Kailasam, J.-The plaintiff is the appellant in this Letters Patent Appeal. As a mortgagor, the filed O.P. No. 18 of 1964 and deposited the amount due under a usufructuary mortgage and preyed for redemption under section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act. The usufructuary mortgage was originally executed by one Ramachandra Iyer, the original owner of the suit property under Exhibit A-2, dated 2nd March, 1924, in favour of one Kauvery Achi. Ramachandra Iyer later sold the suit property to the father of the plaintiff under Exhibit A-1, dated 18th December, 1929. Defendants 1 and 2, who succeeded to the interest of the usufructuary mortgagee under a will executed by Kauveri Achi on 30th September, 1942, did not resist the suit for redemption, but consented to a decree for redemption. Defendants 3 and 4, who were in possession as tenants inducted by the usufructuary mortgagee, resisted the suit on the ground that they were entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. The third defendant claimed to be cultivating the property under Kauveri Achi by a registered lease deed till her death, and then, under defendants 1 and 2. There is no dispute that defendants 3 and 4 were tenants under the usufructuary mortgagee. 2. The trial Court decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession from defendants 3 and 4. On appeal, the first appellate Court confirmed the finding of the trial Court holding that after redemption of the usufructuary mortgage by the mortgagor, it is not open to the defendants 3 and 4 to claim any rights as cultivating tenants. On a second appeal preferred by defendants 3 and 4 (tenants), Ramanujam, J., held that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Prabhu v. Ramdeo1, the tenant under the usufructuary mortgagee can acquire rights and is entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, and found against the mortgagor, who subsequently redeemed the mortgage. The plaintiff mortgagor has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 3. The question that arises for consideration is, whether the tenants under the usufructuary mortgagee are entitled to the rights of a cultivating tenant under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act as against the mortgagor also. 4. The plaintiff mortgagor has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 3. The question that arises for consideration is, whether the tenants under the usufructuary mortgagee are entitled to the rights of a cultivating tenant under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act as against the mortgagor also. 4. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider the rights of a tenant under the usufructuary mortgagee as against the mortgagor, who subsequently redeemed the mortgage under the general law and to decide whether the rights under the general law has been in any way altered by the special legislation. 5. It is well established that no person can confer on another a better title than he himself has. The usufructuary mortgagee’s interest lasts only as long as the mortgage has not been paid off. Therefore, on redemption of the mortgage, the title of the mortgagee comes to an end, and the rights of any person, who derived title such as a lessee, would also come to an end, and with the expiry of the mortgagee’s title, when the interest of the mortgagee as a lessor is determined, the right of the lessee under him also terminates, and under the general law, the lessee’s interest cannot subsist beyond the mortgagor’s interest. The Courts have recognised one exception to this rule under section 76 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, and that is, when the mortgagee takes possession of the mortgaged property and manages it as a person of ordinary prudence and leases the property, the lessee may be entitled to continue in possession even after the termination of title of the mortgagee in possession. This principle is applicable to agricultural lands. 6. This exception in the case of agricultural lands is stated by the Supreme Court in All India Film Corporation v. Sri Raja Gyannath1, in the following terms: “.... acts done bona fide and prudently in the ordinary course of management, may bind even after the termination of the title of the mortgagee in possession. This principle applies ordinarily to the management of agricultural land and has seldom been extended to urban property so as to tie it up in the hands of lessee or to confer on them rights under special statutes. To this again, there is an exception. This principle applies ordinarily to the management of agricultural land and has seldom been extended to urban property so as to tie it up in the hands of lessee or to confer on them rights under special statutes. To this again, there is an exception. The lease will continue to bind the mortgagor or persons deriving interest from him if the mortgagor had concurred to grant it.” On the facts of that case, the Court found that it was a long lease on a small rent, and, therefore, it could not be deemed to be a bona fide act of prudence. In Seshammal Parasram v. Ratnabai2, the exception regarding agricultural lands was reiterated. It is, therefore, necessary to consider what is the scope of the exception regarding the agricultural lands in leases granted by mortgagee in possession so as to bind the mortgagor, who redeems the mortgage subsequently. 7. In Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain3, it was held that the mortgagee may grant leases not extending beyond the period of the mortgage, and any leases granted by him must come to an end on redemption, and that a mortgagee cannot during the subsistence of the mortgage act in a manner detrimental to the mortgagor’s interests, such as by giving a lease which may enable the tenant to acquire permanent or occupancy rights in the land, thereby defeating the mortgagor’s right to khas possession. Exception to this rule was recognised, and the Court stated that a permissible settlement by a mortgagee in possession with a tenant in the course of prudent management and the springing up of rights in the tenant conferred or created by statute based on the nature of the land and possession for the requisite period is a different matter altogether, and it is an exception to the general rule; in such a case the tenant cannot be ejected by the mortgagor even after the redemption of the mortgage and he may become an occupancy ryot in some cases and a non-occupancy ryot in other cases. This exception will not apply in a case where the terms of the mortgage prohibit the mortgagee from making any settlement of tenant on the land either expressly or by necessary implication. The case of the Supreme Court referred to above related to lands under Zamindari. This exception will not apply in a case where the terms of the mortgage prohibit the mortgagee from making any settlement of tenant on the land either expressly or by necessary implication. The case of the Supreme Court referred to above related to lands under Zamindari. The Court observed: “Where all the ‘Zamindari rights are given to the mortgagee, it may be possible to infer on the proper construction of the document that he can settle lands with tenants in the ordinary course of management and the tenants might acquire certain rights in the land in their capacity as tenants”. But, the terms of the document in that case prohibited the mortgagee from locating the tenants on the lands mortgaged. In the circumstances, the Court held that the person on whom the property was settled could not claim any right as a ryot under the statute or that he was entitled to occupancy rights. 8. In Harshara Prasad v. Deonarain Prasad1, the case arose out of the Bihar Tenancy Act and it was contended that the mortgagees had the power under section 76 of the Transfer of Property Act to induct tenants on the land for purposes of cultivation, that such a transaction would be binding on the mortgagors, and that its effect would be to confer on the tenants the status of ryots and that they would get occupancy rights under section 21 of the Act. The Court held that if the lease is one which could have been made by the owner in the course of prudent management, it would be binding on the mortgagors, notwithstanding that the mortgage has been redeemed and even in such a case, the operation of the lease cannot extend beyond the period for which it was granted. The Court further held that even assuming that the mortgagees had the power under section 76 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, to continue to lease as tenants on the lands after the termination of the period fixed therein, that would confer on them at best the status of tenants from year to year, and not give them the right to continue in possession after the termination of the agricultural year during which the redemption takes place. It was ruled that the power of the mortgagee to induct tenants in the usual course of management would not avail the tenants to claim occupancy rights over the lands. 