JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The Petitioner was recruited into Bihar and Orissa Government service in May 1926 as a temporary Subordinate Engineer and continued in various capacities until he was placed under suspension on 1-11-1954 pending a proceeding referred to the Administrative Tribunal for disposal on allegations of misconduct. The Petitioner's superannuation became due, but his service was continued for some time obviously with a view to completing the proceeding then pending against him. Under the relevant rules the final orders in a proceeding enquired into by the Administrative Tribunal can only be passed by the Governor. As it appears, no such orders were ever passed. On 8-11-1959, the Petitioner ultimately retired. After his retirement the Chief Engineer passed an order saying that the period of suspension from 1-11-1954 until his retirement shall be treated as suspension, and after giving a notice to the Petitioner he reduced his pension by 50 percent long after the Petitioner's superannuation. The Petitioner challenges both these orders as being without jurisdiction. In the counter affidavit attempts have been made to justify both the actions. 2. The learned Government Advocate raises the question of delay and laches. There is no doubt that there has been some amount of delay on the part of the Petitioner in coming before this Court. Law has now been settled that there is no period of limitation as such prescribed for filing of a writ application though ordinarily the limitation for a civil action would be the time limit beyond which a Petitioner would not be allowed to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court. There have been several instances, however, where taking the special facts of a particular case into consideration and the explanations of the Petitioner as to why he had not approached the Court earlier the principle indicated above has been overlooked and relief has been granted. In Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and Others Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court overruling such an objection said: We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and Others Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court overruling such an objection said: We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilockchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi (1971) 2 S.C. W.R. 57 is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit it will all depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose. In the instant case after looking into the record as also the relevant papers of the disciplinary proceeding produced by the learned Government Advocate at the Petitioner's request during the hearing, we are satisfied that a case has been made out where the Petitioner's laches should not stand in the way of his getting relief. As a fact he had been making representations, one after the other highlighting the illegality of the orders passed against him and was demanding relief. The two orders which are impugned before us are clearly without jurisdiction as we shall presently show and if mind had been applied to any of the representations made by the Petitioner from time to time we are sure relief could not have been withheld. In that view of the matter we are not prepared to accept the preliminary objection on the question of laches. The preliminary objection of the learned Government Advocate is, therefore, over ruled. The Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951 make it clear that final orders in the proceedings referred to the Tribunal can only be passed by the Governor. The relevant file produced by the learned Government Advocate clearly shows that no final orders were ever passed by the Governor in the disciplinary proceeding. The Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951 make it clear that final orders in the proceedings referred to the Tribunal can only be passed by the Governor. The relevant file produced by the learned Government Advocate clearly shows that no final orders were ever passed by the Governor in the disciplinary proceeding. As already stated, the Petitioner continued under suspension for a little more than five years and the Chief Engineer ultimately passed an order saying that the period of suspension would be treated as such. Suspension is a substantive punishment under Rule 13(v) of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification Control & Appeal) Rules, 1962. These rules, however, would not apply to the proceeding in view of the fact that the impugned order was passed before these Rules came into force. Even then when an officer would be put under suspension pending' a disciplinary action and the disciplinary authority does not ultimately pass an order in the proceeding itself imposing a penalty, justification for suspension particularly continuing it for five years vanishes and the order of suspension to be accepted as such retrospectively would really work out serious prejudice. In the facts of the case we see no justification to uphold the order of suspension passed by the Chief Engineer as it is an order without any foundation. 4. Next is the question of reducing the pension of the Petitioner by 50 per cent. The Supreme Court has now clearly laid down that' pension is property and a Government servant who has put in the specified period of service becomes entitled to pension unless pension full or partial can be withheld under the rules. Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar and Ors. (1971) 2 S.C.W.R. 57 . Recently we had occasion to examine in the case of Nilakantha Misra v. State of Orissa O.J.C. No. 300 of 1972-D/20-12-1973, this point and held that the relevant rule (C.S.R. 470(b)) has no application to the pre-1936 entrants and after the Petitioner has superannuated there would be no occasion to take proceedings for reduction of the pension. The impugned order of 1963 is long after the superannuation. As already indicated, the Petitioner is a pre-1936 entrant into service and to him for the reasons indicated in the said decision the rule does not apply. The impugned order of 1963 is long after the superannuation. As already indicated, the Petitioner is a pre-1936 entrant into service and to him for the reasons indicated in the said decision the rule does not apply. Therefore, the proceeding of the Chief Engineer by which the Petitioner's pension was reduced by 50 percent is an act without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained. That order must also get quashed. 5. We accordingly allow the writ application, and set aside the order of suspension as also the order of reduction of the pension. The Petitioner shall have his costs. Hearing fee Rs. 100/- (one hundred). A writ of mandamus shall issue to the opposite parties to settle the pension of the Petitioner within four months from the date of service of the order. The Petitioner shall also be entitled to his arrear dues flowing out of the relief of quashing of the order of suspension. Payment thereof be made within the same time as indicated for finalising the pension. B.K. Ray J. 6. I agree.