Judgment.-This is an appeal against the order of the Commissioner for Workmens’ Compensation, Hyderabad, in W.C Case No. 113 of 1970. rejecting the claim of the appellant for payment of Rs. 8,000 towards compensation for the death of her husband Challapareddy Venkateswara Rao., while working as a driver on the lorry of the respondent. 2. The admitted facts are as follows: The appellant’s husband was employed as a driver for driving the lorry No. ADB 2367 belonging to the respondent. While the lorry was transporting goods of Hyderabad Aluminium Company, Hyderabad, on 4th October, 1970 it met with an accident and the appellant’s husband who was driving the lorry then received injuries which resulted in his death. 3. The appellant stated that her husband was drawing a salary of Rs. 250 per month at the time of the accident and therefore she is entitled to compensation of Rs. 8,000 according to the provisions of the Workmens’ Compensation Act of 1923. 4. The respondent while admitting that the appellant’s husband was employed as a driver of his lorry and that the accident resulting in his death occurred while he was driving the lorry, contended that the New Indian Assurance Company Ltd., Guntur, with whom the lorry was insured should be made a party and that the Hyderabad Aluminium Company, Hyderabad, should indemnify the respondent. 5. The appellant examined herself as P.W.1 and the respondent as R. W.1. The Motor Vehicles Inspector of the area and the Sub-Inspector of Police, Nakrekal, were examined as Court witnesses Nos. 1 and 2. 6. The appellant as P.W.1 spoke to the facts mentioned in her petition. The respondent also admitted the facts deposed to by the appellant. But he only disputed the monthly salary of the deceased and stated that the appellants husband was receiving only Rs. 80 per month. 7. The Motor Vehicles Inspector (C. W. 1) stated that his predecessor made an inspection of the scene of accident and the lorry and prepared a sketch. The report could not be traced in his office, but the sketch was filed as Exhibit G-3. From this sketch, he inferred that the accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the deceased driver. The report could not be traced in his office, but the sketch was filed as Exhibit G-3. From this sketch, he inferred that the accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the deceased driver. He could not say whether the breaks of the vehicle were in order though the superficial inspection carried out by his predecessor indicated that the accident was not the result of any mechanical defect. 8. The Sub-Inspector of Police, examined as C. W. 2 stated that at the time of the accident the lorry was carrying 531 boxes of aluminium weighing about 10105 Kgs., that it was proceeding from Hyderabad to Achapuram, that from the statements of the passengers who were travelling in the vehicle, he was able to ascertain that the deceased driver had permitted six passengers to get into the lorry, that two passengers were sitting in the cabin and the remaining four in the body of the lorry over the goods and that one of the passengers sitting in the body of the lorry had died due to the accident on the spot while others had sustained serious injuries. The cleaner had escaped unhurt. 9. In cross-examination he stated that he did not see the deceased-driver driving the lorry, that he registered cases again the deceased-driver in the light of the opinion given by the Motor Vehicles Inspector, that the inspection carried out by his predecessor was only superficial and that no “Road Test” was possible. 10. The Commissioner came to the conclusion that there was no evidence of any mechanical defect of the vehicle, that the lorry was intended for carrying load and not for passengers, that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the deceased-driver, that the action of the deceased-driver in permitting six passengers to get into the lorry amounted to adding peril to his employment by his own conduct and that therefore the appellant was not entitled to payment of compensation. 11. In this appeal it is contended by Sri T. Veerabhadrayya, learned Counsel for the appellant that the commissioner erred both in fact and law in rejecting the claim for compensation. He submits that as a question of fact there is no evidence on record to establish that passengers were carried in the lorry. 11. In this appeal it is contended by Sri T. Veerabhadrayya, learned Counsel for the appellant that the commissioner erred both in fact and law in rejecting the claim for compensation. He submits that as a question of fact there is no evidence on record to establish that passengers were carried in the lorry. Even otherwise, the mere fact that six passengers were allowed to travel in the lorry would not constitute an added peril and even if there was a rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver, it would not preclude the appellant from claiming; compensation. 12. The first question to be considered is whether the injuries were caused to the deceased by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. On this aspect, there is no dispute because it is admitted in the counter filed by the respondent that the husband of the appellant was employed on the respondent’s lorry and he was involved in the accident when he was driving that lorry, while it was transporting the goods of Hyderabad Aluminium Company, Hyderabad to Achapuram. 13. Therefore on a question of fact, I find that the injuries were caused to the appellant’s husband by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. 14. The next question for consideration is whether the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the lorry by the deceased driver or by reason of added peril. 