9.In Asaram v. Ramkali2 , the Supreme Court held that where the lands over which the lease was created were home-farm lands under the direct cultivation of the proprietors, as distinguished from lands which were under cultivation by tenants, having regard to the special rights which the tenancy laws all over India have recognised in the owner in respect of such lands, an act of the mortgagee which puts those rights in peril cannot be regarded as that of a prudent owner, and it requires exceptional ground to justify it. 10. In Prabhu v. Ramdeo3, the Supreme Court held that persons inducted into agricultural land as tenants by an usufructuary mortgagee and who have become entitled to rights of khatedar tenants by virtue of section 15 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, cannot be ejected by the mortgagor on the ground that the mortgage of land has been redeemed. Section 15 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, provides that subject to the provisions of section 16 every person who, at the commencement of the Act, is a tenant of land, shall, subject further to any contract not contrary to section 4 be entitled to all the rights conferred and be subject to all the liabilities imposed on khatedar tenants under the Act. In other words, the Court stated that as soon as section 15 came into operation on 15th October, 1955, the possession of the tenants who had been inducted into the land by the mortgagee was substantially altered, and they became khatedars by virtue of the statutory provisions prescribed by section 15. The Court pointed out that the decision in Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain Singh4, that as a general rule a person cannot, by transfer or otherwise, confer a better title on another than he himself has, is subject to the rights of the tenants inducted by the mortgagee being conceivably improved by virtue of the statutory provisions which may meanwhile come into operation, and that had happened in the case under consideration by the Supreme Courts The Court also referred to the decision in Harihar Prasad Singh v. Deonarain Prasad5, and held that under the Bihar Tenancy Act, no statutory benefit had been conferred on the tenants. 11. 11. Summing up the effect of the decisions of the Supreme Court above referred to, it is clear that normally no person can confer a better title on another than he possesses. But, under section 76 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, the usufructuary mortgagee has a right to manage the property during the subsistence of the mortgage, and if in the course of such management grants leases, the leases should normally terminate with the rights of the usufructuary mortgagee. Any lease granted while the tenancy laws were in contemplation, which would result in the mortgagee being deprived of his khas possession on redemtion cannot be considered to be a prudent act. If there is any clause in the mortgage prohibiting the leasing of the property, any lease conferred contrary to such terms of the usufructuary mortgage cannot confer any right on the tenant so inducted. If the lease granted by the mortgagee is a prudent one, it would bind the mortgagor even after redemption for the period for which the lease was granted. The right of such tenants may be improved by statutory provisions as in the case in Prabku v. Ramdeo1, by specific provisions in the enactment. 12. On the basis of the abovesaid decision, if we examine the present case, it appears from the findings of the Courts below that the lease by the mortgagees was from 1957, that is, after the present Act came into force. 13. The trial Court found accepting Exhibits B-15 and B-16, that the third defendant was in possession of the suit item as a lessee under the second defendant prior to the date of the order, Exhibit A-3, dated 19th June, 1964. It has also found that Exhibit B-1 revealed that in 1957 the fourth defendant was cultivating some of the suit items under the first defendant. Though the trial Court did not give a specific finding as to whether the lessees were in possession as tenants under the usufructuary mortgagee before 1957, the recorded finding would indicate that the third and the fourth defendants were in possession from 1957. Though the trial Court did not give a specific finding as to whether the lessees were in possession as tenants under the usufructuary mortgagee before 1957, the recorded finding would indicate that the third and the fourth defendants were in possession from 1957. The first appellate Court found that none of the allegations in the written statement filed by the tenants would show that the tenants were in possession of the property from 1957; and even with reference to the third defendant, who cultivates 2.12 acres, that is items 3 to 6, it is only from 23rd March, 1957 as seen from Exhibit B-10, the lease deed executed by the third defendant in favour of the second defendant. Regarding the fourth defendant, the Court found that the lease deed in his favour is Exhibit B-1, dated 21st May, 1957. The first appellate Court concluded by holding that it is needless to point with reference to the lease of any one whether such a lease is to be accepted, that it is not a prudent act especially after the tenancy laws wherein a specific right is given in these statutes to these tenants. 14. Accepting the findings of the first appellate Court, which was not challenged either before the second appellate Court or before us, we find that the leases were after the Act came into force and as such according to the decisions of the Supreme Court, the lease will have to be considered as imprudent, as it would result in the mortgagor being deprived of his right to obtain khas possession. 15. The result would be that defendants 3 and 4 would not be entitled to claim any right under section 76 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act and claim that their rights were enlarged under the Act. 16. The important question that arises for consideration is, whether the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, has altered the position in favour of the tenant of the usufructuary mortgagee conferring on him the rights of a cultivating tenant under the Act. Before examining the provisions of the Act, three decisions of the Supreme Court bearing on this point have to be closely examined. The latest decision of the Supreme Court is Seshammal Parasram v. Ratnabai2. Before examining the provisions of the Act, three decisions of the Supreme Court bearing on this point have to be closely examined. The latest decision of the Supreme Court is Seshammal Parasram v. Ratnabai2. As this decision proceeds on the basis that the question has been concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in All India Film Corporation v. Raja Gyannath3, that decision will be referred to in detail. 17. The question which arose there was as to whether a tenancy created by the mortgagee in possession survives on the termination of the mortgagee’s interest. It was held that the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, was not applicable to the facts of the case therein. The facts of the case are: The mortgagee of property in which a cinema was run, leased it to the first appellant on a monthly rental of Rs. 250, for a period of five years renewable for ten years by yearly renewals on the same terms. The lessee was given the full right to use the property whether by itself or through agents or in partnership or by subleasing. The lessee sublet the premises after equipping the house with cinema machinery on a monthly rental of Rs. 1,250. The property was declared evacuee property, and the lessee applied under the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act (1951), for separation of interest, and the Competent Officer ordered sale of the property which was purchased for Rs. 65,000 by the respondent. The respondent therein filed a suit against the head-lessee and the sub-lessee for possession of the property, before the expiry of the term of lease. 18. It is not in dispute that the mortgagee leased the property after the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, came into force. 65,000 by the respondent. The respondent therein filed a suit against the head-lessee and the sub-lessee for possession of the property, before the expiry of the term of lease. 18. It is not in dispute that the mortgagee leased the property after the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, came into force. The relevant provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, may be extracted: The landlord is defined under section 2 (c) of the Act as follows:- “ ‘Landlord’ means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor, or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised and every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord.” and the ‘tenant’ is defined in section 2 (i) of the Act, which is as follows:- “‘Tenant’ means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, unless with the consent in writing of the landlord or a person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, car-stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a municipal town or notified area committee”. 