ORDER N.M. Golvalker, J. 1. By this petition, the petitioner has claimed issuance of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus directing his release from the Central Jail, Jabalpur, in terms and pursuance of the licence granted in his favour under section 2 of the M.P. Prisoner's Release on Probation Act, 1954 (hereinafter called the Act). 2. It is urged that his detention in jail after the grant of licence under the aforesaid Act is wrongful. It is contended that there is no power to cancel the licence before it is given effect to or implemented. In any case, it could not be revoked without giving him an opportunity to show cause against the proposed revocation in the same manner as is required to be furnished to him under section 6 of the Act. At any rate, natural justice required such notice to him. 3. Before we proceed to examine the contentions raised before us, it would be better to state the facts giving rise to this petition. The petitioner, along with one Munnilal, was convicted under section 302/34, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment; that while they were undergoing their sentence of imprisonment, Munnilal was granted a licence and accordingly he was released on probation under the Act; that the petitioner also moved for his similar release, and as his release was recommended by the Advisory Board, and as his conduct in jail was also found sufficiently worthy for his release on probation, the State Government passed orders granting him licence for his release on probation as contemplated by the Act; that the licence was sent to the Superintendent, Central Jail, Jabalpur, to enable him to proceed to give effect to it as required by the Act; and that before the licence could be given effect to and duly implemented, the State Government passed orders cancelling the licence, evidently on the report of the Local Authorities at Jabalpur, that as the earlier release of Munnilal has already deteriorated the atmosphere and adversely affected the peace in the area where he lived, the further release of the petitioner would seriously aggravate the situation which has already become explosive inasmuch as the two families, one belonging to Munnilal (released prisoner) and the petitioner and the other aggrieved by the murder committed by the two prisoners, are bound to come to clash resulting in much more serious consequences. 4. It will thus be seen that though the State Government appears to have revoked the licence in terms of the provisions of section 6 of the Act, in the circumstances, it is truly an order recalling and cancelling the licence. In our opinion, a fair reading of the provisions of section 6 of the Act would indicate that it comes into play only after the licence is duly given effect to and implemented by release of the prisoner. As otherwise till his release, there can never arise any question of breach of any conditions of the licence on his part entailing revocation of the licence, and that is the reason why provision is made for giving him a hearing before revocation on that ground so that he may be able to show that he has committed no breach of any condition requiring revocation of the licence. The Act has prescribed Form 'E' in terms of which Order of revocation has to be passed and in that Order, the prisoner released on probation has to surrender to the Jail Authorities for being re-admitted and detained therein. This re-admission in jail lends further assurance to our view that revocation as such would be after release. In this view therefore, the provisions of section 6 of the Act cannot be pressed into service, notwithstanding the fact that the respondents, in their return filed in this Court in reply to the petition, claim that the cancellation of the licence has been in exercise of powers under that section. In our view, the cancellation of the licence, as has already been pointed out, is really nothing but recall of the Order granting the licence and of formally cancelling the same. 5. Even assuming for argument's sake that it is a revocation under section 6 of the Act, the same being not on the ground that there has been any breach of conditions of the licence, there was no necessity in law to give any prior hearing to the petitioner to show cause against the proposed revocation. The respondents have filed a report received from the District Magistrate, Jabalpur, to indicate how in the circumstances detailed therein, it would be undesirable to release the prisoner (petitioner). It is thus evident that the licence has been recalled and cancelled on the basis of that report. 6. The respondents have filed a report received from the District Magistrate, Jabalpur, to indicate how in the circumstances detailed therein, it would be undesirable to release the prisoner (petitioner). It is thus evident that the licence has been recalled and cancelled on the basis of that report. 6. We may now proceed to examine the nature of the licence granted under the Act and consequences thereof. A fair reading of section 2 of the Act would indicate that Government may grant licence thereunder to the prisoner if it appears to it that the prisoner concerned would not revert to his criminal activities if he is released from jail. It may be borne in mind that this release from jail does not amount to any remission of sentence within the meaning of section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The sentence is not irrevocably wiped out by grant of licence, as is the result when it is remitted under section 401, Criminal Procedure Code entitling the prisoner to be released as of legal right, from the prison. For, as soon as Order to that effect is passed thereunder by the Government, the sentence is wiped out and thereafter it cannot be revived even by cancelling the order of remission. The remission of sentence, if granted under section 8 of the Act, is revocable as provided therein. Further, after release under the Act, the period during which he remains out of jail has to be calculated as part of the period of imprisonment which he is sentenced to suffer on conviction. He remains under supervision and his activities are watched with a view to see that, not only he abides by the conditions of his licence, but also fulfils the hopes of the Government in the matter of his keeping peace and good behaviour as a law abiding citizen. The licence is thus only a permission to the prisoner to live outside the prison and secures to him freedom, though not absolute but restricted slightly, the restrictions being only to prevent his reversion to life of a criminal. It is thus a benefit at the hands of the Government available to him not for mere asking, nor as of right but to be earned and retained on terms and conditions provided under the Act as also by the licence granted thereunder. 