Sambasiva Rao, J.: This case provides a typical and telling example of the turbulence which the adolescent and the youth of the Country are passing through at the present moment and the mental and psychological aberrations they are suffering from. 2. The accused, who is the appellant before us, was a young man, we could even say a boy, when he is alleged to have committed the murder and that too for gain. He was nearly 16 years of age to be precise 15 years 8 months when the occurrence took place. 3. On 14th September, 1972, as the prosecution would have it, the accused went to a girls’ school in Amalapuram town where the deceased was a pupil. She was aged 8 years. Her parents belonged to a different village, but her mother (P.W.2), who was a sickly woman, came down to the town to receive medical treatment. For that purpose, she, with the deceased child, was living with her brother (P.W.1) whose house was very near the school. P.W.4, the wife of P.W.I was a teacher in the school and usually the girl used to accompany her aunt to go to the school That day also, after mid-day meal, the girl, her name is Udayakumari, went in the company of her aunt to the school. At about 3-00 p.m., the school was having a recess. The girl was playing with other girls like P.Ws. 12 and 13. The accused went there and dangled before the girls a ring made of beads. He offered to give it to the girl who could catch it. Obviously no girl succeeded in the attempt. Seeing that Udayakumari was having a ring on her finger and also ear-rings, the accused enticed her away promising to give her a similar ring. In the first place, the two went to the shop of P.W.9 very near the school, and the accused purchased two chocolates for 10 np He gave one to the deceased and promised to give the other sometime later. From there they proceeded further and went to several places. On the way, P.W.3 saw them together and finally at 5-00 p.m., P.W.14 saw the accused in the company of the deceased at the junction of the main road with another by road. That was the last when the deceased was seen alive. From there they proceeded further and went to several places. On the way, P.W.3 saw them together and finally at 5-00 p.m., P.W.14 saw the accused in the company of the deceased at the junction of the main road with another by road. That was the last when the deceased was seen alive. 3-A. Getting agitated by the non-return of the deceased, her mother (P.W.2), her uncle (P.W.1) and aunt (P.W.4) began to make searches that night and the whole of next day. Not finding any trace of her, on 15th September, 1972 at 6-00 p.m., P.W.1 gave a report (Ex.P.1) to the Town Police Station. P.W.20, the Sub-Inspector, registered the complaint as the case of a missing girl. Though some searches were made by the police also, no traces of the girl were found. But on 20th September, 1972 at 4 p.m., the maternal uncle (P.W.1) himself found a dead body in the field of one Bhushanam. By that time the body was in a highly decomposed state. However, P.W.1 identified the body as that of his neice Udayakumari, with the help of the clothes and gave the report (Ex.P-2) to the police at 5-00 p.m The reafter, P.W.20 altered the crime to one under section 302, Indian Penal Code. The body was found in a paddy field. The body was examined by P.W.18 on 21st September, 1972 who conducted the postmortem examination. He found that the girl might have died of asphyxia. He also detected fracture of hyoid bone. On the same day at 4 p.m. the accused was arrested in the presence of P.W.16. When questioned, he gave a statement (Ex.P-4) in pursuance of which P.W.20, accompanied by the mediators of whom P.W.16 is one, went to the house of P.W.7. That witness produced the ear-rings and the finger ring marked as M.Os. 1 and 2. Those were seized under Ex.P.6. In fact, a ring of beads was recovered from the person of the accused which is marked as M.O.6. The accused was produced before P.W.17, the local Magistrate, who recorded his confession which is marked as Ex.P-10. That witness produced the ear-rings and the finger ring marked as M.Os. 1 and 2. Those were seized under Ex.P.6. In fact, a ring of beads was recovered from the person of the accused which is marked as M.O.6. The accused was produced before P.W.17, the local Magistrate, who recorded his confession which is marked as Ex.P-10. In that confession, the accused made a clean breast of how he took the girl promising her to give a ring, how he tried to remove the jewels in the fields, how she protested and cried, and how he pushed her into the muddy water in the fie]d fearing that somebody would hear her. This is how, according to the confessional statement, the deceased died: On 3rd October, 1972, three parades were held in the presence of P.W.17. The first one was in regard to M.Os. 1 and 2, the jewels of the deceased girl. P.Ws. 1 and 2 and P.W.11 who was a goldsmith, identified the jewels as those of the deceased girl. The next parade is in respect of the clothes of the deceased. P.Ws.1 and 2 and P.W.10, the washerman of P.W.1’s family, identified the clothes as those of the deceased. The third and last parade was in regard to the accused whom P.Ws. 12 and 13 the playmates of the deceased identified him. Ultimately a charge-sheet was filed against the accused. 4. The defence was one of denial and also that the confession was not voluntary. 