19. The definition of the words ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ are wide enough to include the usufructuary mortgagee as well as the lessee under him. Section 13 which relates to eviction of tenants provides that a tenant in possession of a building shall not be evicted otherwise than under the provisions of the Act. Though the definitions of the words ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ and the provision relating to eviction would include a tenant under the usufructuary mortgagee, the Court was of the opinion that that status of landlord and tenant would not continue when the mortgagee’s rights come to an end. The Court stated the law thus: “The answer to this question depends upon whether we can say that there was a tenancy to protect. The Court stated the law thus: “The answer to this question depends upon whether we can say that there was a tenancy to protect. We have shown above that the lease came to an end with the mortgagee’s interest in the property • • • • The interest of of the mortgagor and the mortgagee united in the person of the purchaser and the mortgage ceased to subsist. In this view of the matter, the purchaser could claim that the mortgagee’s action came to an end and there did not subsist any relationship between him and the tenants.” It is clear, therefore, that the mortgagor can state that there was no relationship between him and the tenants. It was contended before the Court that the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, defined ‘landlord’, with reference to the payment of rent, as a person entitled to receive the rent, and ‘tenant’ as a person by whom rent is payable, and that the benefits of the Act would be applicable to the mortgagee, and his tenant would be a tenant under the definition of the Act. The Court held that these definitions apply, if the tenancy, either real, or statutory could be said to survive after the termination of the mortgage. In conclusion, the Court stated that the termination of the mortgagee’s interest terminated the relationship of landlord and tenant, and it could not, in the circumstances, be said to run with the land and there being no landlord and no tenant, the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act could not apply any further. This decision was approved in a later decision of the Supreme Court in Seshammal Parasram v. Ratnabai1. The case arose under M. P. Accommodation Control Act. The tenancy in the case was created by the mortgagee in possession. It was contended that the mortgagee in possession had the right to let the premises in dispute under section 76 of the Transfer of Property Act and this act of letting the premises was an act of prudent management and binding on the mortgagor, who subsequently, redeemed the property. It was contended that the mortgagee in possession had the right to let the premises in dispute under section 76 of the Transfer of Property Act and this act of letting the premises was an act of prudent management and binding on the mortgagor, who subsequently, redeemed the property. After stating that the decision in All India Film Corporation v. Raja Gyannath2, concluded the matter, and proved that the definitions of the words ‘tenant’ and ‘landlord’ in Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, were similar to that of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, the Supreme Court held that the observation in All India Film Corporation Ltd. v. Gyannath2, would be equally applicable to the facts of that case. 20. In the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in All India Film Corporation Ltd. v. Gyannath2, the effect of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act with which we are now concerned will have to be examined. The Supreme Court has stated that even when the definitions of landlord and tenant are applicable, the tenancy cannot be said to survive after the termination of the mortgage and the termination of the mortgagee’s interest terminated the relationship of landlord and tenant which could not be said to run with the land and there being no landlord and no tenant, the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act could not apply any further. 21. Having held that under the general law the lease granted by the usufructuary mortgagee did not continue and the redeeming mortgagor is not bound by the lease, I will now proceed to consider whether the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act has enlarged the rights of the tenants of the mortgagee so as to bind the mortgagor. 22. The Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (XXV of 1955), was enacted with the object of giving protection from unjust eviction of cultivating tenants in certain areas in the State of Tamil Nadu. 22. The Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (XXV of 1955), was enacted with the object of giving protection from unjust eviction of cultivating tenants in certain areas in the State of Tamil Nadu. The Preamble runs as follows: — “Whereas it is necessary to protect cultivating tenants in certain areas in the State of Madras from unjust eviction.” ‘Cultivating tenant’ is defined under section 2 (a) as follows: — “Cultivating tenant in relation to any land means a person who carries on personal cultivation on such land under a tenancy agreement, express or implied, and includes — (i) any such person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement, and (ii) the heirs of such person, but does not include a mere intermediary or his heirs.” From the definition it would be seen that any person who carries on cultivation under a tenancy agreement, express or implied, will be a cultivating tenant. It also includes a person who continues in possession after the determination of the tenancy agreement and the heirs of such person. The definition contemplates the relationship of landlord and tenant between the tenant and a person with whom he has entered into a tenancy agreement express or implied. This would support the view that the relationship of the tenant and landlord continues between the two contracting parties alone that is, the tenant and the usufructuary mortgagee, his landlord, and would not subsist when the mortgage is extinguished for the mortgagor cannot be said to have entered into an express or implied contract or succeed to the rights of the usufructuary mortgagee. The words ‘a person who continues in possession after the determination of the tenancy agreement’ is ambiguous, for determination of the tenancy agreement may cither refer to a tenant holding over under the usufructuary mortgagee or a case where the usufructuary mortgagee’s rights had been determined. As the intent is not clear, it cannot be said that the Act has specifically conferred a right on the cultivating tenant even after the mortgage had been extinguished so as to bind the redeeming mortgagor. 23. As the intent is not clear, it cannot be said that the Act has specifically conferred a right on the cultivating tenant even after the mortgage had been extinguished so as to bind the redeeming mortgagor. 23. The term landlord has been defined as follows:- "‘Landlord’ in relation to a holding or part thereof means the person entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from such holding or part." The definition in the context would refer to the usufructuary mortgagee as the person with whom the tenant had entered into an express or implied contract and is entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from the holding. The definition would not necessarily include the mortgagor, for, so long as he does not recognise the tenancy and so long as the tenancy did not bind the mortgagor, he would not be entitled to evict the cultivating tenant, though he would have other remedies to obtain possession from the usufructuary mortgagee’s tenants. While, therefore, there can be no doubt that the two definitions of ‘cultivating tenant’ and ‘landlord’ would be applicable to the tenant and the usufructuary mortgagee, there is nothing that could bring the redeeming mortgagor within the definition of the word ‘landlord’. Section 3 of the Act runs as follows: — "3 (1) Subject to the next succeeding sub-section, no cultivating tenant shall be evicted from his holding or any part thereof by or at the instance of his landlord, whether in execution of a decree or order of a Court or otherwise. " The words ‘by or at the instance of his landlord’ would indicate that section 3 in particular, and the Act in general, were intended only to apply to his landlord, that is, the person with whom the tenant had entered into express or implied contract and the persons who claim title under such landlord. The amended section 6-A of the Act is in general terms, and bars a suit before any Court for possession or injunction in relation to any land where the defendant is a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act. Though the suit against all cultivating tenants is barred, in the context it would refer only to a suit agiinst defendants, who are treated as cultivating tenants and would not be applicable to persons who claim possession not as landlord. 