JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS second appeal is directed against the reversing judgment and decree of the District Judge, Jabalpur in a claim for partition by the appellant of the property left by one Sheikh Munna. The Civil Judge (Class II), jabalpur upheld the claim of the appellant and decreed the suit for partition. ( 2. ) THE question involved in this appeal is whether the appellant was married to Sheikh Munna and thus became entitled to a share in the property. The respondents 2 and 3 support the claim of the appellant and their stand is common with the appellant as they also claim to be the daughter and son of sheikh Munna from his second wife, the appellant in this appeal. The case of the appellant was that Sheikh Munna was already married to Jaitunbi, respondent No. 1, but since he did not have any child from her he married the appellant on 25-12-1949 at Bhopal. After marriage, the appellant stayed with Sheikh munna at his house at Andherdeo for about 4 or 5 months but as she could not pull on well with the first wife, she shifted to a house at Bhartipur and continued to stay there. Sheikh Munna was visiting her there and it is in this house that respondents 2 and 3 were born to her from Sheikh Munna. During Sheikh munnas life time, he on all occasions acknowledged and made declarations that respondents 2 and 3 were his daughter and son. Sheikh Munna died on 23-4-1966 and left behind properties mentioned in Schedule attached to the plaint. The respondent No. 1, it was stated, wrongfully took possession of all the property, cash and moveables and deprived the appellant and respondents 2 and 3 of their lawful share. Hence this suit. ( 3. ) THE respondent No. 1 Mst. Jaitunbi denied that the appellant was ever married to Sheikh Munna and that respondents 2 and 3 are daughter and son respectively of Sheikh Munna. She alleged that the appellant was married to one Nazar Mohammad and was living with her sons and daughter at Bhartipur at the time of Sheikh Munnas death She also pleaded that in 1962, the appellant fought the State Assembly election from Jabalpur constituency and the voters list indicated that she was the wife of Nazir Mohammad. She alleged that the appellant was married to one Nazar Mohammad and was living with her sons and daughter at Bhartipur at the time of Sheikh Munnas death She also pleaded that in 1962, the appellant fought the State Assembly election from Jabalpur constituency and the voters list indicated that she was the wife of Nazir Mohammad. In the nomination form she had described herself as the wife of Nazir Mohammad and, therefore, it was a circumstance clearly going against her claim to be the wife of sheikh Munna. She also stated that at the time of Sheikh Munnas death she alone had performed the necessary rites. The respondent No. 1, therefore, entirely denied the marriage of the appellant with Sheikh Munna and accordingly the appellant was not entitled to a share in the property of Sheikh Munna. ( 4. ) THE trial Court found that the parties were Sunni Muslims and that sheikh Munna had married the appellant and out of this wedlock, the respondents 2 and 3 were born to them. The trial Court also found that Sheikh Munna acknowledged the defendants 2 and 3 as his legitimate daughter and son during his lifetime. He, therefore, allowed the claim of partition declaring the share of respondents 2 and 3 as 7 /8th in the property and that of the appellant as 1 /16th. The learned District Judge, however, took quite a contrary view. He was of the opinion that the marriage of Sheikh Munna with appellant did not take place and had not been established by the evidence on record. Not only that it had not been established but that it was disproved by the evidence on record that Sheikh Munna married the appellant. He also disbelieved the evidence as regards the acknowledgment which carried conviction to the trial Court. ( 5. ) THE entire case as already indicated depends on the sole question whether the appellant was married to Sheikh Munna. The evidence had been led to establish marriage with Sheikh Munna and to show circumstances that the appellant had been living as wife of Sheikh Munna, and lastly of declarations said to have been made by Sheikh Munna during his lifetime acknowledging respondents 2 and 3 as his daughter and son thus giving rise to a presumption of marriage with the appellant. ( 6. ( 6. ) EVIDENCE was led of Rasulbi (P. W. 2), Kazi Mohammad Israil {p. W. 5), Bashirulla (P. W. 6) and Bashir Mohammad (2 D. W. 4) to establish that the appellant went to Bhopal and a marriage in the Nikah form took place in Moti Masjid at Bhopal on 25-12-1949. She also relies on Ex. P. 1. C which purports to be a certified copy of Nikahnama from a register of Nikahs of the kazi at Bhopal evidencing Nikah of Sheikh Munna with Rasulbi. Another important document relied on by her in this connection is Ex. C-l, dated 19-7-1967 a letter from Darul kaza of Bhopal in which it is stated that from 14-11-1954, the