5. The lower Court accepted the confession as being voluntary and also reliable. It also felt that it received corroboration from other evidence. Another basis for the conviction of the accused is that he was last seen in the company of the deceased by as many as five persons. Lastly, it also relied upon the recoveries of M.Os. 1 and 2 on the basis of statement of the accused from P.W.7. In the result, the trial Court convicted the accused under section 302, Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment. It further convicted the accused under section 392, Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to five years’ rigorous imprisonment. However, a direction was given that the sentences were to run concurrently. 6. Obviously, no submission was made before the learned Sessions Judge as to the need and feasibility of sending the accused to a Borstal School. It further convicted the accused under section 392, Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to five years’ rigorous imprisonment. However, a direction was given that the sentences were to run concurrently. 6. Obviously, no submission was made before the learned Sessions Judge as to the need and feasibility of sending the accused to a Borstal School. As could be seen from paragraph 64 of the judgment a contention was made under the Children’s Act. The learned Judge rejected this plea on the ground that the birth certificate of the accused produced showed that the accused was born on 10th January 1957, and so the Children’s Act did not apply. He also found that since the accused is liable to be punished with death or imprisonment for life, he could not be dealt with under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. So the sentences, as stated above, were awarded to the accused. 7. In the appeal before us, Sri Padmanabha Reddy, learned Counsel for the accused-appellant, raises four principal contentions. They are: (1) There is no proof that the dead body was that of Udayakumari. In any case, murder is not proved, since the medical evidence does not support the confessional statement; (2) Confession itself is not voluntary, (3) The corroborating evidence is not at all reliable and trustworthy; (4) In any case, the accused being less than 16 years of age when the offence was committed, his is a fit case for being considered under the Andhra Pradesh Borstal Schools Act, 1925. 8. Taking up the point that there is no proof that the body found by P.W.1 on 20th Setpember, 1972 in the field of Bhushanam was that of the deceased, we find abundance of evidence to establish this fact. It is true that the doctor, who conducted the post-mortem examination, states in his further cross-examination that: “It will not be possible for any one to say from the state of the body which I found at the post-mortem examination, that it was the dead body of any particular individual.” But the salient features of the body were there even though it was highly decomposed. The clothes in particular gave the clue. The clothes, though ordinarily worn by girls of that age, could certainly be identified by the mother, the maternal uncle and the dhobi who washed them day after day. The clothes in particular gave the clue. The clothes, though ordinarily worn by girls of that age, could certainly be identified by the mother, the maternal uncle and the dhobi who washed them day after day. It cannot be imagined for a single minute that when three persons including the mother, identified the clothes as those of the deceased, there could be any doubt about it. When the dead body was having these clothes, the proof is positive that the dead body was that of the missing girl Udayakumari. Further, there was the height and size of the body which tallied with Udayakumari’s measurements. That was also a feature known to P.Ws. 1 and 2. What further reinforces this conclusion is the fact that M Os. 1 and 2, which are identified to be jewels of the deceased, were recovered from P. W.7 with whom the accused had pledged them earlier. Those jewels were identified as those belonging to the deceased. In those circumstances, it is futile to say that there is no positive proof that the dead body was that of Udayakumari. The confessional statement of the accused also supports this conclusion. 9. Allied to this contention is the argument that murder is not proved in this case. How the learned Counsel puts forward this point is that if the Court goes by the confessional statement of the accused, what we get is that he pushed the head of the deceased into the muddy water, and there was no strangulation. But the medical evidence, as afforded by P.W.18, is that the right cornea of the hyoid bone was fractured at its junction with the body of the bone. He also hazarded an opinion due to the fracture of the right cornea of hyoid bone, the death might be due to asphyxia caused by strangulation. It is pointed out that strangulation and fracture of the hyoid bone are wholly inconsistent with the confessional statement, wherein it was stated that the accused merely pushed the head of the deceased into the muddy water. Then there could be no strangulation and no fracture of the hyoid bone. In the first place, even according to the confessional statement, Udayakumari died on account of the accused pushing her head into the water. Then there could be no strangulation and no fracture of the hyoid bone. In the first place, even according to the confessional statement, Udayakumari died on account of the accused pushing her head into the water. That means, according to the confessional statement, the deceased died on account of the action of the accused pushing her head