7. It is thus a benefit at the hands of the Government available to him not for mere asking, nor as of right but to be earned and retained on terms and conditions provided under the Act as also by the licence granted thereunder. 7. It cannot be disputed that for grant of a licence under section 2 of the Act, prisoner's antecedents and conduct in prison are not the only and ultimate criteria on the basis of which Government may form any opinion about his possible future conduct outside jail. The criteria mentioned in section 2, in our opinion, are only the preliminary requirements which the prisoner has to satisfy before his prayer for grant of licence to him under the Act is entertained. The ultimate satisfaction of the Government that the prisoner, if released, would not revert to his criminal activities, will necessarily depend further on the atmosphere or surroundings at the place where the prisoner would live after release. The Government will have to consider whether he may or may not be, even by force of circumstances, persuaded to participate in or drawn into any undesirable criminal activities defeating thereby not only the very aims and objects of the Act, but also the pious hopes which it had entertained about his future conduct. In our opinion, if the Government has reasons to believe that the prisoner would very likely revert to criminal activities, no matter that it is because of force of circumstances, it would be entitled to turn down the prayer of the prisoner for grant of licence, notwithstanding the fact that his antecedents and conduct in prison are in his favour. If this apprehension about his future conduct could be, as it must be, a good ground for refusal to grant licence, we are unable to see why it would not furnish a good ground to recall and cancel the licence before it is given effect to, if in a given case, the Government, subsequent to its decision to grant licence, becomes aware of factors having an intimate bearing thereon. The satisfaction of the Government, persuading it to grant licence, must continue to subsist till the last moment before the release of the prisoner, and if during that period before his release that satisfaction ceases to subsist, the grant can be recalled and cancelled. The satisfaction of the Government, persuading it to grant licence, must continue to subsist till the last moment before the release of the prisoner, and if during that period before his release that satisfaction ceases to subsist, the grant can be recalled and cancelled. In the power to grant licence, the power to cancel is implicit and included under section 21 of the General Clauses Act. It cannot, therefore, be urged that the Government has power to grant licence, but no power to cancel it and that it can only revoke it as provided under section 6 of the Act. Any cause for being dissatisfied with the conduct of the prisoner thereafter would, of course, be a matter to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of the Act and if dissatisfaction is due to any breach of conditions of the licence, the prisoner would certainly be apprised of the grounds thereof and called upon to explain and show cause against revocation of the licence, if proposed to be done. 8. This satisfaction either way is, on the face of it, subjective and not objective. If the Government refuses to grant licence to a prisoner, no Court is entitled to examine and weigh the reasons for refusal in an objective way inasmuch as the Act has provided for the subjective satisfaction of the Government only. It is by way of its governmental policy to encourage prisoners to equip themselves for their own rehabilitation, after they finally come out of jail, that under the Act a privilege is made available to a prisoner whereunder he is allowed to live outside jail and train himself to be able to live the life of law abiding citizen fully and truly after the period of his sentence is over and he is discharged therefrom. But this privilege, at the same time, is made dependent on his living a life of a law abiding citizen outside the jail. The Government-it cannot be disputed-has to safeguard equally the rights, interest and safety of the public in whose contact the said prisoner is likely to come every day outside jail. The Government, therefore, has to see that welfare and safety of public is not, in any manner, jeopardised by the interim freedom of the prisoner. True it is that the prisoner would be constantly guarded and watched. The Government, therefore, has to see that welfare and safety of public is not, in any manner, jeopardised by the interim freedom of the prisoner. True it is that the prisoner would be constantly guarded and watched. Even so, possibility of his freedom proving a danger to the public, cannot be kept out of mind and sight. In our opinion, a Court is the least appropriate tribunal to investigate into the pros and cons of all the circumstances which Government is to consider and weigh while examining the question whether to grant or refuse licence under the Act. To grant or not licence is purely a Governmental function and not justiciable at