JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - At a meeting of the Municipal Board, Hardwar, a motion of no confidence in the President was passed. The President made a representation to the State Government that the Board be superseded. This was under Sec. 47-A (1) of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916. After receiving the representation of the President the State Government issued a charge-sheet to the Board under Sec. 30 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. The Board submitted its explanation. After considering it the State Government by a notification dated 14th May, 1973, superseded the Board for a period of two years with effect from 18th May, 1973. The order of supersession was challenged by some members of the Board by way of a writ petition. 2. A learned Single Judge held that the powers of the State Government to supersede the Board under Sec. 47-A and Sec. 30 of the U. P. Municipalities Act were independent; they were complementary not supplementary to each other. The consequence of the order passed under Sec. 30 is different than that of an order under Sec. 47-A. When the President of a Board has invoked the exercise of the power under Sec. 47-A it is incumbent on the State Government to pass a suitable order on the representation of the President. While such a representation was pending the State Government had no jurisdiction to take proceedings under Sec. 30. On this view the writ petition was allowed and the impugned order of supersession was quashed. 3. Aggrieved, the State has come up in appeal. Learned Chief Standing Counsel, appearing for the appellants urged that Sec. 30 of the U. P. Municipalities Act does not prescribe any particular source of information upon which action under it could be taken. The State Government was well within its power in initiating proceedings under Sec. 30 on the basis of the material furnished by the President in his representation. The State Government was well within its power in initiating proceedings under Sec. 30 on the basis of the material furnished by the President in his representation. This submission was repelled by the learned Single Judge by holding that: "This argument clearly cuts across the decision rendered by G. C. Mathur, J. It is true that the President may also furnish information to the State Government and the State Government may take action under Sec. 30 on the basis of such information or report but the President has to make a choice as to whether he wants the State Government to proceed under Sec. 30 or under Sec. 47-A. Once he chooses to invoke the right given to him of making the representation under Sec. 47-A, the State Government must confine itself to the provisions contained in that section. It must consider the grounds raised in the representation only and the Board can only be called upon to meet the charges contained in the representation of the President. After considering the representation the State Government must conclude the proceedings either by rejecting the representation or by accepting it and superseding the Board. It cannot switch over to Sec. 30." The decision of G. C. Mathur, J., referred to, is reported as Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P., 1966 A.L.J. 1091. 4. Sec. 47-A entitles that President against whom a motion of no-confidence has been passed to make a representation to the State Government for the supersession of the Board. Sec. 30, however, confers power upon the State Government to supersede or dissolve a Board on certain mentioned grounds. It does not authorise the President of a Board to invoke the power of supersession. The State Government can act under Sec. 30 on the basis of information supplied to it by any one. It is, therefore, not quite right to any that the President has a choice to invoke the power of the State Government either under Sec. 30 or under Sec. 47-A. 5. Sec. 47-A entitles the President to make a representation. Thereupon the State Government is liable to consider it and to pass suitable orders. It is, therefore, not quite right to any that the President has a choice to invoke the power of the State Government either under Sec. 30 or under Sec. 47-A. 5. Sec. 47-A entitles the President to make a representation. Thereupon the State Government is liable to consider it and to pass suitable orders. This aspect also does not preclude the State Government from initiating proceedings under Sec. 30 for the supersession or dissolution of the Board, if it feels that the facts that have come to its knowledge make out a ground upon which action can be taken under Sec. 30. 6. In our opinion the submission that the State Government can act under Sec. 30 on the basis of any information supplied to it including the information given by a President under Sec. 47-A does not cut across the decision of G. C. Mathur, J. In that case a motion of no-confidence was passed against the President of Municipal Board, Mussoorie. The President made a representation under clause (1) (a) of Sec. 47-A of the Municipalities Act praying that the Board be superseded. The State Government without giving any show cause notice to the Board passed an order under Sec. 47-A(3) superseding the Board. This order was challenged, inter alia, on the ground that Sec 47-A does not confer any power upon the State Government to supersede a Municipal Board. The power of supersession has been conferred only by Sec. 30 and could be exercised only in accordance with that section. This plea was repelled by Hon. G. C. Mathur, J. He held that the power under Sec. 47-A to supersede a Board was independent of the power conferred under Sec. 30. Therefore, a Board can be superseded on accepting the representation made by the President under Sec. 47-A. There it was observed that if the power to supersede was to be exercisable under Sec. 30 then the limitation of three days under which the President could make a representation would become meaningless and even if a representation was made after three days of the passing of a motion of non-confidence on the President the power under Sec. 30 can be exercised. Therefore, the imposition of this limitation of three days indicates that the power to be exercised by the State Government u/s 47-A was not one contained under Sec. 30 but an independent power. 7. Therefore, the imposition of this limitation of three days indicates that the power to be exercised by the State Government u/s 47-A was not one contained under Sec. 30 but an independent power. 7. There is nothing in this decision which may suggest that in a case where a President has invoked the exercise of power of supersession under Sec. 47-A the State Government is confined to the exercise of that power alone and that while those proceedings are pending the State Government is precluded from proceeding under Sec. 30. The premise that the two powers are independent of each other would naturally lead to the conclusion that the exercise of either power is not dependent upon the pendency of proceeding under the other provision. The mere fact that the President has invoked the exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 47-A would not denude the State Government of the power possessed by it under Sec. 30. The power under Sec. 30 can be exercised any time provided the grounds mentioned therein are made out. To hold that while the proceedings under Sec. 47-A for the supersession of the Board are pending the State Government does not possess the power of supersession or dissolution under Sec. 30 would mean that the power to dissolve the Board under Sec. 30 which is not to be found under Sec. 47-A would stand nullified so long as the proceedings under Sec. 47-A are pending. There is no warrant in the concerned provisions for any such assumption or conclusion. 8. In our opinion, on the facts and in the circumstances the State Government had jurisdiction to invoke its power under Sec. 30 of the Act and to supersede the Board. The impugned order cannot be characterised as without jurisdiction. 9. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. Since the writ petition proceeded on several other points which have not been decided by the learned Single Judge the case is remanded to an appropriate Single Judge for decision of the writ petition in accordance with law. The appellants would be entitled to their costs.