of the defendant and when it was stated that his tenancy was determined it obviously referred to the part described earlier in the notice. Reliance was sought to be placed on Hari Har Banerji v. Ram Shashi Rai, AIR 1918 P.C. 102 , but the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. The notice in that case described the entire land in the tenancy of the defendant and had stated that the tenancy was terminated. In the latter portion, however, the area of the plot was wrongly mentioned. In such a situation the Privy Council held that the notice was in fact with regard to the entire area of land under the tenancy of the defendant and the notice was not rendered invalid because of a wrong mention of the area of the plot in the latter part of the notice. In such a situation the Privy Council held that the notice was in fact with regard to the entire area of land under the tenancy of the defendant and the notice was not rendered invalid because of a wrong mention of the area of the plot in the latter part of the notice. In the present case the plaintiff determined the tenancy only in respect a part of the tenanted accommodation which is not permissible in law and the notice must be held to be invalid. 7. No other point has been urged before me. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.