15. So far as the first question with regard to rash and negligent driving is concerned, there is no evidence to establish the circumstances in which the accident occurred. The evidence of the applicant and the respondent are of no help in determining the question. The only other evidence is that of the Court witnesses C. Ws. 1 and 2. C. W. 1 is the Motor Vehicles Inspector, but he was not the Inspector who made the inspection and even the inspection report of his predecessor who made the inspection has not been filed. Only the sketch prepared by his predecessor is filed as Exhibit C-3 from which C.W.1 sought to infer that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving. Only the sketch prepared by his predecessor is filed as Exhibit C-3 from which C.W.1 sought to infer that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving. Similarly C. W. 2 the Sub-Inspector of Police, stated that he did not see the deceased-driver driving the vehicle that he registered cases against the deceased in the light of the opinion given by the Motor Vehicles Inspector, and that the inspection carried out by his predecessor was only superficial. Thus the evidence of C.Ws.1 and 2 does not establish the circumstances under which the accident took place. Therefore the respondent has failed to establish that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the lorry. 16. The main ground on which the Commissioner appears to have rejected the claim for compensation is that the deceased-driver’s action in permitting six passengers to travel in the lorry which was already carrying a load of 10105 Kgs., amounted to adding peril to his employment by his own conduct and therefore that constituted a rash and negligent act which resulted in the accident. 17. Sri T. Veerabhadrayya, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that there is no evidence to establish that six passengers were actually carried in the lorry at the time of the accident. C.W. 2 states that from the statements of the passengers he was able to ascertain that six passengers were travelling in the lorry. Neither the report of the Motor Vehicles Inspector nor that of C.W.2 has been filed in the case. None of the passengers has been examined. Therefore, it is not established that actually six passengers were carried. 18. Even if C.W. 2’s evidence is accepted that six passengers were carried in the lorry, it is not stated that the lorry was over-loaded beyond its capacity. Therefore it cannot be said that the mere fact of carrying passengers would amount to a rash and negligent act. Further under section 2 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act, "Goods Vehicle" means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods, solely or in addition to passengers.’ 19. This definition of ‘goods vehicle’ shows that a lorry can be used for the carriage of goods solely as well as for carriage of goods in addition to passengers. This definition of ‘goods vehicle’ shows that a lorry can be used for the carriage of goods solely as well as for carriage of goods in addition to passengers. The mere fact that six passengers were allowed to travel in the lorry would not constitute a rash and negligent act on the part of the deceased-driver. 20. Sri T. Veerabhadrayya, submitted that even assuming that there was rash and negligent act on the part of the deceased-driver, it would not preclude the appellant from claiming compensation under section 3 of the Workmens’ Compensation Act (hereinafter called the Act), where the accident resulted in the death of the workman. 21. Section 3 of the Act, reads as follows: "3. Employer’s liability for compensation: (1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter: Provided that the employer shall not be so liable: (a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the workman for a period exceeding (three) days; (b) in respect of any (injury, not resulting in death, caused by an) accident which is directly attiributable to: (i) the workman having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or (ii) the wilful disobedience of the workman to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed for the purpose of securing the safety of workman, or (iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the workman of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purposes of securing the safety of workman. (c) * * *". 22. It will be seen that if personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, the employer is liable to pay compensation except in the cases covered by the proviso. In the following cases, the employer will not be liable to pay compensation: (i) Where the injury does not result in the total or partial disablement of the workman for a period exceeding three days; (vide proviso (a)). In the following cases, the employer will not be liable to pay compensation: (i) Where the injury does not result in the total or partial disablement of the workman for a period exceeding three days; (vide proviso (a)). (ii) Where the injury is caused by the workman having been at that time under the influence of drink or drugs; (iii) Where the workman wilfully disobeyed an order expressly given or to a rule expressly framed for the purpose of securing the safety of workman; (iv) Where the injury was caused due to the wilful removal or disregard by the workman of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purposes of securing the safety of workmen. (see proviso (b). 23. In the case of injury resulting in death, the Exceptions (ii), (iii) and (iv) are not applicable. Where death occurred due to the injury caused by the accident, the employer is made liable to pay compensation irrespect of the factors mentioned in Exceptions (ii), (iii) and (iv). Therefore even assuming that there was any disregard by the deceased-driver of any rule or any direction given by the employer that would not deprive the appellant of her right to claim compensation under section 3 of the Act. In the instant case however it is not the case of the respondent nor is it established by the evidence on record that there was any wilful disobedience of the workman viz., the deceased driver of any order or of any rule. Therefore, the appellant cannot be denied compensation under the Act. 24. Sri Veerabhadrayya, has invited my attention to two rulings in support of his contention that even in cases where the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving or due to any added peril, the dependants of the workman would be entiled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act, if it is established that the death occurred due to an injury caused to the workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. 