( 1 ) 1. The State has filed this writ petition praying for issue of an appropriate writ, order or direction calling for the records and proceedings in pet. No. 227 1966 and Case No. 2940 of 1965 on the file of the then Mysore revenue Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, (to be hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), and quashing the order dt. 8-11-1967 passed thereon by the Tribunal. ( 2 ) THIS matter arises out of the provisions of the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Jagirs Abolition Act) under which the appointed date was 1-8-54. The necessary facts are that Respt. 1 was a Jagirdar under the Jagirs abolition Act. The jagir village held by him was a 'proprietary jagir village under the Jagirs Abolition Act. The lands in question are grazing lands where grass is naturally grown, and situated in this village. They were, on the appointed date, in actual possession of Respt. l as provided in S. 5 (1) (b) oj the Jagirs Abolition Act. Respt. l's name came to be entered as an 'occupant' under the Jagirs Abolition Act, in the record of rights Ceertain objections were raised by certain members of the public in regard to these entries, and demands were made to the concerned authorities in the Revenue Dept. for sanction of certain areas in the lands in question to people belonging to backward classes as sites for construction of houses. An enquiry under S. 37 of the Bombay Land "revenue Code (to be-hereinafter referred to as the Code) was held. All the Revenue authoiities, including the Divl. Cornmr. , Bel gaum, concerned with the enquiry, held that the lands in question vested in the Government under s. 8 of the Jagirs Abolition Act and Respt 1 was not entitled to occupancy rights and, therefore, could net be recognised as occupant. Respt 1 instituted proceedings before the Tribunal and the Tribunal decided m favour of Respt 1. This is the order that is challenged in this writ petition. ( 3 ) THE records make it clear that the following facts are found either undisputed or established. (1) the village in question is a proprietary jagir village; (2) the lands in question are grazing lands where grass grows naturally; and (3) the said lands were, on the appointed date, in actual possession of respt. ( 3 ) THE records make it clear that the following facts are found either undisputed or established. (1) the village in question is a proprietary jagir village; (2) the lands in question are grazing lands where grass grows naturally; and (3) the said lands were, on the appointed date, in actual possession of respt. 1 and Respt. 1 was securing some income from these lands by sale of the naturally grown grass etc. The questions that have arisen foir determination are: (1) whether in view of. S. 5 (1) (b) of the Jagirs Abolition Act, Respt. l is entitled to occupancy rights, or (2) whether in view of S 8 pf the Jagirs Abolition Act, , the lands vest in the Government. Section 5 (1) (b) of the Jagir Abolition Act reads as follows : " (5) (1) In a proprietary jagir village,- ****** (b) in the case of lands other than Gharkhed land, which is in the actual possession of the Jagirdar or in the possession of a person other than a peimanent holdei holding through or from the Jagirdar, such Jagirdar. . . . . shall be entitled to ail the rights and shall be liable to all the obligations in respect of such land as an occupant under the Code or any other law for the time being in force. " on reading the above provision independently of the other provisions in the Jagirs Abolition Act, it appears tnat Respondent 1 would be entitled to be recognised as an occupant, in regard to the lands in question, under the Code. " on reading the above provision independently of the other provisions in the Jagirs Abolition Act, it appears tnat Respondent 1 would be entitled to be recognised as an occupant, in regard to the lands in question, under the Code. ( 4 ) SECTION 8 of the Jagirs Abolition Act, reads as follows : " All public roads, lanes and paths, the bridges, ditches, dikes and fences, on or beside the same, the bed of the sea and of harbours, creaks below high water mark, and of rivers, streams, nalas, lakes, wells and tanks and a,ll canals and water courses, and all standing and flowing water-, all unbuilt village site lands, all waste lands and all uncultivated lands (excluding lands used for building or other non-agricultural purposes) which are situate within the limits of any jagir village, shall, except in so far as any rights of any person other than the Jagirdar may be established in or over the same and except as may otherwise be provided by any law for the time being in force, vest in and shall be deemed to be, with all rights in or over the same- or appertaining thereto, the property of the state Go,vt. and all rights held by a Jagirdar in such property shall be deemed to have been extinguished and it shall be lawful for the Collector, subject to the general or special orders of the State Govt , to dispose them of as he deems fit, subject to the rights of the public or of individuals legally subsisting. Explanation: For the purposes of this section, land shall be deemed to be uncultivated if it has not been cultivated for a continuous period of three years immediately before the appointed dale. " ( 5 ) THERE