into the water. The confessional statement also described the manner in which the pushing took place. We may usefully quote that particular passage here: “I took her (deceased) to some distance. There I asked her to give me the ring and ear-rings She refused to give saying that her mother would beat her. Then I tried to take them forcibly. She cried ‘Amma, Amma’. I was then afraid that anybody might come. There was water in the fields. I drowned her head. She drank water even before I removed the rings. I left the girl there taking them (M.Os.l and 2).” It is exactly there P.W.1. found her body. This statement of the accused shows that he was obliged to remove the ornaments from the body of the deceased by force. Here, we must remember that what were removed from the body of the deceased were not only a ring on the finger but also the earrings. That means they had to be pulled from out of her ear lobers. She refused to give the ornaments and cried ‘Amma, Amma’. Getting afraid that anybody would hear her and come, he drowned her head into the water. That means he must have used considerable force against the struggling girl to drown her head in the water. The word used is not “pushed” but “drowned”, which would necessarily imply that force, that too considerable one, was used on her head region. So when he drowned her head, he must have caught hold of her neck in the process and used considerable pressure. It is quite possible that the pressure so applied to the neck, could have caused strangulation and fracture of the hyoid bone. Apart from that, he admitted that he removed the earrings also. We have already pointed out that in order to remove her earrings, he should have necessarily used considerable force at the head region. For that, he must have been obliged to hold the neck and the bead with considerable pressure. Apart from that, he admitted that he removed the earrings also. We have already pointed out that in order to remove her earrings, he should have necessarily used considerable force at the head region. For that, he must have been obliged to hold the neck and the bead with considerable pressure. That way also, strangulation and fracture of the hyoid bone could have been caused. Once we know that the death was caused by the accused drowning the deceased into the water of the field, what we have to examine is whether the medical evidence falsifies the confessional statement. From what we have said, it does not, not only falsify but is also in a way in accordance with it. Further, the doctor (P.W.18) clearly states that no definite opinion as to the cause of death could be given as the body was in a highly decomposed state. The opinion that the death might be due to asphyxia due to strangulation was only hazarded by the medical gentlemen Even that opinion is not inconsistent with the confessional statement. Therefore, the offence of murder is clearly proved. 10. The next principal point is whether the confession recorded in Ex.P-10 was voluntary. In order to say that it could not be voluntary, it is brought to our notice that it was recorded one week after arrest of the accused that the sub-jail in which the accused was kept was next to the police station, and that the confessional statement was not in accordance with the medical evidence. The last of the so-called infirmities does not really exist. As we have already pointed out, the medical evidence is not in conflict with the confessional statement. For the purpose of finding out whether the confessional statement is voluntary or not, we will have to examine the evidence of the Magistrate, who is examined as P.W.17 in the case. He is a fairly experienced Judicial Officer aged about 40 years, and his evidence shows that he had given all the necessary warnings, and adopted all the requisite procedure before he recorded the confessional statement. Even the statement would show that all the necessary precautions were taken by him. The Magistrate added a certificate marked as Ex.P-11 in Ex.P-10 that he recorded the statement after explaining to the accused the significance of making a confessional statement. Even the statement would show that all the necessary precautions were taken by him. The Magistrate added a certificate marked as Ex.P-11 in Ex.P-10 that he recorded the statement after explaining to the accused the significance of making a confessional statement. Reading the evidence of the Magistrate, there is no doubt left in our minds that it was a voluntary statement made by the accused, and was not forced or induced by the police. We have therefore no hesitation in rejecting this contention. 11. We will now go to the third point that the other evidence does not corroborate the confessional statement. The need for corroboration arises in this case because the confession was retracted even in the committal Court. But there is ample evidence which corroborates the confessional statement. We may here exclude from consideration the evidence of P.Ws. 12 and 13. Apart from the fact that they were girls of tender age, they also state that they had been shown the accused earlier. So we do not feel quite safe to rely on their evidence as pieces of corroboration of the confessional statement. But we see no reason to reject the evidence of P.Ws. 9, 3 and 14. P.W.9 saw the accused in the company of the deceased between 3-00 and 4-00 P.M. Both of them went to his shop and purchased chocolates from him for which the accused paid the money. A comment is made that it was impossible for him to