ORDER Shiv Dayal, J. By this petition under Articles 226, 227 of the Constitution, an order of allotment passed by the Authorised Officer, Jabalpur under section 39(2) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), is challenged. The first contention is that the impugned order relates to "house No. 271, Madhatal, Jabalpur", while in fact the petitioner was dispossessed from his house No. 275/1, possession of which was given to Manoharlal Gupta (respondent No. 4, the allottee). On a perusal of the record of the Authorised Officer, we found that house No. 271, Madhatal, Jabalpur, was mentioned throughout. The petitioner filed objections before the Authorised Officer in which he stated that "house No. 271, Madhatal, Jabalpur" was in a dilapidated condition and that as soon as he would get the sale proceeds of house No. 273 (another house belonging to him, which he has sold to U. S. Tiwari), he would rebuild the house and then reside in it himself. On January 19, 1974, the petitioner told us that he is the owner of the following houses: No. 272 in which U.S. Tiwari is the tenant; No. 272 /l in which Devaji Tailor is the tenant; No. 273 in respect of which the petitioner has entered into an agreement of sale with U. S. Tiwari and in the first floor of which he himself resides; - No. 274; No. 275; No. 275/1; No. 276 in which one Soni is the tenant; and No. 277. He stated before us that house No. 271 does not belong to him and he is not concerned with it, and that it was a mistake of the typist when in his objection filed before the Authorised Officer, he said that house No. 271 was in a dilapidated condition and he would rebuild it after selling his house No. 273. He stated before us that in fact he meant to say all that about house No. 275/1. He further admitted that in fact the house which has been allotted to M. L. Gupta (respondent No. 4) is house No. 275/1 and its possession has been given by the Collector to the allottee. He stated before us that in fact he meant to say all that about house No. 275/1. He further admitted that in fact the house which has been allotted to M. L. Gupta (respondent No. 4) is house No. 275/1 and its possession has been given by the Collector to the allottee. It is abundantly clear that the accommodation in respect of which proceedings were taken and allotment made and possession delivered to the allottee really bears No. 275/1, while the Authorised Officer was under the impression that its number was 271 and the petitioner also in his objection described the house as No. 271. However, inspite of the confusion or the mistake as regards the number of the house, the Authorised Officer as well as the petitioner, as also the allottee, were certain about the identity of the accommodation. We are, therefore, of the view that on that ground the proceedings are not vitiated and the first contention must be rejected. The second contention is that house No. 275/1 (which is the correct number of the accommodation in question) is exempt from the operation of section 39(2) of the Act, inasmuch as the last tenant who occupied it was Baijnath, paying monthly rent of Rs. 25. The petitioner's contention is that once an accommodation is let out to a tenant, it is the rent paid by him which determines the application of section 39(5). Learned Deputy Advocate-General contends that occupation by a tenant 7 years ago is of no consequence and cannot be taken into consideration for the purposes of section 39(5). His argument is that the section contemplates recent possession of a tenant, that is, soon before the order of allotment is made. He further argued that in such a case it is the rental value of the accommodation at the time of allottment which should be seen. Apart from all this, his last contention is that the house fell vacant when the petitioner himself having been in occupation, vacated it. We shall postpone consideration of this last contention for a while and first deal with the petitioner's contentions. To appreciate these contentions, we must state the facts which, at this stage, are not in controversy. (1) The petitioner and another purchased the house (comprising of Municipal Corporation Nos. We shall postpone consideration of this last contention for a while and first deal with the petitioner's contentions. To appreciate these contentions, we must state the facts which, at this stage, are not in controversy. (1) The petitioner and another purchased the house (comprising of Municipal Corporation Nos. 272, 272/1, 273, 274, 275, 275/1, 276 and 277) situate at Madhatal, Jabalpur, from one Hariram, Smt. Tarabai and Mulkraj, under a deed of sale dated July 18, 1966. (2) Prior to this, the accommodation in question that is the portion bearing Municipal Corporation No. 275/1 was in the occupation of one Baijnath as tenant. He was paying Rs. 25 per month as rent (and this has been ascertained on investigation by the Authorised Officer himself during the pendency of this writ petition). (3) Baijnath had vacated the accommodation before the execution of the above sale deed. In the sale deed, the recitals in clause (h) are as follows: The portion which was in occupation of Baijnath tenant is vacant and its possession has been delivered to the Purchasers (Indrapal Singhai and Tejpal Singhai) today and they have locked the same. Its Corporation No. is 275/1. (4) From the date of sale to December 29, 1973, the accommodation remained in possession of the petitioner. We shall refer to this again while dealing with the last contention of the learned Deputy Advocate General. (5) On the last mentioned date, vacant possession was given to M. L. Gupta (respondent No. 4) in pursuance of the impugned order of allotment