office of Moulvi Abdul Hadi Saheb had been closed and the same is being now organised from 15-11-1954 by the Darul kaza Committee. ( 7. ) THE learned District Judge found that the evidence regarding marriage of the appellant with Sheikh Munna was not reliable; that the document, ex. P-1c, alleged to be a certified copy of Nikahnama was not properly issued and that since loss or untraceablity of the original Nikahnama had not been established the document was inadmissible in evidence. He found that the evidence indicated that the records of the marriage were available and these records do not show that the appellant was married with Sheikh Munna on 25-12-1949 at Bhopal, as has been the plaintiffs case. The learned District Judge also found that the acknowledgment of the paternity of the defendants 2 and 3 by sheikh Munna was also not reliable and convincing and that the acknowledgment did not show that Sheikh Munna acknowledged the legitimacy of defendants 2 and 3. He also came to the conclusion that the evidence indicated that rasulbi did not live with Sheikh Munna and was living in a different house. The appellant continued to stay at the house at Bhartipur along with her parents and that there was no reliable evidence establishing that Sheikh Munna treated the appellant as his wife or lived with her and cohabited with her at the house at Bhartipur. The admitted position in the case was that defendants 2 and 3 were born at Bhartipur house. At the general election in 1962, the appellant had contested the election from Jabalpur constituency describing herself as widow of Nazar Mohammad and not wife of Sheikh Munna. The admitted position in the case was that defendants 2 and 3 were born at Bhartipur house. At the general election in 1962, the appellant had contested the election from Jabalpur constituency describing herself as widow of Nazar Mohammad and not wife of Sheikh Munna. The photographs in which Sheikh Munna was shown along with the appellant, Ex. P-2-C and another such photograph, Ex. P. C where Sheikh Munna was shown holding a child were of no evidentiary value. The cumulative effect of all this was that the story that Sheikh Munna was married to the appellant was "a subsequent concoction" and, in fact, no marriage had taken place. He thus concluded that the marriage between the appellant and Sheikh Munna had been disproved. The learned District Judge accordingly dismissed the claim of the appellant allowing the defenant No. 1s appeal. ( 8. ) IN the second appeal, it may not be permissible to re-appreciate the entire evidence over again. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, pointed out that the learned District Judge misread material part of evidence which led him to reach to an erroneous conclusion. It was pointed out that even the material evidence had been ignored. Lastly, the whole judgment proceeded on a misconception as to the real question in issue thus vitiating the findings. It was, therefore, urged that it would be necessary that the High Court came to an independent conclusion as to the factum of marriage and the subsequent declarations acknowledging the paternity of the defendants 2 and 3. It may be observed that the criticism is not without force and it would be necessary to judge the validity of some of the findings arrived at by the learned District judge. ( 9. ) FOR proving marriage, the appellant relied on the evidence of Rasulbi (P. W. 2), Kazi Mohammad Israil (P. W. 5), Bashirulla (P. W. 6) and Bashir mohammad (2 D. W. 4 ). Rasulbi (P. W. 2) was not relied on because in the voters list for the Assembly election in 1962, her name was recorded as widow of Nazar Mohammad. While filing her nomination form, she had described herself as widow of Nazar Mohammad. Rasulbi (P. W. 2) was not relied on because in the voters list for the Assembly election in 1962, her name was recorded as widow of Nazar Mohammad. While filing her nomination form, she had described herself as widow of Nazar Mohammad. This is true, Rasulbi (P. W. 2) explained this and stated that she had not checked up the voters list earlier and it was quite late when she discovered that she was continued to be shown as wife of Nazar mohammad. If she wanted to fight the election, it may not have been possible for her to have her name corrected and in any case, the description given by her did not detract from the truth that she had been the widow of Nazar mohammad. She, however, bad her name corrected in the voters list during the lifetime of her husband for the subsequent election in the year 1967. The learned District Judge has not considered this subsequent statement made by her and has come to an erroneous conclusion that the subsequent correction in in the voters list was made after filing of the suit in May 1966. The explanation given by Rasulbi is quite convincing but even if it did not lend any conviction to the learned District Judge, he was bound to take the circumstance into consideration that Rasulbi had taken steps to have the name rectified