all. 9. The learned counsel Shri R.S. Dabir relied on the following decisions of the Supreme Court: (i) Patel Chunibhai Dajiba and others v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambeker and another AIR 1965 SC 1457 , (ii) S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and another AIR 1967 SC 1427 ; and (iii) Union of India v. M.L. Capoor and others AIR 1974 SC 87 and urged that just as in those cases exercise of powers by authorities under certain laws were examined in an objective way, in order to determine whether those powers were lawfully exercised or not, similar approach should be made when examining the powers under the Act. But in our opinion, the observations made and law laid down in those cases have no bearing on the question which falls for our decision in the instant case. AIR 1965 SC 1457 : (a) In this case, question was whether the Collector, having once dismissed the petition under section 76(A)(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, could or could not later on recall that dismissal. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that it could not be done. It was pointed out that by the earlier order dismissing the petition, the Collector had held that there were no grounds for interfering with the order of the lower Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction and having so held, his decision was final and could not be reopened. AIR 1957 SC 1427 & AIR 1974 S C 87: (b). It was pointed out that by the earlier order dismissing the petition, the Collector had held that there were no grounds for interfering with the order of the lower Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction and having so held, his decision was final and could not be reopened. AIR 1957 SC 1427 & AIR 1974 S C 87: (b). In the first case, Rules for recruitment by way of promotion of departmental personnel as also of direct recruits were in question, and as there was also quota fixed for appointment from both these sources, the same could not but be followed. The same not having been followed, their Lordships of the Supreme Court quashed the selection of the candidates for promotion. (c). In the second case, certain statutory Regulations, governing Provincial Service Personnel with regard to their selection for being included in the list of candidates to be considered for being promoted to the All India Service Cadre, were examined and construed, in order to determine whether the procedure for selection to be included in the list for the first time as also for deletion from it of any candidate's name, already in the list, later on at the time of its revision according to Rules, has to be strictly in accordance with the relevant Regulation or not. It was ruled that the relevant Regulation was mandatory and, therefore, the list complied in contravention of that Regulation was invalid. It was also held that the candidate whose name was being deleted and substituted by another, was entitled to be heard to show cause against the deletion of his name, inasmuch as it affected seriously his legal rights available to him as a servant. In all these cases relied upon, it will be seen that interests of the parties concerned amounted to their rights which stood legally recognised, protected and enforceable, and as they were found to be adversely affected by the decision of the authorities. Hence the Supreme Court stepped in to examine whether the decision was or was not in accordance with law and taken after due observance of rules of the procedure as also such rules of natural justice as were attracted. No such question or situation is involved in the instant case. No right as such of the prisoner is involved which he may enforce. No such question or situation is involved in the instant case. No right as such of the prisoner is involved which he may enforce. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the decisions relied upon cannot be pressed into service as an aid to arrive at a decision on the questions posed before us. Instead, we would properly refer to and rely on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Khemu Gawali v. Deputy Commissioner of Police 1956 SCR 506 which, in our opinion, is nearest in approach to the instant case. This decision expressly lays down that the decisions of the authorities on the questions, of the nature involved in that case, are not justiciable. Similar is the situation in the instant case. 10. It may be properly pointed out further that while conferring powers on the Government to grant licence, the Legislature has used the word 'may' in section 2 of the Act to indicate that the Government has a discretion to exercise those powers on being satisfied about existence of certain state of affairs. The word 'may' cannot be interpreted to mean 'must', inasmuch as the exercise of powers contemplated under the Act is not coupled with any 'duty' as such, to exercise that power. The word 'may' is not a word of courtesy. The considerations which would weigh with the Courts, to permit it to construe the word 'may' as 'must' are completely lacking in the Act in question. We have already pointed out that a prisoner, though he may find himself eligible according to Rule 4 of the Rules framed under the Act for grant of the licence, cannot claim the benefit under the Act as a matter of right, nor does the Act cast any duty on the Government to grant that benefit. Since refusal to grant licence does not affect any legal rights of the prisoner nor renders him liable thereby for any penalty, there is no scope for requiring any judicial or quasi-judicial approach on the part of the Government while granting, refusing or revoking the licence. Since refusal to grant licence does not affect any legal rights of the prisoner nor renders him liable thereby for any penalty, there is no scope for requiring any judicial or quasi-judicial approach on the part of the Government while granting, refusing or revoking the licence. Even its finding, that the prisoner has committed breach of any of the conditions of licence after due enquiry held as required by section 6 of the Act would not be open to challenge in a Court of law either in exercise of its ordinary civil jurisdiction or extraordinary writ jurisdiction under the Constitution. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Government could suspend the operation of the licence and not give effect to it till the prisoner is heard. He referred, by way of analogy, to the procedure where bail granted to an individual under the Criminal Procedure Code may, on being appropriately moved for its cancellation, keep the bail order in abeyance till the decision of the prayer for its cancellation, and deal with it according as the decision on that matter would be. At any rate, it was urged that on grounds of natural justice, the petitioner should have been heard even assuming that the orders of the Government were administrative. The analogy undoubtedly, in first impression, is very appealing. But when examined in the context of law governing bail, it would be clear that order granting bail or refusing bail or cancelling bail already granted, has to be a judicial order and person or persons concerned have a fair right to be heard before final order, one way or the other, is passed. We may point out that the order is not passed after holding any enquiry as such in which the petitioner could be invited to take part. This Rule of natural justice would not in our opinion, be applicable to the instant case. The Government exercising powers under the Act is entitled to exercise those powers exclusively on its own but in a fair and just manner, and as the powers are to be exercised by Government, it can be safely and properly presumed that it would not be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 12. The Government exercising powers under the Act is entitled to exercise those powers exclusively on its own but in a fair and just manner, and as the powers are to be exercised by Government, it can be safely and properly presumed that it would not be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner relying on two decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Harbhajan Singh v. Karansingh and others AIR 1966 SC 641 and Patel Narshi Thakershi and others v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji AIR 1970 SC 1273 further contended that in the absence of any power to review conferred under the Act, the Government could not recall and cancel the licence as that recalling and cancellation amounted to review of its own order granting the licence. In our opinion, the aforesaid decisions have no application to orders passed under the Act. The orders in question are not decisions of any judicial or quasi judicial nature consequent to any enquiry attracting rules of natural justice or in any manner liable to be examined, modified or set aside by any other authority higher or otherwise. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that since Government, while revoking under section 6 of the Act the licence, has to record reasons for the same, it would mean that the Government has to act, at any rate, quasi-judicially. The same, it is argued, would and should be the position even when the Government recalls and cancels the licence before it is given effect to. We do not feel disposed to accept this submission as laying down the correct legal position in the matter. Recording of the reasons is not for the purpose of communicating them to the prisoner, except when they pertain to breach of conditions of the licence on his part. They are only for purposes of making the Government records complete for future guidance and information of the authorities who may thereafter, be called upon again to consider a prayer for grant of licence afresh by the same prisoner. The very fact that exception has been made in the matter of communication of reasons for revocation on ground of breach of condition, that itself shows that reasons for revocation on other grounds have to be there merely on records of the Government for its own future guidance. The very fact that exception has been made in the matter of communication of reasons for revocation on ground of breach of condition, that itself shows that reasons for revocation on other grounds have to be there merely on records of the Government for its own future guidance. Those reasons would not also be justiciable and Courts would not be entitled to quash the revocation, if it is on grounds other than of breach of any of the conditions of licence on the part of the prisoner. 14. It may be significantly pointed out that the Act has prescribed Form 'E' in terms of which order of revocation has to be passed. There is no room whatsoever to incorporate the reasons for revocation therein. The Government, if it decides to revoke the licence on the ground that the prisoner has committed breach of any of the conditions of licence, it would certainly point out that ground to the prisoner and call upon him to show cause why the licence on that ground should not be revoked. If it does not do so, Courts would be entitled to call upon it to disclose whether the licence is revoked on that ground or not, and if the answer is in the negative, Courts will have to stay its hands and decline to grant any relief to the prisoner if he were to move the Courts in that matter. To this extent only Courts, in our opinion, can be approached. However, there may not arise such occasion inasmuch as the Government--we have reasons to believe-would strictly observe the provisions of section 6 of the Act when occasion arises. 15. Thus in the view we have taken as aforesaid, of the provisions of the Act, we are unable to hold that the cancellation of the licence granted to the prisoner is unauthorised and unsustainable rendering his continuance and detention in jail in any manner unlawful. 16. Accordingly we dismiss this petition. Petition dismissed