24. Though the suit against all cultivating tenants is barred, in the context it would refer only to a suit agiinst defendants, who are treated as cultivating tenants and would not be applicable to persons who claim possession not as landlord. 24. An examination of the Act would thus disclose that there has been no express or implied enlargement of the rights of the tenant under a usufructuary mortgagee so as to bind the mortgagor. 25. It was urged that the decision of the Supreme Court in All India Film Corporation Ltd. v. Gyannath1, was rendered without making any reference to Prabku v. Ramdeo2, and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in All India Film Corporation Ltd. v. Gyannath1, is not in conformity with the decision in Prabhu v. Ramdeo". I do not feel that there is any irreconcilable inconsistency between the principles laid down by the two decisions. In the case second cited before the Supreme Court, one Jore executed a usufructuary mortgage in about 1936 for a period of 20 years in favour of one, Ganga Din. After the expiry of the period prescribed by the said mortgage Jore’s son, the appellant before the Supreme Court, obtained a decree for redemption on 16th July, 1956. During the continuance of the mortgage, the mortgagee Ganga Din, had let out the property to respondents 1 to 3 therein. Before the mortgage was redeemed and during the continu ance of the lease, the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, came into force on 15th October, 1955. The question arose whether the tenants, who were inducted by the usufructuary mortgagee could be ejected by the appellant on the ground that the mortgage in question had been redeemed. It may be noted that in this case, the lease was before the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force. After referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Makabir Gaps v. Harbans Narain Singh1, wherein it was laid down that a mortgagee cannot, during the subsistence of the mortgage, act in a manner detrimental to the mortgagor’s interest, such as by giving a lease which may enable the tenant to acquire permanent or occupancy rights in the fields thereby defeating the mortgagor’s right to khas possession, the Court observed that those observations were made in relation to the obligations of the mortgagee and the mortgagor under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme Court pointed out that the Court had taken the precaution to point out that even in regard to tenants inducted into the land by a mortgagee, cases may arise where the said tenants may acquire rights of special character by virtue of statutory provisions which may, in the meanwhile, come into operation, and added that a permissible settlement by a mortgagee in possession with a tenant in the course of prudent management and the springing up of rights in the tenant conferred or created by statute based on the nature of the land and possession for the requisite period, was a different matter altogether. Explaining the observations, the Court stated that while dealing with the normal position under the Transfer of Property Act, the rights of the tenants inducted by the mortgagee may conceivably be improved by virtue of statutory provisions which may meanwhile come into operation. The effect of the above passages is that normally the usufructurary mortgagee cannot confer a better title on the tenant than what he has and that the rights of the tenant arc extinguished with the expiry of the mortgage. But, if the usufructuary mortgagee, in the course of prudent management leases the property, the tenant may get certain rights and the possession of the tenant induced by the mortgagee may be protected during the period for which the lease was granted. It is open to the legislature to enlarge the rights of the tenants inducted by the mortgagee by statutory provisions. The question as to whether the rights of the tenants had been enlarged or not will depend upon the provisions of the statute. It is open to the legislature to enlarge the rights of the tenants inducted by the mortgagee by statutory provisions. The question as to whether the rights of the tenants had been enlarged or not will depend upon the provisions of the statute. The Supreme Court considering the provisions of section 15 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, came to the conclusion that the tenant under the usufructuary mortgagee being a tenant satisfying the requirements of section 5 (43) of the Act, would be entitled to all the rights conferred and be subject to all liabilities imposed on khatedar under the Act, and as they become khatedar by virtue of the statutory provisions, and as under section 161 of the Act no tenant shall be ejected from his holding otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the tenant-thus inducted by the usufructuary mortgagee became entitled to the benefits of section 15 of the Act and cannot be ejected except under the provisions of the Act in view of section 161 of the Act. The decision is on the basis that the lease by the usufructuary mortgagee is a prudent act, the lease being before the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force, and on the basis that section 15 of the Act conferred on all tenants, who satisfy the requirements of section 5 (43), the rights of khatedar under section 15 of the Act. It will be seen that the Supreme Court was dealing with the case of a prudent lease by the usufructuary mortgagee where the lessee’s rights had been enlarged by specific provisions of the enactment. When the lease is not prudent and when the right of the lessee has not been specifically enlarged by the statute, the decision will not apply. When the lease is not prudent, the decision of the Supreme Court in All India Film Corporation v. Gyannath2, will be at plicable. As there is no lease subsisting, and as there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the mortgagor and the usufructuary mortgagee’s lessee, the lessee cannot claim any enhanced right. But, if the lease is a prudent one and by statutory provisions his rights had been enlarged, then he could claim protection under the enactment concerned and this position is laid down by the Sunreme Court in Prabhu v. Ramdeo1. Thus viewed there is no inconsistency between the two decisions. But, if the lease is a prudent one and by statutory provisions his rights had been enlarged, then he could claim protection under the enactment concerned and this position is laid down by the Sunreme Court in Prabhu v. Ramdeo1. Thus viewed there is no inconsistency between the two decisions. The case under consideration before me being one where there was no prudent lease by the usufructuary mortgagee, the decision in All India Film Corporation Ltd. v. Gyannath2, would be aplicable, and the tenant cannot claim any enhanced right. 26. As conflicting views have been taken by several Judges of this Court, we gave notice to the Advocate-General and requested Mr. M. S. Venkatarama Iyer, a senior member of the Bar, to assist us as amicus curiae. We are indebted to both of them for their valuable assistance. 27. In the result, I would allow the appeal, but under the circumstances would not make any order as to costs. Maharajan, J. -I have had the advantage of going through the judgment of my learned brother. With great respect to him, I find myself unable to concur with his conclusions. 29. The two questions that arise for determination in this appeal are:- 1. Whether the tenants under a usufructuary mortgagee are entitled after the discharge of the usufructuary mortgage, to claim the protection granted tinder the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, as against the mortgagor ? 2. If the tenants are so entitled to protection, whether the civil Court would have jurisdiction to try the suit, which is essentially one for recovery of possession of the leasehold from the tenants? While upon the first question, I may hasten to agree that the lease granted by a usufructuary mortgagee would ordinarily be co-terminous with the usufructuary mortgage. It is a truism to say that a person cannot, by transfer or otherwise, confer on another a tetter title than he himself has, and that, consequently, a mortgagee cannot create an interest in the hypotheca in favour of a tenant which would enure beyond the termination of his own interest as a mortgagee. It is obvious that a lease granted by a usufructuary mortgagee would come to an end the moment the usufructuary mortgage itself has been redeemed. It is obvious that a lease granted by a usufructuary mortgagee would come to an end the moment the usufructuary mortgage itself has been redeemed. But, where before the usufructuary mortgage has been redeemed, the statute intervenes and confers upon the tenant of the mortgagee certain rights and privileges, the principle that the lease is co-terminous with the usufructuary mortgage would no longer hold good, because the statutory rights and privileges of the tenant are neither traceable to, nor derived from, the mortgagee, but have been conferred upon the tenant by statute. This proposition admits of no doubt, and has been laid down authoritatively by a Bench of 5 Judges of the Supreme Court in Prabku v. Ramdeo3. What remains for the Court to consider is whether the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act has before the redemption of the mortgage, conferred any statutory protection upon the respondents, who were tenants of the usufructuary mortgagee. 