JUDGMENT APTEJ.- The short point which arises in this revision application, filed by the original accused Nos. 1 and 2 against the interlocutory order made by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on April'9, 1974, framing a charge against the petitioners for an offence under section 420 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code in Criminal case No. 25 /W of 1973, is whether this revision application is maintainable. 2. This case arises on a private complaint filed by respondent No. 1 R. K. Gurnani, who alleged in substance that the two accused had induced him to part with a sum of Rs. 1,35,000 on making false representations. The complaint was filed on February 19, 1973 and after issuing process against the accused, the learned Magistrate started recording of evidence preparatory to the framing of a charge on October 12, 1973. The r6cording of evidence was concluded on January 16, 1974. Thereafter, for some reason or the other, the case was adjourned from time to time without passing any order as to the framing of the charge. 3. In the meantime, on April 1, 1974, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 came into force and thereafter, as already noted above, the interlocutory order framing the charge against the accused for the aforesaid offence was made by the learned Magistrate on April 9, 1974. 4. Under the new Code, the powers of revision of this Court are to a certain extent curtailed, inasmuch as sub-section (2) of section 397 provides that the powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) of that section shall not be exercised either by this Court or by the Sessions Court in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. It is in view of this provision that the question as to the maintainability of the present revision application arises since the interlocutory order against which the present revision petition has been directed has been passed after the new Code came into force. 5. Now, section 484 of the new Code is the repealing and saving section. By sub-section (1) of that section, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 has been repealed. 5. Now, section 484 of the new Code is the repealing and saving section. By sub-section (1) of that section, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 has been repealed. Sub-section (2), however, provides: "(2) Notwithstanding such repeal,- (a) if, immediately before the date on which this Code comes into force, there is any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending, then, such appeal, application trial, inquiry or investigation shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 or'1898), as in force immediately before such commencement, (hereinafter referred to as the old Code), as if this Code had not come into force." The proviso to this clause, which perhaps is not relevant .for our purpose, is to the effect that every inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the old Code, that is to say, inquiry into cases triable by Court of Session or High Court, which in pending at the commencement of this Code, shall be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Code, that is, the new Code. In other words, excepting proceedings relating to' inquiry into cases triable by the Court of Session or the High Court, pending proceedings, such as, appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation are to be disposed of, continued, held or made according to the old Criminal Procedure Code. 6. After this revision application was filed in this Court, an objection was raised by the office that in view of the aforesaid provisions of sub-section (2) of section 397 of the new Code, this revision petition is not maintainable. The matter was then placed before a single Judge (Gandhi J.), who on April 24, 1974 issued rule for the limited purpose of the preliminary objection and ordered interim stay of the proceedings in the trial Court. 7. The matter was again placed before Gandhi J. on two occasions, as the rule was not served on the other side. Ultimately, the matter came before Shah J. on August 21, 1974. Before him, we are told, the matter was argued for about a couple of days and thereafter Shah J. thought that the matter involved a substantial question of general importance and, therefore, referred the matter to a Division Bench. 8. Thereafter, this case came up before the Division Bench consisting of Vimadalal and Gandhi JJ. Before him, we are told, the matter was argued for about a couple of days and thereafter Shah J. thought that the matter involved a substantial question of general importance and, therefore, referred the matter to a Division Bench. 8. Thereafter, this case came up before the Division Bench consisting of Vimadalal and Gandhi JJ. Mr. Gill, the learned advocate who appeared for the petitioners, argued the case before the Division Bench at some length and then prayed for leave to amend the petition so as to challenge the Constitutional added by the petitioners on October 28, 1974 and the matter has now been placed before this Division Bench for final disposal of the preliminary objection. 9. Mr. Gill for the petitioners posed three questions for our consideration, namely:. (1) On a true interpretation, construction and effect of section 484 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the proceeding out of which this revision petition arises continues to be governed by the old Code until its final disposal by the highest Court. (2) If it is found that there is any ambiguity in the language of section 484 of the new Code, it should be resolved in favour of the continuation of the old Code of Procedure to all matters which were pending at any stage starting from investigation to the final disposal of the case by the highest Court. (3) If there is no ambiguity in the language and the construction put forth above cannot be accepted, in that event section 484 should be declared to be unconstitutional and the same is, therefore, liable to be struck down as it violates the provisions of Articles 14 and 20 of the Constitution of India. 