ORDER : Amitav Banerji, J. In this appeal by the Plaintiffs two questions of law have been raised. Firstly, whether Article 91 or Article 95 of the Limitation Act, 1908 will apply and, secondly, whether a "decree" is an "instrument" within the meaning of Article 91 of the Limitation Act, 1908. 2. Plaintiffs filed a suit for cancellation of the compromise decree passed in Suit No. 30 of 1955, Hari Kunwar Rai and Ors. v. Lochan Rai and Ors. of the Court of City Munsif, Azamgarh in respect of matters which were not covered by that suit. Plaintiffs' case was that the compromise was the result of fraud and in any event since it involved matters extraneous to the suit, it could have no effect on the pa ties. Moreover, the compromise signed by Sri Ram Singar Rai was beyond his competence as he could not act in respect of the properties other than those involved in the suit. The defence was a denial of the plaint allegations and an assertion that the compromise was validly arrived at and was binding on the parties. It settled the disputes between the parties and Shri Ram Singar Rai was competent to verify the compromise on behalf of the Plaintiffs. The trial court framed two issues and negatived the plea of the Plaintiffs both on the question of fraud and the validity of the compromise decree. Plaintiffs suit was dismissed. On appeal the lower appellate court held that the compromise decree was neither null nor void on the grounds taken in the plaint. A fresh point was taken as to whether the suit was within time. The lower appellate court framed an issue on the point and remitted it to the trial court. The trial court by its decision dated 30th of July 1965 held that the Plaintiffs' suit was barred by time. This finding of the trial court was affirmed by the lower appellate court. The appeal was dismissed. 3. In this appeal, learned Counsel has not addressed any argument, on the question whether the compromise decree was null and void and I think rightly for the finding given by the lower appellate court is unexceptionable. On the question of limitation, however, learned Counsel has raised two questions, as stated earlier. 4. The appeal was dismissed. 3. In this appeal, learned Counsel has not addressed any argument, on the question whether the compromise decree was null and void and I think rightly for the finding given by the lower appellate court is unexceptionable. On the question of limitation, however, learned Counsel has raised two questions, as stated earlier. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellants contended that Article 91 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') would have no application and Article 95 would be applicable. In the alternative it was argued that even if Article 91 applied, the starting point would be when the Plaintiff's Knew of the compromise decree. It was contended that the Plaintiffs had knowledge of the compromise decree in October, 1961 and the suit filed on the 10th of March, 1962 was well within time. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents was that Article 95 had no application for it applied only to a decree obtained by fraud or for other relief on the ground of fraud. The finding of the court below is that the compromise decree was not obtained by fraud. Consequently, Article 95 of the Act would have no application. The view taken by the court below in this regard is perfectly correct. The alternative arguments may now be considered. Article 91 of the Act reads as follows: 91:- To cancel or set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for. Three years When the facts entitling the Plaintiff to have the instrument can-celled or set aside become known to him. 5. It would be evident that this Article would apply where the relief sought was to cancel or set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for. Admittedly, there is no other provision in the Limitation Act, 1908 for the cancellation or setting aside of a decree or instrument. Consequently, this Article would have application. Learned Counsel contended that this will establish that this Article applies to suits in which it is sought to cancel or set aside an instrument which is voidable and has no application where the instrument which is challenged is void ab initio. In this context he relied on a decision reported in Mt. Bibi Saleha and Others Vs. Md. Zakariya Khan and Others, AIR 1950 Patna 247. He further contended that there was no finding that the compromise decree was voidable. In this context he relied on a decision reported in Mt. Bibi Saleha and Others Vs. Md. Zakariya Khan and Others, AIR 1950 Patna 247. He further contended that there was no finding that the compromise decree was voidable. The only finding was that it was without jurisdiction. It, therefore, meant that the decree was a nullity. If it was so, Article 91 had no application. I am unable to agree. The Article 91 would apply in all cases for cancellation or setting aside an instrument not otherwise provided for. The compromise was within the purview of Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC and it was not without jurisdiction and it was not a nullity. Where a person is prima facie, bound by a decree, he cannot ignore the decree and evade the operation of law and where such