30. The Act (Tamil Nadu Act XXV of 1955) came into force on 27th September, 1955. For some years before the Act was passed, there was considerable public discussion as to what kind of land reforms should be effected by legislation. These discussions created apprehensions in the minds of those who had leased out lands and they started evicting their tenants with a view to bring the lands under their personal cultivation. As such large-scale eviction might lead to agrarian trouble and disturbance the Legislature enacted the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons published in Part IV-A of the Fort St. George Gazette of 3rd August, 1955 at page 145, runs as follows:- " It has been brought to the notice of Government that in anticipation of land reforms legislation, owners of lands are evicting cultivating tenants with a view to bringing the lands under their personal cultivation. Such large-scale eviction will if allowed to continue, lead to agrarian trouble and disturbance and to breach of peace: The object of this Bill is to protect the tenants from unjust eviction for a period of one year. Such large-scale eviction will if allowed to continue, lead to agrarian trouble and disturbance and to breach of peace: The object of this Bill is to protect the tenants from unjust eviction for a period of one year. The tenant will not, however, be entitled to protection if he is in arrear of rent or has done any act which is destructive of or injurious to the land or any crop thereon, or has ceased to cultivate the land or has used it for any purpose other than that for which it was let. Suitable provision has been made for restoring land to any cultivating tenant who was in possession of it on the 1st December, 1954." 31. It would be apparent from the above statement that the legislative intent was to give protection to cultivating tenants regardless of the fact whether the tenants hold possession in pursuance of tenancy agreements with absolute owners or with any person such as a life estate holder or a Receiver or usufructuary mortgagee entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from the holding. The main concern of the legislation was to protect all cultivating tenants from eviction and thereby prevent agrarian trouble, disturbance and breach of peace. There is no reason to suppose that the legislature intended to discriminate between different categories of cultivating tenants and to give protection only to those cultivating tenants who derived possession from absolute owners and deny protection to cultivating tenants who derived possession from limited owners or usufructuary mortgagees. One would think that eviction of either category of cultivating tenants would have brought about agrarian trouble which it was the main purpose of the enactment to avert. It may be noticed that the Act makes serious inroads upon the rights of lessors and owners under the Transfer of Property Act and under the common law of India. The Court ought not, therefore, to construe the effect of this special enactment by grafting into it considerations imported from the Transfer of Property Act or the common law of India. In construing a statute the Court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied or the purpose to be subserved and place on it a reasonable or liberal construction, which would best effect its purpose rather than one which would defeat it (vide: Note 323, page 595 Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 82). In construing a statute the Court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied or the purpose to be subserved and place on it a reasonable or liberal construction, which would best effect its purpose rather than one which would defeat it (vide: Note 323, page 595 Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 82). Even if a statute is susceptible of more than one construction it must be given that which will best effect its purpose rather than one which would defeat it even though such construction is not within the strict literal interpretation of the statute and even though both constructions are equally reasonable. The legislative declaration of purpose and policy is entitled to gravest consideration unless overthrown by facts of record, and a statute will if possible be given a construction which is consistent with its declared purpose (vide: Note 323, Corpus Juris Secundum, cited supra, Vol. 82). Though the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Act will not be controlled or affected by anything in the preamble it is a well known rule of interpretation that in cases of doubt as to the proper construction of the body of a statute, resort may be had to the preamble or recitals for the purpose of ascertaining the legislative intent (vide: Corpus Juris Secundum, cited supra, Vol. 82, note 349, page 730). 32. The Preamble to the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, runs as follows:- "Whereas it is necessary to protect cultivating tenants in certain areas in the State of Madras from unjust eviction." The Preamble seems to indicate that all categories of cultivating tenants would come under the protective umbrella of this Act. The definition of ‘cultivating tenant. 32. The Preamble to the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, runs as follows:- "Whereas it is necessary to protect cultivating tenants in certain areas in the State of Madras from unjust eviction." The Preamble seems to indicate that all categories of cultivating tenants would come under the protective umbrella of this Act. The definition of ‘cultivating tenant. ‘in section 2 (aa) as amended by Tamil Nadu Act IX of 1969, is as follows: (ii) includes-(a) any such person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement ; (b) the heir of such persons, if the heir contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of such land ; (c) a sub-tenant, if he contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of such land ; or (d) any such subtenant who continues in possession of the land notwithstanding that the person who sublet the land to such subtenant ceases to have the right of possession of such land ; but (iii) does not include a mere intermediary or his heir." It is noteworthy that in sub-clause (i) of clase (aa) to section 2, no reference is made to the person with whom the cultivating tenant should have entered into a tenancy agreement. In order to qualify as a cultivating tenant, it is sufficient if he is in possession of any land belonging to another in pursuance of a tenancy agreement with any person who is entitled for the time being to lease out the land to him. The definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ is so wide as to embrace even a sub-tenant between whom and the landlord there is no privity of estate. Sub-clause (d) of clause (aa) proceeds to make it clear that even a sub-tenant, who continues in possession of the land, notwithstanding that the person who sublet the land to such sub-tenant has ceased to have the right to possession of such land, would be a cultivating tenant within the meaning of the Act and entitled to protection thereunder. Sub-clause (d) of clause (aa) proceeds to make it clear that even a sub-tenant, who continues in possession of the land, notwithstanding that the person who sublet the land to such sub-tenant has ceased to have the right to possession of such land, would be a cultivating tenant within the meaning of the Act and entitled to protection thereunder. Under the general law and under the Transfer of Property Act; the tenure of a sub-tenant is analogous to and as precarious as that of a lessee from a usufructuary mortgagee and the sub-tenancy would terminate with the tenancy and the sub-tenant, who has no privity of contract with the landlord cannot maintain possession of the land as against the landlord after the head tenancy has terminated. But, this notion has been thrown overboard by the definition contained in the Act, which confers even upon such a sub-tenant protection from eviction. If ‘A ‘the owner of a land, grants a lease in favour of ‘B ‘for a period of one year and ‘B ‘sub-leases the land to ‘C ‘and the sub-tenant continues in possession of the land even after the expiry of one year, he