10. Taking up the first point for consideration, it is necessary to point out that notwithstanding the repeal of the old Code, the new Code in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 484 provides that if, immediately before the date on which the new Code comes into force, there is any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending, then such appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as in force immediately before such commencement, as if the new Code had not come into force. In other words, in the case of any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending at the time the new Code came into force, the new Code should as if be closed or deemed not to have come into effect at all and the proceedings referred to above should be disposed of, continued, held or made according to the provisions contained in the old Code. 11. In the present case, on April 1, 1974, when the new Code came into force, a charge was not framed but evidence was only recorded in order to find out whether there was any prima facie case for framing a charge. The question, therefore, is as to what was the stage of the present proceedings at the time the new Code came into force. In Sriramulu v. Veerasalingam1 and Narayanaswamy Naidu v. Emperor2, the Madras High Court took the view that in a warrant case, the trial commences when the accused is called upon to plead to a charge, and until a charge has been framed, there is no trial but only an inquiry. A similar view was also taken by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Hari Dass Sanyal v. Saritulla3. But a contrary view appears to have been taken by this Court in two cases, namely, Dagdu v. Punja4 and Emperor v. Ramchandra Narhar5. It has been held by this Court in these cases that in a warrant case, the trial commences when the Magistrate starts the inquiry, that is, takes his seat in Court with the accused in the dock in front of him and not when the charge is framed, that is to say, the trial commences when the Magistrate takes cognizance of the case. In view of these rulings, for the purposes of the present case, we would proceed on the basis that on the date on which the new Code came into force the present case was at the trial stage and, therefore, in view of the provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 484 of the new Code, the trial of this case was governed by the provisions of the old Code there is no dispute so far as this position is concerned. 12; Now, as already noted, it was after the coming into force of the new Code that the charge was framed in this case by passing an interlocutory order on April 9, 1974 and it is the correctness of that order that is challenged by the present revision petition. On a plain reading of section 397 (2), prima facie it does appear that this being an interlocutory order, this Court is prevented from exercising revisional powers in the present case. 13. The argument of Mr. Gill, however, is that the proceeding which was pending on the date of the coming into force of the new Code should be deemed to be pending till its final disposal by the highest Court and, therefore, the old Code would be applicable to it at all stages. In other words, what he argues is that such a pending proceeding-would be governed by the old Code even in the matter of appeal, revision as well as appeal to the Supreme Court. For this purposes he relied on several cases in which it has been held that appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding. Almost all of these cases arose out of civil proceedings with the only exception of the recent Full Bench decision in Hiralal Nansa Bhavsar v. The State6. So far as the civil proceedings are concerned, there can be no dispute that the appeal as well as even the execution proceedings are regarded as the continuation of the original suit. It is, however, extremely doubt full whether an appeal or revision in a criminal case can be regarded as the contmuation of the original proceeding of the trial in the trial Court. We, however, need not decide that question in this case, because we are here concerned not with an appeal but with an application for revision of the interlocutory order passed in the trial Court and, therefore, the narrow question for out consideration would be whether the revision application under section 397 of the new Code, which is analogus to section 435 of the old Code, can be regarded as the continuation of the proceeding in the trial Court. 