Judgment H.L.Agarwal, J. 1. This is an appeal by the defendants. The plaintiff, who is a minor and under the guardianship of his adoptive mother Sarala Bala Gorain, instituted a title suit for a declaration that the three sale deeds executed by his adoptive mother aforesaid on 16-4-1931, 5-5-1938 and 28-2-1942, fully described in the schedule of the plaint, were not for legal necessity and thus not binding on the plaintiff. A further declaration that the plaintiffs adoption by Sarala Bala Gorain was valid was also prayed for, and on these declarations, a decree for recovery of possession with mesne profits in respect of the land covered by the three sale deeds was sought for. In order to appreciate the questions raised in this appeal, it is necessary to state the relevant facts of the case. 2. The husband of Sarala Bala, namely, Gulam Chandra Gorain died issueless in 1926-27, leaving behind only the widow. Gulam Chandra Gorain had left behind considerable landed properties and on his death his widow Sarala Bala came in possession of the same. The widow thereafter sold away by means of three sale deeds the aforesaid extensive areas. Under the first document dated 16-4-1931, (Ext. 4) 5 bighas and odd was sold for a sum of Rs. 599/-; under the second document dated 5-5-1938 (Ext. 3) an area of 2 bighas 18 kathas and odd was sold for Rs. 291/- and under the third document dated 28-2-1942, (Ext. 5) 7 bighas and odd was said for a sum of Rs. 49 only. After the enforcement of the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act (Act 78 of 1956), Sarala Bala adopted the plaintiff, who was originally the son of one Bhagyadhar Gorain, according to the Shastric rites. A registered deed of adoption (Ext. 1/Gha) was also executed and registered on 3-4-1960 to evidence this adoption. Only a few years after the adoption, the suit was filed for the reliefs as stated above, 3. The suit was contested by the purchasers and the main defence set up by the defendants was that the adoption of the plaintiff was illegal and inoperative as Sarala Bala had no authority from her husband Gulam Chandra Go-rain to adopt a son and. therefore, the plaintiff had no locus stand! to institute the suit and to challenge the alienations made by Sarala Bala. therefore, the plaintiff had no locus stand! to institute the suit and to challenge the alienations made by Sarala Bala. It was also pleaded that the sale deeds in question were all genuine and executed for legal necessity. 4. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, on the findings that the adoption of the plaintiff was invalid for the reason of the absence of the consent of his natural mother for giving the plaintiff in adoption and, therefore, the plaintiff has got no right to maintain the suit and challenge the alienations made by Sarala Bala. He also recorded a finding that the disputed sale deeds were all valid and for legal necessity, and in any event, the suit was barfed by limitation. 5. An appeal was taken by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree of the trial Court and the learned District Judge on appreciation of the evidence on the record, reversed the finding of the trial Court regarding the invalidity of the adoption of the plaintiff and held that it had been satisfactorily proved by evidence that the adoption of the plaintiff was valid as both his father and mother had participated in the ceremony of giving him to Sarala Bala who had the necessary authority in law to adopt the plaintiff. He also held that the plaintiff being still a minor, there could be no question of limitation in this case as he could institute the suit even within a period of three years after his attaining majority. Regarding the binding nature of the three sale deeds in question, the learned District Judge held that the considerations mentioned in the documents were inadequate and that the defendants had failed to prove that the alienations in question were for legal necessity. Accordingly, he allowed the appeal of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. Now the contesting defendants have filed a second appeal in this Court, 6. Mr. J.C. Sinha, learned counsel aptiearing for the appellants, has raised the following questions in support of this appeal: 1. The finding of the Court of appeal below that the plaintiff was validly adopted and his natural mother was a consenting party, is erroneous and vitiated; 2. Now the contesting defendants have filed a second appeal in this Court, 6. Mr. J.C. Sinha, learned counsel aptiearing for the appellants, has raised the following questions in support of this appeal: 1. The finding of the Court of appeal below that the plaintiff was validly adopted and his natural mother was a consenting party, is erroneous and vitiated; 2. The Court of appeal below has committed an apparent error of law in recording a finding on the point of legal necessity for the execution of the three sale deeds by Sarala Bala by relying upon the inadequacy of the considerations; juad, 3. In any view of the matter, the plaintiff having been adopted by virtue of an independent right of adoption given to a Hindu female under the Act, he became the adopted son of the widow only and will not be deemed to be the son of her deceased husband and was, therefore, bound by the prior alienations of his adoptive mother. 7. The first question regarding the validity of the adoption raised by learned counsel for the appellants has got no substance. In the deed of adoption (Ext. 1/Gha), there is, no doubt, no mention of any consent having been given by the natural mother of the plaintiff for the adoption, and the father Bhagya-dhar Gorain is alone one of the executants of the said deed: from the evidence of the various witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff, however, which has been considered in detail by the Court of appeal below, it has been established that the mother of the plaintiff was present at the time of the ceremonies and she herself had handed over the child to Sarala Bala at the adoption ceremony. The only requirement under Section 9 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) is that the father, if alive, has the right to give a child in adoption, but with the consent of the mother, unless she has completely and finally renounced the world and has ceased to be a Hindu etc. From the evidence referred to above, the consent of the mother of the plaintiff to give him in adoption is well establised and. therefore, the finding recorded by the Court of Appeal below is based upon legal evidence and is binding on the appellants in a second appeal, 8. From the evidence referred to above, the consent of the mother of the plaintiff to give him in adoption is well establised and. therefore, the finding recorded by the Court of Appeal below is based upon legal evidence and is binding on the appellants in a second appeal, 8. Now, I consider the second question, namely, the question of legal necessity for execution of the three sale deeds (Exts. 3, 4 and 5) by the widow. The learned District Judge has referred to the evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of the defendants and has observed that the defendants did not adduce any evidence to show that ike purchasers had made any bona fide inquiry about the existence of legal necessity which was mentioned in each of tha three sale