would, under the definition, be entitled to protection under the Act, and he can successfully resist the suit by the landlord for eviction against him on the ground that he is a cultivating tenant, but the landlord cannot say that there is neither privity of contract nor privity of estate between him and the subtenant and that the sub-tenant cannot, therefore, continue in possession, because the head-tenant, who had sublet the land to the sub-tenant, had himself ceased to have the right to possession of such land. This part of the definition would appear to emphasise the view that all cultivating tenants would be entitled to protection of this statute regardless of the termination of their contractual right to possession, so long as they continue in cultivation of the land in pursuance of a tenancy agreement with the person entitled to lease the land. The usufructuary mortgagee is certainly a person who is entitled to be in possession of the hypotheca and to enjoy the usufruct thereof so long as the usufructuary mortgage is in full force. During this period he is entitled in law to lease out the hypotheca. The usufructuary mortgagee is certainly a person who is entitled to be in possession of the hypotheca and to enjoy the usufruct thereof so long as the usufructuary mortgage is in full force. During this period he is entitled in law to lease out the hypotheca. It may be noted that the word ‘landlord ‘has been defined in section 2, clause (c) of the Act so widely that it may take in not only an absolute owner of a holding, but also any person who may have an inferior interest in the holding but is nevertheless entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from such holding. The holder of a life interest in a holding or the holder of a usufructuary mortgagee therein would, notwithstanding his truncated rights, still be entitled to evict the cultivating tenant under the law, and would therefore, be qualified to be a landlord within the meaning of this Act. The definition of ‘landlord ‘as ‘a person entitled to evict a cultivating tenant from such holding’ is designedly elastic so that it may include within its gamut all persons ranging from, a person having absolute ownership in the holding down to a person like a usufructuary mortgagee, who, despite his precarious right to possession of the holding, would still be entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from the holding during the currency of the mortgage. The deliberate wideness of this definition has a two-fold-purpose. In the first place, it throws light on the kind of persons with whom the cultivating tenant can enter into a tenancy agreement within the meaning of section 2 (aa) of the Act. It need not necessarily be with the owner of the land. Reading the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ in conjunction with the definition of ‘landlord ‘it has to be held that the tenancy agreement contemplated in section 2 (aa) may be with any person entitled to evict the cultivating tenant, which means any person ranging from an absolute owner to a person like a usufructuary mortgage who despite his rights being inferior to those of an absolute owner would still be entitled to possess the land by leasing it or otherwise. In the second place, the inclusive definition of the word ‘landlord ‘would throw light upon the manner in which section 3 (1) of the Act should bo interpreted. In the second place, the inclusive definition of the word ‘landlord ‘would throw light upon the manner in which section 3 (1) of the Act should bo interpreted. Section 3 (1) says- “Subject to the next succeeding subsection ; no cultivating tenant shall be evicted from his holding or any part thereof, by or at the instance of his landlord, whether in execution of a decree or order of a Court or otherwise.” This provision makes it clear that notwithstanding the fact that a decree or order of a civil Court for eviction of the tenant has been passed before the coming into force of the Act, no cultivating tenant shall be evicted except in accordance with the other provisions contained in the Act. No doubt, the words ‘by or at the instance of his landlord ‘occur in this section. We will be taking the words too literally, if we construe the same to mean that in the matter of eviction of the tenant, the statute imposes a disability solely and only upon the person with whom the tenant has entered into an express or implied tenancy agreement. It may be that the tenancy agreement is concluded with A, an absolute owner, but at the time the eviction suit is filed, A is dead, and his heir B has inherited the holding. It would not be open to B to contend that though the tenant cannot be evicted at the instance of ‘his landlord ‘namely, A, there is no legal embargo against B, evicting him. Such a literal construction would kill the spirit of the enactment, besides leading to anomalous results; the principle of harmonious construction requires the Court to read the word ‘landlord ‘in section 3 (1) in conjunction with the definition of the word ‘landlord ‘in section 2 (e) of the Act, in which case, it would embrace all persons entitled to evict the cultivating tenant, such persons including not only the mortgagee who during the currency of the tenancy agreement, would be entitled to evict the cultivating tenant, but also the mortgagor, who after redeeming the mortgagee, has become entitled to evict the cultivating tenant. If section 3 (1) says that no cultivating tenant shall be evicted “ by or at the instance of his landlord” , it means that no cultivating tenant shall be evicted by or at the instance of any person entitled to evict him. To say that the tenant’s landlord is only the mortgagee and not the mortgagor and that though the section interdicts the mortgagee from evicting the tenant, it does not interdict the mortgagor from evicting him, would be to put a construction upon the section, which besides being uncharitable to the draftsman, who had unfortunately to express himself in a foreign language, would have the effect of frustrating the’ very purpose of this special enactment. In my view, the expression ‘his landlord ‘in section 3 (1) can be reasonably construed to mean not only the usufructuary mortgagee, who leased out the lands to the respondents, but also the appellant (mortgagor), who after redemption of themortgage, has become entitled to evict the cultivating tenant in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 33. Further, section 6-A of the Act, which is less vulnerably drafted, says that if in any suit before any Court for possession of any land, it is proved by affidavits or otherwise that the defendant is a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of this Act, the Court shall not proceed with the trial of the suit, but shall transfer it to the Revenue Divisional Officer. There is no reference in this section to ‘his landlord ‘. If it is proved that the defendants are cultivating tenants, entitled to the benefits of the Act, the Court shall refuse to proceed with the trial of the suit which has been instituted for possession of the land from the cultivating tenants and shall transfer it to the Revenue Divisional Officer who shall dispose it of as though it were an application under the Act. The embargo placed by section 6-A upon suit for possession is unqualified. Any suits for possession before any Court, instituted, whether it be by the mortgagee before redemption or after redemption by the mortgagor, shall be transferred by the civil Court to the Revenue Divisional Officer. This provision would also reinforce the conclusion that the Act is intended to protect all cultivating tenants against eviction either by the mortgagee or by the mortgagor. This provision would also reinforce the conclusion that the Act is intended to protect all cultivating tenants against eviction either by the mortgagee or by the mortgagor. The object to be accomplished by the Act and the mischief sought to be remedied thereunder require the Court to place on it a reasonable and liberal construction, which would best accomplish its purpose rather than frustrate it. I am therefore, of the view that the respondents are cultivating tenants entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, that they had acquired statutory protection even before the suit usufructuary mortgage had been redeemed by the appellant, that for the purpose of the Act, the appellant is as much the landlord of the respondent as the usufructuary mortgagee who has been redeemed by the appellant and that the appellant is not entitled to evict the respondents except in conformity with the provisions embodied in, and the procedure laid down by the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. Upon the first question, I agree with Rama-nujam, J. 34. Upon the second question, I have to respectfully differ from the second appellate Judge, who has dismissed the suit of the appellant on the ground that the respondents are not liable to be evicted. If the respondents are cultivating tenants within the meaning of the Act and entitled to the benefits of the Act, as I hold them to be, the civil Court has no jurisdiction under section 6-A of the Act to proceed with the trial of the suit, but it shall transfer the suit to the Revenue Divisional Officer for disposal by him in accordance with the provisions of the Act. I would, therefore, while agreeing with Ramanujam, J., that the respondents are cultivating tenants entitled to the benefits of the Act, set aside the learned Judge’s dismissal of the suit, and direct the suit to be transferred to the Revenue Divisional Officer concerned. Under the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. Kailasam, J-The question involved in this Letters Patent appeal is whether the tenants under a usufructuary mortgagee are entitled, after redemption of the usufructuary mortgage, to claim the protection granted under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, as against the mortgagor. 