JUDGMENT C.S.P. Singh, J. - A learned Single Judge has on account of the conflict between the decisions given in the case of Kanpur Mazdoor Congress v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, A.I.R. 1955 N. U. C. 3296 and Industrial Employees Union v. State of U. P., A.I.R. 1960 All 738 has referred the following question to a larger Bench :- "Whether a writ petition on behalf of a Union which was a party before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal is maintainable without impleading the workmen concerned ? 2. We, however, think that in as much as the learned Single Judge desired a decision of a Bench only in order to resolve the conflict between the two Single Judge decisions, the appropriate question that arises is : "Whether a writ petition on behalf of a Union which was a party before a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal was maintainable ?" The question referred is reformed accordingly. 3. It is now necessary to refer to such facts as are necessary for the decision of the present reference. The Indian Press Mazdoor Union is a registered Trade Union and represents inter alia the workmen of the Indian Press (Private) Ltd., Allahabad. A dispute arose between the workmen and the Indian Press regarding retrenchment of some employees. 4. Conciliation proceedings having failed, the dispute was referred to the Labour Court, Allahabad by the State Government under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The Union had espoused the cause of the workmen during the dispute and also before the Conciliation Officer. The Union represented the workmen in the dispute before the Labour Court, and thereafter the Union, representing the workmen of the Indian Press contested the matter, and subsequently, an award was given by the Labour Court. The Union being dissatisfied with the award filed Civil Misc. Writ .Petition No. 75 of 1970. A preliminary objection was taken by the counsel for the Indian Press (Private) Ltd. that the petition by the Union was not maintainable and reliance was placed on the decision of Industrial Employees Union v. State of U. P., A.I.R. 1960 All. 738. The Union being dissatisfied with the award filed Civil Misc. Writ .Petition No. 75 of 1970. A preliminary objection was taken by the counsel for the Indian Press (Private) Ltd. that the petition by the Union was not maintainable and reliance was placed on the decision of Industrial Employees Union v. State of U. P., A.I.R. 1960 All. 738. in which a learned Single Judge of this Court had taken the view that a Union had no, right to present a petition under Art. 226, on behalf of discharged workmen, in as much as in a writ petition only an individual or a corporation whose rights are affected can seek relief. The petitioner on the other hand relied upon the decision in Kanpur Mazdoor Congress v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. 3296, where another learned Single judge had held that in as much as an industrial dispute is a dispute between the workmen in general and one or more employers, and trade unions are parties before Industrial Tribunals, they were directly affected by awards given in the dispute and as such are entitled to file petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It appears. that this decision was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge deciding the case of Industrial Employees Union A.I.R. 1960 All. 738, and as such the subsequent decision in Industrial Employees Union v. State of U. P. and others, A.I.R. 1960 All 738 can he said to be one which is per incuriam. 5. Before we advert to the large number of authorities cited by the parties, it would be useful to refer to the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and the Rules by virtue of which the union steps into a dispute between the workmen and its employers. 6. Under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, only an industrial dispute can be referred to a Labour Court, under Section 4-K of the Act. An industrial dispute' has been defined as being one which is a dispute or difference between the employers and workmen connected with employment or non-employment or the terms of the employment or with the ,condition of the labour of any person. An industrial dispute' has been defined as being one which is a dispute or difference between the employers and workmen connected with employment or non-employment or the terms of the employment or with the ,condition of the labour of any person. There is a catena of decisions which firmly establish that it is only a collective dispute that can be referred for adjudication, and an individual dispute does not come within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. This being so, the dispute is of a' representative or collective character, as employers are arrayed against the workmen as a body. Sec. 6-1(1) provides for representation of parties. Section 6-1(2) prevents a legal practitioner from representing any party,unless the consent of the other party has been taken and leave obtained from the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court or Tribunal. Section 6-1(3) of the Act , permits the representation of workmen by a union or by an officer of a federation of unions. Rule 40 amplifies the position, and provides for representation of workmen by an officer of a union of which the workmen is a member, or by an officer of a federation of unions, to which his union is affiliated. In case, there is no union of workmen, any representative duly nominated by the workmen can represent them. By Rule 40(2) parties are bound by the acts of their representatives. This resume shows that a dispute can be