Judgement SARMA, J.:- This is a second appeal by the plaintiffs against the decree of the learned District Judge, Tripura, dated 16-1-1967 passed in Title Appeal No. 33 of 1964 whereby he dismissed the plaintiffs suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of a plot of land measuring 5 kanis, as described in the schedule to the plaint, hereafter called the suit land. 2. The plaintiffs case was that the defendant Shri Harendra Kumar Das entered into a contract with late Amulya Kumar Majumder - husband of plaintiff No. 1 and father of the other plaintiffs, on 18-4-1960 A. D. to sell the suit land for Rs. 15,900/- by executing a registered deed of agreement (Ext. P-1) on receipt of Rs. 1,000/- as advance with the stipulation that he would execute the sale deed on receipt of the balance of the consideration money on or before the 30th day of Chaitra, 1367 B. S. After this agreement Amulya Kumar Majumder died in the month of Sravan. During his lifetime Amulya Kumar Majumder himself and after his death the plaintff No. 1 requested the defendant to execute the sale deed. on receipt of the balance of the consideration money but the defendant did not pay any heed. The plaintiffs averred that they were and they are still willing to perform their part of the contract. As the defendant avoided execution of the sale deed in spite of repeated requests the plaintiffs filed the suit for a decree for specific performance of the contract and in the alternative for refund of the advance money, against the defendant. 3. The defendant contested the suit denying that he had entered into any contract for sale of the suit land as alleged by the plaintiffs. His case was that late Amulya Kumar Majumder carried on money lending business and he (the defdt.) used to take loan from Amulya Kumar Majumder, occasionally. On 18-4-1960, he stated, he took a loan of Rs. 1,000/-from him. As Amulya Kumar Majumder was then serving in the office of the Sub-Registrar it was difficult for him to take a licence for such money lending business and so instead of taking a bond for the amount he got a bainapatra (Exhibit P-1) executed by him (the defendant) as was done on some previous occasion. 1,000/-from him. As Amulya Kumar Majumder was then serving in the office of the Sub-Registrar it was difficult for him to take a licence for such money lending business and so instead of taking a bond for the amount he got a bainapatra (Exhibit P-1) executed by him (the defendant) as was done on some previous occasion. Though it was executed as a bainapatra it was actually taken as a security for the loan. The defendant further alleged that he paid Rs. 662-8 annas i. e.. Rs. 600/- towards the principal and Rs. 62-8 annas as interest on 9-6-60 A. D. and executed a promissory note for the balance of Rs. 400. Thereafter he cleared the balance as well to the plaintiff No. 1 and got back the promissory note from her. Under the circumstances the defendant denied his liability to execute any sale deed or to refund any advance money said to have been paid to him. The suit was also resisted on some other grounds with which we are not concerned in this appeal. 4. The plaintiffs examined 4 witnesses including the scribe and one attesting witness of the bainapatra Ext. P-1, in support of their case. The defendant also examined 4 witnesses to prove that he had taken a loan of Rs. 1,000/- from late Amulya Kumar Majumder and that he paid Rs. 662-8 annas to said Amulya Kumar Majumder on 18-4-1960 and executed a promissory note Ext. D-1 for the balance of Rs. 400/- and subsequently paid this balance as well to plaintiff No. 1 and got back the promissory note. He also proved a similar registered bainapatra Ext. D-5 executed by him in favour of Amulya Kumar Majumder on 27-8-1959 under similar circumstances in respect of the same land which he subsequently got back from Amulya Kumar Majumder, after clearing the loan. 5. On a consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties the learned Munsiff who tried the suit rejected the defence case and he decreed the suit. The learned Munsiff held, inter alia, that in view of the registered deed of agreement the defendant was debarred under Section 92 of the Evidence Act to take any such plea, as he did in the case. The learned Munsiff held, inter alia, that in view of the registered deed of agreement the defendant was debarred under Section 92 of the Evidence Act to take any such plea, as he did in the case. In the first appeal filed by the plaintiffs, the learned District Judge reversed the findings of the trial Court and accepted the defendants case holding, inter alia, that the bar under Section 92 of the Evidence Act would not apply to the deed of agreement Ext. P-1, as such an agreement for sale of land is not required by law to be registered. 6. The first contention of Mr. A. K. Shyam Choudhury, the learned counsel for the appellants before us was that the learned District Judge committed an error in law in holding that the bar under Section 92 of the Evidence Act is not applicable to the document Ext. P-1. According to him, on the face of this registered instrument, the respondent was debarred from adducing any evidence to contradict or vary the terms as contained in the document, under the said section. 