36. We consider this question is of considerable public in portance, and it will have to be authoritatively decided finally. 36. We consider this question is of considerable public in portance, and it will have to be authoritatively decided finally. This question has arisen many times and different judges have taken different views. In order to finally settle the position of law, so far as this High Court is concerned, we are agreed that the matter should be decided by a Full Bench. Under Order I, proviso to rule 2 of the Rules of the High Court, Appellate Side, the matter will be posted before a Full Bench. Pursuant to the Order of Reference aforesaid, this appeal coming on for hearing before the Full Bench, the Court delivered the following Judgment: Veeraswami, C J.-The Letters Patent Appeal is posted before a Full Bench, because, Kailasam, J. and Maha-rajan, J., differed on the question whether the tenants under a usufructuary mortgagee are entitled, after redemption of the usufructuary mortgage, to claim protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, as against the mortgagor. The usufructuary mortgage was created on 2nd March, 1924. Respondents 1 and 2 were inducted into the land by the usufructuary mortgagee in 1957 as tenants. On 19th June, 1964, the mortgage was redeemed. The mortgagor-owner brought the suit for possession and mesne profits. The first two Courts agreed in decreeing the suit. But, in second appeal, Ramanujam, J., reversed the decree relying on Prabhu v. Ramde1, and dismissed the suit. But, he granted leave. In the Letters Patent Appeal, Kailasam, J., took the view that the respondents were not entitled to the statutory protection, while Maharajan, J., took the opposite view. 38. The Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, was enacted for the protection from eviction of cultivating tenants in certain areas in the State of Madras. It provided for statutory protection, eviction on certain grounds, right of tenant to restoration of possession in certain events and right of landlord to resume for personal cultivation. ‘Cultivating tenant’ is defined by section 2 (aa) in relation to any land as a person who carries on personal cultivation on such land under a tenancy agreement, express or implied. It provided for statutory protection, eviction on certain grounds, right of tenant to restoration of possession in certain events and right of landlord to resume for personal cultivation. ‘Cultivating tenant’ is defined by section 2 (aa) in relation to any land as a person who carries on personal cultivation on such land under a tenancy agreement, express or implied. The definition also includes “ any such person as is referred to in subclause (1) who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement.” By Act IX of 1969, an amendment was introduced bringing within the scope of definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ a sub-tenant as well. This was done in view of certain earlier decisions of this Court, as for instance Ganapathi v. Ayyakannu2. A landlord is defined by the section in relation to a holding or part thereof as a person entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from such holding or part. ‘Holding ‘under section tion 2 (a) means a parcel or parcels of land held by a cultivating tenant. ‘Land’ as defined means land used for the purpose of agriculture or horticulture, and it includes certain things with which we are not concerned in this case. A person is said to carry on personal cultivation on a land when he contributes his own physical labour or that of the members of his family in the cultivation of the land. The term ‘cultivating tenant’ would extend also to his heirs, but not to a mere intermediary or his heirs. The protection of a cultivating tenant is afforded by means of section 3 which is- “(1) Subject to the next succeeding sub-section, no cultivating tenant shall ‘be evicted from his holding or any part thereof, by or at the instance of the landlord, whether in execution of a decree or order of a Court or otherwise.” Clauses (aa) to (d) in sub-section (2) of the section deals with the grounds for eviction. Clause (aa) is not apposite in this case. Clause (b) makes negligence, which is destructive of or injurious to the land or any crop thereon, a ground for eviction. If the cultivating tenant has altogether ceased to cultivate the land, that will also furnish the basis for eviction. Clause (c) would enable ‘a landlord to evict a cultivating tenant, if he has used the land for any purpose not being agricultural or horticultural purpose. If the cultivating tenant has altogether ceased to cultivate the land, that will also furnish the basis for eviction. Clause (c) would enable ‘a landlord to evict a cultivating tenant, if he has used the land for any purpose not being agricultural or horticultural purpose. The next clause (d) deals with another ground for eviction, namely, wilful denial of the title of the landlord to the land. These are the relevant provisions in the light of which we have to answer the question set out at the outset. 39. It is noteworthy that the first part of the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ envisages a tenancy agreement, express or implied. The agreement is a sine qua non to bring about a tenancy. But, in order to make the tenant a cultivating tenant, a further requisite is that he should carry on personal cultivation as defined which we have adverted to. When such a tenancy agreement comes to an end by whatever means, then the statutory tenancy begins by virtue of the inclusive definition of the term ‘cultivating tenant’. Determination of a tenancy agreement necessarily means that the contractual relationship of landlord and tenant is brought to an end and notwithstanding only by reason of the fact that the cultivating tenant as defined in the first part of the definition continues in possession of the land he is enabled to continue to have the status of a cultivating tenant. In other words, the effect of the inclusive definition is that it brings about a statutory tenancy for purposes of protection. To bring about that result the precedents are that there should have been in the origin a tenancy agreement, express or implied, and under that agreement to which the person is a party he should carry on personal cultivation, on the land. If these premises are granted, though the agreement of tenancy express or implied has terminated but the person mentioned in the first part of the definition continues in possession of the land he will be a cultivating tenant. The first part of the definition does not specify as between whom and whom, the tenancy agreement mentioned is contemplated. The lease may have been granted by the owner or a usufructuary mortgagee or even a lessee of the land. The first part of the definition does not specify as between whom and whom, the tenancy agreement mentioned is contemplated. The lease may have been granted by the owner or a usufructuary mortgagee or even a lessee of the land. But, the person who carries on personal cultivation of the land should derive his right under a tenancy agreement, express or implied with a person entitled to enter into it who may be any one of those persons we have just now mentioned as instances. To attract the inclusive definition, the two requisites are determination of a tenancy agreement and the person who was within the first part of the definition continues in possession of the land. If those requisites are satisfied, the person continuing in possession of the land will be a cultivating tenant. The inclusive definition does not visualise that after the determination of tenancy if the person as defined in the first part of the definition continues in possession of the land, he would not be a cultivating tenant unless there is a contractual relationship, express or implied, with his landlord. We say so, because, a landlord, as noticed supra, is defined not in terms of a person who lets out the land, but as a person entitled to evict the cultivating tenant. No contractual relationship is