deeds. He has also referred to the evidence adduced by the plaintiff to show that the widow was possessed of sufficient properties and it was not necessary for her to incur any debt and alienate the lands in question. On accepting the plaintiffs evidence on this question, he has, no doubt also referred to a circumstance to support his view, namely, that the considerations mentioned in all the three documents were very inadequate, but the inadequacy of the considerations is not the basis of the finding, The law on this question is now well-settled, that those who deal with a per-, son who has only a limited interest in the property, are bound to make out facts which authorise such a disposition by the limited interest holder. The burden was. therefore, on the defendants to prove that the widow had the necessary legal necessity for execution of the three sale deeds by means of independent and reliable evidence. The recitals of the existence of legal necessity are, no doubt, admissible in evidence, but they are not evidence of this fact. To substantiate the allegation of the existence of necessity, there must be some evidence aliunde as the alienee in order to purchase the interest may get false recitals made in the document itself. The recitals of the existence of legal necessity are, no doubt, admissible in evidence, but they are not evidence of this fact. To substantiate the allegation of the existence of necessity, there must be some evidence aliunde as the alienee in order to purchase the interest may get false recitals made in the document itself. No doubt, in some of the cases on account of long lapse of time since the sale by the limited owner and when it was challenged, it has been held that it may not be reasonable to expect such full and detailed evidence of the circumstances which gave rise to the sale as in the case of an alienation at a more recent date, and presumption was held to be permissible to fill in the details which might have been obliterated by lapse of time. In support of this principle reliance was placed upon a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Banga Chan-dra V/s. Jagat Kishore, 43 Ind App 249 = (AIR 1916 PC 110). In this authority the principles have been very lucidly laid down as follows. The recitals of necessity cannot by themselves be relied upon for the purpose of proving the assertions of fact which they contain and, at best, they can only be evidence as between the parties to the conveyance and those who claim under them. If the deeds were challenged at the time or near the date of their execution, so that independent evidence would be available, the recitals would deserve but slight consideration, and certainlv should (not) be accepted as proof of the fact. But. as time goes by and all the original parties to the transaction and all those who could have given evidence on the relevant points have grown old or passed away, recitals consistent with the probability and circumstances of the case assume greater importance and cannot lightly be set aside. In that case, the proceeding was instituted challenging the transaction after about sixty years. In that case, the proceeding was instituted challenging the transaction after about sixty years. The sale deeds in question in the case in hand however are not of a period so remote and the executant, namely, the widow herself was alive and acting as the next friend of the present plaintiff, as well as some of the purchasers and, therefore, first hand evidence upon the matters and the circumstances might be still available and the appellants cannot fall upon the presumption, to be deduced from the recitals of the necessity mentioned in the three sale deeds. In their evidence, the defendants witnesses have themselves admitted that no inquiry was made by the purchasers nor the defendants have adduced any other independent evidence. Therefore, the finding of the Court of Appeal below on the second question against the appellants is also unassailable. 9. Now I proceed to consider the last question raised by Mr. Sinha. It is not disputed that a son adopted by a Hindu widow under the Shastric Hindu Law on the basis of the consent of her husband during his lifetime would also be deemed to be the son of the deceased husband. It is, however, urged that this policy of the old Hindu Law was given a go-by by the provisions of the new Act on account of an independent right of adoption having been given to the females already referred to above. This question was not raised in either of the two Courts below, but inasmuch as it is a pure question of law, the appellants are entitled to raise the same at this stage. Reliance has been placed upon the provisions of Sec.12 of the Act which reads as follows : "12. This question was not raised in either of the two Courts below, but inasmuch as it is a pure question of law, the appellants are entitled to raise the same at this stage. Reliance has been placed upon the provisions of Sec.12 of the Act which reads as follows : "12. An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoptive family; Provided that-- (a) xx xx (omitted) (b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth; (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption." It was argued on the basis of the above provision that the present Act made a complete departure from the previous law, according to which there was no question of the adopted child divesting of any property already vested in him. 10 The argument on the first impression seems to be attractive, but on a closer examination of the provisions of Sec.12 of the Act, it is fallacious and unsustainable. What is missed by the learned counsel for the appellants in Sec.12 of the Act is that the main section itself not only lays down that the adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of his adoption, but it also provides that from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family. The expression, replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family in my opinion are the key words which exposes the fallacy in the argument of Mr, Sinha. The expression, replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family in my opinion are the key words which exposes the fallacy in the argument of Mr, Sinha. It cannot be doubted for a moment that after a female is married, she belongs to the family of her husband and, therefore, it is this family to which the child adopted must belong to. I have therefore, no difficulty in coming to a conclusion thai, on adoption by a widow, the adopted son becomes a member of the family of her deceased husband and loses all his rights in the family of his birth and his rights in his previous family are replaced by the rights created by virtue of the adoption in the new family and he succeeds to the estate of the adoptive family and, consequently, becomes entitled to all those rights in the capacity of a member of that family .as an adopted son of the deceased husband of the widow, or as the case may be. I am supported in my view by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sawan Ram V/s. Mst. Kalawanti, ( AIR 1967 SC 1761 ). In the view that I have taken, the last question raised by Mr. Sinha also fails. 11. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal has got no merit and must be dismissed with costs in favour of the plaintiff-respondent.