Judgment S.N.P.SINGH, J. 1. The petitioner in this writ application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution has challenged the validity of the orders as contained in Annexures 1, 7 and 15 to the application and has made a prayer for auashing those orders. Annexure 1 is the order dated the 14th of January, 1970 passed by the Deputy General Manager (respondent No. 3), Union Bank of India (hereinafter to be called "the Bank") suspending the petitioner from the service of the Bank pending a disciplinary action taken against him. Annexure 7 is the order of the Deputy General Manager of the Bank dated the 23rd of January. 1971, dismissing the petitioner from the service of the Bank with immediate effect. Annexure 15 is the order dated the 7th of May, 1971. passed by the custodian dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of his dismissal. 2. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant in the Bank at Calcutta in the year 1958 and was confirmed after six months. He was transferred to Patna in the year 1966 and was subsequently promoted as a Special Assistant. Sometime in the year 1966 he was transferred to Jamshedpur. He acted as the officiating accountant on several occasions while working at Jamshedpur. On the 14th of January, 1970. the petitioner was informed that he had been suspended bv the Deputy General Manager, Eastern Zone, of the Bank in connection with the delivery of two motor lorry receipts which were not accounted to the Bank. He was asked to show cause why a disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his misconduct. A coPv of that order has been made Annexure 1 to the application. The petitioner sent his reply on the 29th of January. 1970 (Annexure 2) in which he alleged that he had only checked and passed the receipts and had nothing to do with their accounting. On the 12th of February, 1970, another letter was sent by respondent No. 3 in which the petitioner was asked to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his misconduct in the matter of delivery of certain railway receipts and a Hundi. A coPv of that letter has been made Annexure 3 to the writ application. The petitioner sent his explanation and show cause (Annexure 4) relating to the Hundi and the bills. A coPv of that letter has been made Annexure 3 to the writ application. The petitioner sent his explanation and show cause (Annexure 4) relating to the Hundi and the bills. The authorities of the Bank evidently not being satisfied with the explanation submitted by the petitioner framed charges against him and a copy of the charge-sheet (Annexure 5) was sent to the petitioner informing him that an enquiry would be held on the 4th of August, 1970. at Jamshedpur bv Mr. K. C. Supariwala. It appears that due to certain reasons the enquiry was postponed. Ultimately the enquiry was held at Jamshedpur from the 5th of September 1970 by Mr. R. R. Kothare (respondent No. i). On the 23rd of November, 1970, the enquiry report (Annexure 6) was sent to the petitioner by Mr. Kothare stating that the charges framed against him were found to be established. The petitioner was further asked to show cause why he should not be dismissed from the service of the Bank with immediate effect. The 5th of December, 1970, was fixed as the date for the personal hearing of the petitioner at Jamshedpur. It appears that the date of hearing was postponed. Ultimately on the 12th of January, 1971. the petitioner went to Bombay and made his submission. Thereafter the order of dismissal passed bv the Deputy General Manager of the Bank dated the 23rd of January, 1971. with immediate effect was communicated to the petitioner. The petitioner then filed a writ application in this Court, which was numbered as C. W. J. C No. 240 of 1971, for quashing the order of suspension dated the 14th of January, 1970. and the order of dismissal dated the 23rd of January. 1971. The case was put up for admission on the 27th of February. 1971. and it was allowed to be withdrawn with the following observation: "Mr. S. S. Asghar Hussain learned counsel appearing for the petitioner after some argument sought permission to withdraw this application so that the petitioner may file an appeal before the appropriate authority if he is treated as Government Servant in view of the nationalisation of the bank. It will be open to the petitioner to file fresh application in this Court after the decision of the appeal if it is entertained. It will be open to the petitioner to file fresh application in this Court after the decision of the appeal if it is entertained. If it is decided that no appeal lies, in that case also it will be open to the petitioner to file fresh application". The petitioner thereafter filed an appeal before the Custodian of the Bank. The appeal was heard bv the Custodian at Bombay and it was dismissed by the impugned order (Annexure 151 3 In the charge-sheet (Annex. 5), which was frarned against the petitioner, the following specific allegations were made: "1. That during the periods he was working as a special Assistant and/or officiating as Accountant at Jamshedpur Branch of the Bank and more particularly between 30th October 1969 and 9th January 1970 Mr. S. M. Z. Naqui from time to time received from the drawees of various bills received bv the Branch from up country centres for collection, the cash proceeds of such bills aggregating in all Rs. 11,309.26 or thereabout particulars whereof are given in the Annexure A hereto but wilfully and deliberately failed to account for the said proceeds of the bills in the books of the Bank and thereby put the Bank to serious monetary loss. 2. That contrary to the established office procedures Mr. Naqui deliberately failed to have 2 bills IDB. P. 611 and IDBP 554 received from Rhand Bazar Branch of the Bank (included in the Annexure A hereto) duly entered in the relative registers of the bills department of which he was in charge. 