can be no doubt that the lands in question are 'uncultivated lands' mentioned in the above provision. The explanation to S. 8 has not been called into application in this case. Reading of S 8, independently of the other provisions of the Jagirs Abolition Act, makes it appear that the lands in question vest in the State Government. It is, therefore, seen that so far as the type of the lands involved in the petition is concerned, the above two provisions in the Jagirs Abolition act, Appear to overlap. Reading of S 8, independently of the other provisions of the Jagirs Abolition Act, makes it appear that the lands in question vest in the State Government. It is, therefore, seen that so far as the type of the lands involved in the petition is concerned, the above two provisions in the Jagirs Abolition act, Appear to overlap. The learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State vehemently argued that the aims and objects of the Jagirs Abolition Act should be borne in mind and the principle of harmonious construction of the provisions of a Statute should be taken into consideration while interpreting the above two pro-visions. Ho urged that according to the above two principles, the Courts should first consider as to which properties vest in the state Govel. under S. 8 of the Jagirs Abolition Act and thereafter proceed to consider whether qul of the residual properties the Jagirdar or Jagirdars under the Jagirs Abolition Act would be entitled to occupancy rights under Section 5 of the Jagirs Abolition Act. ( 6 ) SRI V. Krishna Murthy, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of respt. 1, contended that there is no non obsiante clause in S-8 of the Jagirs abolition Act and therefore, S. 5 is independent of S. 8 and, hence, what a, Jagirdar is entitled to under S. 5 cannot be regarded ap haying been taken away by S. 8. He further urged that when once a Jagirdar becomes entitled to occupancy rights under S. 5 of the Jagirs Abolition Act, prqvisions of S. 8 would not at all be called into play and even if according to s. 8 the very property can be regarded as vesting in the State Govt. it cannot, under the scheme of the Act, be held th^t such property vests in the state Govt. in spite of the provisions of S. 5 of the Jagirs Abolition Act. He placed reliance on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ambabai janhavibai v. State of Maharashtra, 67 Bom. L. R. 291 and on the decision in Mavinkurve v. Madhavasingh, AIR. 1965 SC, 1747 In the decision in Ambabai's case the provisions of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Inams Abolition Act), have been considered. In Mavinkurve's case, the provisions of the Jagirs Abolition Act have been considered. L. R. 291 and on the decision in Mavinkurve v. Madhavasingh, AIR. 1965 SC, 1747 In the decision in Ambabai's case the provisions of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Inams Abolition Act), have been considered. In Mavinkurve's case, the provisions of the Jagirs Abolition Act have been considered. ( 7 ) THERE can be no doubt that harmonious constructions of all the provisin in the Jagirs Abolition Act is called for. The aim and object of the Inams Abolition Act was to abolish personal inams in the State of Bombay. By Sec. 4 of the Inams Abolition Act, all personal inams and rights in respect of such personal inams were deemed to have been extinguished with effect from and on the appointed date, save as expressly provided by the provisions of the Act. S. 5 (l) of the inams Abolition Act made the inam village or the inam land liable to payment of land revenue. S. 5 (2) of the Inains Abolition Act made an inam" dar, in respect of the inam land in his actual possession, entitled to all the rights and liable to all obligations as an occupant, under the Code, in respect of such land. It may be mentioned here itself that uncultivated grazing lands where grass was growing naturally and in actual possession of the mamdar, would naturally be included in this provision. By S. 7 of the inams Abolitions Act, all public reads, lanes and paths, bridges, ditches, dikes, fences etc. , and all uncultivated lands (excluding lands used for building or other non-agricultural purposes) were made, to vest in the state Go|vt It is, in my opinion, appropriate to mention here that S 5 (2), (a) of the Inams Abolition Act is in no way different from S 5 (1) (b) of the Jagirs Abolition Act and Sec. 7 of the Inams Abolition Act is almost in pari materia with S. 8 of the Jagirs Abolition Act. ( 8 ) THE aim and object of the Jagirs Abolition Act was to abolish jagirs of various kinds in the merged territories and merged areas in the State of Bombay and to provide for matters consequential and incidental thereto. ( 8 ) THE aim and object of the Jagirs Abolition Act was to abolish jagirs of various kinds in the merged territories and merged areas in the State of Bombay and to provide for matters consequential and incidental thereto. By S. 3 of the; Jagirs Abolition Act, all jagirs, were deemed to have been abolished, save as expressly provided by or under the provisions of the act, on and from the appointed date. As already narrated, the Jagirs Abolition act, by S. 5 (1) (b), recognised that Jagirdars in regard to lands other than Gharkhed lands in their actual possession, were