dated December 11, 1973. From the above facts, it is clear that Baijnath was the last tenant. The accommodation fell vacant within the meaning of section 39(2) of the Act when Baijnath vacated it. That was in the year 1966 or earlier. An order of allotment could be passed at that time under section 39(2) of the Act. At this stage, we may mention a point which was faintly raised by the petitioner before us. It was contended that after the expiry of the statutory period of 15 days, no order of allotment could be made. In our opinion, that contention is misconceived. Limitation on the exercise of the power that order of allotment must be made within 15 days under section 39(2) of the Act, comes into play only when information is given by the landlord under section 39(1). In our opinion, that contention is misconceived. Limitation on the exercise of the power that order of allotment must be made within 15 days under section 39(2) of the Act, comes into play only when information is given by the landlord under section 39(1). But where such information is not given, limitation of 15 days is out of the way. Here, it is not the petitioner's case that he or his predecessor-in-title had given information to the Collector or the Authorised Officer as required by section 39(1). We now come back to the petitioner's contention that the accommodation was, by virtue of section 39(5)(a) exempt from the operation of section 39(2). That exception reads as follows: (5) Nothing in this section shall apply to-- (a) any accommodation used for residential purposes the monthly rent of which does not exceed twenty-five rupees. There can be no doubt that the sine qua non for an order under section 39(2) is that the "accommodation has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant". If, in the present case, the accommodation fell vacant for the purposes of section 39(2), when Baijnath vacated it in or about the year 1966, then undoubtedly the impugned order of allotment is ultra vires the section, as the accommodation is exempt from its operation by virtue of section 39(5)(a). When Baijnath vacated it in or about the year 1966, no duty was cast on the then landlords to give information to the Collector or the Authorised Officer under section 39(1) because "nothing in this section" applies to this accommodation, the monthly rent being Rs. 25, that is, not exceeding Rs. 25. Likewise, it was no duty of the petitioner, as purchaser, to give such information under section 39(1). If that state of affairs continued up to the date of the order of allotment and if the expression "has fallen vacant" related back to that point of time, when Baijnath vacated, the order of allotment would be bad even though passed after 7 years. When a case within any of the exceptions contained in sub-section (5) of section 39, sub-section (2) of section 39 remains completely out of the way, and then there is complete lack of power to make any allotment. This view was also taken in Tulsiram v. Rent Controlling Authority, Jabalpur 1969 MPLJ 475 : 1969 JLJ 681. When a case within any of the exceptions contained in sub-section (5) of section 39, sub-section (2) of section 39 remains completely out of the way, and then there is complete lack of power to make any allotment. This view was also taken in Tulsiram v. Rent Controlling Authority, Jabalpur 1969 MPLJ 475 : 1969 JLJ 681. Thus, if that is all, the petitioner's contention would prevail and the order of allotment would be struck down. We are not persuaded to accept the contention of the learned Advocate General that where an accommodation has been lying vacant for a large number of years, the monthly rent which was paid by the last tenant should be forgotten and ignored, and there should be fresh assessment of the monthly rental value in order to see whether it is exceeding Rs. 25 for the purposes of applying the first exception. In our opinion, the first exception applies only in respect of the accommodation which was let out to a tenant for residential purposes and the monthly rent did not exceed Rs. 25. There is no provision in this exception to determine monthly "rental value". The period which may have elapsed between the accommodation falling vacant (owing to the last tenant vacating it) and the order of allotment, is immaterial, provided the accommodation remains vacant all the while so that the order of allotment relates back to its having fallen vacant on the last tenant vacating it. As we are going to say after a little while, sub-section (2) of section 39 is not restricted in its scope to an accommodation falling vacant on being vacated by a "tenant". The section is not limited in its operation to accommodations which are let out to tenants. An accommodation which was never let out to tenant can also be subject to the control of letting as enacted in the section. Take for instance, the case of a licensee. In that case, when the accommodation has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant, an order of allotment can be made under section 39(2). We shall presently deal with this point further. This brings us to a rather new contention raised by the learned Deputy Advocate General. Take for instance, the case of a licensee. In that case, when the accommodation has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant, an order of allotment can be made under section 39(2). We shall presently deal with this point further. This brings us to a rather new contention raised by the learned Deputy Advocate General. He urges that if an accommodation is found vacant for several years and it is not in actual occupation of the landlord, it is 'vacant' within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 39, and