3. That on the 17th November 1969 when a representative of Motor Cycle House the drawees of IDBC 6050 for Rs. 5,055.89 came to the Bank and handed over to Mr. Naqui a blank cheque drawn on the Branch with clear instructions to retire their aforesaid bill and other 2 bills drawn on them, namely IDBC 6002 for Rs. 347.30 and IDBC 6049 for Rs. 5055.89. Mr. Naqui delivered to the said drawees all documents including the railway receipts accompanying the said bills, duly endorsed by him, made out a cheque in his own hand for Rs. 10.490.48 but utilised only a part amount of the cheque to retire only 2 of the aforesaid bills viz. IDBC 5002 and 6049 and that the balance amount of the cheque, which was meant for retiring bill No. IDBC 6050 for Rs. 10.490.48 but utilised only a part amount of the cheque to retire only 2 of the aforesaid bills viz. IDBC 5002 and 6049 and that the balance amount of the cheque, which was meant for retiring bill No. IDBC 6050 for Rs. 5055.89 was utilised bv him to adiust or account for the proceeds of two other bills IDBC 780 for Rs. 3.031/- drawn on M/s. Vig Timber Traders and IUDBC 426 for Rs. 1,946.93 on M/s. Rajasthan Textiles which were misappropriated bv him earlier. 4. That in the month of September. 1968, Mr. S. M. Z. Naqui borrowed a sum of Rs. 6,000/- from Mr. M. M. Pandaya Accountant of one of the customers of the Bank, M/s. Chhota Nagpur Automobiles Stores, Jamshedpur, which debt he has not yet discharged and that he gave to his above named creditor a cheque for Rs. 6,000/- drawn on his S. B. Account with the Branch, when to his knowledge, he had not sufficient funds in the account to meet the cheque. 5. That in the month of January 1968, Mr. S. M. Z. Naqui borrowed a sum of Rs. 600/- from Mr. Ramchander Prasad of the Puniab National Bank which debt he has not yet discharged and that he gave to his abovenamed creditor an undated cheque for Rs. 600/- as well as a Promissory Note". On the aforesaid allegations the petitioner was charged (a) for having committed criminal breach of trust in respect of the Banks monies: (b) for manipulating and falsifying the Banks books of accounts; (c) for incurring excessive debts and (d) for doing acts prejudicial to the interest of the Bank involving the Bank in serious loss. The enauirv officer upon a consideration of the evidence and material placed before him recorded the finding that the Bank proved the charges, as mentioned in the charge-sheet, against the petitioner beyond all reasonable doubts. According to the findings of the enquiry officer, the petitioner (1) committed criminal breach of trust in respect of the Banks money bv not accounting for the same to the Bank when he had received it on behalf of the Bank, (2) committed acts of manipulation and falsification of the Banks Books of Accounts. (3) incurred excessive debts, and (41 committed acts preiudicial to the interest of the Bank involving the Bank in serious loss. (3) incurred excessive debts, and (41 committed acts preiudicial to the interest of the Bank involving the Bank in serious loss. The enauiry officer took the view that by incurring excessive debts the petitioner committed only minor misconduct. But bv acting prejudicially to the interest of the Bank he committed gross misconduct. The Deputy General Manager agreed with the findings of the enauiry officer and held that the charges framed against the petitioner were conclusively proved. He further took the view that regard being had to the nature of misconduct, the dismissal was the only proper punishment which could be imposed on the petitioner. He, therefore, by the impugned order (Annexure 7) dismissed the petitioner from the service of the Bank. In appeal the Custodian also held that the charges which were framed against the petitioner were conclusively proved. As he did not find any extenuating circumstance justifying a lesser punishment, he did not interfere with the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner bv the Deputy General Manager of the Bank. 4. It may be stated at the outset that Mr. B. C. Ghosh appearing for the petitioner did not challenge the validity of the order of suspension (Annexure 1). He challenged the order of dismissal (Annexure V) as confirmed bv Annex. 15 on the following grounds : (1) That the allegations which were made against the petitioner were unfounded as it was not his duty to receive Payment of money; (2) That the findings of the enauiry officer are vitiated because thev are based on inferences drawn from certain documents which were not produced and also on the statements of the witnesses who were not examined before him; (3) That some of the findings are based on no evidence and some are based on such materials which do not iustify the findings; and (4) That the order of dismissal has been passed in violation of Art. 311 of the Constitution and also in violation of the principles of natural justice. 5. Mr. K. D. Chatteriee appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the Writ application. He urged that no writ is maintainable at the instance of an employee of the Bank, which is a corporate body, to enforce a contract of service. According to Mr. Chatterji. 