during the lifetime of her husband and that was before the commencement of the suit. Rasulbi (P. W. 2) has not been cross-examined on this point and her assertion that she had corrected her name during the lifetime of her husband remains unchallenged. This is a very material circumstance as it had come to the notice of all concerned including Sheikh Munna that the voters list described Rasulbi as widow of Nazar Mohammad. Therefore, if the steps were taken for correction of the description of the appellant in the voters list during the lifetime of Sheikh Munna and described herself as wife of Sheikh Munna, the circumstance was material. ( 10. ) IT appears from the evidence that Rasulbi was undoubtedly living at a house at Bhartipur, the number of which was 294. Therefore, if the steps were taken for correction of the description of the appellant in the voters list during the lifetime of Sheikh Munna and described herself as wife of Sheikh Munna, the circumstance was material. ( 10. ) IT appears from the evidence that Rasulbi was undoubtedly living at a house at Bhartipur, the number of which was 294. Rasulbi (P. W. 2)stated that her marriage took place at Bhopal and thereafter she lived for sometime in the house at Andherdeo but since she could not pull on with the respondent Jaitunbi, she shifted to Bhartipur house where Sheikh Munna used to visit her and lived with her. From this, the learned District Judge concluded that the evidence was not sufficient as would establish cohabitation with her. To my mind, the evidence clearly indicated without being vulgar as to what was meant. After marriage, if the wife stated that the husband bad access to her and was visiting her in her Bhartipur house it is difficult to see hew this could be construed as anything other than evidence of cohabitation with the husband. The implications were obvious. ( 11. ) IT is true that Rasulbi had not given any explanation why she had not been given the Nikah certificate at the time of her marriage when it had been prepared in triplicate. Her case, however, is that after 4 or 5 months when it became apparent to her that her marriage may be questioned she rushed to Bhopal and obtained a certified copy of the Nikahnama. ( 12. ) THE next witness is Kazi Mohammad Israil (P. W. 5), who, at the relevant time, was employed as a Peshkar (Reader) in the Kaziat (the office of kazi) at Bhopal. The learned District Judge disbelieved him because he stated that at the time of Nikah, none of the lady members was present. This, according to the District Judge, was at variance with the evidence of Rasulbi who stated that she had gone to Bhopal with her mother and sister. Rasulbi stated that the marriage talk took place before Sahidabi, her sister and mother zinnatbi. At that time, Mehar was not settled. Mehar was settled at Bhopal at the time of Nikah. Now, from the above statement, it does not appear that rasulbi stated that at the time of Nikah either Sahidabi or her mother Zinnatbi was present. Rasulbi stated that the marriage talk took place before Sahidabi, her sister and mother zinnatbi. At that time, Mehar was not settled. Mehar was settled at Bhopal at the time of Nikah. Now, from the above statement, it does not appear that rasulbi stated that at the time of Nikah either Sahidabi or her mother Zinnatbi was present. Kazi Mohammad Israil (P. W. 5) who had filled in the proforma of Nikah was, therefore, right when he said that the Nikah was witnessed only by male witnesses. His evidence could not be thrown out on this ground. ( 13. ) BASHIRULLAH (P. W. 6) who acted as the Vakil at the time of Nikah, has been disbelieved on the ground that he had not signed the document-Nikahnama. But Ex. P-l-O undoubtedly indicates that the document had been signed by the witness. In the evidence as I read it the witness does not say that he had not signed the document but he stated that he did not remember whether he had signed any document. According to him, the writing of the nikahnama had already been done even before the Nikah was read out. He has, therefore, been disbelieved on a misreading of the evidence. ( 14. ) BASHIR Mohammad (2 D. W. 4) stated how the talk to marry appellant had been initiated by Shahirbi. The talks, he stated, had been resumed two to four times. The learned District Judge has misconceived his evidence inasmuch as the initiation of talks were hardly material for establishing proposal and acceptance of the marriage. What was important was that the offer and the acceptance of marriage must have taken place at one place and the initial talks were of no significance as far as the proof of actual marriage was concerned. ( 15. ) THE evidence of Bashirullah (P. W. 6) does not appear to have been contradicted on any materia! particulars as regards the marriage at Bhopal. It would be necessary here to state that for marriage under Mahomedan Law no special form is prescribed. The essentials of a marriage under Mahomedan law as described under section 252 by Mulla at page 256, 7th edition, are as under:- "252. particulars as regards the marriage at Bhopal. It would be necessary here to state that for marriage under Mahomedan Law no special form is prescribed. The essentials of a marriage under Mahomedan law as described under section 252 by Mulla at page 256, 7th edition, are as under:- "252. Essentials of a marriage.