entitled to rights of an occupant under the Code. The Act, by S. 8, vested certain pieces of properties in jagir villages, in the State Government. It is, therefore, manifest that the principle governing the interpietation of the provisions of Ss. 4, 5 and 7 of the Inams Abolition Act and the provisions of Ss. 3, 5 and 8 of the Jagirs Abolition Act would be one and the same. ( 9 ) IN Rangildas v. Collector of Surat, AIR. 1957 Bom. 270, the Bombay High Court considered ss. 4, 5 and 7 of the Inams Abolition Act in regard to certain inam lands which fell within the category of 'uncultivated lands' (excluding lands used for building or other non-agricultural purposes) in S. 7 of the the Act. It was held that by S. 4 not only all personal inams but also all rights which were subsisting in respect of. such personal inams, were extinguished so that any privileges that an inamdar enjoyed in respect of an inam village or land ceased to be available to him from the appointed date;. It was also, held that the enumeration of 'lands used for building or other non-agricultural purposes' is undoubtedly in terms an exception to S. 7 and by no stretch of imagination can that be deemed to be an exception to s. 5. Their Lordships found that all that happened by reason of the exclusion of such lands from the operation of S. 7 of the Act was that such lands do not vest in the State Govt. , but they remain liable, as other inam lands and inam villages do, to assessment to land revenue. Their Lordships found that all that happened by reason of the exclusion of such lands from the operation of S. 7 of the Act was that such lands do not vest in the State Govt. , but they remain liable, as other inam lands and inam villages do, to assessment to land revenue. The said case went up to the Supreme Court and the decision of the Supreme Court is Rangildas v. Collector of Surat, AIR. 1961 SC. 291. The main contention all through was that S. 7 of the Inams Abolition Act created an exception to Ss. 4 and 5 with respect cf lands of inamdars used for building or for other non-agricultural purposes and, therefore, the appellant's inam land which was used entirely for non-agricultural purposes (namely, building) could not be assessed to land revenue under Section 5 of the, Act. The Supreme Court found that there was no warrant for holding that S. 7 was an exception to ss. 4 and 5 of the Act It was pointed out that S. 4 abolished personal inams and the rights of inamdars with respect to such inams and S. 5 made all inam villages or inam lands subject to the payment of full assessment of land revenue in accordance with the Code, and S. 7 dealt with vesting of certain parts of inam lands in the State (namely, public roads lanes and paths, all unbuilt village site lands, all waste lands and all uncultivated lands and so on), and further that an exception had been made so far as vesting was poncerned, with respect to lands used for building or other non-agricultural purposes by the inamdar. The result of this exception was summarised as follows by the Supreme Court : "the result of the exception is that such inam lands do not vest in Government and remain what they were before and are thus subject to the provisions of Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act. The appellant therefore cannot claim because of the exception contained in S. 7 that the lands excepted from vesting are not subject to Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act. The argument therefore based on S. 7 must fail. 4 and 5 of the Act. The appellant therefore cannot claim because of the exception contained in S. 7 that the lands excepted from vesting are not subject to Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act. The argument therefore based on S. 7 must fail. " ( 10 ) WHAT has been clearly held by the Supreme Court is that the lands which do not fall within the categories mentioned in S. 7 of the Inams Abolition act, will retajn their original character but will be subject to payment of land revenue under the Code as provided in Ss. 4 and 5 of the Inams abolition Act. It did not accept the contention that S. 7 was an exception to Ss. 4 and 5. It, therefore, follows, in my opinion, that Ss. 4 and 5 also cannot be regarded as exceptions to Sec. 7. In this view of the matter, the contention of Sri V. Krishna Murthey, the learned Counsel appealing for respt. 1, that because under S. 5 (1) (b) of the Jagirs Abolition Act, respondent 1 is entitled to be recognised as an occupant in regard to the lands in question, the lands cannot vest in the Gcvt. in spite of the provisions of s. 8 of the Act, has to fail. ( 11 ) IN Mavinkurve'a case, the lands concerned were forest lands. The dispute was in- regard to right to cut and remove the trees from the forest lands and application of S. 40 of the Code. It has already been mentioned that the forest lands were in a jagir village and the provisions of the Jagirs abolition Act were applicable. The High Court as well as the Supreme court held that the Jagirdars became the occupants of the forest lands and were entitled to trees standing on the forest lands. We are not concerned with the dispute relating io the right to cut and remove the trees from the said forest lands and the interpretation of S. 40 of the Code. Sri V. Krishna, murthy