JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal filed by the wife, and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 13th March 1972 passed by the District Judge, Ratlam, in C. S. No. 11-A of 1968, granting judicial separation on the ground of cruelty under section 10 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, (hereinafter called the Act) ( 2. ) THE petitioner husband filed an application before the District Judge, ratlam, under section 10 (1) of the Act, for a decree for judicial separation on the ground that his wife, the appellant, had treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his mind that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live with her. The petitioner averred that his marriage with the appellant was solemnized on 15th June 1963, that soon after the marriage the appellant, neglecting her domestic duties, even failed to cook food for him whereby he had to go without food for attending his office; that the appellant had a very irritable temper and a foul tongue and used to break her bangles; that all that behaviour caused great mental agony to the petitioner, but he preferred to suffer the same with a view not to break up the matrimonial home. The petitioner further alleged that in January 1964, when his mother was seriously ill due to burns, the appellant behaved in a revolting manner, not only during the illness of the petitioners mother but even after her death, thus subjecting him to humiliation and shame in the eyes of the society. The petitioner also alleged that the appellants obstinacy in leaving for parental home for delivery, without undergoing necessary religious ceremonies, was the cause, according to the petitioner, of the death of his infant son within ten days of his birth, and that this fact caused severe anguish to the petitioner; that he had, therefore, refused to receive her back in the matrimonial home, but as a result of an undertaking given by her in an agreement dated 4th December 1956 executed by her, and as a result of persuasion by elders, he made another attempt of set up the matrimonial home, but it was of no avail as the appellant did not mend her ways and even attempted to set fire to her clothes to alaram the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, prayed for grant of a decree for judicial separation on the ground that the appellant by all her aforesaid acts of cruelty, caused a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful and injurious for him to live with the appellant. ( 3. ) THE appellant, in her reply, denied all the allegations made against her. She stated that the petitioner was infatuated by some other woman and hence he was disliking her. She admitted execution of the undertaking, but urged that it was really meant to satisfy the vagaries of the petitioner. She alleged that it was the petitioner who was behaving in an inhuman manner towards her. She further contended that there were absolutely no grounds for granting a decree for judicial separation, and that the application filed by the petitioner in that behalf be rejected with costs. ( 4. ) ON these pleadings, the following issues were framed by the trial Court-" (1) Whether the respondent has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with her ? (2) Relief?" ( 5. ) IN support of his case, the petitioner examined himself and eight witnesses. He also produced two letters and the agreement alleged to have been written by the appellant. The appellant also examined herself and six witnesses. After a careful consideration of the entire evidence on record, the learned District Judge found that on the first issue the petitioner husband had made out a case of cruelty. In this view, of the matter, the trial Court granted a decree for judicial separation. Aggrieved by this decree, the appellant has come up in appeal. ( 6. ) IN this appeal, Shri Patel, learned counsel for the appellant, has strenuously urged that the trial Court had erred in holding that the petitioner had succeeded in proving the various acts of cruelty alleged to have been committed by the appellant. Aggrieved by this decree, the appellant has come up in appeal. ( 6. ) IN this appeal, Shri Patel, learned counsel for the appellant, has strenuously urged that the trial Court had erred in holding that the petitioner had succeeded in proving the various acts of cruelty alleged to have been committed by the appellant. He contended that the petitioner and his witnesses have exaggerated minor incidents which are the ordinary wear and tear of married life and so viewed, it was urged, all those incidents could not be considered to be so grave and weighty as to justify a finding as required by section 10 (1) (b) of the Act, that the appellant had treated the petitioner with such cruely as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the appellant. ( 7. ) NOW, it is well established that to constitute cruelty so as to justify grant of a decree for judicial separation each case has to be Judged on its own facts and circumstances, having regard to the conduct of the parties, their previous relations with each other, their status in life, the particular acts complained of and the causes that precipitated. The test and approach of cruelty it in such cases is succinctly stated in Rayden on Divorce (11th edition), at