JUDGMENT : Satish Chandra, J. Aggrieved against an order of allotment of the accommodation in question dated 2nd December, 1970, the Appellant filed an objection on the ground that the house was not vacant. He was living in it with his family. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected this objection on the finding that the Appellant was living at Hyderabad and the allottee of the house in question had migrated to Pakistan and so the house was vacant and available for allotment. The State Government affirmed this order and dismissed the revision filed by the Appellant u/s 7-F of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. 2. Thereafter the Appellant filed a writ petition in this Court. That also failed, leading to the present appeal. 3. The findings that the Appellant was all through residing at Hyderabad, that his son, who was the previous allottee of the accommodation, had migrated to Pakistan and that one Rais Ahmad was living in the accommodation in dispute illegally arc all findings on questions of fact, They have been affirmed by the State Government as well as by the learned single Judge. We awe in entire agreement with the reasoning and the conclusions reached by the learned single Judge, The findings on those questions do not disclose any manifest error of law. 4. It was next contended that the order of allotment was not enforceable because the 1947 Act was repealed by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, which came into force on 15th July, 1972. Section 43 of the 1972 Act provides for repeal and savings. Sub-section (1) thereof repeals the 1947 Act, and Sub-section (2) provides in many clauses for various situations which are to operate notwithstanding the repeal. Clause (t) provides that any decision of the District Magistrate the Prescribed Authority, the District judge, the Commissioner or the State Government under the foregoing clauses may be enforced, whenever necessary, in like manner as if it were an order by a competent authority under the corresponding provisions of this Act. 5. Clause (k) of Section 43(2) provides that an order passed by the District Magistrate before the commencement of this Act u/s 7(2) or u/s 7-A shall become final if it was passed more than thirty days before the commencement of this Act. 5. Clause (k) of Section 43(2) provides that an order passed by the District Magistrate before the commencement of this Act u/s 7(2) or u/s 7-A shall become final if it was passed more than thirty days before the commencement of this Act. The question is: what is the correct significance of the phrase 'any decision of the District Magistrate under the foregoing clauses' occurring in Clause (t), A decision can be under the foregoing clauses if it is empowered to be made by any of the foregoing clauses. For instance Clause (k)(2) provides for an appeal to the District Judge against an order passed u/s 7(2) or Section 7-A of the old Act made not more than thirty days before the commencement of the 1972 Act. It can be said that Clause (k)(2) authorises the District Judge to make a decision in appeal. Clause (k)(1), however, makes an order passed by the District Magistrate u/s 7(2) or Section 7-A made than thirty days before the commencement of this Act final. The old Act was a temporary Act. With its repeal all orders passed, and proceedings taken, under that Act would have lapsed. To save such orders Clause (k)(1) makes the mentioned orders final. It has the efficacy of making those orders operative and enforceable. Clause (t) is a machinery provision which makes the orders mentioned in it executable as if they were passed by the competent authority under the corresponding provision of this Act. Clause (t) provides for the method of execution of the orders made under, or recognised by, the foregoing clauses of this section as enforceable. An order which is recognised by Clause (k)(i) as having become final, that is executable, would, in our opinion, be a decision under Clause (k)(i) within meaning of Clause (t), and it may be enforced in the manner provided by that clause. We are hence unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the allotment order in question, which was passed more than thirty days prior to the coming into force of the new Act, was not enforceable at all. 6. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.