JUDGMENT :- This civil miscellaneous second appeal arises in execution. In pursuance of a decree passed in O. S. 710 of 1972 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Tirunelveli, certain moneys payable to the judgment debtors were attached by prohibitory order. The judgment debtors unsuccessfully agitated before the executing court as well as the first appellate court that the said amount is not attachable under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The judgment debtors have filed this civil miscellaneous second appeal contending that the attachment is bad in law and that therefore it has to be raised. The judgment-debtors are, the School. Committee which manages the Muthuraman Elementary School, Muthumothanmozhi, through its manager, Shanmughasundara Pandia Nadar, as well as the said Shanmughasundara Pandia Nadar himself. The amount attached by a prohibitory order is one payable by the Government to the judgment-debtors as building grant for the said school. The objection by the judgment-debtors is that such building grant being earmarked for the specific purpose of maintenance of the building of the school, cannot be attached. It is contended that the sum payable by the Government is not a debt inasmuch as the Government can withhold payment under certain contingencies. 2. In this connection, the decision reported in Brijkumar v. Naurangi Lal, AIR 1938 Lah 336 was referred to. There it was pointed out that a debt is an obligation to pay a liquidated (or specified) sum of money and that the word 'debt' in Section 60 therefore means an actually existing debt, that is a perfected and absolute debt. It was also pointed out that a sum of money which might or might not become due, or the payment of which depends upon contingencies which may or may not happen is not a debt. In the present case, it is pointed out that the payment of the building grant by the Government is governed by the rules relating to Elementary Schools framed under the Madras Elementary Educational Act, 1920 and that under Rule 14 thereof, a sanctioned grant may for reasons to be recorded in writing be withheld by the District Educational Officer at any time before payment and shall not be deemed to be a debt enforceable by suit or by any other legal process. 3. 3. The learned counsel for the decree-holder does not seriously dispute that the amount payable by the Government to the judgment-debtors would not be a debt as contemplated under Section 60, C.P.C. However, the contention is that the money payable, even though may not be a debt, can be attached as 'money' of the judgment-debtors. Under Sec. 60. C.P.C., "lands, houses or other buildings, goods, moneys, bank notes, cheques, bills of exchange, hundies, promissory notes, Government securities, bonds or other securities for money, debts, shares in a corporation" are liable to attachment. Under Order 21, Rule 46 (1) (c) any movable property not in the possession of the judgment-debtor (except property deposited in or in the custody of any court) may be attached by a prohibitory order. There is no dispute that 'money' is movable property as contemplated under Rule 46 (1) (c) of Order 21, C.P.C. and if the same belongs to the judgment-debtor but in the possession of another, the same can be attached by a prohibitory order. 4. However, the contention on behalf of the judgment-debtors is that by virtue of the rules contained in the rules relating to elementary schools, the grant payable by the Government cannot be deemed to be 'money' belonging to the judgment-debtors until the same is actually paid. It is pointed out that till the amount is actually paid, the Government has power to withhold payment and that therefore it cannot be said that the money as long as it remains in the hands of the Government is the money of the judgment-debtors. Another contention on behalf of the judgment-debtors is that the money payable being building grant earmarked for the purpose of maintaining the building of the school, the same cannot be attached by a decree-holder. 5. To take up the second contention, first, I find that there is no merit at all in the same. It must be noted in this case that the decree is one for arrears of rent for the building of the school itself. What is payable by the Government is building grant though of course it is meant for maintaining the building. It must be noted in this case that the decree is one for arrears of rent for the building of the school itself. What is payable by the Government is building grant though of course it is meant for maintaining the building. It is pointed out on behalf of the judgment-debtors that the Government makes another grant for the specific purpose of paying the rents due for the building and that being so, the money payable towards maintenance of the building cannot possibly be utilised by the judgment-debtors for payment of rent and that therefore the said money is not attachable towards the decree for arrears of rent. It is common ground that the school is entitled to claim a separate grant towards rent for the building. However, it is stated that the Government would sanction such a grant for rent only on proof that the school committee has actually paid the rents for a particular period. In other words, the, grant towards payment of rent would be in the nature of reimbursement for expenditure already incurred by the school committee in such payment of rent. For some reason or other, the school committee and its manager have thought fit not to pay the rent and it is an admitted fact that the grant payable by the Government towards rent is not being drawn. But the question is whether the money payable by the Government towards building grant can be attached for the decree for the arrears of rent for the very same building. 6. It is true that under the rules relating to Elementary Schools, the grant is earmarked for a particular purpose, namely, maintenance of the building. Assuming that payment of rent is not part of maintenance of the school building, I fail to see how the said rule can be invoked against the attachment of the money. First of all, as held by the Supreme Court in Regina v. St. A. H. E. School, AIR 1971 SC 1920 , the rules framed under the Madras Elementary Education Act are not statutory rules. That apart, there is nothing in Section 60, C.P.C., itself to debar the decree-holder from attaching the grant, provided the money in the hands of the Government can be said to belong to the judgment-debtors. 