5. Mr. K. D. Chatteriee appearing for the respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the Writ application. He urged that no writ is maintainable at the instance of an employee of the Bank, which is a corporate body, to enforce a contract of service. According to Mr. Chatterji. the status of the petitioner even after the nationalisation of the Bank is not of a Government servant and as such he cannot claim protection under Articles 311 of the Constitution. 6. In view of the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Chatterji, the first and the most important auestion which falls for consideration is whether the writ application is maintainable. In order to decide this auestion it would be necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Banking Companies (Acauisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1969 hereinafter to be called "the Act"). As laid down in Section 2 (b) of the Act, " corresponding new Bank, in relation to an existing bank, means the body corporate specified against such bank in column 2 of the First Schedule". As defined in clause (d) of Section 2, " existing bank means a banking company specified in column 1 of the First Schedule, being a company the deposits of which, as shown in the return as on the last Friday of June 1969. furnished to the Reserve Bank under Section 27 of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949, were not less than rupees fifty crores". Section 3 of the Act provides as follows: "(1) On the commencement of this Act, there shall be constituted such corresponding new banks as are specified in the First Schedule. (2) The paid-up capital of every corresponding new bank constituted under sub-section (1) shall, until any provision is made in this behalf in any scheme made under Section 13, be equal to the paid-up capital of the existing bank in relation to which it is corresponding new bank. (3) The entire capital of each corresponding new bank shall stand vested in and allotted to the Central Government. (4) Every corresponding new bank shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and shall sue and be sued in its name. (5) Every corresponding new bank shall carry on and transact the business of banking as defined in clause (b) of S. 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. (4) Every corresponding new bank shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and shall sue and be sued in its name. (5) Every corresponding new bank shall carry on and transact the business of banking as defined in clause (b) of S. 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. and may engage in one or more forms of business specified in sub-section (11 or Section 6 of that Act. and shall have power to acquire and hold property, whether movable or immovable, for the purposes of its business and to dispose of the same, (6) Every corresponding new bank shall establish a reserve fund to which shall be transferred the share premiums and the balance, if. any, standing to the credit of the existing bank in relation to which it is the corresponding new bank, and such further sums, if any, as mav be transferred in accordance with the provisions of Section 17 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949". As provided under Section 10 (21 of the Act. the general superintendence and direction of the affairs and business of a corresponding new bank vest in a Custodian until any provision to the contrary is made under any scheme made under S. 13. Section 24 (1) authorises the Board of Directors of a corresponding new bank, after consultation with the Reserve Bank and with the previous sanction of the State Government, to make regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and any rule or scheme made thereunder, "to provide for all matters for which provision is expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act". As provided under sub-section (21 of Section 24. in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the power under sub-section (11. the regulations mav provide, inter alia, for the duties and conduct of officers, advisers and other employees of the corresponding new bank and the establishment and maintenance of superannuation, pension, provident or other funds for the benefit of officers or employees of the corresponding new bank or of the dependants of such officers or employees and the granting of superannuation allowances, annuities and pensions payable out of such funds. Sub-sec. (3) provides as follows: "Until any regulation is made under sub-section (1). Sub-sec. (3) provides as follows: "Until any regulation is made under sub-section (1). the articles of association of the existing bank and every regulation, rule, bye-law or order made bv the existing bank shall, if in force at the commencement of this Act, be deemed to be the regulations made under sub-section (1) and shall have effect accordingly and any reference therein to anv authority of the existing bank shall be deemed to be a reference to the corresponding authority of corresponding new bank and until any such corresponding authority is constituted under this Act, shall be deemed to refer to the Custodian". 7. It is clear from the provisions of sub-section (41 of Section 3 of the Act that every corresponding new bank is a body corporate and separate legal entity. Two questions arise for consideration, namely. (1) whether the petitioner is entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution; and (2) if not, whether a writ can issue asainst the Bank at the instance of the petitioner to enforce the contract of service. 