JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The village where the land in dispute is situate, was brought under consolidation operations. Respondent No. 4 was recorded as a co-tenure holder along with the petitioner's mother, in proceedings under Section 8 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stopped at that time. The petitioner's mother did not file any objection either at the stage of Section 12 or Section 20 challenging the correctness of the entry in favour of the respondent No. 4. Accordingly a new Khatauni under Section 27 was prepared wherein the said respondent was shown as a co-tenure holder along with the petitioner's mother. Subsequently, the relevant notification under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was issued. Therefore, the petitioner's mother instituted a suit under Section 229-B for a declaration that she was the exclusive tenure holder of the land in dispute and the name of respondent No. 4 was wrongly recorded. One of the pleas raised in defence by respondent No. 4 was that the suit was barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of holdings Act. This plea found favour with the trial court and the suit was dismissed. The order passed by the trial court was upheld on appeal by the Additional Commissioner. Before the Additional Commissioner it was urged on behalf of the petitioner's mother that the father of respondent No. 4 was her Mukhtar-e-am, and the name of respondent No. 4 was got added fraudulently. The Additional Commissioner repelled this contention and held: - "On the question of fraud I find that in para 4 of her plaint the plaintiff had not alleged that fraud has been committed by the Mukhtar-e-am. She had also not said that fraud was played on her during consolidation operations. It was open to her to state before the consolidation courts that the Mukhtar-e-am had practised fraud on her. She had several opportunities to say so before the consolidation authorities which she failed to do." 2. Her appeal having been dismissed by the Additional Commissioner the petitioner's mother filed a second appeal before the Board of Revenue. It was open to her to state before the consolidation courts that the Mukhtar-e-am had practised fraud on her. She had several opportunities to say so before the consolidation authorities which she failed to do." 2. Her appeal having been dismissed by the Additional Commissioner the petitioner's mother filed a second appeal before the Board of Revenue. As appears from paragraph 4 of the Board's order only one point was urged; viz., that the suit was not barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act inasmuch as the village was notified under Section 4 of the Old Act on 13th March, 1955 and the Revenue Court was competent to entertain the suit. The Board of Revenue did not agree with this submission and dismissed the second appeal. Aggrieved by the order passed by the revenue courts the petitioner has instituted the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. It was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the finding of the Board of Revenue that the fact of the notification under Section 4 having been issued on March 13,1955 was not relevant is manifestly erroneous in law. I am, however, unable to agree with this submission. The suit giving rise to the second appeal which was up for consideration before the Board of Revenue had been instituted in 1964 i.e., long after the notification under Section 4 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act had been issued in 1955. Not only that, even after the proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act had become final and the village had been denotified under Section 52. At the time when the suit was instituted in 1964, there was already a final adjudication made by the consolidation authorities in respect of the title of the parties over the land in dispute. As such, the same question could not be raked up again. It was urged that the petitioner's mother not having filed any objection in the title proceedings, it cannot be said that there was any decision given in favour of respondent No. 4 on account of which the bar of Section 49 could be applied. Even this argument has no substance, in view of the Division Bench decision of this Court in Rakesh Kumar v. Board of Revenue, etc., 1972 A.L.J. 769. Even this argument has no substance, in view of the Division Bench decision of this Court in Rakesh Kumar v. Board of Revenue, etc., 1972 A.L.J. 769. where it was held that Section 49 of the Act bars the adjudication of rights through a suit irrespective of the question as to whether the plaintiff or the defendant raises the question of title, and that the rights determined in consolidation proceedings either after contest, or without contest, are final. It was further held that Section 49 is a bar to the plea which raises the question of acceptance of which will mean the setting aside and cancellation or ignorance of the entries made in consolidation proceedings. 4. It was then urged for the petitioner that the name of respondent No. 4 having been added in consolidation proceedings as a result of fraud, the bar of Section 49 could not be applied, inasmuch as fraud would vitiate even a most solemn act. In regard to this point, suffice it to say that it does not appear to have pressed before Board of Revenue; there is no mention in regard to this point in the order of Board of Revenue. In Debi Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1960 A.L.J. 427. relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Tika Ram and Sons v. Its Workmen, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 198 it was held that if a judgment is silent about a certain point, it would be legitimate to infer that it had not been urged before the court. If a certain objection, which should have been raised at an earlier stage, had not been raised, it should not be allowed to be raised in a writ petition in the extra ordinary powers of the High Court. Since the order of the Board of Revenue is silent on the question of fraud, it can, in view of the aforesaid decision be presumed that this point was not pressed before the Board of Revenue. If the petitioner's ease was to the contrary it was; incumbent on him to have stated in the writ petition specifically, that even though the point was pressed, the Board I of Revenue did not care to go into the question. This not having been done, I am, afraid, it, is now too late for the petitioner to be permitted to raise this question in the writ petition.