- It is essential to the validity of a marriage that there should be a proposal made by or on behalf of one of the parties to the marriage, and an acceptance of the proposal by or on behalf of the other, in the presence and hearing of two male or one male and two female witnesses, who must be sane and adult Mahomedans. The proposal and acceptance must both be expressed at one meeting; a proposal made at one meeting and an acceptance made at another meeting do not constitute a valid marriage. Neither writing nor any religious ceremony is essential. " It would further be seen that the learned author has indicated that no particular form of proposal and acceptance is prescribed as such. In Mt. Bashiran v. Mohammad Hussain (AIR 1941 Oudh 284), it was held that "evidence that the wife gave her consent to the marriage and the husband agreed to the dower constitutes sufficient proposal and acceptance. " It was then pointed out that after the lapse of a long time after the marriage all the formalities required should be presumed to have been complied with. In his commentary by Mulla, it has also been indicated that where the person who performed the Nikah was dead, the evidence of a witness was enough to prove the Nikah and the exact words of offer and acceptance need not be proved [see, Alamgir v. The State (I L R 35 Pat. 93.)]. It would, therefore, be seen that the evidence of Rasulbi (P. W. 2), Bahirullah (P. W. 6) and bashir Mohammad (2 D. W. 4) is consistent that Rasulbi agreed to marry on payment of Mehr of Rs. 11,250. The evidence of Bashirullah in particular clearly points out how Sheikh Munna and Rasulbi had agreed and how Rasulbi had consented to marry on payment of Mehr. 11,250. The evidence of Bashirullah in particular clearly points out how Sheikh Munna and Rasulbi had agreed and how Rasulbi had consented to marry on payment of Mehr. In my opinion, on the facts of the case, Oudh case squarely applies and the exact words by which proposal and acceptance was made at the time of the marriage before the Nikah was read out were not necessary to be proved. The learned District Judges opinion is, therefore, not sound in law when he sought the proof of proposal and acceptance for proving the marriage in the circumstances of the case. He had also ignored the material parts of the evidence of the witnesses. ( 16. ) THE appellant tried to prove her marriage also by producing Nikahnama, Ex. P-1-C which evidenced the actual marriage with Sheikh Munna on 25-12-1949. The document has been found to be inadmissible by the learned district Judge on the ground that the loss of the original record of the Kaziat has not been established and if the record could be made available, secondary evidence could not be permitted. Secondly, reliance was placed on Ex-Dl, by which it was indicated that a search of the record was made in the Kaziat but to no avail. The authorities wanted more particulars to trace the records. The material portion of Ex. D-l reads as under:- ( 17. ) THE learned District Judge read the document to mean that the Naib kazi, Bhopal had searched the record of the Nikah performed on 25-12-1949 but no such Nikah had taken place. The interpretation placed on this document does not seem to be proper as it overlooked the last line of the letter. If the authorities had found out that no such Nikah had been performed then it was wholly useless for them to call for further particulars of Nikah to search the relevant record concerning it. The letter, in my opinion, ought to be construed to mean to say that the authorities even after search were not able to trace the record of the Nikah performed on 25-12-1949. It may be possible for them to find the record if more particulars had been made available. ( 18. The letter, in my opinion, ought to be construed to mean to say that the authorities even after search were not able to trace the record of the Nikah performed on 25-12-1949. It may be possible for them to find the record if more particulars had been made available. ( 18. ) THE learned District Judge relied on the oral evidence of Syed Abid ali (2 D. W. 3) and Hasan Askari (1 D W. 4) to establish that the Government department contained records of all the proceedings and Nikah done prior to 31-5-1950 and, therefore, it was held that the original of the document, Ex. P-1-C being available, secondary evidence would not be admissible. The appellant produced a letter, Ex. C-l, from Darul Kaza, Bhopal, dated 19 7-1967 by which it was conveyed that all the records of 1949 of the time of Moulvi Mufti Abdul hadi Saheb could not be traced and was not in the Moti Masjid. It was further pointed out that from 14-11-1954 the office of