Judgment.-This revision is directed against an order passed by the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Gudivada in C.C. No. 293 of 1973 on the file of his Court. The petitioners are the accused 1 and 3 in the ease. 2. M/s. Bhavani Prabhakara Rice Mill, Gudivada is a licensee under the A.R.M.L. Order. The three accused are the Partners of the firm. Besides being a partner, A-2 is the working Manager of the firm. The firm is a licensee under the G.F.L. Order also and as such it was acting as an Agent of the Government in civil supplies matters. The Grain Purchasing Officer, Gudivada, seized 70 bags of paddy on 3rd September, 1969 when the said paddy was being illegally transported from out of the Krishna District to Khammam District. He handed over the paddy to A-2 for safe custody on 3rd September, 1969. On 2nd February, 1970, A-2 submitted a petition requesting orders of disposal of the paddy lest it should be damaged. The Grain Purchasing Officer directed A-2 to sell the paddy at controlled rate and remit the sale proceeds in the treasury to the credit of “Revenue Deposits”. As the Grain Purchasing Officer did not hear anything from A-2 subsequently, he issued notice, dated 22nd April, 1972 to A-2 calling upon him to furnish the credit particulars of the sale proceeds of the paddy. Though A-2 received the notice on 24th April, 1972, he did not give any reply. 3. The Grain Purchasing Officer thereupon sent a report on 17th May, 1972 to the S.H.C., Gudivada Police Station alleging that A-2 was entrusted with paddy worth Rs. 2,520 and that he dishonestly misappropriated the property. He requested action against A-2 under section 409, Indian Penal Code. 4. After due investigation, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Gudivada, filed a charge-sheet against all the three accused under section 409, Indian Penal Code, alleging that the paddy was entrusted by the Government to the firm and that in so far as the paddy was dishonestly misappropriated, all the three partners of the firm are liable under section 409,. Indian Penal Code. 5. Indian Penal Code. 5. On a consideration of the allegations in the charge-sheet and the documents filed along with the charge-sheet, the then Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Gudivada, discharged the accused 1 and 3 under his order, dated 6th November, 1973 on the ground that A-2 alone is liable to be prosecuted. The trial of the case proceeded against A-2. Four witnesses have been examined on behalf of the prosecution. Thereafter on 12th July, 1974, Assistant Public Prosecutor incharge of the prosecution submitted a Memo. relevant portion of which reads: "During the course of evidence it was disclosed that A-1 to A-3 are partners and the paddy was credited to the Mill account and so A-1 to A-3 became liable for the entrustment and so they have to account for the same." 6. So stating in the Memo, he requested that the case may be taken on file against A-1 and A-3 also and summonses might "be issued to them. The learned Judicial First Class Magistrate who succeeded the Magistrate who first discharged A-1 and A-3, accepted the Memo. and directed the issuance of summonses to A-1 and A-3 under his order, dated 12th July, 1974. A-1 and A-3 have filed this revision questioning this order. 7. The Assistant Public Prosecutor requests cognizance against A-1 and A-3 also evidently because they are partners of the firm along with A-2 and a firm is a ‘person’ as defined in section 11 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 11, Indian Penal Code, reads as follows: "The word ‘person’ includes any Company or association or body of persons whether incorporated or not". 8. It is an accepted principle of judicial interpretation that when a word or expression is defined in a statute by employing the words ‘includes’ or ‘ shall be deemed to include’, the Legislature intended to enlarge the meaning of the word or phrase defined and that the word or phrase however, retains its ordinary meaning. The inclusive meaning of a term cannot be indiscriminately assigned to the term. The original or comprehensive meaning of the term should be assigned according to the context and circumstances. Section 3 (42) of the General Glauses Act reads: "3 (42) ‘person’ shall include any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not." 9. The inclusive meaning of a term cannot be indiscriminately assigned to the term. The original or comprehensive meaning of the term should be assigned according to the context and circumstances. Section 3 (42) of the General Glauses Act reads: "3 (42) ‘person’ shall include any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not." 9. The definitions in the various subsections of section 3 of the General Clauses Act are governed by the qualifying clause in the main section 3, and that clause reads: "Unless there is any thing repugnant in the subject or context." 