it must be completely dissociated with the fact of its having been occupied and vacated by a tenant long ago. In such a case, the accommodation must be made available for allotment; the landlord will get his rent. Shri Dube's argument on the other hand is that sub-section (2) of section 39 is limited in its operation to those accommodations which are let out to tenants, so that an accommodation which was never let out to a tenant cannot be subjected to the control of letting under section 39(2). On giving a considered thought we are of the opinion that sub-section (2) is wide enough to cover every case where an accommodation 'has fallen vacant 'or' is likely to fall vacant'. There are no words in this section on in any other section which confine the ambit of sub-section (2) to an accommodation which was let out to a tenant. There is nothing in this section which excludes an accommodation which was not let out to a tenant. We are clearly of the view that sub-section (2) comes into play as soon as an accommodation 'falls vacant' or 'is likely to fall vacant' irrespective of the fact whether the falling vacant is due to a tenant vacating it or otherwise. The accommodation may 'fall vacant' in a variety of circumstances, vacating by a tenant is only one of them. For instance, where a lessee vacates an accommodation, or a usufructuary mortgagee vacates an accommodation, or even where the owner, being in actual occupation of the accommodation, vacates it and shifts to another one; in all these illustrations it must be said that the accommodation 'has fallen vacant'. There is nothing in the section for which it can be said that it does not apply although the accommodation has 'fallen vacant'. There is nothing in the section for which it can be said that it does not apply although the accommodation has 'fallen vacant'. If the intention of the legislature was to limit the operation of the sub-section to the case of tenants only, nothing was easier than to employ such words in the section. It was an argument that sub-section (c) of section 5 throws light on the intention of the legislature to limit sub-section (2) to the case of a tenant vacating an accommodation. We are not persuaded to accept this argument. There are 4 exceptions which are enumerated in sub-section (5). They are independent of one another. There is no nexus inter se between them. Clause (a) of sub-section (5) applies to a case where an accommodation, used for residential purposes, is vacated by a tenant as is indicated by the words "monthly rent." Clause (b) applies when an accommodation used for nonresidential purposes is vacated by a tenant. Clause (c) steps in and prevents an accommodation to be allotted under section, if it has fallen vacant in pursuance of an order passed under the Act for the purpose of occupation by the landlord, e.g. when a decree of eviction is passed by virtue of sub-section (1)(e) or (f). Thus clause (c) means that where a decree for eviction is passed and in pursuance of it the tenant is evicted and the accommodation falls vacant, but for clause (c) of sub-section (5), the object and intent of clauses (e) and (f) of section 12 would have been defeated by section 39(2). Therefore, clause (c) of section 39(5) is only harmonious with clauses (e) and (f) section 12(1). The view we take finds support in clause (b) of section-11. The section reads as follows: 41. Liability of person allotted accommodation to pay rent.-- Where an accommodation is allotted to a person under sub-section (2) of section 39 or section 40A, he shall be deemed to be a tenant of the landlord of such accommodation and shall be liable to pay therefor from the date of the vacation of the accommodation-- * * * * * * (b) where the accommodation was not previously in occupation of a tenant, such rent may be determined by the Rent Controlling Authority in accordance with the principles specified in section 7. Provided that........... Provided that........... This section creates a statutory tenancy by legal fiction between the landlord and the allottee and then provides for payment of rent by the allottee-tenant to the landlord. The mode of determination of rent is also provided in this section. Clause (a) applies to an accommodation which was in occupation of a tenant and is vacated by him. Clause (b) applies to a case where the accommodation was 'not' in occupation of a tenant and in that case rent has to be determined by the Rent Controlling Authority in accordance with the principles specified in section 7 (standard rent). The result of this discussion is that the expression "any accommodation which has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant" in section 39(2) of the Act does not limit its operation to those accommodations which were let out to tenants. It is wide and general in its application. The section comes into play in every case where an accommodation 'falls vacant' or is likely 'to fall vacant'. However, it must be remembered that "falling vacant" is not the same thing as "laying vacant". The words "has fallen vacant" or "is likely to fall vacant" are eloquent enough of a change from occupation to vacation. Power under sub-section (2) can be exercised only when the accommodation was in occupation and then it falls vacant because the person in occupation vacates it. This is the sine quo-non. This can be illustrated thus.