page 1104, as follows:- "it has been said that to test cruelty by assessing whether it is cruelty in the ordinary sense of that term, is a dangerous test. It is submitted that the proper approach still is: was the conduct of such a grave and weightily nature as to make cohabitation virtually impossible. The conduct complained of must be serious. It must be much higher than the ordinary wear and tear of married life. It is the effect of conduct rather than its nature which is of paramount importance in assessing a charge of cruelty. To obtain a matrimonial order on the ground of cruelty it must be proved that one partner in the marriage however, mindless of the consequences, has behaved in a way which the other spouse could not in the circumstances be called upon to endure, and that that misconduct had caused injury to health or a reasonable apprehension of such injury. To obtain a matrimonial order on the ground of cruelty it must be proved that one partner in the marriage however, mindless of the consequences, has behaved in a way which the other spouse could not in the circumstances be called upon to endure, and that that misconduct had caused injury to health or a reasonable apprehension of such injury. There are two sides to be considered in a case of cruelty; from the complainants side, ought this complainant to be called on to endure the conduct; from the defendants side, was this conduct excusable ? the Court deals with the husband and the wife before it not with hypothetical parties. Assuming that injury or apprehended injury to health is found, the Court has then to decide whether the sum total of the reprehensible conduct was cruel. That depends on whether the cumulative conduct was sufficiently serious to say that, from a reasonable persons point of view after a consideration of any excuse which this respondent might have in the circumstances, the conduct is such that the complainant ought to be called upon to endure it. " In Jamieson v. Jamieson ( (1952) 1 ALL E R 875.) Lord Reid observed (at page 886) as follows:- "but there can hardly be a more grave matrimonial offence than to set out on a course of conduct with the deliberate intention of wounding and humiliating the other spouse and making his or her life a burden and then to continue in that course of conduct in the knowledge that it is seriously affecting his or her mental and physical health. Such conduct may consist of a number of acts each of which is serious in itself, but it may well be even more effective if it consists of a long continued series of minor acts no one of which could be regarded as serious if taken in isolation once it is established that physical violence is not a necessary ingredient of cruelty and I think that has long been recognised by the law of Scotland-then I can see no justification in principle for requiring that the deliberate acts of the defender must be of certain character and I know of no authority which requires me to make any such distinction " ( 8. ) IT is also well settled that in assessing the conduct of the spouse of the petitioner, the question, of intention of the spouse is not relevant. As observed by Lord Reid in Gollind v. Collins ( (1963) 2 ALL E R 966.) "if the conduct complained of and its consequences are so bad that the petitioner must have a remedy, then it does not matter what was the State of the respondents mind". It has also to be borne in mind that in matrimonial cases, we are not concerned with the reasonable man, as we are in cases of negligence. We are dealing with this man and this woman. As observed by Lord Reid in the aforesaid judgment, in cruelty cases one can hardly ever even start with a presumption that the parties are reasonable people, because it is hard to imagine any cruelty case ever arising if both the spouses think and behave as reasonable people. The learned Law lord has further observed as follows:-"for a long time it was thought that, at least in theory, intention or mental state of some kind was a necessary ingredient in negligence. But life would be impossible in modern condition unless on the highway and in the market place we were entitled to rely on the other man behaving like a reasonable man. So we now apply a purely objective standard. The other man may have been doing his best, and we may not realise that his best is not good enough, but if he causes damage by falling short of the ordinary standard he must pay. In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing with objective standards, and it is not a matrimonial offence to fall below the standard of the reasonable man (or the reasonable woman.) We are dealing with this man and this woman. " (P. 972.) ( 9. ) JUDGED by the aforesaid tests, it is to be seen as to whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for. Now what are the acts attributed to his wife and complained of by the petitioner, which can be held to have been proved from the evidence on record. The petitioner, P. W. 5, Ramchandra, stated that soon after the marriage, the appellant often exhibited her ill-temper, neglected her domestic duties, and on occasions the petitioner had to leave his home for attending office without taking any food. The petitioner, P. W. 5, Ramchandra, stated that soon after the marriage, the appellant often exhibited her ill-temper, neglected