Moulvi Hadi Saheb was closed and it was after 15-11-1954 that the present office started functioning. Now, it has been proved that Abdul Hadi Saheb was the main Kazi who was running the Kaziat after it bad ceased to be a Government officer. The office itself was known as the Kaziat or Moulvi Mufti Abdul Hadi Saheb. Therefore, whether the Nikah had been read by Hadi Saheb himself or not was of little consequence as record of all the Nikahs done in his Kaziat would be in his office and not with Darul Kaza. ( 19. ) THE document, Ex. P-1-A, the certified copy of Nikahnama and the evidence of Kazi Mohammad Israil (P. W. 5) clearly established the marriage of the appellant with Sheikh Munna. Kazi Mohammad Israil (P. W. 5) has not been cross-examined nor he has been put the suggestion that Ex. P-1-C is a false document. In fact, his evidence on this score remains unchallenged and there is no reason why it should not be accepted. He is the only witness to the nikah and the appellant by leading his evidence has proved the fact of marriage with Sheikh Munna. ( 20. ) IT would be seen that either the oral evidence or Ex. In fact, his evidence on this score remains unchallenged and there is no reason why it should not be accepted. He is the only witness to the nikah and the appellant by leading his evidence has proved the fact of marriage with Sheikh Munna. ( 20. ) IT would be seen that either the oral evidence or Ex. P-1-C which establishes the marriage of the appellant with Sheikh Munna even if disbelieved was not enough to disprove the fact of the existence of marriage with Sheikh munna. Therefore, even assuming that the learned District Judge was right in rejecting Ex. P-1-C and the oral evidence, it could not lead to a conclusion that the marriage was disproved so that the declarations of acknowledgement made by the deceased Sheikh Munna lost all their value. The passage from Mulla from section 342 at page 324 (7th edition) would clearly indicate that unless the marriage had been disproved the acknowledgement could be used as substantive evidence to prove marriage and legitimate descent. The passage may be quoted as under:- "342. Acknowledgement of legitimacy- (1) Where the paternity of a child, that is, his legitimate descent from his father cannot he proved by establishing a marriage between his parents at the time of his conception or birth, the Muhammadan law recognizes acknowledgement as a method whereby such marriage and legitimate descent can be established as a matter of substantive law for purposes of inheritance. " "the Muhammadan law of acknowledgement of parentage with its legitimating effect has no reference whatsoever to cases in which the illegitimacy of the child is proved and established, either by reason of a lawful union between the parents of the child being impossible (as in the case of an incestuous intercourse or an adulterous connection), or by reason of marriage necessary to render the child legitimate being disproved. The doctrine relates only to cases where either the fact of the marriage itself or the exact time of its occurrence with reference to the legitimacy of the acknowledged child is not proved in the sense of the law as distinguished from disproved. In other words, the doctrine applies only to cases of uncertainty as to legitimacy, and in such cases acknowledgement has its effect, but that effect always proceeds upon the assumption of a lawful union between the parents of the acknowledged child". In other words, the doctrine applies only to cases of uncertainty as to legitimacy, and in such cases acknowledgement has its effect, but that effect always proceeds upon the assumption of a lawful union between the parents of the acknowledged child". In short, the doctrine applies only to cases where either the fact or the exact time of the alleged marriage is a matter of uncertainty, that is, neither proved nor disproved. Stated in another form, the doctrine is "limited to cases of uncertainty of legitimate descent, and proceeds entirely upon an assumption of legitimacy and the establishment of such legitimacy by the force of such acknowledgement. " ( 21. ) IT was held in Mt. Bashiran v. Mohammad Hussain (supra) that even if direct evidence of marriage is adduced and the Court disbelieves it, the effect of presumption arising from the acknowledgment is not lost and the failure does not absolve the opposite party from disproving or proving the impossibility of marriage and thereby rebutting the presumption. It would be further observed in this case that it is not the case of the respondent No. 1 that the marriage with the appellant was either impossible or it was a mere concubinage. To disprove a marriage would be to show all those conditions by which the fact of marriage could be negatived. The fact that the plaintiff failed to establish the factum of marriage would not, in itself, mean that the marriage had been disproved. This is clear from Mohambat Ali Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim khan (A I R 1929 