7. I would presently come to the question whether, the money is that of the judgment-debtors. That apart, there is nothing in Section 60, C.P.C., itself to debar the decree-holder from attaching the grant, provided the money in the hands of the Government can be said to belong to the judgment-debtors. 7. I would presently come to the question whether, the money is that of the judgment-debtors. As far as the present suit is concerned, if the money is that of the judgment-debtors, the question is whether there is any prohibition against its attachment. Whatever may be the prohibition in the rules referred to above, there is nothing in Section 60, C.P.C., that the grant in question cannot be attached, provided it is money belonging to the judgment-debtors. Under Section 60, any money belonging to the judgment-debtor, except those mentioned in the proviso can be attached. The grant in question does not come under any of the clauses mentioned in the proviso. 8. Clauses (j) to (p) of the said proviso exempt moneys, such as allowances payable under the Air Force Act etc., compulsory deposits under the Provident Funds Act, allowances of Government servants exempted from attachment by notification in the Official Gazette, an expectancy of succession by survivorship or other merely contingent or possible right or interest, the right to future maintenance, any allowance declared by any Indian Law to be exempt from liability to attachment etc., from attachment. It is significant to note that the grant payable under the rules referred to above is not so exempt under any of the clauses of the proviso to Section 60. Therefore, the mere fact that the grant is earmarked for the maintenance of the building does not mean that the same is not attachable provided it is money belonging to the judgment-debtors. 9. On an earlier occasion, the decree-holder herein attached the teaching grant payable by the Government as money belonging to the judgment-debtors. Then the Government, as garnishee objected to such attachment and ultimately in C. R. P. 674 of 1961 the objection of the Government (garnishee) was upheld. But that decision cannot be of help to the judgment-debtors in the present case. There the grant was not building grant but teaching grant. It was really payable to the teachers though through the school committee. Therefore, the grant payable by the Government cannot be said to be money belonging to the judgment-debtors in any sense of the term. But that decision cannot be of help to the judgment-debtors in the present case. There the grant was not building grant but teaching grant. It was really payable to the teachers though through the school committee. Therefore, the grant payable by the Government cannot be said to be money belonging to the judgment-debtors in any sense of the term. But now the grant is payable to the judgment-debtors and therefore unless there is any statutory prohibition against its attachment it will not be open to the judgment-debtors to say that the amount was not attachable. 10. The learned counsel for the judgment-debtors relied on the decision of the Kerala High Court reported in Vasudeva v. Pappu, 1969 Ker LT 46, but that case has no application to the facts of the present case. There neither the school committee nor the manager thereof was the judgment-debtor. It was the school as such that had been impleaded as the defendant in the suit and a decree had been passed against the school. It was pointed out by the Kerala High Court that the school is not a juristic entity and cannot be treated as a person against whom a decree could be passed. It was further pointed out that the maintenance grant payable by the Government cannot be treated as a property of the school (which was the judgment-debtor). But that is not the position here. Apart from the fact that the Madras Educational Rules are not statutory as held by the Supreme Court (the grants under the Kerala Education Rules are statutory because there is provision in the Kerala Education Act itself for payment of such a grant) the judgment-debtors in this case are the persons who are entitled to receive the grant. Therefore the decision of the Kerala High Court would not be applicable. 11. Still the question remains whether the grant which can be withheld by the Government can be treated as money belonging to the judgment-debtors. In this connection, the fact is, admittedly the Government has already sanctioned the grant and the bill for the amount in question is said to have already been passed. 11. Still the question remains whether the grant which can be withheld by the Government can be treated as money belonging to the judgment-debtors. In this connection, the fact is, admittedly the Government has already sanctioned the grant and the bill for the amount in question is said to have already been passed. It is, however, pointed out on behalf of the judgment-debtors that even after the passing of the bill it would be open to the Government to withhold payment and therefore till the money is actually received by the judgment-debtors the same cannot be said to belong to them. I am unable to agree with this contention. Once a bill had been passed, I am of the view that the grant would be similar to salary payable to a servant. Salary is also attachable as money under Section 60, C.P.C. subject to clauses (i) and (ia) of the proviso to the said section. There is no dispute that even salary payable in future is attachable subject to the abovesaid clauses in the proviso. It cannot also be disputed that even though salary is to be paid to a servant, the employer may withhold payment under certain contingencies. Therefore the mere right of the employer to withhold payment would not mean that the money payable is not that of the judgment-debtors. 12. It is also to be noted that while in the case attaching the teaching grant which was done earlier, the Government (garnishee) raised objection and filed the civil revision petition referred to earlier, with regard to the present attachment, the Government itself is not raising any objection. In fact in this civil miscellaneous second appeal, I ordered notice to the Government Pleader, but he did not appear. Therefore I take it that the garnishee has no objection for the amount being attached for the decree amount. I hold that the amount in question has been properly attached and there is no merit in this civil miscellaneous second appeal. Accordingly the same is dismissed with costs.