JUDGMENT Prem Prakash, J. - In this case the petitioner, who is the tenant of a shop situate on the ground floor of Raj Kamal Hotel, Aminabad, Lucknow, the landlords being respondent Nos. 1 to 12, has moved for an order of certiorari to bring up and quash an order of the Prescribed Authority, Lucknow (Annexure 1) dated 16th June, 1973. directing his eviction from the building, under Sec. 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (to be hereinafter referred as the Act) which order was affirmed in appeal under Sec. 22 of the Act by the District Judge, Lucknow, in Annexure 2 dated 22nd January, 1974. Upon an application made by the petitioner for time to vacate the premises, the District Judge allowed a period of one month for the vacation of the same. 2. The admitted and stipulated facts are these : The petitioner is a displaced person from Pakistan and since 17th August, 1964, he has been in the occupation of the accommodation as the tenant, paying rent at the rate of Rs. 150/- per mensem; he has been carrying on business of general merchandise and Kirana in the said shop. He owns a residential house in Nazarbagh, Lucknow, in which he lives and the ground floor of which has been let out to various tenants. The respondents, who are the members of the Hindu undivided family, carry on business of Jewellers under the name Badri Narain Laxmi Narain Jewellers and also run a hotel under the name, Raj Kamal Hotel, which building is owned by them. On 8th October, 1972, respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and in particular Raj Narain Gupta (to be hereinafter referred as respondent No. 2) made an application under Sec. 21 of the Act for eviction of the petitioner from the shop which is situate on the ground floor of the Raj Kamal Hotel, on the ground that respondent No. 2 required the said shop for starting the business of Chemists and Druggist. In reply to that application the petitioner questioned the existence of the bonafide need of respondent No. 2 or of the family, he refuted the allegation that alternative accommodation could be available to him in the market closeby. In reply to that application the petitioner questioned the existence of the bonafide need of respondent No. 2 or of the family, he refuted the allegation that alternative accommodation could be available to him in the market closeby. Amongst other pleas taken by him, one of the pleas was that there were a number of rooms on the ground floor of Raj Kamal Hotel which were vacant for the business of the respondents. The assertion made by the respondents that the petitioners son carried on joint family business in another shop in Chaddha Market, Aminabad, was controverted by saying that the petitioners son carried on separate business in the Chaddha Market, and which belonged exclusively to him. 3. The Prescribed Authority arrived at the finding that the residential building owned by the petitioner has no suitable accommodation for purposes of carrying on the business and that the petitioner had acquired business goodwill, as he had been carrying on business there for the last nine or ten years. As regards the availability or alternative accommodation for the petitioner, the Prescribed Authority left it for the petitioner himself to find it out, although at the same time it was said that the obtaining of an alternative accommodation was fraught with considerable difficulty. But taking into consideration the circumstance that respondent No. 2 in order to supplement his income, was in need of an accommodation where he could start a separate business and because the Nagar Mahapalika had not given him the licence to start such business without his having obtained the suitable accommodation, the Prescribed Authority came to the conclusion that the building is bona fide required by respondent No. 2 for the purpose of carrying on trade. He, therefore, allowed the application. Feeling aggrieved from the order the tenant went up in appeal to the District Judge who, taking the view that since the need of the landlord was bonafide and was not vitiated by any oblique motive intended to harass the tenant or to extract more rent or otherwise, to let it out to some other tenant, confirmed the order of the Prescribed Authority, without taking into consideration the likely hardship which may be caused to the tenant from the grant of the application and other factors which he was required to consider under sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act. On the request of the petitioner, he granted him two months time on 22nd January, 1974, to vacate the accommodation, but when an objection was preferred by the landlords, the period was reduced to one month by an order dated 13th February, 1974. 4. Counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that the order of the Prescribed Authority as also of the District Judge suffers from "an error apparent on the face of the record" inasmuch as the circumstances which sub-rule (2) of Rule 20 directs the Authority to take into consideration, have not been considered, which if they were consideration, in the back ground of the sub-rule, would have apparently titled the balance against the landlord that he bonafide required the accommodation for the business of respondent No. 2. On the contrary, the contention of the respondents is that when once it had been found that the need of the landlord was bonafide and the Prescribed Authority had considered the question of the "likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application", the court, sitting, as it does, in a supervisory capacity under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not interfere with the order of the Authority which was affirmed by the District Judge in appeal. 