remember the date. Patently because of the tragedy that ensued he evidently remembered it. He knew the accused because he had been coming to the school now and then though he did not know his name or his parents. He also knew the deceased girl because she was living in the same street as he did. He also knew her name prior to 14th September, 1972. He is also a natural witness because he had a pen shop very near the school. Then there is the corroboration of P.W.3, an ayah of the school. She states that at about 3-00 p.m. when she was returning from the stores, she saw the accused and the deceased together. Her evidence is criticised that she had no business to be away from the school at that time. But her statement itself gives the explanation because she says that she was returning along with another ayah from the stores. Her evidence is criticised that she had no business to be away from the school at that time. But her statement itself gives the explanation because she says that she was returning along with another ayah from the stores. Evidently, she had gone to fetch some stores for the school. It is also said that she could not have remembered the colour and the details of the dress worn by the deceased, and therefore her evidence is dubbed as artificial. We cannot accept this criticism because she was an ayah of the school in which the deceased was a student, and it was one of her businesses to look after the children. So she had every opportunity and occasion to watch the dresses of the girls. Thus P.W.3 corroborates the confessional statement. Then there is the evidence of P.W.14 who saw the accused in the company of the deceased at about 5-00 p.m., near the junction leading to the fields. He says that the accused was taking Udayakumari with him holding her hand. There is nothing in his evidence which would cast a shadow of doubt on his veracity. Thus these three witnesses can be certainly relied upon when they say that they had seen the accused in the company of the deceased that evening. That is exactly what the confessional statement also states. Thus, the evidence of P.Ws. 9, 3 and 14 corroborates and supports the confessional statement. 12. Even stronger corroboration comes from P.W.7. It may be remembered here that it was to P.W.7 the accused took M.Os. 1 and 2 on the same evening of 14th September, 1972 for pledging. She had no money then and the accused went to her the next morning. She advanced Rs. 15 on keeping the two ornaments. On the basis of the statement of the accused (Ex.P-4), P.W.20 and the mediators were taken by the accused to P.W.7’s house who produced these two ornaments. Therefore, this material portion of the confessional statement that the accused had the ornaments of the deceased in his custody and pledged them with P.W.7 is borne out also by the evidence of P.W.7. P.W.8, the sister-in-law of P.W.7 and her neighbour, fully supports the evidence of P.W.7. Thus there is more than adequate corroboration to the confessional statement. Therefore, this material portion of the confessional statement that the accused had the ornaments of the deceased in his custody and pledged them with P.W.7 is borne out also by the evidence of P.W.7. P.W.8, the sister-in-law of P.W.7 and her neighbour, fully supports the evidence of P.W.7. Thus there is more than adequate corroboration to the confessional statement. There can be no hesitation to completely rely upon the confessional statement of the accused, though it had "been retracted in the committal Court. 13. What has been discussed above shows that the accused committed the murder of the deceased to remove her go!d ornaments and, after removing them, pledged them with P.W.7. Thus he is liable to be convicted under section 302, Indian Penal Code and 392, Indian Penal Code, as well. We see no reason to modify the sentences awarded by the trial Court on these two counts. We, therefore, confirm the convictions and sentences imposed on the accused. 14. Now remains the last submission made by Sri Padmanabha Reddy. According to him, it is an eminently fit case for recommendation that action might be taken under section 10-A of the Andhra Pradesh Borstal Schools Act, 1925. On the other hand, ‘he learned Public Prosecutor says that the accused, though young in years, is not worthy of any lenience because he had committed the murder for gain We have given our very careful and anxious consideration to this aspect of the matter. The essence of criminal jurisprudence and the philosophy behind imposing punishments on culprits and accused is not only punitive but also reformatory. In fact, the latter aspect is gaining more and more ground as time goes on. Whatever may be the principle behind the Indian Penal Code and other statutes, the Borstal Schools Act is founded on the hope and belief that adolescent convicts should be given an opportunity of reforming themselves. Otherwise, there would be no justification for the Borstal Schools Act; for, a criminal is a criminal, whether he is an adult or adolescent. After all, law is the manifestation of society’s conscience. When an adolescent is involved in a crime, it is the duty of the society and the Court, which administers justice on behalf of the society, to find out whether reformation is possible in an adolescent criminal. After all, law is the manifestation of society’s conscience. When an adolescent is involved in a crime, it is the duty of the society and the Court, which administers justice on behalf of the society, to find out whether