8. The first auestion can be answered without anv difficulty. It is well settled that the employees of corporations or companies, even though they are under the control of the State or the Union of India, are not entitled to the protection of Article 3U of the Constitution. In this connection. I would refer to the two decisions of this Court in the cases of Subodh Ranjan Ghosh v. Sindri Fertilisers and Chemicals Ltd., AIR 1957 Pat 10 and Baleshwar Prasad v. Agent, State Bank of India, Gaya. AIR 1958 Pat 418 . In the first case, referred to above, an employee of the Sindri Fertilisers and Chemicals Ltd. had filed a writ application in this Court challenging the validity of the order of termination of his service. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner in that case that the petitioner was entitled to the protection of Articles 311 and 320 of the Constitution. This contention was not accepted and it was held that the company had an independent legal entity and an independent legal existence and it was not a department of the State Government or its delegate or agent. This contention was not accepted and it was held that the company had an independent legal entity and an independent legal existence and it was not a department of the State Government or its delegate or agent. It was observed; in that case that though the ownership, control and management of the company was completely vested in the President of India but the Court was not entitled to "pierce the veil of corporate entity and to examine the reality beneath", for determining the auestion. In the second case, referred to above, the petitioner was an employee of the State Bank of India and he had challenged the validity of the order of his discharge from service. It was contended in that case that the petitioner was holding a permanent civil post under the Union Government and the order of discharge had been made in violation of the provisions of Articles 311 and 320 of the Constitution of India. A Bench of this Court repelled the contention and held that the petitioner could not be said to have held a civil post under the Union of India and Articles 311 and 320 of the Constitution of India had no application. Similar view has been taken in a number of decisions of the other High Courts. A reference may be made to the cases of M. Varghese v. Union of India, AIR 1963 Cal 421 ; Prafulla Kumar v. Calcutta S. T. Corporation, AIR 1963 Cal 116 : Barada Kanta v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1963 Cal 161 : Suprasad v. State Bank of India, AIR 1962 Cal 72; Ram Babu v. Divisional Manager. L. I. C. AIR 1961 All 502 : Abdul v. Garo Hills District Council, AIR 1961 Assam 69: Tara Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Bom 101 ; Kapoor Sineh v. Union of India, AIR 1960 Madh Pra 119; Subodh Ranjan v. N. A. O. Callaghan, AIR 1956 Cal 532: Dass Mal v. Union of India, AIR 1956 Puni 42 and Ramit Ghosh v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1960 Cal 549 . 9. Mr. 9. Mr. B. C. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Chini Mazdoor Sangh v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1971 Pat 273 in support of his contention that the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution will apply in the case of the petitioner. In that case the Chini Mazdoor Sangh, Guraru, a Trade Union having its office at Guraru Mills, and the two employees of the Sugar Factory at Guraru had filed a writ application in this Court. The Sugar Factory at Guraru was the property of Gava Sugar Mills Ltd., which company went into liquidation. Eventually the factory was sold to the State of Bihar which took possession of the factory and continued employment of all the workers of the factory since 26-1-1962. The factory was thus directly under the management and control of the State of Bihar. The aues-tion which fell for consideration in that case was as to what rule or law governed the service conditions of the employees of the Guraru Factory which was owned and directly managed departmentally by the Government of Bihar. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the employees of the factory were holding posts in connection with the affairs of the State of Bihar within the meaning of Art. 309 of the Constitution and they held civil posts under the State for the purposes of Articles 310 and 311 of the Constitution. A Bench of this Court, of which I was a member held that the employees of the Guraru Sugar Mills held civil posts under the Government of Bihar and they were entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution. The facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. In that case, as I have already stated, the Guraru factory was owned and directlv managed departmentally by the Government of Bihar. It was not the case of a corporation which is a distinct legal entity from the State. In that case also it was observed that employees of corporations or companies, even though under the State control in which almost the entire shares are held by the State, are not entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution. It was not the case of a corporation which is a distinct legal entity from the State. In that case also it was observed that employees of corporations or companies, even though under the State control in which