10. Even though the clause ‘unless the contrary appears from the context’ is contained only in section 9 of the definitions in Chapter II of the Indian Penal Code and no such clause is contained for the definitions in the other sections 8 to 52-A it is now well settled that every one of the definitions in the Indian Penal Code also should be read as if the definition is followed by the clause. ‘unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.‘ 11. Certain offences like murder, bigamy or perjury by their very nature can be committed only by natural persons. Despite the generality of the definition of a ‘person’ as contained in section 11 of the Penal Code, a juristic or artificial person like a corporate body or a company, is not indictable for offences which can be committed only by? human individual or offences which are compulsorily punishable with death or imprisonment though a corporate body may be prosecuted for the criminal acts on omissions of its Directors or authorised agents or servants for certain other offences. A firm or company can commit crime only by or through its agents, some of whom must themselves be responsible for the crime. It is a question of fact in each particular case whether the criminal act of its agent is the act of the corporation and whether the agent’s state of mind can be imputed to the company or firm. It depends on the nature of the offence disclosed by the allegations in the complaint or in the charge-sheet, the relative position of the officer or agent vis-a-vis a corporate body and other relevant facts and circumstances which would show that the corporate body as such intended to commit that act. It depends on the nature of the offence disclosed by the allegations in the complaint or in the charge-sheet, the relative position of the officer or agent vis-a-vis a corporate body and other relevant facts and circumstances which would show that the corporate body as such intended to commit that act. Each case depends on its own facts and it cannot be laid down as a general rule that every company or association or firm is liable to criminal prosecution for every offensive act committed by its Director or working partner or officer managing the company or association or firm. 12. The offence of criminal breach of trust by an Agent under section 409, Indian Penal Code is mandatorily punishable with imprisonment. The ingredients of the offence are: (1) entrustment with property or with dominion over property and (2) dishonest conversion of such property. Dishonest conversion of property over which a person gets dominion otherwise than by entrustment, does not constitute criminal breach of trust though it may amount to criminal misappropriation. Dishonest conversion is the essence of an offence of either criminal breach of trust or criminal misappropriation. It is the prosecution case itself that the paddy in question was entrusted to A-2. by the Grain Purchasing Officer. Neither A-1 nor A-3 had anything to do with the entrustment. If the property entrusted to A-a had been dishonestly converted to his own use or has been disposed of by A-2 in violation of the conditions of the trust, it is A-2 that would be liable for criminal breach of trust and not A-1 and A-3. The Assistant Public Prosecutor requests a prosecution of A-1 and A-3 obviously on the ground that the sale proceeds of the paddy entrusted to A-2 were credited to the assets of the firm. Of course when the sale proceeds have been credited to the assets of the firm A-1 and A-3 being partners of the firm, get dominion over the property by the operation of law. The mere fact that they get dominion over the property entrusted to A-2, does not make them liable under the criminal law if A-2 should have dishonestly converted the property contrary to the conditions under which he was entrusted with the property. There can be no question of breach of trust in respect of property which has not been entrusted with. There can be no question of breach of trust in respect of property which has not been entrusted with. It is also not the case of the prosecution that A-1 and A-3 or either of them connived with A-2 for dishonestly converting the property entrusted. The fact that A-1 and A-3 are partners of the firm and the other circumstance that the sale proceeds of the entrusted property were credited to the assets of the firm, cannot be made a basis to hold that A-1 and A-3 were either entrusted with the property or that they had in any way instigated or aided A-2 in the dishonest conversion of the entrusted property. If the sale proceeds of the paddy have been treated as an asset of the firm, A-1 and A-3 being partners of the firm might incur civil liability but they cannot be held liable for criminal breach of trust punishable under section 409, Indian Penal Code or even for criminal misappropriation punishable under section 403, Indian Penal Code. There is absolutely no allegation of any kind indicating the necessary mens rea on the part of A-1 and A-3. 13. Under the circumstances the cognizance taken by the lower Court against A-1 and A-3 is unwarranted. The proceedings against A-1 and A-3 are therefore quashed. In the result the revision petition is allowed.