referred only in case it acquires a collective nature, by being espoused by the union of workmen, or in case there is no such union by workmen as a body and it is only when it acquires the nature of a collective dispute that a reference can be made. By, virtue of Section 6-I and Rule 40 of the Rules, unions can represent workmen involved in the dispute. Now, unions registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act are primarily formed for the purpose of protecting the interest of workmen and ventilating their grievances and demands, so as to secure better working conditions and employments. This being so, can it be said that a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution not maintainable by them, when a decision of a Labour Court or Tribunals goes against the interest of workmen whose cause they had espoused? This being so, can it be said that a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution not maintainable by them, when a decision of a Labour Court or Tribunals goes against the interest of workmen whose cause they had espoused? Art. 226 of the Constitution does not lay down in specific terms the person at whose instance a petition is maintainable. The question has, however, been considered by this Court as also by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. In Indian Sugar Mills Association through its President Sri Hari Raj Swarup v. Secretary to the Government of U. P., Labour Department and others, A.I.R. 1951 All. 1 the Indian Sugar Mills Association through its President had filed a petition against the State of U. P. and also against the U. P. and Bihar Sugar Mills Workers Federation, U. P., Bihari Chini Mills Mazdoor Federation and the National Sugar Mill Workers Association, for a writ of certiorari or prohibition restraining these parties from enforcing a notification, which directed payment of certain sums of money to workmen in the sugar industry. Under the Rules of the Indian Sugar Mills Association, the Association was not entitled to represent the Sugar Mills in any legal proceedings before a court or to move any application on their behalf. The association being a registered under the Trade Union Act. was a body corporate and was distinct and separate person from the various Mills which were acted by the order. The Full Bench held that a petition by the Association for challenging the' notification in question was not maintainable, in as much as its interest were not directly affected by the order. The Full Bench observed thus on page 3 :- "We have already said that it is the interest of the applicant which must be directly affected by the statute or the order complained against and the applicant cannot claim that its interest are directly affected." In Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1044, it was held that under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the rights that can ordinarily be enforced are one which are personal or individual rights of the petitioner himself. The matter was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on page 1047 of the Deport as under :? The matter was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on page 1047 of the Deport as under :? "The first question that falls to be considered is whether the appellant has locus standi to file the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The argument of learned counsel for the respondents is that the appellant was only managing the industry and it had no proprietary right therein and, therefore, it could not maintain the application. Art. 226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. It is, therefore clear that persons other than those claiming fundamental rights can also approach the Court seeking a relief thereunder. The Article in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled `to apply thereunder' but it is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right. In State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, 1952 S.C.R. 28 : A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 12, this Court has ruled that the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, 1950 S.C. R. 869=A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 41, it has been held by this Court that the legal right that can be enforced under Art. 32 must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief. We do not see any reason why a different principle should apply in the case of a petitioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution. We do not see any reason why a different principle should apply in the case of a petitioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The right that can be enforced under Art. 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo war-rants this rule may have to be relaxed or modified." In Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 928, the question as to who can file a petition under Art. 226 of the "Constitution was considered again, and after refer-ring to the decision of Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1044 their Lordships observed as under:- "This Court held in the decision cited supra that `ordinarily' the petitioner who seeks to file an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution should be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the petition. A personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest. It can also relate to an interest of a trustee. That apart, in exceptional cases as the expression `ordinarily' indicates, a person who has been pre-judicially affected by an act or omission of an authority can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject-matter thereof. The appellant has certainly been prejudiced by the said order. The petition under Art: 226 of the Constitution at his instance is, therefore, maintainable." 