14. In order to test the validity of the argument advanced by Mr. 14. In order to test the validity of the argument advanced by Mr. Gill, it would be necessary to examine the language of section 397 of the new Code which is almost analogous to section 435 of the old Code, with this difference that the provisions of the old Code conferred unlimited powers on the High Court as well as the Sessions Court to call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal Court situate within its local limits for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety 'of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such inferior Court-whether the order was final or interlocutory. In the new Code, however, in sub-section, (2) of section 397, it bas been expressly provided that the powers of revision conferred by sub· section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding, that is to say, this Court is prohibited by this provision from revising any interlocutory order passed by the trial Court during the continuance of any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding before it. It is noteworthy that neither section 397 of the new Code nor section 435 of the old Code gave any right to a party to a proceeding in the trial Court to approach the High Court for revising any order or for exercising its revisional jurisdiction in respect of any matter. In other words, these sections only conferred powers of supervision on the High Court and the Sessions Court to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded by the lower Court, and from the language used by the Legislature it is obvious that this power could be exercised suo motu and no right was conferred on any party to approach this Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 15. No doubt, a practice has developed that usually it is on an application by a party this Court has exercised its revisional jurisdiction. 15. No doubt, a practice has developed that usually it is on an application by a party this Court has exercised its revisional jurisdiction. The reason why such a practice seems to have developed is that in the very nature of things it is almost impossible for this Court or the Sessions Court to know the cases in which the lower Courts have committed any illegality or impropriety or have given any incorrect finding, unless it was brought to its notice either by any party to the proceeding or even by any third party. There are cases when this Court has taken cognizance suo mOtu on presi reports and has called for the records of the lower Courts in its revisional jurisdiction. The point which we wish to emphasise, however, is that a party to a proceeding cannot as a matter of right come to this Court for revision of any order passed by the lower Court, but it is a matter of practice that such applications are entertained by this Court as a matter of expediency. But no party has any vested right either in procedure or in practice. In this connection, it would be worthwhile to quote the following observations made by Maxwell in his "Interpretation of Statutes", 12th edition, at page 222: "The presumption against retrospective construction has no application to enactments which affect only the procedure and practice of the Courts. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure, but only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being, by or for the Court in which he sues, and if an Act of Parliament alters that mode of procedure, he can only 'proceed according to the altered mod". Alterations in the form of procedure are always retrospective, unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be.' " Therefore, in our view, since the revision is not a matter of right, the petitioners in this case cannot be heard to contend that they have a vested right which is affected by the new amendment incorporated in sub-section (2) of section 397 of the new Code. Consequently, in our judgment, the revision application cannot be regarded as a continuation of the proceeding in the trial Court. 16. Consequently, in our judgment, the revision application cannot be regarded as a continuation of the proceeding in the trial Court. 16. We are supported in taking the aforesaid view by the decision of the Supreme Court in P. K. Mitra v. State of West Bengal. In that case, Sailendra, the father of the appellant before their Lordships, was tried and convicted by a Magistrate of the first class of the offence of cheating under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer one day's imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500, and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months more. On appeal, the appellate Court confirmed the order of conviction and sentence. Being aggrieved by the judgments and orders of the Courts below, the accused moved the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 439 of the old Code. During the pendency of the revision petition, the High Court had stayed the proceedings far realisation of the fine pending the hearing .of the petition, During the pendency of the case in the High Court, the revision petitioner-accused died leaving him surviving his widow and five, children, all .of wham were minors except the appellant before their Lordships. The appellant made an application that he being one of the heirs of the deceased accused was interested in the proceedings and, therefore, prayed that he might be added as a party to the criminal revision application filed by his father so as to enable him to challenge the order of conviction and sentence aforesaid. This application, which was termed by the High Court as application far substitution, was heard and the Bench of the High Court passed its order holding that the principle of section 431 of the Code applied to a criminal revision application even when there was a composite sentence but only in so far as the sentence of fine was concerned. The application for substitution was, therefore, allowed. The High Court also ruled that the conviction could not be challenged, in a much as the sentence was a composite one of imprisonment as also fine, and that, therefore, the revisional application would survive only to limited extent whether the sentence of fine was proper or unduly severe. The application for substitution was, therefore, allowed. The High Court also ruled that the conviction could not be challenged, in a much as the sentence was a composite one of imprisonment as also fine, and that, therefore, the revisional application would survive only to limited extent whether the sentence of fine was proper or unduly severe. The High Court, therefore, refused to go into the merits of the conviction and confined itself to the question whether, in the circumstances of the case, the sentence .of fine was unduly fever. In view of the fact that the defence of the accused was that he had refunded the amount involved, the High Court reduced the sentence. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order of the High Court, the appellant, namely, the son of the original accused, moved the Supreme Court. While dealing with this application, their Lordships held as follows: "Section 431 of the Criminal Procedure Code in terms applies only to appeal and not to revision applications. In the absence of statutory provisions, in terms applying to all application in revision, as there are those in section 431 in respect of criminal appeals, the High Court has the power to pass such orders as to it may seem fit and proper, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction vested in it by section 439 of the Code. Indeed, it is a discretionary power which has to be exercised in aid of justice, Whether or not the High Court will exercise its revisional jurisdiction in a given case, must depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case, The revisional powers of the High Court vested in it by section 439 of the Code, read with section 435, do not create any right in the litigant, but only conserve the power of the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognized rules of criminal jurisprudence, and that subordinate Criminal Courts do not exceed their jurisdiction or abuse their powers vested in them by the Code." (Italics ours). 17. On behalf of the petitioners, our attention was invited to a passage from the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Benoari Lal v. Emperors. That was a case in which the proceedings were taken against the accused under the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance (2 of 1942). 17. On behalf of the petitioners, our attention was invited to a passage from the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Benoari Lal v. Emperors. That was a case in which the proceedings were taken against the accused under the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance (2 of 1942). It provided a special procedure for the trial of certain offences and section 26 of the Ordinance prohibited the interference by the High Court with either of the proceedings or of the convictions. However, the convicted persons contended that the Ordinance itself was ultra vires the law-making powers of the Governor General and prayed for a declaration to that effect and to exercise revisional jurisdiction and to set aside the convictions, or alternatively, to reduce the sentence. It is not necessary to go into the detailed discussion of the facts of that case. In the course of the discussion, the Court made the following observations (p. 291): "……..Under the ordinance a man may be brought before a Magistrate charged with an offence and it is left to the District Magistrate to say whether that man should be tried by the ordinary Courts and have the ordinary rights of appeal and revision under the Criminal Procedure Code and the High Court's powers under its Letters Patent or whether he should be tried by a Magistrate sitting as a Special Magistrate with very limited rights of appeal and no right as to revision. The man's rights as regards appeal and revision are not predetermined by law but are left to the discretion or order of the District Magistrate and, in some cases, practically to the discretion of the police." Relying on these observations, it was contended that the Court treated revision also on par with an appeal. In other words, it held that a party had a right to appeal as well as to file a revision. Ultimately, in that case, the High Court struck down the Ordinance as being ultra vires the powers of the Governor General. That decision was confirmed by the Federal Court in Emperor v. Benoari Lal9. The matter went to the Privy Council in Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma10 and the Privy Council ultimately set aside the decisions of the Courts below and held that the Ordinance in question was intra vires the powers of the issuing authority. That decision was confirmed by the Federal Court in Emperor v. Benoari Lal9. The matter went to the Privy Council in Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma10 and the Privy Council ultimately set aside the decisions of the Courts below and held that the Ordinance in question was intra vires the powers of the issuing authority. In the course of the judgment, the Privy Council did not hold that to invoke the revisional jurisdiction under section 435 read with section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was a right vested in a party. While making the aforesaid observations, the High Court of Calcutta no doubt used the word "revision" immediately after the words "right of appeal". It has nowhere held, however, that to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is a right vested in a party. 