a decree is an impediment in his obtaining relief, he must bring a suit within the period prescribed under Article 91 for setting aside the decree. It was a voidable and it had to be set aside and it could not be deemed to be void ab initio, consequently, Article 91 would have application. On the question of commencement of limitation, there is a clear finding arrived at by the court below that the Plaintiffs had knowledge of the compromise decree on the 19th of August, 1955 which was the date of the compromise decree. Admittedly, the suit was not brought within a period of three years from the 19th of August 1955. The case set up by the Plaintiffs that they had knowledge only in October, 1961 has been disbelieved. Consequently, the court below was sight in holding that the suit was filed beyond the period of limitation. 6. In this case a new argument was raised that the compromise decree was not an instrument within the meaning of Article 91 of the Act. It was contended that the word "instrument" could relate to a document of the nature like a document of transfer but not a court decree. In respect of this contention learned Counsel was not able to cite any case law. All that he could refer to was to the Wharton's Law Lexicon which gives the following meaning: Instrument- To prepare or provide a formal legal writing e.g., record, chapter, deed or transfer or agreement. Instrument does not include a statute. 7. In respect of this contention learned Counsel was not able to cite any case law. All that he could refer to was to the Wharton's Law Lexicon which gives the following meaning: Instrument- To prepare or provide a formal legal writing e.g., record, chapter, deed or transfer or agreement. Instrument does not include a statute. 7. According to the above definition an agreement which results in a formal legal writing is an "instrument". A consent decree is based on an agreement. That agreement is an instrument within the meaning of Article 91. The decree passed upon compromise is based on that agreement. It will, therefore, take the character of an "instrument". 8. In the case of Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and Others Vs. Valluri Jagannadha Rao and Others, AIR 1967 SC 591 , their Lordships have laid down that a compromise decree is not a decision by the court. It is the acceptance by the court of something to which the parties had agreed and a compromise decree sets the seal of the court on the agreement of the parties. Consequently, it can be said that not only the compromise but also the decree based upon such a compromise is an "instrument" within the meaning of Article 91 of the Limitation Act, 1908. 9. The word "instrument" is not defined in the Limitation Act, 1908 or in the Limitation Act, 1963. 10. The word "instrument" finds place in the Stamp Act. In Section 2(14) of the Stamp Act "instrument" is defined as follows: (14) "instrument" includes every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. 11. A compromise decree will satisfy the aforesaid definition and will be an "instrument" as defined in the Stamp Act. Any instrument by which any right or liability is created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished 6r recorded would be an "instrument". It will thus be seen that the above definition includes two distinct types of documents Firstly, document by which any right or liability is or purported to be, created, transferred, limited, extended or extinguished; and two (documents) by which any such right or liability is recorded through the document itself does not create such right or liability. A consent decree may come in either of the above two categories. It will depend on the terms of the compromise decree itself. 12. A consent decree may come in either of the above two categories. It will depend on the terms of the compromise decree itself. 12. The word "instrument" is used in the Registration Act, 1908 but has not been defined in that Act. The word "document" has also not been defined. However, these words have been held to be interchangeable See ILR 19 Luc 57 (FB). 13. The word "instrument" has not been defined in the Court Fees Act. But the definition given in the Stamp Act has been held to be applicable to interpret the word "instrument" in the Court Fees Act as well. After the death of the testator, his Will becomes an "instrument" securing money or property within the meaning of Section 7(iv-a) (U.P.) of the Court Fees Act. It was held in a case that the Will could not be enforced against the testator so long as he was alive and as such it could not be said to be a document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded during his life time. This view was taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Gulab Chand Vs. Jaswant Singh and Others, AIR 1956 All 71 . 