PC 135) where their Lordships quoted the case of Habibur Rahman Chowdhury v. Altaf Ali Chowdhury (AIR 1922 PC 159.) as an instance of positive disproof of marriage. The law was stated by their Lordships as under:- "the present case accordingly is one of an acknowledgement by the father, an acknowledgement which involves the assertion that he, the father Khushdil, was married to mt. Babo, the appellants mother. Such acknowledgement undoubtedly raises a presumption in favour of the marriage and of the legitimacy. The presumption is no doubt rebuttable, and if (here is proof aliunde on the subject to the effect that there was no such marriage in fact, the same position is reached as if no such marriage had been possible. A recent instance of positive disproof of the marriage was Habibur Rahman Chowdhury v. Altaf AH Chowdhury. The presumption is no doubt rebuttable, and if (here is proof aliunde on the subject to the effect that there was no such marriage in fact, the same position is reached as if no such marriage had been possible. A recent instance of positive disproof of the marriage was Habibur Rahman Chowdhury v. Altaf AH Chowdhury. As Lord Dunedin put it: "such acknowledgement in face of the fact that there was no marriage is of no avail, and the general law was summed up in the same judgment as follows: "a claimant son who has in his favour a good acknowledgement of legitimacy is in this position: the marriage will be held proved and his legitimacy established unless the marriage is disproved. Until the claimant establishes his acknowledgement, the onus is on him to prove a marriage. Once he establishes an acknowledgement the onus is on those who deny a marriage to negative it in fact. " it would accordingly appear clear that it rests upon the respondents in this case to establish that there was no marriage. " The declarations of acknowledgements made by Sheikh Munna in the instant case would, therefore, serve as substantive evidence in proof of marriage with rasulbi. ( 22. ) THERE are two important acknowledgements which need closer attention in this case. The first is a report made by Sheikh Munna of the birth of a son on 2-2-1956, Ex. P-3-A and the second purports to be declaration at the time of admission of respondent No. 3 in a school where again, it is said, that Sheikh Munna acknowledged that respondent No. 3 was his son. ( 23. ) I have already commented upon the observations of the learned district Judge where he stated that the plaintiff Rasulbi had not stated that she shared the bed with Sheikh Munna and in absence of this evidence, it could not be said that the children born on 14-4-1951 and 2 2-1956 were legitimate children born out of the wedlock between the plaintiff and Sheikh Munna. I have already pointed out that this is not so. Rasulbi,s evidence showed that Sheikh munna visited her house and that he was living there. I have already pointed out that this is not so. Rasulbi,s evidence showed that Sheikh munna visited her house and that he was living there. I have also pointed out that the defendant No. 1 neither took any plea nor made any suggestion that the respondents 2 and 3 were illegitimate children of Sheikh Munna or that sheikh Munna was merely having a concubinage with Rasulbi. ( 24. ) THE documents, Exs. P-l, P-3 and P-3-A have been discarded by the learned District Judge on an untenable ground. Exhibit P 4 is a copy of the entry in the birth register. It records the birth of a son to Rasulbi and Sheikh munna. The mid-wife who conducted the delivery was Mohania and the informent had been one Rajeshwar. The report was made on 7-2-1956 of the birth that took place on 2-2-1956. Exhibit P-3 A is the report on the basis of which the entry, Ex. P-1, had been made. This report is signed at two places by sheikh Munna. The signatures of Sheikh Munna appear in a column where the person who was making the report is to sign. Similarly, in the column where the head of the household has to sign, there appears signature of Sheikh munna. Below this report is the signature of one Rajeshwar. Rasulbi has been shown to be the mother and Sheikh Munna, father of the boy whose birth is reported. Exhibit P-1 is the certified copy of the report. The learned District judge found these documents suspicious. He relied on the statement of Rasulbi (P. W. 2) in para 10. In para 10 of her deposition, she stated thus:-This statement cannot be taken to mean that the report of the birth of the son had been made by the mid-wife Mohania. It merely goes on to say that mohania was the mid-wife at the time of delivery of her son and Mohania was living. The report not having been made by Mohania, it was not necessary to have her examined to prove the declaration. What is important here is that in this declaration, Sheikh Munna has signed acknowledging that a son had been born to him through Rasulbi on 2-2 1956. Exhibit P-3 must have been delivered by Rajeshwar and he is the person who had placed his signature at the bottom of the slip. What is important here