almost the entire shares are held by the State, are not entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution. In mv opinion, the decision in that case does not in any way lend support to the contention of Mr. Ghose. Mr. Ghosh has not been able to cite anv decision in which it has been held that the employees of a corporation, which is a separate legal entity are entitled to the protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution. I may refer also to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. L. Agarwal v. The General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd.. AIR 1970 SC 1150 = (1970 Lab IC 1029). In that case it was held that Hindustan Steel Ltd., which is a corporation, is not a department of the Government nor are the servants of it holders of civil posts under the State. Therefore, its employees are not entitled to the protection of Art. 311 of the Constitution. It must, therefore, be held that the petitioner being an employee of a corporate body, which is a separate legal entity, is not entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution. 10. Now I will consider the second question, namely, whether a writ can issue against the Bank at the instance of the petitioner to enforce the contract of service. Mr. K. D. Chatterii very fairly conceded the position that a writ can issue against a corporate body if certain statutory provisions have been violated. Learned counsel, however, submitted that no writ can issue against a corporate body at the instance of its employee for enforcing the contract of service. In support of this contention, learned counsel mainly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of Executive Committee of U. P. State Warehousing Corporation. Lucknow v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi. AIR 1970 SC 1244 = (1970 Lab IC 1044) and Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai, AIR 1971 SC 1828 = (1971 Lab IC 1129). In support of this contention, learned counsel mainly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of Executive Committee of U. P. State Warehousing Corporation. Lucknow v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi. AIR 1970 SC 1244 = (1970 Lab IC 1044) and Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo Rai, AIR 1971 SC 1828 = (1971 Lab IC 1129). In U. P. State Warehousing Corporation case their Lordships of the Supreme Court after reviewing a number of English decisions made the following observation: "The law relating to master and servant is clear. A contract for personal service will not be enforced by an order for specific performance nor will it be open for a servant to refuse to accept the repudiation of a contract of service by his master and say that the contract has never been terminated. The remedy of the employee is a claim for damages for wrongful dismissal or for breach of contract. * * * * But when a statutory status is given to an employee and there has been a violation of the provisions of the statute while terminating the service of such an employee, the latter will be eligible to get the relief of a declaration that the order is null and void and that he continues to be in service, as it will not then be a mere ease of a master terminating the services of a servant". In paragraph 23 of the judgment their Lordships summarised the position in law in these words : "......... the position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. But there are certain well-recognised exceptions to this rule and they are : To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding (1) A public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311. (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed bv statute". (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial Law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3) A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed bv statute". In the case of Indian Airlines Corporation it was held by their Lordships that though the dismissal of the respondent in that case bv the Corporation was wrongful in the sense of its being in breach of the terms and conditions which governed the relationship between the corporation and the respondent, the corporation had undoubtedly the power to dismiss its employees and as such the dismissal of the respondent was with Jurisdiction. As the case did not fall under any of the three exceptions, their Lordships held that the respondent was only entitled to damages and not to the declaration that his dismissal was null and void. The two decisions of the Supreme Court, referred to above, fully support the second contention which has been advanced bv Mr. Chatterji. 11 Mr. Ghose, however, referred to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis. AIR 1973 SC 855 = (1973 Lab IC 453) and contended that the view expressed in the two earlier decisions of the Supreme Court is no longer the correct view. The respondent of that case had filed a suit for a declaration that her dismissal bv the appellant Municipality was illegal and void on the ground that Rule 143 of the Sirsi Municipality Rules was violated and she was not given a reasonable opportunity of defending herself against the charge as also on the ground that the impugned resolution was passed bv the Municipality on a dav when the agenda before the Municipality did not contain any subject of dismissal of the respondent. It was contended on behalf of the Municipality that the rules and bye-laws of the Municipality were only for the guidance of the Municipality and as such the respondent could not challenge the resolution or action of the Municipality on the around of violation of rules and bve-laws. The High Court had found that the resolution of the Municipality was in violation of Rule 143 and declared it as invalid and inoperative. The High Court had found that the resolution of the Municipality was in violation of Rule 143 and declared it as invalid and inoperative. Before the Supreme Court it was contended on behalf of the Municipality that the respondent was not entitled to any declaration and if the dismissal was wrongful, the remedy of the respondent lay in damages. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not accept the contention raised on behalf of the Municipality and held that the dismissal of the respondent was rightly found by the High Court to be in violation of Rule 143 which imposed a mandatory obligation. The dismissal bv the Municipality was thus ultra vires. In this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court have referred to the decision in U. P. State Warehousing Corpn. case AIR 1970 SC 1244 = (1970 Lab IC 1044) and Indian Airlines Corpn. case. AIR 1971 SC 1828 = (1971 Lab IC 1129) but have distinguished those cases on facts. Their Lordships have nowhere said that the views taken in those two cases were not correct. The Supreme Court in this case simply reiterated the principle that when a statutory body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed bv statute, a declaration to enforce the contract of personal service will be granted. Mr. Ghose is, therefore not correct in his submission that the views expressed in U. P. State Warehousing Corporation case and Indian Airlines Corporation case are not the correct view. In the instant case it has not been argued on behalf of the petitioner that the order of dismissal has been passed in violation of any mandatory provision of a statute. The instant case, therefore, is not covered bv any of the exceptions as pointed out bv their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the U. P. State Warehousing Corporation case. The petitioner cannot, therefore, set a declaration that the order of dismissal is void and the writ application is not maintainable at the instance of the petitioner against the Bank to enforce the contract of service. 12. Although the writ application is liable to be dismissed on the ground that it is not maintainable. I will briefly consider the question whether there has been violation of the principles of natural justice. As I have already stated, definite charges were framed against the petitioner. 12. Although the writ application is liable to be dismissed on the ground that it is not maintainable. I will briefly consider the question whether there has been violation of the principles of natural justice. As I have already stated, definite charges were framed against the petitioner. The enquiry report (Annexure 6) shows that the Enquiry Officer examined the evidence and the materials placed before him in detail in respect of each charge. There is nothing to show that in the enquiry the petitioner was denied the opportunity of puttine forward his defence. The submission of Mr. Ghose that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are based on no evidence is not correct. On the contrary, the enquiry officer has aone in great detail and has considered all the relevant materials before recording his findings. The petitioner did not make anv grievance at the time of enquiry about the supply of documents. It appears, however, that after the order of dismissal was passed bv respondent No. 3, the petitioner made two applications on the 20th of March, 1971 and the 6th of April 1971. for the supply of certain documents. It has not been shown to us that those documents were relevant documents and the petitioner was in any wav prejudiced in properly placing his case before the appellate authority. Mr. Ghose made comments on the findings of the appellate authority, namely, the Custodian, and submitted that those findings are perverse and based on no evidence. The above submission is also not correct. The Custodian has in his order brieflv discussed the evidence in the light of the submission made on behalf of the petitioner. This Court cannot sit in appeal over the decision of the dismissing authority or the appellate authoritv and examine the evidence in detail, 13. Mr. Ghose referred to Annexure 8, which is the duty chart of the Special Assistants of the Bank, and submitted on the basis of Annexure 8 that it was not the duty of the petitioner to receive money. When there is a definite and clear finding of the Enquiry Officer supported on evidence that money was received bv the petitioner in respect of the bills but it was not accounted for in the books of account of the Bank the question as to what was the duty of the petitioner was altogether immaterial. When there is a definite and clear finding of the Enquiry Officer supported on evidence that money was received bv the petitioner in respect of the bills but it was not accounted for in the books of account of the Bank the question as to what was the duty of the petitioner was altogether immaterial. In my considered opinion, the petitioner has not even been able to show that the order of dismissal has been passed in violation of the principles of natural iustice. 14. In the result, this application is dismissed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs, S.K.JHA, J. 15 I agree.