5. That brings me to Sec. 21 (1) (a) of the Act. The Prescribed Authority may order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely, (a) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling. On an order being made under clause (a) of sub-sec. (I) a building or part thereof, as the case may be, stands released in favour of the landlord. On an order being made under clause (a) of sub-sec. (I) a building or part thereof, as the case may be, stands released in favour of the landlord. However, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Prescribed Authority is not an absolute one, but is trammelled by several factors contained in Rule 16(2) (a), (b) and (c), they being (a) the greater the period since when the tenant has been carrying on his business in the building, the less the justification for allowing the application; (b) where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he can shift his business without substantial loss, there shall be greater justification for allowing the application; and (c) the greater the existing business of the landlords own, apart from the business proposed to be a set up in the leased premises, the less the justification for allowing the application. The mere assertion on the part of the landlord that he requires the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of staring his own business is not decisive. The test which has to be applied is an objective test and not a subjective one and merely because a landlord asserts that he wants the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business, that would not be enough to establish that he requires it for that purpose and that his requirement is bona fide. The word required signifies that mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show the burden being upon him that he genuinely requires the non-residential accommodation for the purpose of starting or continuing his own business". Vide Mattulal v. Radhey Lal, (1974) S.C.C. page 365. Dissenting from there earlier decision in Smt. Kamla Sone v. Rup Lal Mehra, Civil Appeal No 150 of 1946, decided on 26-9-1969, the Supreme Court, affirming the principle laid down by them in Sarwate T.B. v. Ramichand, 1966 U.P.L.J. 56 (20), hold that the finding that the landlord bona fide required the accommodation for the purpose of starting business was a finding of fact and not a finding of mixed law and fact. A finding so arrived at could not be set aside unless it was arbitrary, unreasonable or perverse. A finding so arrived at could not be set aside unless it was arbitrary, unreasonable or perverse. But even when the landlord had established his need for additional accommodation such party must adduce evidence to show that hardship would be caused to him by the granting or refusal of the eviction and it would be for the court to determine whether the suffering of the tenant, in case an order was made for eviction, would be more than that of the landlord by its refusal. The court has to weigh the matter, though not in golden scales, in the light of the criteria indicated in sub-rule (2) of Rule 16, aforementioned, and it is only after sifting such evidence that the court must form its conclusion whether in the circumstances greater hardship would be caused by making an order of eviction than by refusing to make it. Learned counsel for the respondents relying upon the authority of the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Parsuramaiah v. Lakshman, A.I.R. 1966 A.P. 220, contended that when once the need of the landlord was found to be genuine, that is an end of the matter and the fact that the accommodation was bona fide required must certainty outweigh the hardship which the tenant is likely to suffer because of his eviction. In view of the scheme of the Act, the object of which was to provide for the control of eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situate in urban areas and the Rules which have been made thereunder, to safeguard the interest of the tenant, also in a case where the landlord bona fide required the accommodation for his personal use or business. I find myself unable to agree with the learned counsel that as soon as the landlord establishes his need, he is relieved of all further obligations under sub-rule (2) of Rule 16. In the view, which I take, I am fortified by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Phiroz Ramaji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Total, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1052. The learned District Judge has misdirected himself by misconstruing the scheme of the Act and the language of Rule 16(2) by erroneously holding that when once the landlord establishes his need, howsoever hard it may be upon the tenant, the landlords requirement should be deemed supreme. The learned District Judge has misdirected himself by misconstruing the scheme of the Act and the language of Rule 16(2) by erroneously holding that when once the landlord establishes his need, howsoever hard it may be upon the tenant, the landlords requirement should be deemed supreme. Indeed, the District Judge has not even cared to consider the question of hardship which he was enjoined to do under sub-rule (2). 6. In the present case, there was evidence, no doubt, before the Prescribed Authority that respondent No. 2 bona fide required additional accommodation for the purpose of starting new business as Chemist and Druggist and that finding cannot be held arbitrary or unreasonable to as to merit interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, but counsel for the petitioner has contended that the order of eviction was vitiated in law firstly, because the Prescribed Authority did not address itself to the question whether the additional accommodation already available to the landlord in the ground floor of Raj Kamal Hotel, which belongs to them, was sufficient for the requirement of respondent No. 2, more so in a case where the joint Hindu family of which respondent No. 2 is a member, has been carrying on jewellery business in the separate accommodation, besides the hotel business carried on in the Raj Kamal Hotel; and secondly, because the Prescribed Authority failed to attach weight to the fact that no alternative accommodation was available to the tenant who has been carrying on business in the shop in question for about ten years. In my view, there can be no doubt that these two circumstances were relevant for the decision by the Prescribed Authority which has to be based upon an objective assessment of the manifold circumstances, set out in sub-rule (2) of Rule 16. 