necessary or is implied for purposes of the definition. The grounds of eviction which we enumerated above should be understood and related to a landlord as defined and not in terms of a landlord as contemplated by the Transfer of Property Act. Under the latter Act, a landlord necessarily implies contractual relationship, and there should be a landlord as well as a tenant, and, as between them, the basis of relationship should be the tenancy agreement. But that will be so only in respect of the first part of the definition of cultivating tenant’. When we take the inclusive definition, it deals with a case of a situation arising after determination of tenancy so that the contractual relationship need not exist as the basis for entitling the landlord either to collect rent or evict. Reading the definitions of ‘cultivating tenant’ and ‘landlord ‘it is further clear that in order to be a cultivating tenant for an extended period, the lessor need not necessarily have the capacity or right to confer it. Reading the definitions of ‘cultivating tenant’ and ‘landlord ‘it is further clear that in order to be a cultivating tenant for an extended period, the lessor need not necessarily have the capacity or right to confer it. All that is essential for the inclusive definition to apply is that in the origin of the tenancy, it should have resulted from a tenancy agreement, express or implied, and for purposes of inclusive definition, it does not matter whether the original lessor is in the picture or not. The test to find out whether a person is a landlord is not that whether there is a direct agreement between him and the tenant but whether the person who claims to be the landlord is entitled to evict on the grounds mentioned in the Act. It is in the light of this position, in our opinion, we have to appreciate the scope and effect, of sub-section (1) of section 3. When it speaks of ‘at the instance of his landlord ‘, it means at the instance of the person entitled to evict the tenant. The word ‘his ‘does not make any difference, for the person entitled to evict him will be his landlord at any given time. The same meaning to the ‘landlord ‘has to be given in clauses (b), (c) and (d) as well of subsection (2) of section 3. 40. On the construction, we have thus placed, it will be obvious that, even though the usufructuary mortgage on the strength of which the mortgagee let out to the tenant has been redeemed, since the tenancy originated in an agreement and since because of the redemption, such an agreement came to an end but the tenant continued to be in possession, he will squarely be within the inclusive definition of the term ‘cultivating tenant’. On that view, the reasoning in Ganapathi v. Ayyakannu1, does not appear to us to be correct. There is no question of the usufructuary mortgagee conferring upon the tenant a higher title than what he is possessed of. What happens for purposes of the inclusive definition is that no higher title than what the usufructuary mortgagee possessed is conferred on the cultivating tenant. There is no question of the usufructuary mortgagee conferring upon the tenant a higher title than what he is possessed of. What happens for purposes of the inclusive definition is that no higher title than what the usufructuary mortgagee possessed is conferred on the cultivating tenant. But, the statute intervenes at the determination of the tenancy agreement and enjoins that if the contractual tenant within the meaning of the first part of the definition of ‘cultivating tenant’ continues in possession of the land, he would be entitled to protection as a cultivating tenant. A reference was made in that case in the observations of Balakrishna Ayyar, J. in Ramaswami Naidu v. Marudaveera Moopan1. Both Ganapathi v. Ayyakannu2and Ramaswami Naidu. v. Marudaveera Moopan1, deal with cases of sub-lessees. They were all of the view that sub-lessees were not within the inclusive definition. The reasoning of Balakrishna Ayyar, J., which Jagadisan, J. and Kailasam, J., accepted in Ganapathi v. Ayyakannu2, was this: "A tenancy agreement means an agreement creating a tenancy, and when we speak of a tenancy we normally understand that there is on the one side a landlord and, on the other side, a tenant or lessee. In relation to sublessee we do not usually use the term tenancy agreement ; instead we speak of the assignee of a lease. It will also be appreciated that if the contention of Mr. Krishnaswami Iyer were right, it would be possible for a lessee to create rights larger than he himself has, and normally a construction which produces such a result should not be accepted.....The expression ‘heirs, legal representatives and assignees ‘in a very familiar one. When, therefore, the Legislature said that the ‘heirs of such person ‘shall be deemed to be tenant, but did not, at the same time, include his ‘legal representatives or assignees’ in that category the inference must be that it did not want to confer the benefit of the Act on the legal representatives or assignees of the original lessee. Otherwise, it will be hard to explain the omission of the words" legal representatives and assignees." So far as the first part of the learned Judge’s reasoning is concerned, we are in agreement because a tenancy necessarily implies a landlord on the one hand and a tenant on the other. But equally to a sub-lessee, the protection is traced to the statute. But equally to a sub-lessee, the protection is traced to the statute. If the sub-lessee continues in possession, but the tenancy agreement originally entered into had not terminated, then the inclusive definition may not apply, and, therefore, the sub-lessee may not be entitled to protection. If, on the other hand, by the time the sub-lessee claims protection under the Act, the tenancy agreement with his lessor had terminated, then it will be a different matter to which the inclusive definition will have application. Also, the observation of the learned Judge that the lessor cannot confer higher title than he himself possessed misses the fact, if we may say so with respect, that the conferment of protection is not by any person under a contract but by force of the statutory provision. The principle that no man can confer upon another a title or right higher than what he himself possessed, will, therefore, have no validity in the application of the inclusive definition of cultivating tenant’. 41. For the appellant it was contended that, when by Amending Act IX of 1969, only a sub-tenant was brought within the vortex of the inclusive definition of ‘cultivating tenant’, it did not do so in respect of a tenant or a usufructuary mortgagee. But on principle, as we consider, the position of a usufructuary mortgagee is not different from that of a lessee who sub-lets, because in either case the tenancy results from a valid agreement and after its termination the tenant continuing in possession becomes entitled to the statutory protection. 43. In Prabhu v. Ramdeo3, which was concerned with Rajasthan Tenancy Act, especially, sections 15, 161, 5 (43) and (44), it was held that the persons inducted into the agricultural land, as tenants by the the usufructuary mortgagee and who had become entitled to rights of khatedar tenants by virtue of section 15 could not be ejected by the mortgagor on the ground that mortgage of the land had been redeemed. Rights of tenants inducted by the mortgagee in possession under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act may conceivably be improved by statutory provisions which may meanwhile come into operation. Ramanujam, J., in the second appeal, has placed reliance on this decision for his view. Rights of tenants inducted by the mortgagee in possession under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act may conceivably be improved by statutory provisions which may meanwhile come into operation. Ramanujam, J., in the second appeal, has placed reliance on this decision for his view. But, we would prefer to rest our view on the construction that we have been inclined to make on the statutory provisions themselves in the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. 43. Counsel for the appellant referred to Sachalmal Parasram v. Ratanbai1, which we do not think in any way affects the view that we have taken as to the effect of the related statutory provisions in the Act. The Letters Patent Appeal fails, and it is dismissed. No costs. 44. Maharajan, J, in his opinion, has suggested that the matter will have to go back to the Revenue Divisional Officer. But, the suit out of which the appeal arises was one simpliciter for recovery of possession and mesne profits and not for eviction on any other grounds available to the plaintiff under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. There is, therefore, no point in forwarding the plaint to the Revenue Divisional Officer functioning under the Act. If the plaintiff wants to evict the defendants, he can always do so on grounds open to him in appropriate proceedings. S.J. ---------- Appeal dismissed.