reformation is possible in an adolescent criminal. Even adolescents can be confirmed or hardened criminals, by having long history of offences and crime behind them. Such adolescents do not deserve to be shown any lenience either by the Court or by the State. Whatever might be the benefit or advantage to them personally, there is the other aspect. If they are placed in the company of young boys and girls in a Borstal School, they would vitiate the minds of the other children. No Court or Government could afford to run that risk. But the consideration would be different in the cases of adolescents who have no history of crime behind them, or who have committed some offence on the spur of the moment, or under the stress of circumstances. For instance, we may refer to the decision In re J. Munirathnam Reddy1. In that case, Subba Rao, C.J. as he then was of this Court) speaking for the Court held that section 10-A of the Borstal Schools Act was really intended to govern the case of accused who committed an offence on the spur of the moment. He pointed out that the accused in that case was not a hardened criminal. He was a student of Sri Venkateswara College and was below 21 years at the time he was convicted of the offence of murder. He had shot the deceased when he abused him and his father, presumably when they questioned him about his conduct in insulting his mother. The act was done by an young man of good antecedents in an emotional state. Likewise is the decision in Public Prosecutor v. Kavada Mohanarao2. That it is also a case where a young man was charged and convicted under section 302, I.P.C. A Division Bench of this Court for which Basi Reddy, J., spoke also took a similar view. While convicting an young man under section 302, I.P.C., the learned Judges observed that it was a fit and proper case where section 10-A of the Borstal Schools Act might be applied by the State Government. While convicting an young man under section 302, I.P.C., the learned Judges observed that it was a fit and proper case where section 10-A of the Borstal Schools Act might be applied by the State Government. Another Division Bench of this Court in Pedda Anjaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh3, held that the provision could be applied to young persons who are not hardened criminals. This is indeed, in our opinion, the spirit of the Borstal Schools Act. The young persons would have their entire lite before them. On account of the stress of some unfortunate circumstances, the might have committed crimes and on occasions very grievous crimes too. But when there is no reason to suppose that they are confirmed criminals and when there is a possibility of reforming them, it would be a fit and appropriate case for applying section 10-A of the Borstal Schools Act. 15. In this case, we do feel that the case of the appellant, though we had no hesitation in confirming the convictions under sections 302 and 392, I.P.C. and the sentences imposed on him, deserves consideration. The provisions of section 10-A of the Borstal Schools Act could be reasonably applied. By no stretch of imagination could he be called a confirmed or hardened criminal. He was a student, studying Matriculation. There is no history of crime or offence behind him. Our attention is invited to the evidence of P.W.7 that even previously he was borrowing from her Re. 1 or Rs. 2 on occasions. Borrowing small amounts is no offence at all. As an afterthought, she adds that he was pledging some utensils for borrowing. Again borrowing and pledging utensils is no crime or offence. P.W.7 does not say that those utensils were stolen ones. Thus there is no history of crime behind him. It is true that he has committed this crime for the sake of jewels; in other words for gain. But the evidence discloses that he did not plan the, murder. He only wanted to take away] the ornaments from the girl. We have accepted the confessional statement not only as a voluntary one but also as a correct one. If we go by that confessional statement, what we get is that he took the girl to the fields to remove the jewels. He asked her to give him the ear-rings. He only wanted to take away] the ornaments from the girl. We have accepted the confessional statement not only as a voluntary one but also as a correct one. If we go by that confessional statement, what we get is that he took the girl to the fields to remove the jewels. He asked her to give him the ear-rings. When she refused, he tried to take them forcibly. But then she cried aloud saying ‘Amma, Amma’. He became afraid that somebody might hear and come. Then obviously, to avoid an ugly situation, he drowned her in the muddy water. So it is quite clear that he did not originally intend the killing of the deceased. Killing in this case comes under clause fourthly of section 300, I.P.C., because the accused had intended to cause such bodily injury which he knew was likely to cause the death of the deceased without any lawful excuse. That was why we have confirmed his conviction under section 302, I.P.C. But, at the same time, it shows that he had not pre-planned the murder. His only mention was to take away the jewels, but when it was not possible to do that in a peaceful manner by cajoling her, he used force. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the case of the appellant is a fit one for applying section 10-A of the Borstal Schools Act to him. A recommendation to the State Government is accordingly made. With this observation, the appeal is dismissed.