is that in this declaration, Sheikh Munna has signed acknowledging that a son had been born to him through Rasulbi on 2-2 1956. Exhibit P-3 must have been delivered by Rajeshwar and he is the person who had placed his signature at the bottom of the slip. I fail to appreciate how the statement of Rasulbi was relied on to the effect that Sheikh Munna did not make any report of the birth of her son. It would further be observed that what is important in Ex. P-3-A is the signature of the person who wrote the report and not the person who carried the report to the Corporation. In any case, Sheikh Munnas signature in the last columan as the head of the household is significant and no undue emphasis could be laid on the fact that it was Mohania or Rajeshwar or Sheikh munna who actually conveyed the information to the Corporation. The document, it would be seen has been rejected on a total mis-reading of the evidence of Rasulbi and on a misapprehension as to the requirements of the acknowledgment. ( 25. ) RAJARAM (P. W. 1) has proved how the documents were produced from the custody of the Corporation. That Ex. P-3-A was kept in a box should not make any difference if it was actually produced from the record of the corporation. Rajaram (P. W. I) has not been put the suggestion that the document was false or forged and not taken out from the record of the Corporation. No suggestion was also put to Rajaram. (P. W. 1) that no such chits were available in the Corporation of the year 1956. It would be relevant to point out here that the Corporation was bound to maintain a register of births and deaths under section 63 (1) (q) of the City of Jabalpur Corporation act, 1948 (Act No. 3 of 1950 ). The record of births and deaths was required to be kept by the Act and they were bound to take steps to preserve this record. The evidence of Chunmunlal Nigam (1 D. W. 6) does not appear to be true when he stated that the statement contained in Ex. D-l 16 to the effect that the reports (chits) made by the parents for the year 1956 were not available in the corporation records. The evidence of Chunmunlal Nigam (1 D. W. 6) does not appear to be true when he stated that the statement contained in Ex. D-l 16 to the effect that the reports (chits) made by the parents for the year 1956 were not available in the corporation records. It is difficult to believe that these chits would be destroyed and they would not be found for the entire year of 1956. Such an assertion was not to carry much conviction. It is true that his attention should have been drawn to the document itself but in face of Exs. P-l, P-3 and 1-3-A, in my opinion, his evidence would stand falsified and to infer from such evidence that the document was forged or false without anything more, would be holding that the Corporation had not been keeping the records which they were enjoined by the statute to keep and which the Corporation would have kept normally. The learned District Judge was also not justified in inferring that Ex. P-3-A was forged with the help of Rafiq who was an employee of the Corporation. ( 26. ) THE other acknowledgment is a declaration purporting to have been made by Sheikh Munna at the time of admitting respondent No. 3 in the school. Ramkrishna (P. W. 3) stated that he was a teacher in Galgala School No. 4. After showing the procedure that declaration was obtained whenever a child was first admitted in the school, he stated how Ex. P-2 was submitted in his school which bears Sheikh Munnas signature and countersigned by him. He also stated that Sheikh Munna would often come to the school to reach the respondent No. 3 there. In this declaration, Sheikh Munna has signed declaring while admitting the respondent No. 3 Khuajmuddin into the school that khuajmuddin had been vaccinated. The declaration is to the following effect:- This document has been rejected by the learned District Judge on the ground that the signatory Sheikh Munna has not been shown as to whether he signed as a father or guardian of the ward. The criticism appears to be that unless the word "guardian" was scored out it could not be said that Sheikh Munna signed it as a father of the ward. The criticism appears to be that unless the word "guardian" was scored out it could not be said that Sheikh Munna signed it as a father of the ward. Such a criticism was wholly misplaced as there is a note below the place where signature is to be placed to the effect that when the signatory was guardian he had to state the relationship with the ward. It, therefore, presupposed that when no relationship was given, it was by father. The non-scoring of the un-necessary portion, to my mind, is not such as would cause any confusion as to the capacity in which Sheikh Munna had signed the declaration. ( 27. ) HERE again, what is important is to find out whether the document was a genuine one or not. The learned District Judge himself was of the opinion that Ramkrishna (P. W. 3) was an independent and reliable witness and there is, therefore, no reason