7. The view taken by the learned District Judge that the bar under Section 92 of the Evidence Act is not applicable to a registered instrument relating to an agreement which is not required by law to be registered, is not well founded. The provision of Sections 91 and 92 are very clear. Under Section 91, when a transaction has been reduced to the form of a document, either by consent or agreement of the parties or by requirement of law, the written instrument must be regarded as the appropriate and only evidence of the terms of their agreement and no other evidence of the transaction can be substituted for that so long as the writing exists and is within the power of the party. Under Section 92, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a written contract. When the parties have voluntarily and deliberately set down in writing the terms of a transaction it is presumed between themselves and their privies that they intended the document to contain a full and final statement of their intentions, and the parties or their representatives in interest are therefore, precluded under Section 92 from giving any extrinsic evidence to contradict or vary its terms. All the terms and conditions being included in the written instrument the matter becomes conclusive. The language of Section 92 does not warrant any conclusion that in regard to an agreement which is not required by law to be registered, the bar for any extrinsic evidence as laid down in Section 92 of the Evidence Act is not applicable. The rule contained in that section is applicable to the terms of all contracts, grants or other disposition of property as enumerated in Section 91, if reduced into writing, whether or not such contract or grant is compulsorily required to be reduced into writing and registered. But this section does not preclude a party from showing that the writing was not really the contract between the parties, but was only a fictitious or colourable device to cloak something else. All contracts must be made "animo contrabandi" and parol evidence is admissible to show that there was no animus, that a contract as embodied in a document was never intended to be acted upon but was made for some collateral purpose. This is now a settled law. In Tyagaraja v. Vedathanni, AIR 1936 PC 70, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held:- "Section 92 only excludes oral evidence to vary the terms of the written contract and has no reference to the question whether the parties had agreed to contract on the terms set-forth in the document. So also Section 91 only excludes oral evidence as to the terms of a written contract. Oral evidence is admissible, therefore, to show that the document executed by a person was never intended to operate as an agreement, but was brought into existence solely for the purpose of creating the evidence about some other matter. ** ** ** ** ** ** Even if there were no provisos to Sections 91 and 92 there is nothing in either section to exclude oral evidence in such a case to show that there was no agreement between the parties, and therefore, no contract." In Asaram v. Ludheshwar, AIR 1938 Nag 335 (FB) it was similarly held:- "All that Section 92, Evidence Act excludes is oral evidence to contradict, vary, add to or to subtract from the terms of the contract which has been reduced into writing. It does not preclude a party from showing that the writing was not really the contract between the parties but was only a fictitious or colourable device which cloaks something else. Benami transactions afford a common illustration of this rule. In any case it is always permissible to look to the surrounding circumstances to see in what manner the language of the document was related to existing fact." The same view was again expressed in Arumoorthi v. S. E. Committee, AIR 1962 Mad 360 where it was held:- "There is material difference between an attempt to show that the terms of a contract were different from those recorded in a deed, and an attempt to show that the contract as mentioned in the deed was not real contract between the parties but it was something different. It is the former that is hit by Section 91 of the Evidence Act but the latter is not so hit. Thus where the contention of the plaintiff is that the actual contract itself was different and that for certain reasons it was made to appear in the document that it was a rectification deed. S. 91 does not preclude the plaintiff from proving that the real contract was different from what is found in the deed." 8. The case of the respondent in the instant case is exactly of that nature. According to him there was actually no such contract between the parties and the document Ext. P-1 was actually not intended to be acted upon but was executed only as a security for some loan taken by him. In view of the authorities mentioned above we are of the opinion that the defendant was not debarred under Section 91 or Section 92 of the Evidence Act to take such a plea and to adduce evidence in support of the same. The first contention of Mr. Shyam Choudhury thus stands rejected. 9. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that even if the respondent was not legally debarred from taking such a plea, the finding of the learned District Judge that the document Ext. P-1 was executed by the respondent only as a security for loan taken by him, which he has since repaid, is against the weight of evidence and not maintainable. 10. In view of an earlier document of this nature (Ext. P-1 was executed by the respondent only as a security for loan taken by him, which he has since repaid, is against the weight of evidence and not maintainable. 10. In view of an earlier document of this nature (Ext. D-5) which was executed only 9 months before the execution of Ext. P-1 relating to the same land stipulating a much higher price, but never to be acted upon, and also in view of the evidence of the D. Ws. that the respondent paid Rs. 662-8 annas to late Amulya Kumar Majumder and executed a promisory note Ext. D-1 for the balance of Rs. 400/- without receiving any money about two months after execution of Ext. P-1, the learned District Judge accepted the defendants case and came to the above finding. By no standard the finding of the learned District Judge can be said to be perverse or baseless to warrant any interference in the second appeal. This Court has got no jurisdiction to reappraise the evidence in a second appeal. We, therefore, reject the second contention of the appellants as well. 11. In the result, the decree of the learned District Judge appealed against is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case we, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs in all the three Courts. R. S. BINDRA, J.:- I agree. Appeal dismissed.