7-8. Now so far as union is concerned, after it has espoused the cause of the workmen-concerned and has represented them in the dispute, it is the main party to the dispute and the workmen concerned are not parties to the dispute independently of the union which has espoused their cause. This position is now beyond dispute in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prasad Vishwakarma v. Chairman. Industrial Tribunal, Patna, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 857 wherein it was observed thus :- "In deciding this question, we have on the one hand to remember the importance of collective bargaining in the settlement of industrial disputes, and on the other hand, the principle that the party to a dispute should have a fair hearing. Industrial Tribunal, Patna, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 857 wherein it was observed thus :- "In deciding this question, we have on the one hand to remember the importance of collective bargaining in the settlement of industrial disputes, and on the other hand, the principle that the party to a dispute should have a fair hearing. In assessing the requirements of this principle, it is necessary and proper to take note also of the fact that when an individual workman becomes a party to a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act he is a party, not independently of the union, which has espoused his cause." Let us now see as to whether the Union being the main party to the dispute before the Labour Court satisfies the test laid down by the Full Bench or the Supreme Court so as to enable it to maintain the petition. The decision in the case of the Gandak Yojana Karamchari Kalyan Sangh v. State of Bihar, 1970 II L.I.C. 1482 The workmen Mysore State Electricity Board, Banglore v. The State of Mysore, 1971 II L.I.C. 1582; Director General Ordinance Factories Employees Association v. Union of India and Director General of Ordinance Factories, 1969 I L.I.C. 268 C. I. Kannan V. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, A.I.R. 1968 Madras 580 and General Secretary Eastern Zone Insurance Employees Association v. Zonal Manager, Eastern Zone Life Insurance Corporation, A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 45 relied upon by the counsel for the respondents do not shed any light on the controversy, for they do not relate to cases of a labour dispute in which an award had been given and challenged by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution by the Union which espoused the cause of the workmen. The cases which deal with the point and which have been cited before us are three: the two Allahabad cases already referred to and the case of the Calcutta High Court viz. West. Bengal Press Workers and Employees Union v. Art Union Printing Works Private Ltd. and Co., A.I.R. 1962 Cal. 649. In Kanpur Mazdoor Congress v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India,A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. 3296, it was held that a writ petition is maintainable at the instance of the employees union in as much as they are parties before Industrial Tribunal and are directly effected by the result of the decision. 649. In Kanpur Mazdoor Congress v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India,A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. 3296, it was held that a writ petition is maintainable at the instance of the employees union in as much as they are parties before Industrial Tribunal and are directly effected by the result of the decision. In Industrial Employees Union, Kanpur v. State of U. P.,A.I.R. 1960 All 738, the dismissed employee was the workman of Messrs. Kanpur Tennery Ltd. which carried on business in leather. There were four registered unions of the leather industry but none of them had espoused the cause of the workmen. The matter seems to have been taken up by the Industrial Employees Union which was not an union concerned with the leather industry. On an award being given against the workmen, a writ petition was filed by the Union. The petition was dismissed firstly on the ground that in as much as the personal rights of the Union were not affected by the award it as such had no locus standi to file the petition. The learned Single Judge in coming to this conclusion, followed the decision of the Full Bench in Indian Sugar Mills Association v. Secretary to Government U. P. Labour Department, A.I.R. 1951 All. 1 and also referred to the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Charanjit Lal v. Union of India, 1950 S.C.R. 869=A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 41. The Calcutta decision in West Bengal Press Workers and Employees Union v. Art Union Printing Works Private Ltd. and Co., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1044 is based primarily on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prasad Vishwakarma v. Industrial Tribunal, Patna, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 857. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it held that an industrial workman is at no stage party to an industrial dispute independently of the Union, and that in as much as a worker's union is in a position to raise an industrial dispute and to help workmen before courts and tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act, they have a legal right. and as such can enforce those rights by way of a writ petition, In coming to this conclusion, it dissented from the Full Bench of this Court in Indian Sugar Mills. Association v. Secretary to Government U. P. Labour Department and others, A.I.R. 1951 All. and as such can enforce those rights by way of a writ petition, In coming to this conclusion, it dissented from the Full Bench of this Court in Indian Sugar Mills. Association v. Secretary to Government U. P. Labour Department and others, A.I.R. 1951 All. 1 and also from the case of Industrial Employees Union v. State of U. P., A.I.R. 1960 All 738 9. Now so far as the principles laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Indian Sugar Mills Association v. Secretary to the Government of U. P. Labour Department and others, A.I.R. 1951 All. 1 is concerned, they are unexceptionable and we see no reason to doubt the correctness of these principles as the Calcutta decision has done. The principles laid down in this case are, however, not exhaustive. In Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 928, it has been laid down that the petitioner, under Art. 226 of the Constitution must be ordinarily one whose personal or individual rights are affected, but this test does not apply to exceptional cases, and in such cases a person who is prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority can file a writ petition. In Gadde Venkateswara Rao's case, the petition was filed by a representative of a committee which had collected funds. so that a Health Centre may be situated in a particular village. Their Lordships on page 833 of the Report gave the following reasons for holding that the petition was maintainable : "Has the appellant a right to file the petition out of which the present appeal has arisen. The appellant is the President of the Panchayat Samithi of Dharmajigudem. The villages of Dharmajigudem formed a committee with the appellant as President for the purpose of collecting contributions from the villagers for setting up a Primary Health Centre. The said committee collected Rs. 10,000/- and deposited the same with the Block Development Officer. The appellant represented the village in all its dealings with ,the Block Development Committee and the Panchayat Samithi in the matter of the location of primary Health Centre at Dharmajigudem. His conduct, the acquiescence on the part of the other members of the committee, and the treatment meted out to him by the authorities concerned support the inference that he was authorised to act on behalf of the committee. His conduct, the acquiescence on the part of the other members of the committee, and the treatment meted out to him by the authorities concerned support the inference that he was authorised to act on behalf of the committee. The appellant was, therefore, a representative of the committee which was in law a trustee of the amounts collected by it from the villagers for a public purpose. We have therefore, no hesitation to hold that the appellant had the right to maintain the application under Art. 226 of the Constitution." It will thus be seen that in exceptional cases, a petition can be filed by a person who is pre-judicially affected by a particular order. It is not necessary that his personal or proprietary interest should be prejudiced. All that is required is that the person concerned should have been allowed by the public authorities to represent a particular cause which is decided adversely. In the present case, the Union had espoused the cause of the workmen throughout the proceedings and was the main party before the Labour Court. The Labour Court had permitted it to participate in the proceedings, and it was also entitled to do so in view of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The award has gone against the workmen whose cause it had espoused, and as such being the main party to the dispute, was clearly adversely affected. Thus the test laid down in Gadde Venkateswara Rao's case are fulfilled in the present case. It has, however. been contend-ed that the case is not an exceptional one, and as such even if the Union is prejudicially affected, a petition on its behalf is not maintainable. In Gadde Venkateswara Rao's case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have not laid down the categories of cases which are exceptional. The case, however, gives an indication as to what can be treated as a case of exceptional type. In Gadde Venkateswara Rade case. the petitioner had espoused a cause which effected the interest of 14 the village community. The community, of which he was a representative had collected funds for setting up a Health Centre which was for a public purpose. The espousal of a cause on behalf of the village community which involved a public purpose, was treated as being an exceptional case. The community, of which he was a representative had collected funds for setting up a Health Centre which was for a public purpose. The espousal of a cause on behalf of the village community which involved a public purpose, was treated as being an exceptional case. Applying, this test, an industrial dispute espoused by an Union clearly falls within the category of cases contemplated by Gadde Venkateswara Rao's case, for the Union espouses the cause of workmen in general, for their benefit. Thus this contention too must be rejected. The petition on behalf of the Union was accordingly maintainable. 10. We. accordingly, answer the question, as reformed by holding that a petition on behalf of a Union which has espoused the cause of the workmen in an industrial dispute and which has participated in the proceedings can file a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for impugning an adverse award. The paper of this case shall now be sent, back to the learned Single Judge for decision of or the points involved in the petition.