14. It has been held that an award is an "instrument" within the meaning of Article 91 and the Plaintiff cannot challenge the decree incorporating the award unless he can show that a suit to set aside the award was brought within the period prescribed by Article 91 See AIR 1927 Lah 172, The Supreme Court in the case of Purshotam H. Jadye and Others Vs. V.B. Potdar, AIR 1966 SC 856 has held an "award" by an Industrial Tribunal a decree. Their Lordships were considering the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act and the definition of the word "wages" in Section 2(vi) of the Act and in particular their Lordships were construing the meaning of the word "instrument" as appearing in Sub-clause (d) of Section 2(iv). Their Lordships observed: It is thus clear in construing the word "instrument" we must have regard to the context in which the word occurs No one can suggest that the word "instrument" can always and in every case include an award or an order of adjudication. Their Lordships observed: It is thus clear in construing the word "instrument" we must have regard to the context in which the word occurs No one can suggest that the word "instrument" can always and in every case include an award or an order of adjudication. On the contrary as we have already indicated ordinarily the word "instrument" would refer to a document executed by the parties. But if the context clearly indicates that the word "instrument" is used in a much larger sense, that context must be taken into account and the comprehensive interpretation must be placed upon that word. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the word "instrument" did not include an award.... Construing on the basis of the above principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court the provisions of Article 91 of the Limitation Act, 1908, cannot be given a narrow meaning because there is nothing to suggest that a narrow meaning be given so as to exclude a compromise decree even. In this context learned Counsel contended that in Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 a provision has been made both for "decree" as well as "instrument". The relevant provision reads as follows: "To cancel or set aside an "instrument" or "decree" or for the rescission of the contract." The word "decree" was not there in Article 91 of the 1908 Act. It was on this basis contended that the word "instrument" in Article 91 of the 1908 Act did not refer to a decree I am unable to agree The reason in adding the word "instrument" in Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 appears to be to clarify the position. It cannot be interpreted to say that an "instrument" did not include a decree earlier and it is only provided for under the 1963 Limitation Act. It has been indicated in the objects and reasons to the Limitation Act, 1963 that Article 59 of the new Act combines existing Articles 91 and 144. Article 91 as indicated above refers to "instrument" and Article 144 refers to the rescission of a contract. It lends support to the view that the word instrument" in Article 91 also embraces within its fold a decree. 15. The word "instrument" also appears in Section 26-A of the Income Tax Act, 1922. Article 91 as indicated above refers to "instrument" and Article 144 refers to the rescission of a contract. It lends support to the view that the word instrument" in Article 91 also embraces within its fold a decree. 15. The word "instrument" also appears in Section 26-A of the Income Tax Act, 1922. It came in for interpretation in ILR 65 Bom 610. It has been held that an "instrument" means a document of a legal nature by which any right or liability is, or is purported to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. The document must be executed by the parties. This interpretation is on the same par as in the Stamp Act. It would, therefore, not be incorrect to give the word "instrument" the same meaning as is generally to be found in various other enactments. 16. I have come across a decision in the case of Dwarka v. Salik 8 Oudh Cases 191 where the suit had been held to be barred by Article 91 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Learned Judicial Commissioner of Oudh held that Article 91 applied where there was a question of cancelling an "instrument" and the decree was held not to be an "instrument". In the case of Nibaran Chandra Shaha v. Matilal Shaha 39 CWN 610, it was held that a suit to set aside a consent decree where fraud is not alleged or proved was maintainable but it was not governed either by Article 91 or Article 95, but Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. I am unable to subscribe to the view taken in the above two cases for the reasons indicated above. 17. It is therefore, clear that a document cannot be an "instrument" unless it affects some right or liability. In other words an "instrument" is a document which defines, prescribes, transfers, recognises, establishes a right in a party. Judged from this aspect a compromise decree either gives a right to a party or recognises his rights, vis-a-vis a property. The compromise decree is a document of title. It affects rights as well. It, therefore, fulfils all the requirements of an instrument. I am, therefore, of the opinion that a "decree" is an "instrument" within the meaning of Article 91 of the Act. 18. No other argument was raised. 19. The compromise decree is a document of title. It affects rights as well. It, therefore, fulfils all the requirements of an instrument. I am, therefore, of the opinion that a "decree" is an "instrument" within the meaning of Article 91 of the Act. 18. No other argument was raised. 19. In this view of the matter, this appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.