to discard his evidence. The document is genuine and had been signed by Sheikh Munna and was an acknowledgment made by him during his lifetime. I have also compared the signature on Ex. P-2. The stress on the absence of the word (which means signature) before the signature is not material as the column itself was meant for signature. The placing of the word d would be redundant; as the word dastakhat is already appended there. The signature compared fovourable with the speciman signatures. They could be compared in the enlargements given on Ex. D-17. The document does not leave it vague that Sheikh Munna was not the father of respondent No. 3. A number of documents have been filed such as Ex. P-8, P-4 being the Mark sheets of defendants 2 and 3 wherein they have been described as daughter and son of Sheikh Munna. These documents may not themselves constitute acknowledgements but they go to prove that respondents 2 and 3 were being taken as daughter and son of Sheikh Munna and, in any case, support the evidence of acknowledgment. Other oral evidence has been led to the same effect that respondents 2 and 3 were acknowledged by the deceased Sheikh munna as his daughter and son. But I need not go to such evidence as, in my opinion, the documentary evidence satisfactorily establishes the declarations made by Sheikh Munna. ( 28. Other oral evidence has been led to the same effect that respondents 2 and 3 were acknowledged by the deceased Sheikh munna as his daughter and son. But I need not go to such evidence as, in my opinion, the documentary evidence satisfactorily establishes the declarations made by Sheikh Munna. ( 28. ) THE learned District Judge has also found that some signatures were found on vouchers and cash memos between the dates 23-12-1949 and 25-12-1949 which bore the signatures of Sheikh Munna. From this, an inference was drawn that Sheikh Munna could not have been present at Bhopal during this period. Abdul Shakoor (2 D. W. 1) who was looking after the coal depot of sheikh Munna has explained this and he has stated that the receipts and the documents between that period were made by him. He has also explained how he had authority of Sheikh Munna to sign on vouchers in his absence. Not much weight could be given on this circumstance for nobody insisted on correct signatures and vouchers and it is only for the purpose of the record of the seller that it is important. They may be useful to him for sales-tax purposes but as far as the purchaser was concerned, he was satisfied if he had a voucher after he had paid the price for the goods. We cannot ignore the common experience in such cases. ( 29. ) THE evidence clearly brings out certain salient features in this case. Jaitunbi was childless. Sheikh Munna was a prosperous business man and there was a high degree of probability that he would feel the desirability of a son who would inherit his wealth. He could not get any son from Jaitunbi and, therefore, there was every probability that Sheikh Munna would contract a second marriage. Secondly, that they would marry at Bhopal was also natural as this may not have been very much to the liking of Jaitunbi. The only witness to the nikah has been examined in the case. The certified copy of the Nikahnama has been filed. These, there are acknowledgements made by Sheikh Munna during his lifetime acknowledging Rasulbi as his wife and respondent No. 3 as his son. The only witness to the nikah has been examined in the case. The certified copy of the Nikahnama has been filed. These, there are acknowledgements made by Sheikh Munna during his lifetime acknowledging Rasulbi as his wife and respondent No. 3 as his son. The acknowledgement as regards respondent No. 2 may not have been satisfactorily proved but the fact remains that having acknowledged Rasulbi as his wife, the natural inference would be that the paternity of respondent No. 2 is also proved. I have not dealt with the oral evidence in so far as Sheikh munna as deposed by these witnesses to have acknowledged Rasulbi as his wife and respondents 2 and 3 as his daughter and son. It may not be necessary to do so in view of the documentary evidence which are already discussed. In any case it is not possible to hold in this case on the evidence on record that the marriage of Sheikh Munna with Rasulbi was positively disproved. The declarations of acknowledgements by Sheikh Munna that respondent No. 3 was his son would not only establish legitimacy but also establish the marriage with rasulbi. The onus to negative the marriage was on the respondent No. 1 jaitunbi and unless such proof was coming as either made the marriage an impossibility or negatived the factum of marriage, the appellant was entitled to succeed. ( 30. ) I, therefore, set aside the Judgment and decree of the District Judge, jabalpur and restore the judgment and decree of the trial Court. The appeal is accordingly allowed. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, I order the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.