18. Mr. Gill for the petitioners contended that even though the powers vested in the High Court under section 435 read with section 439 are disctetionary, yet a duty has a right to approach the Court with a prayer to exercise those discretionary powers. He submitted that after the party so approaches the High Court, it may be that it is within the discretion of the High Court to exercise those powers or not. But this argument has also no force, inasmuch as, as we have discussed above, section 435 read with section 439 of the Code, which is analogous to section 397 of the new Code, does not confer any right on the party to make an application to invoke the. revisional jurisdiction of this Court, but it only confers powers of supervision on the High Court to correct the errors committed by the lower Courts. The errors committed by the lower Courts, while dealing with cases, may be brought to the notice of the High Court in any manner, but that would not confer any right on a party to the proceeding to approach the High Court:. 19. The errors committed by the lower Courts, while dealing with cases, may be brought to the notice of the High Court in any manner, but that would not confer any right on a party to the proceeding to approach the High Court:. 19. In this connection, it appears to us that if the Legislature had intended to confer any right on a party to approach this Court in revision, the Legislature would not have failed to use appropriate phraseology, such as, that the High Court or the Sessions Court may call for and examine the record of any proceeding either suo motu or on application of any party just as it had done in section 26 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (Act No. XXXI of 1950). That section dealt with powers of review and revision of Custodian and sub-section (I) was worded in the following terms: "(1) The Custodian, Additional Custodian or Authorised Deputy Custodian may at any time, either on his own motion or on application made to him in this behalf, call for the record of any proceeding under this Act which is pending before, or has been disposed of by, an officer subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any orders passed in the said proceeding, and may pass such order in relation thereto as he thinks fit." In our opinion. therefore, this argument too has no force. 20. Then a point was also sought to be made that a statute which takes away jurisdiction would have no retrospective effect. It was submitted, while elaborating this argument, that by sub-section (2) of section 397 of the new Code it is as though the jurisdiction of this Court to revise interlocutory orders has been taken away and, therefore, it will have no retrospective effect. But this argument also, although on the face of it appears to be plausible, has no force, inasmuch as the revision petition which has been filed before us was filed after the Code came into force and not before. Had this revision petition been filed and it was pending when the new Code came into force, perhaps the argument might have possessed some merit. 21. Had this revision petition been filed and it was pending when the new Code came into force, perhaps the argument might have possessed some merit. 21. Our conclusion, therefore, on the first point raised for our consideration is that the party having no right to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court conferred on it by the statute, it cannot be contended that since the trial was pending in the trial Court when the new Code came into force, even the revisional application filed against an interlocutory order passed in such a proceeding would be governed by the old Code in view of the provisions of section 484 of the new Code. 22. In the view which we have taken on the first point, indeed the question as to whether section 484 of the new Code is violative of the provisions of Articles 14 and 20 of the Constitution of India does not really survive for our consideration, inasmuch as this revision petition was not pending on the date on which the new Code came into force. However, we may briefly refer to the argument advanced by Mr. Gill on this point. It was submitted by Mr. Gill that under clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 484, any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation, pending immediately before the date on which the new Code came into force, has to be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the old Code and his submission is that such proceedings would be governed by the old Code in all their ramifications arising subsequently and, as we have pointed out above, he relied on the analogy' of appeal. But since we have taken the view that to invoke the revisional jurisdiction is not a right of a party but is a discretionary power vested in the Court, it cannot be said to be a conviction of the proceeding in the trial Court. Besides, Mr. Gill also wanted that the question as to whether only appeal, application, trial, inquiry and investigation, which were pending on the date the new Code came into force, would be governed by the old Code and the subsequent proceedings arising out of them would be governed by the old Code or the new Code, should be decided by us in this revision petition. But, in our· view, since we are in the present case concerned only with the revision petition filed against the interlocutory order passed after the new Code came into force, we are not called upon to decide that question, as it does not directly arise. We, therefore, keep that question open for decision whenever an occasion would arise. 23. In the result, we discharge the rule and vacate the stay. 24. Mr. Gill at this stage orally makes an application for leave to approach the Supreme Court against this judgment under Article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. We, however, reject this application. Rule discharged.