sought support of this decision to substantiate his contention that when a Jagirdar became entitled to occupancy rights in regard to all lands in his actual possession (except Gharkhed lands) under S. 5 (1) (b) of the Jagns Abolition Act, such lands fell out of the application of S. 8 of the Jagirs Abolition Act. Sri V. Krishna, murthy sought support of this decision to substantiate his contention that when a Jagirdar became entitled to occupancy rights in regard to all lands in his actual possession (except Gharkhed lands) under S. 5 (1) (b) of the Jagns Abolition Act, such lands fell out of the application of S. 8 of the Jagirs Abolition Act. He contended that forest lands fell within the category of uncultivated lands and, hence, this decision conclusively laid down the proposition canvassed by him. I am not impressed by this reasoning because a reading of S. 8 of the, Jagirs Abolition Act makes it abundantly clear tha,t forest lands are excepted from the application of S. 8 as there is no reference made therein to such lands. On the qther hand, separate provision in S 9 in regard to right to trees, is made Similarly, there is a separate provision in regard to such a right in the Inams Abolition Act also. It is evident that there was no dispute before the Supreme Court as to whether the Jagirdar in question was or was not entitled to occupancy lights in regard lo such forest lands. The Supreme Court has net held that the Jagiidai in question was entitled to occupancy rights in regard to, forest lands on the basis that the forest lands fell within the category of uncultivated lands. When S. 8 of the Jagirs Abolition Act did not make such forest lands vest in the Govt. , there was no obstacle in the operation of S. 5 (1) (b) of the Act, m favour of the concerned Jagirdar. ( 12 ) THEREFORE, this argument of Sri V. Krishna Murthy has to fail. In Ambabai's cased) the lands concerned were uncultivated lands wherein grass was growing naturally and the concerned inamdars were getting some income. The Bombay High Court held that S. 7 of the Inams abolition Act does not apply to lands which, on the appointed date, were in actual possession of the inamdar even, if they were uncultivated lands, and, therefore, when it was shown that the lands, cultivated or uncultivated, were in possession of the inamdar on the appointed date, the inamdar would become the occupant of such lands under S. 5 of the Act and such lands will not vest in the State Govt. under S. 7 of the Act. under S. 7 of the Act. It further held that S. 7 of the Act deals with lands and other properties, which were not in the possession of any person on the appointed date, while S. 5 of the Act makes provision for lands, which on that date were in possession of the inamdar or some other person. It cannot be gain-said that the principle laid down in this decision amply supports the contention of Sri v. Krishna Murthy. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: "there therefore, appears to be a conflict between the two provisions. It is a well-settled rule of construction, that different provisions of the Act must be read together, so as to to bring about harmony between them. This can be done by. holding that S. 7 applies to lands, which were not. ir the pojssession of any person on the appointed date, this is also suggested by the scheme of the Act. Apart from waste and uncultivated lands, the other properties mentioned in Sec. 7 are public roads, paths, lanes, rivers, canals etc. , which ordinarily are not in the possession of any particular person, but the use and benefit of which are taken by the public in general. S. 7, therefore, appears to deal with lands and other properties, which were not in the possession of any person on the appointed date, while S. 5 makes provision for lands which on that date were in pqsscssoin of the Inamdar or some other person. It has been urged by Mr Rane that S. 7 carves out an exception to what is provided in S. 5. This argument does not seem to be correct, been use S. 7 refers to many other properties such as public roads, rivers and canals to which S. 5 does not apply and which ordinarily are not in the possession of any particular person. It has been contended that the indention of the Legislature that such lands should vest in Govt. is also shown by the fact that in S. 10 it has made provision for componsation for the abolition or extinguishment of rights in uncultivated lands. It has been contended that the indention of the Legislature that such lands should vest in Govt. is also shown by the fact that in S. 10 it has made provision for componsation for the abolition or extinguishment of rights in uncultivated lands. This circumstance is not of much assistance, because in many villager there are uncultivated lands, such as lands used for grazing of village cattle, which are not in the possession of any person, but which are set apart or reserved for the use of all the villagers. The Legislature may have considered it desirable to provide for compensation for the loss of the inanidar's rights, if any, in such lands. It seems to us (hat (he question whether the inamdar loses his rights to !he lands, which were in his actual possession, but which were not cultivated should be decided by reading together Ss. 5 and 7 and so construing