JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - This is an appeal by the Plaintiffs against a reversing judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Cut tack in a suit for declaration of title, confirmation of possession, and, in the alternative, for recovery of possession. Nidhi and Kina were two brothers being sons of one Panu Das. Kina's sons were Hari and Gouranga, As Nidhi had no son, he had adopted Hari, Plaintiff No. 1 Pravakar is Hari's son. Gouranga died in the years 1929 leaving behind his widow Kanchan, but, no issues. Kina died in the year 1940. During the life time of Nidhi and Kina they had, separated from each other. The property in dispute in this litigation was admittedly self acquired property of Kina. 2. On 25-11-1954, Kanchan executed the Kabala Ext. A, in respect of the disputed property in favour of Respondent Subal Padhan. It was recited in the sale deed that the sale was,necessary to procure, funds to discharge certain debts which Kina had incurred and also for her own maintenance. Shortly before the execution of Ext. A and at a time when Kanchan was still alive, Appellant No. 1 Pravakar alleging that he has become,entitled to the disputed property executed two sale deeds in respect of portions thereof (Exts. 1/a and 2/a) in favour of Appellants 2 and 3. As these two Appellants created disturbance in possession of the Respondent, there was, a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, between the Respondent on one side and Appellants 2 and 3 on the other. That proceeding terminated in favour of Appellants 2 and 3. The Respondent Subal there upon instituted Title Suit No. 320 of 1959 against all the three Appellants for declaration of his title to the disputed property on the ground that he had purchased the property from' the limited owner Kanchan who executed the sale deed for legal necessity. That trial Court found inter alia that there was legal necessity for Kanchan to execute the sale deed Ex. A, and consequently Subal acquired a valid title to the disputed property. He, therefore, held that Exts. 1/a and is executed by Appellant No. 1 in favour of Appellants 3 and 2 respectively, were invalid and inoperative. He accordingly passed a decree in favour of Plaintiff Subal Padhan (Respondent in this case). A, and consequently Subal acquired a valid title to the disputed property. He, therefore, held that Exts. 1/a and is executed by Appellant No. 1 in favour of Appellants 3 and 2 respectively, were invalid and inoperative. He accordingly passed a decree in favour of Plaintiff Subal Padhan (Respondent in this case). On appeal (T.A. 10/107 of 1964) the appellate Court held inter alia that Appellant No. 1 being not a party to the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, he was not a necessary party to the suit and therefore dismissed the suit as against the present Appellant No. 1 In these circumstances, he did not consider necessary to discuss the evidence regarding the existence or otherwise of any legal necessity for Kanchan to execute the sale deed Ext. A. That appeal was disposed of on 5-7-1965 and shortly thereafter the suit giving rise to this appeal was field. 3. The substantial defence put up on behalf of Defendant is that there was legal necessity for Kanchan to execute the sale deed Ext. A and consequently that document is valid and the Respondent acquired a valid title to the disputed property. The trial Court arrived at the finding that there was no legal necessity for Kanchan to sell the disputed property to the Defendant under Ext. A. He further found that although by the time Exts. 1/a and 1/b were executed by Appellant No. 1 in favour of Appellants 2 & 3, Appellant No. 1 had not acquired a fun title to the disputed property, because by then the limited' owner Kanchan was still alive, Plaintiff-Appellant No. 1 acquired, full title to the property after the death of Kanchan in 1955 and therefore by operation of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, Plaintiffs 2 and 3 must be deemed to have acquired title to the property. He, therefore decreed the suit in favour of the Plaintiffs. The Respondent Subal appealed. The appellate Court came to hold that the Defendant-Respondent on making bona fide enquiries was satisfied about the existence of legal necessity for Kanchan to execute the sale deed Ext., A and that consequently he acquired a valid title under that Kabala. He also found that Kina had left some loans which although by the time Ext. The appellate Court came to hold that the Defendant-Respondent on making bona fide enquiries was satisfied about the existence of legal necessity for Kanchan to execute the sale deed Ext., A and that consequently he acquired a valid title under that Kabala. He also found that Kina had left some loans which although by the time Ext. A was executed were barred by time still Kanchan was bound to repay the same under the doctrine of pious