7. In the petition the petitioner made a specific averment that there were a number of rooms on the ground floor of the Raj Kamal Hotel which was vacant for the business of the respondent. The shop in question is also situate in the ground floor of the said hotel. A similar allegation had been made by the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority as it would appear from Annexure 10, the counter affidavit filed by him before the prescribed Authority. The shop in question is also situate in the ground floor of the said hotel. A similar allegation had been made by the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority as it would appear from Annexure 10, the counter affidavit filed by him before the prescribed Authority. In answer to these averments here as also before the Prescribed Authority the landlords had taken the stand that the vacant rooms in the ground floor of the Raj Kamal Hotel open in a narrow lane and, therefore, unless the said rooms were connected by opening a door in the eastern wall of the shop in dispute, the business of Chemist and Druggist could not be conveniently carried on. It is manifestly clear that there were conflicting claims between the parties whether or not the already available accommodation with the landlords was sufficient to cater to the need of respondent No. 2. The Prescribed Authority has not considered this aspect of the matter at all. It was a material fact to be taken into consideration, the answer to which, one way or the other would have had a bearing on he ultimate derision. For if the additional accommodation was sufficient to cater to the need of respondent No. 2, no hardship would be caused by the refusal oi the application and conversely if the need of the landlord could not reasonably be satisfied out of the accommodation available with him, the allowing of the application would not entail greater hardship upon the tenant. Further, the Prescribed Authority has recorded the finding that it was difficult for the tenant to obtain an alternative accommodation which could enable him to carry on his business in the event of his being evicted from the shop in question, a circumstance which under sub-rule (2) (b) should have tilted the balance against the landlord, more so when the Prescribed Authority had not reached a categorical finding that the business carried on by the son of the petitioner in the Chaddha Market was joint family business owned by the petitioner and his son. To add to these was the further fact that the landlord carried on jewellery business in two separate premises besides running a hotel and under sub-rule (c) the greater the existing business of the landlords son, the less is the justification for allowing the application. To add to these was the further fact that the landlord carried on jewellery business in two separate premises besides running a hotel and under sub-rule (c) the greater the existing business of the landlords son, the less is the justification for allowing the application. In determining, therefore, the question whether the tenant should be evicted, the Prescribed Authority has failed to take into consideration the material facts which were apparent on the record and has not evaluated the evidence with reference to the consideration which under sub-rule (2) he ought to bear in mind while considering the application for release. 8. The High Court, it was contended by the counsel for the respondents, could not interfere under Article 226 of the constitution with finding of fact recorded by the inferior tribunal unless it could be shown that they disclosed an error of law in arriving at them which, according to the respondents, was not the position in the present case. This contention raises a question as to true scope and ambit of the Ride in the nature of certiorari. The answer to this argument broadly is that the High Court under Article 226 has a jurisdiction to control all inferior tribunals not in an appellate capacity. This control extends not only to seeing that they observe the law. The control is exercised by means of a power to quash any determination by the tribunal which on the face of it offends against the law. In enunciating this principle, Lord Summer, as far back as the year 1922, observed in Rex v. Hot Bell Liquore, 1922-2 Q.B. 118, that the supervision by certiorari goes to two points one is the area of the inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise; the other in the observance of the law in the course of its exercise". The principle was accepted in the well known case of Rex v. Northamberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, 1952-1 K.B. 338. Referring with approval to these two cases the Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaq, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 844, handed down the opinion that writ of certiorari could be issued to correct an errors of law which must be manifest on the face of the record. Referring with approval to these two cases the Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaq, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 844, handed down the opinion that writ of certiorari could be issued to correct an errors of law which must be manifest on the face of the record. Further, they said "The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of such case." In my view, the taking of irrelevant considerations into account or the disregard of relevant considerations should, on the Authority of the principle laid down in the above and enunciated by Lord Summer in Rex v. Hat Bell Liquore, 1922-2 Q.B. 118, be regarded, as if they were jurisdictional errors redressable by certiorari. That material circumstances were not taken into consideration and the evidence was not appreciated in the manner prescribed under the Act, bring the errors, which appeal on the face of the record, for correction within the rule of certiorari. It is not a case where a mere wrong decision has been arrived at by the Prescribed Authority, but in not taking into consideration the material circumstances the Prescribed Authority has committed an error which should be regarded as a jurisdictional error. 9. For the considerations in the above, the petition succeeds and the Rule is made absolute with costs. Annexures 1, 5 and 4 are quashed. An appropriate writ or direction may be issued on that behalf.