them as to bring about harmony between them, and if this is done, S. 7 will, in our opinion not apply to lands, which on the appointed da,le were in actual possession of inamdar* even if they wejrei uncultivated lands. " ( 13 ) THEIR Lordships of the Bombay High Court haye proceeded on the basis that apart from waste and uncultivated lands, the other properties mentioned in S. 7 are public roads, paths, lanes, rivers, canals etc , use and benefit of which is taken by the public in general and, therefore Sec. 7 appears to deal with lands and other properties which were not in the possession of any person on the appointed date. Reading of Sec. 7 of the inams Abolition Act, does not appear to warrant such an assumption. Fences, wells, canals and all unbuilt village site lands' are also mentioned in S. 7. These are properties in regard to which it cannot be said that they are ordinarily not in possession of any particular person. Reading of Sec. 7 of the inams Abolition Act, does not appear to warrant such an assumption. Fences, wells, canals and all unbuilt village site lands' are also mentioned in S. 7. These are properties in regard to which it cannot be said that they are ordinarily not in possession of any particular person. Therefore, to assume that S. 7 appeals to deal with lands and other properties which were not in possession of any person on the appointed date, would noi, in my opinion, be accurate reading of S. 7 of the Act This aspect of the matter is further clear on reading the later part of S. 7 wherein it is provided as follows : "in so far as any rights of any person other than the inamdar may be established in or over the same and except as may otherwise be provided by any law for the time being in force, vest in and shall be deemed to be with all rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto, the property of the State Govt. and all rights held by an inamdar in such property shall be deemed to have been extinguished s 10 of the Inams Abolition Act makes it further clear that any inamdar having any right or interest in any property referred to in S. 7, shall be entitled to compensation in the manner provided therein. It cannot be gain-said that an inamdar would generally be in possession of all the pieces of proprties in that inam. What is particularly stressed in S 5 (2) (a) of the mams Abolition Act is actual possession of lands. It is in the very manner that the provisions in S. 5 (i) (b), S. 8 and S. 11 rim in the Jagira abolition Act. Therefore, it is with great respect that I do not agree with this decision. ( 14 ) IT is true that the statement of objects and reasons for introducing a particular piece ol legislation cannot be used for interpreting the legislation if the words used therein are clear enough. But the statement of objects and reasons can be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances which led to the legislation in order to find out what was the mischief which the legislation aimed at. But the statement of objects and reasons can be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances which led to the legislation in order to find out what was the mischief which the legislation aimed at. In construing an enactment and determining its true scope, it is permissible to have regard to, all such factors as can legitimately be taken into account to ascertain the intention of the legislature, such as the history of the Act, the reason which led to its being passed, the mischief which had to be cured as well as the cure as also the other provisions of the Statute. I have already pointed out that the principle of harmonious construction has to be applied. In doing so, the attempt should be to avoid conflict rather than create it. ( 15 ) THE Supreme Court has in Siraj-ul-Haq Khan v. Sunm Central board of Waqf, U. P. , AIR. 1959 SC. 198 while interpreting 3. 5 (2) of the U. P. Muslims waqfs Act, laid down as follows : "it as well settled that iit construing the provisions andf a statute, courts should be slow to adopt a construction which tends to make any part of the'statute meaningless or ineffective; an attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by ihe statute. In such a, case, it is legitimate; and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provision and to ma,ke the whole of it effective and operative. " ( 16 ) IT is laid down in Neiv India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Comm. of Sales Tax, bihar, AIR. 1963 SC. 1207, that it is a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that the expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the Legislating and further that if an expression is susceptible of a narrow or technical meaning, as well as a popular meaning, the Court would be justified in assuming that the Legislature used the expression in the sense which would carry out its object and reject that which lenders the exercise of its powers invalid. It ig also held that in interpreting a, statute, the Court cannot ignore its aim and object. It ig also held that in interpreting a, statute, the Court cannot ignore its aim and object. To the very same effect is what is laid down in Gamini Krishnayya v. Guiaza Seshachalam, AIR. 1965 SC. 639. The Supreme Court has observed as follows: "it is common place that every provision of