--'A' builds a house but after its construction, does not occupy it, nor allows anyone else to occupy it either as a tenant or otherwise. It cannot be said that the accommodation has "fallen vacant", although it will be said that it is 'laying vacant'. The expression "has fallen vacant" pre-supposes that it was in the occupation of someone. The importance of this distinction has to be realized in this context at the point of time when order of allotment is to be made under section 39(2), which can be made only in the case of an accommodation "which has fallen vacant or is likely to fall vacant". It is a different matter that an accommodation which has not fallen vacant but is lying vacant may be made available in any other mode e. g. acquisition or requisition. It is a different matter that an accommodation which has not fallen vacant but is lying vacant may be made available in any other mode e. g. acquisition or requisition. To judge the present case by these tests it must be recalled that the accommodation was in the occupation of a tenant (Baijnath) who vacated it as back as in the year 1966 or earlier. Since then it has been lying vacant. The impugned order of allotment is ultra vires section 39(2) if it was made merely because the accommodation was found "laying" vacant. The order of allotment is intra vires the section because the accommodation has "fallen vacant" and it is immaterial when it fell vacant. In either case the order of allotment will have to be struck down; in the former case the order is without jurisdiction; in the latter, the case falls within the exception contained in sub-section (5) (a). When examined from yet another angle we reach the same conclusion. When Baijnath vacated the accommodation, the landlord could have stated that he needed it for his own occupation. But this was unnecessary because its monthly rent did not exceed Rs. 25 and the case was within subsection (5) (a). Therefore, the landlord could occupy it in his own right. He cannot be deprived of that right now, merely on the ground that the "rental value" has subsequently increased to Rs. 30 or Rs. 35 as now reported by the Authorised Officer. The impugned order of allotment would have been valid and good if the accommodation had been occupied by the petitioner and then he vacated it. If the petitioner had "occupied" the accommodation after he purchased it and the shifted to another house (say, to No. 273 or to his house at Panagar) and vacated this House No. 275/1, it could be said that the accommodation has in consequence, 'fallen vacant' within the meaning of section 39(2). But this is no body's case, neither in the writ petition nor in the returns filed before us. We have carefully gone through the entire record of the Authorised Officer as well. The petitioner, no doubt, ventured to say that he had been occupying the accommodation and his household effects were there, but this was denied by the respondents. But this is no body's case, neither in the writ petition nor in the returns filed before us. We have carefully gone through the entire record of the Authorised Officer as well. The petitioner, no doubt, ventured to say that he had been occupying the accommodation and his household effects were there, but this was denied by the respondents. Moreover, when actual possession was taken by breaking open the petitioner's lock and possession was delivered to the allottee (respondent No. 4), nothing was found in the house, as is recorded in the Police Roznamcha which has been placed before us for our inspection. The authorised officer had directed the police to make an inventory of such articles as might be found in the house; but no inventory was made because nothing was found there. In his writ petition also the petitioner does not say that the police had removed any article from the house when possession was given to respondent No. 4. We were not told at any stage that the petitioner made any complaint or report or gave any notice or took any other proceeding, which he would have done in the natural course if any of his articles had been removed. In any event, since it is not the respondent's case that the petitioner was in occupation and then vacated the accommodation, the order of allotment cannot be sustained on that ground. The Authorised Officer very correctly said in his order to the Police under section 39(4) that the house was "laying vacant", when the allotment order was made. Now it can be seen that the house was "lying vacant" because it had "fallen vacant", and that was from July 1966 or earlier; after that the house did not "fall vacant" although it remained "lying vacant". Therefore, in order to see whether by virtue of section 39(5)(a) the accommodation is or is not exempt from the operation of section 39(2), it is that monthly rent of the accommodation which was being paid by the last tenant, Baijnath. That rent being Rs. 25 (not exceeding Rs. 25) the case is within the exception. Learned Deputy Advocate General asked us whether an accommodation which has been lying vacant for several years should not be made available to Government servant when there is paucity of residential accommodation. This question ought to have been asked elsewhere. That rent being Rs. 25 (not exceeding Rs. 25) the case is within the exception. Learned Deputy Advocate General asked us whether an accommodation which has been lying vacant for several years should not be made available to Government servant when there is paucity of residential accommodation. This question ought to have been asked elsewhere. The Court merely interprets the law as made by the Legislature, and enforces it, but does not, in the garb of interpretation, rewrite it or make a new law. The petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute. The order of allotment being ultra vires the law, a writ of mandamus shall issue to the respondents to deliver vacant possession of the accommodation (house No. 275/1) to the petitioner. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition allowed