her domestic duties, and on occasions the petitioner had to leave his home for attending office without taking any food. He is supported by P. W. 2 dhapubai, a neighbour. P. W. 3 Sushilabai, the landlady and P. W. 7 Laxmidevi, who was staying with the petitioner and had brought him up as her ward. Using insulting and abusive language, breaking bangles which symbolize the matrimonial union, striking head against the wall, and frequently throwing away of articles, are other acts spoken of by the petitioner, duly supported by P. W. 1 gopibai, P. W. 2 Dhapubai, P. W. 3 Sushilabai and P. W. 7 Laxmidevi. The appellant is also alleged by these witnesses to have exhibited contempt for her mother-in-law. On behalf of the petitioner, it was suggested that the appellants conduct was the main cause of her mother-in-law Gangabais death, inasmuch as Gangabai had become disgusted with life. Even ignoring this allegation as it was not particularly averred in the pleadings, the facts which are pleaded, namely, that the appellant failed to attend her mother-in-law during her last illness and that after Gangabais death, she showed great contempt for those who had come to pay condolence visits, are well established from the testimony of the aforesaid witnesses. All the conduct was bound to wound the feelings of the petitioner. In the letters, Ex. P/1 and P/2, and the agreement Ex. P/3 the appellant has admitted her faults. It was, however, urged that they were written only with a view to pacify the erring husband. This suggestion of the appellant is, however, not borne out by the evidence on record. Evidence was led on her behalf to indicate that certain statements in the draft agreement were objected to by her, and were accordingly deleted. However, neither any such draft is produced nor any question to that effect has been asked to the petitioner and to P. W. 6 Purushottam, who was the scribe of that document. The petitioner has also proved by the testimony of P. W. 8 Sunderbai, a maid-servant, and P. W. 9 Dr. However, neither any such draft is produced nor any question to that effect has been asked to the petitioner and to P. W. 6 Purushottam, who was the scribe of that document. The petitioner has also proved by the testimony of P. W. 8 Sunderbai, a maid-servant, and P. W. 9 Dr. Bhupendranath that attempt was made by the appellant to set fire to her clothes, a fact which was bound to cause alarm to the petitioner, P. W. 4 Acharya, a relation of the petitioner and a retired Additional district Judge, has stated that the treatment the petitioner received at the hands of his wife made the petitioner, who was a simple straightforward person, morose and miserable. The appellant had chosen to accuse the petitioner, in her pleadings, of infidelity towards her. But in her statement before the Court, she has not owned that allegation. No question to that effect was asked in the cross-examination of the petitioner. We have thus no hesitation in holding that the finding of the trial Judge that the petitioner has proved the acts complained of by him in his petition, is well justified from the evidence on record. We have very carefully gone through the evidence, and we see no reason to take a contrary view. The petitioner belongs to a middle class Brahmin family. In view of his status in life and his nature and character as revealed by the evidence on record, the treatment which he received at his wifes hand was bound to cause a reasonable apprehension in his mind that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live with the appellant. ( 10. ) SHRI Patel, learned counsel for the appellant, relied on a decision of this Court in Narayan Prasad v. Prabhadevi ( AIR 1964 MP 28 =1963 JLJ 718. ). But in that case, this Court found as a fact that the life of the spouses became unhappy because of the petty domestic quarrels between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law. In the instance case, however, the circumstances are entirely different from those found proved in Narayan Prasad v. Prabhadevi (supra ). Here, the husband, a simple straightforward person, soon after the marriage, is faced with a spouse, who by her nagging, persistent insults and revolting behaviour has made, according to the petitioner, his life intolerable for him. In the instance case, however, the circumstances are entirely different from those found proved in Narayan Prasad v. Prabhadevi (supra ). Here, the husband, a simple straightforward person, soon after the marriage, is faced with a spouse, who by her nagging, persistent insults and revolting behaviour has made, according to the petitioner, his life intolerable for him. The appellant, by setting fire to the clothes on her person, further aggravated the situation, and her conduct was no guarantee that there would be no repetition of such incidents in future. In the circumstances, the finding of the trial Court that the petitioner has proved that it would be harmful and injurious for him to live with the appellant in future, is justified. It needs no interference. ( 11. ) NO other point was urged before us. ( 12. ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion, the judgment and decree of the trial Court are confirmed. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 100 (One Hundred), if certified. Appeal dismissed.