a, statute has to be given full effect and whereevei possible the Court should not place that construction upon a provision which would tend to make it redundant eir to overlap another provisiori or to limit its application in disregard of its general applicability unless, of course, that is the ony construction which could be reasonably placed upon it. Secondly, Court cannot ignore the object of the Legislature in enacting this Act which was to grant relief to the agriculturist and any beneficial measure of this kind should, as far as permissible, be interpreted in such a, way as to carry out the main object which the legislature had in view. " ( 17 ) I have already made clear as to what are the aims and objects of the inams Abolition Act and the Jagirs Abolition Act. Occupancy rights in inamdars have been recognised by S. 5 of the Inams Abolition Act. Occupancy rights in Jagirdars have been recognised by S. 5 of the Jagirs Abolition act. These rights are recognised simultaneously with the abolition of Inams and Jagirs and vesting of certain pieces oi properties in the Inams and Jagirs in the Govt. All these provisions have simultaneously come into force. But the objects and aims of abolishing inams and Jagirs have to be borne in mind in understanding and interpreting these provisions. Here again, it is to be particularly noted that in S. 7 of the Inams Abolition Act and in S-8 of the Jagirs Abolition Act, it is specifically provided that all rights held by an inamdar (under the Inams Abolition Act) and a, Jagirdar (under the Jagirs Abolition Act) in such property, shall be deemed to have been extinguished and it shall be lawful for the Collector, subject to the general or special orders of the State Govt. , to dispose them of as he deems fit, subject always to the rights of way and other rights of the public or of individuals legally subsisting. , to dispose them of as he deems fit, subject always to the rights of way and other rights of the public or of individuals legally subsisting. It is for the first time that the two acts make either the inamdar or the Jagildar entitled to occupancy rights. It is. therefore, essential to achieve the object pf abolishing the inam or jagir, to extinguish all rights of the Inamdars or the Jagirdars in such inams or jagirs and to vest pieces of properties in mams or Jagirs in Govt. so as to enable the Government to dispose of the rights in these properties as deemed fit by it. In view of such a position being available in the very scheme of the Jagirs Abolition Act, I consider that there is considerable force in the arguments put forward by the learned Advocate General. ( 18 ) I am of the view that the decision of the Supreme Court in Shivashanhkar prasad Sha v. Baikunth Nath Singh, AIR. 1969 SC. 971, amply supports the aforementioned view. Tn'the said decision the Supreme Court has considered the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act (30 of 1950 ). In that case, the property in question was an estate as defined in S. 2 (i) and the notification issued under S. 3 covered the entirety of the estates. What was urged on behalf of the appellants was that what had vested in the State was the non-bakasht lands as well as the proprietary interest in the Bakasht lands and, hence, the Bakshat lands do not have the protection of S. 4 (d); consequently it is not necessary for them to exclusively proceed under sec. 14. The Supreme Court held as follows : "reading Ss. 3, 4 and 6 together, it follows that all estates notified under S. 3 vest in the State free of all encumbrances. The quondam proprietors and ten tire-holders of those estates lose all interests in those estates. As proprietors they retain no interest in respect of them whatsoever. But in respect of the lands enumerated in S. 6 the State settled on them the rights of raiyats. The quondam proprietors and ten tire-holders of those estates lose all interests in those estates. As proprietors they retain no interest in respect of them whatsoever. But in respect of the lands enumerated in S. 6 the State settled on them the rights of raiyats. Though in fact the vesting of the estates and the deemed settlement of raiyat's rights in respect of certain classes of lands included in the estates took place simultanequsly, in law the two must be treated as different transactions; first there was a, vesting of the estates in the State absolutely and free of all encumbrannces. Then followed the deemed settlement by the Slate of raiyat's rights on the quondam proprietors. Therefore, in law it it would not be correct to say that what vested in the State are only those inerests not coming within Section 6. " ( 19 ) IT is easy to see that the contention that was repelled by the Sureme court was that what vested in the State were only those interests not falling within S. 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, and that contention is similar to the contention put forward on behalf of Respt. 1 that what vests in the State under S. 8 of the Jagirs Abolition Act is what does not come within Section 5 (2) of the Jagirs Abolition Act. In view of the foregoing reasons, I allow this writ petition with costs, and quash the order dt 8-11-1967 passed by the Tribunal in Pet. No. 227 of i960 and Case No 2940 of 1965 Advocate's fee Rs. 250. --- *** --- .