obligation and that consequently the sale effected under Ext. A is valid. In this view, he reversed the decision of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal. 4. It is the common case of the parties that unless it is established that the sale deed Ext. A was executed by Kanchan for legal necessity, Respondent Subal would not acquire a valid title to the disputed property. Kanchan died in the year 1955 and it is not disputes that thereafter Appellant No. 1 Pravakar would succeed to all the properties left by Kanchan as the sole reversioner. No serious attempt had been made on behalf of the Respondent to establish that besides repaying the loans said to have been incurred by Kina, Kanchan required money for her maintenance. 5. Mr. Sinha's contention is' that the finding of the first appellate Court that legal necessity has been established is perverse and the evidence on record is so unsatisfactory that no such finding can be arrived at on such evidence. He has taken me through the evidence of d.ws. 1, 2 and 3. who speak about Kina's loan but neither of them appears to have had any personal knowledge about it. Admittedly they had hot seen the Respondent (d.w. 3) making the enquiries. Neither regarding the existence of the loan nor regarding the alleged enquiries made by the Respondent the evidence of d.ws. 1 and 2 is helpful. On such an important issue, the lower appellate Court should not have disturbed the finding recorded by the trial Court without there being sufficient and satisfactory evidence on record. 6. Assuming for a moment that Kina did incur a loan and it had not been discharged by the time Ex. A was executed, it is conceded by the Respondent that recovery of the said debt had been barred by the time Ex. A was executed. 6. Assuming for a moment that Kina did incur a loan and it had not been discharged by the time Ex. A was executed, it is conceded by the Respondent that recovery of the said debt had been barred by the time Ex. A was executed. The sole question therefore for consideration in this appeal is whether discharge by Kanchan of a time barred debt incurred by her father-in-law Kina, would amount to legal necessity. Mr. B.H. Mohanty, learned Counsel for the Respondent on whom undoubtedly the onus lay to prove legal necessity contends that although the recovery of the loan was barred, still having regard to the fact that Kina was Kanchan's fathler-in-1aw and it is from Kina that she inherited the disputed property as limited owner, it was her pious obligation to discharge Kina's debt. It is further urged that Gouranga had he been alive by the time Ex. A was executed, would have had a pious obligation to discharge his father Kina's debt and that therefore that obligation which would have rested on Gouranga, equally lay on his widow Kanchan. 7. Two propositions are well established. Under the doctrine of pious obligation, a son is bound to discharge his father's debt although the recovery of debt is barred by limitation. Secondly it is the pious obligation of a widow to discharge her husband's debt although it is barred by limitation. If to discharge this obligation, the widow has secured funds by alienating the property, the alienation would be upheld as one having been made for legal necessity. But the question is whether this doctrine can be extended to cover a case of daughter-in-law discharging a time barred debt incurred by her father-in-law. No authority has been cited on the Respondent's side in support of this proposition. 8. Mr. Mohanty for the Respondent has referred to a decision of Allahabad High Court in Ram Adhar Misir Vs. Jagnoo Misir and Others . Although this is a case where the Court held that an alienation made by a widow to procure funds to discharge the debts incurred by her father-in-law is a legal necessity, there is nothing in the decision to show that it was a time barred debt. Jagnoo Misir and Others . Although this is a case where the Court held that an alienation made by a widow to procure funds to discharge the debts incurred by her father-in-law is a legal necessity, there is nothing in the decision to show that it was a time barred debt. If it is not time barred, it is an act of prudence on the part of the widow to discharge the debt which in default could be recovered by sale of the properties. The doctrine of pious obligation did not come up for consideration in the Allahabad case. 9. It appears to me that there is no scope to extend the doctrine of pious obligation to the time barred debt incurred by a father-in-law. It therefore follows that the Respondent has failed to establish that' there was legal necessity for the execution of Ext. A. 10. In the result, I would allow this appeal, set aside the judgment passed by the learned Subordinate Judge and restore that of the Munsif. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs in this Court. Leave prayed for is granted. Final Result : Allowed