25. The first ruling is Padam Debi v. Raghunath1. In that case it was found that the driver of a bus met with his death due to an accident while driving the bus. 25. The first ruling is Padam Debi v. Raghunath1. In that case it was found that the driver of a bus met with his death due to an accident while driving the bus. A contention was raised that the driver had committed breach of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed there under by driving the bus at excessive speed and ignoring the caution signals on the road and therefore the widow of the deceased-driver was not entitled to claim compensation. But that plea was negatived by the learned Judges Panigrahi and Nara simham, JJ., in the following terms: "But these are not factors which would affect the right to claim compensation in a case where death is actually caused because the applicability of Clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 3, Workmens’ Compensation Act is limited to these cases where injury has not resulted in death. Where however the injury has resulted in death the question about disobedience of any rule or order is not material so long as it can be reasonably held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. Similarly the negligent or rash conduct of the workman also is immaterial." 26. The second ruling relied upon is R.B. Moondra and Company v. Bhanwari2. The learned Judge Bhargava, after elaborately considering several English cases held as follows: “In order to claim compensation the employee has to show not only that at the time of the accident he was in fact employed on the duties of his employment, but further that the immediate act which led to the accident was within the sphere of his duties and not foreign to them. In case of death of an employee due to accident if it has arisen out of and in the course of his employment it is no defence to plead that there was wilful disobedience of any order or rule expressly given or framed for the purpose of securing the safety of the workman. Clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 3 is limited to those cases where injury has not resulted in death.” 27. Sri N. Subba Reddy, learned Counsel for the respondent relied upon the ruling Gouri Kinkar v. Radha Kissen Cotton Mills1. Clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 3 is limited to those cases where injury has not resulted in death.” 27. Sri N. Subba Reddy, learned Counsel for the respondent relied upon the ruling Gouri Kinkar v. Radha Kissen Cotton Mills1. In that case, it was found that the workman there was doing something out of the sphere of his employment and therefore it was a case where the injury was caused by an accident not arising out of and in the course of his employment. That case has no application to the facts of the present case as admittedly here the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased as a driver of the respondents lorry which was then transporting goods. 28. As observed in R.B. Moondra and Co. v. Bhanwari2, the question in each case is to see whether that the workman did was really an improper way of doing what he was employed to do or was something outside the sphere of his employment. In the former case the employer would be liable; while in the latter he would not be 1 liable to pay compensation. 29. I therefore hold on the facts of this case that it was not established by the evidence on record that there was any rash or negligent driving on the part of the deceased-driver in. driving the lorry at the time of the accident that the act of allowing six passengers to get into the lorry would not amount to added, peril and that even otherwise as death occurred due to the injuries caused by the accident which had arisen out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased-driver the appellant would be entitled to claim compensation from the respondent. 30. The next question is with regard to the quantum of compensation. Sri N. Subba Reddy, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the deceased-driver was drawing only a basic salary of Rs. 80 per month whereas the appellant stated in her evidence that the deceased was drawing Rs. 250 per month. The respondent has not produced any documentary evidence in support of his version that the deceased driver was drawing Rs. 80 per month. 80 per month whereas the appellant stated in her evidence that the deceased was drawing Rs. 250 per month. The respondent has not produced any documentary evidence in support of his version that the deceased driver was drawing Rs. 80 per month. No explanation is forthcoming as to why the respondent did not produce the relevant accounts or any other document to establish his plea that the deceased-driver was drawing only Rs. 80 per month. There is no reason to disbelieve the version of the appellant as P.W.1 that the deceased driver was drawing a salary of Rs. 250 per month. I therefore accept her evidence and hold that the deceased-driver was drawing Rs. 250 per month at the time of the accident. If so, the appellant would be entitled to payment of compensation of Rs. 8,000 in accordance with Schedule IV of the Workmens’ Compensation Act. 31. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of the Commissioner, is set aside. The claim of the appellant is allowed and the respondent is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 8,000 to the appellant towards compensation. The appellant will have her costs here and in the lower Court.