JUDGMENT S. K. DESAI J.- The petitioner in this special civil application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India was opponent No. 1 in Arbitration Case No. ABN IV. 83 of 1970, which was a dispute under section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, before the District Deputy Registrar of Co· operative Societies, Bombay. In the said dispute raised by respondent No. I to this special civil application (hereinafter referred to as the licensor), the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the licensee) had contended that the dispute between him and the licensor did not touch the business of the Jhulelal Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., who is respondent No.2 to this special civil application, that he was a tenant of the licensor, and that the Court of Small Causes at Bombay alone had the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between him and the licensor. The preliminary point as to whether the dispute fell within the requirements of section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Cooperative Societies Act), was decided by the Officer on Special Duty, who is respondent No.3 before us, by his order dated September 7, 1970, holding that the dispute was one which fell within section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act ; and accordingly he fixed the further hearing of the matter before himself. Being aggrieved by the said decision of respondent No.3, the licensee, has preferred this special civil application, in which rule was issued and interim stay of further proceedings granted on December 16, 1970. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, certain facts are required to be stated. 2. Respondent No.2 before us is a co-operative housing society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, and the licensor is a member of the said co-operative housing society, having been allotted Flat No.2 in a building on Plot No. 500, 16th Road, Khar, Bombay 52. A leave and licence agreement was made in respect of the said flat between the licensor and the licensee; a copy of the said agreement is annexed as exh. 'A' to this special civil application. A leave and licence agreement was made in respect of the said flat between the licensor and the licensee; a copy of the said agreement is annexed as exh. 'A' to this special civil application. In the said agreement the licensor is described as the owner of Flat No.2, and a licence is purportedly granted to the licesee in respect of the said flat initially for a period of eleven months, with an option to the licensee to renew the agreement for two further periods of eleven months each on the terms and conditions mentioned in the said agreement, of which one was to pay compensation of Rs. 350 per month to the licensor, the compensation for each month being payable on the 7th day of the said month. Under the said agreement, the licensee was required to deposit with the "licensor the sum of Rs. 1,050 which represents an amount equivalent to three months' compensation under the said agreement. Again, the agreement recites that on the expiry of the initial period of eleven months or such further periods (under the powers given to the licensee for extension), the licensee has to hand over peaceful possession of the premises in good and proper condition to the licensor. We are not concerned with the other terms of the said agreement. According to the licensor, on the expiry of the initial period of eleven months, which was on March 31, 1969, the agreement was not renewed by the licensee. According to him, further, the licensee had also committed several breaches of the terms of the said agreement and also failed and neglected to pay as from December 1, 1968 the compensation due and payable by him to the licensor under the said agreement. Accordingly in June 1970 a dispute was sought to be raised before the District Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bombay; in which the licensor sought recovery of vacant possession of the said flat as also an order directing the licensee to pay to the licensor a sum of Rs. 6,300 being the arrears of compensation and further compensation at the agreed rate of Rs. 6,300 being the arrears of compensation and further compensation at the agreed rate of Rs. 350 per month from June 1, 1970 upto the time when vacant possession of the said flat was recovered by the licensor, The Co-operative Housing Society was made opponent No.2 to the said petition, and in the application (a copy whereof is annexed as part of exh. 'B'·- collectively-to this special civil application). It was alleged that the proceedings were necessitated by a letter of the said Jhulelal Co-operative Housing Society, dated March 2, 1970, which called upon the licensor to have the said flat vacated immediately by his licensee and occupy the same himself, failing which a threat was given to cancel the membership and allotment of the licensor in respect of the said flat. The licensee filed his statement of preliminary objections which have been indicated earlier in this judgment, and this statement of objections is also part of exh. B (collectives) to this special civil application. As stated as earlier, the Officer on Special Duty who is respondent No.3 before us decided the preliminary objection in favour of the licensor. 3. Mr. Kripalani on behalf of the petitioner to this special civil application has submitted that the matter is concluded in favour of the petitioner by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court given in Kalawati Ramchand v, Shankarrao1. According to Mr. Kripalani, the Division Bench in Kalawati's case postulated three requirements for holding a similar dispute as one falling within the ambit of section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act; and, according to him, in the case before us, none of those three requirements was satisfied. Accordingly it was submitted that the impugned order of respondent No.3 was liable to be quashed and set aside and it ought to be held that the dispute between the licensor and the licensee as sought to be raised in the statement of dispute was not one within the purview of section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act. It becomes necessary, therefore, to see what the said Division Bench decision has decided. 4. [His Lordship, after discussing various propositions laid down in Kalawati's case, proceeded.] Mr. Nain on behalf of respondent No. 1 submitted that the Division Bench consisting of Deshpande and Dudhia JJ. It becomes necessary, therefore, to see what the said Division Bench decision has decided. 4. [His Lordship, after discussing various propositions laid down in Kalawati's case, proceeded.] Mr. Nain on behalf of respondent No. 1 submitted that the Division Bench consisting of Deshpande and Dudhia JJ. in their judgment given in Kalawati's case has, in the first instance wrongly approached the Supreme Court decision in D. M. Co-op. Bank v. Dalichand2. It was 5ubmitted that mere observations of the Supreme Court have been characterised and elevated as ratio decidendi. In the first place, the observations in D. M. Co-op. Bank's case, which have been cited by the Division Bench, cannot be considered to be casual observations in any way, and it is well settled that even the obiter of the Suprt'me Court is entitled to the highest respect. However, We must not be taken to hold that in our view what the Division Bench in Kalawati's case characterised as the ratio (of the Supreme Court decision) is not the real ratio but merely the obiter of the Supreme Court. Similarly, it was 'contended that the Division Bench in Kalawati's case was totally in error in understanding the Supreme Court decision in Sabharwal v. Guna Amrit3 and holding on the authority of Sabharwal's case that Satpalsing v. Santdas4 was no longer good law. Our attention was drawn to the very passages in the judgment of Babharwal's cast to which attention of the Division Bench in Kalawati's case was drawn. Mr. Nain's submission was that if he was able to persuade us that the approach or the conclusions of the Division Bench in Kalawati's case were improper, illogical or erroneous, its conclusion regarding Satpalsingh's case was also suspect, and he invited us, if we agreed with his' line of reasoning, to refer this matter to a Full Bench in view of the conflict (as he claimed) between various judgments of Division Benches of this Court. 5. Now, it is well-settled that normally one Division Bench of a High Court cannot take a view contrary to the decision given by another Bench of that Court. In V. R. G. & G. O. M. C. Co. v. State of A.P.5 it has been observed that the later Bench before whom a question arises is bound by the earlier decision. Mr. In V. R. G. & G. O. M. C. Co. v. State of A.P.5 it has been observed that the later Bench before whom a question arises is bound by the earlier decision. Mr. Kripalani on behalf of the petitioner also drew our attention in this connection to Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., Ltd.6, where the following propositions have been set out in the headnote: "The Court of Appeal is bound to follow its own decisions and those of Courts of coordinate jurisdiction, and the 'full' Court is in the same position in this respect as a division of the Court consisting of three members. The only exceptions to this rule are (1) The Court is entitled and bound to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow; (2) the Court is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which, though not expressly overruled, cannot, in its opinion, stand with a decision of the House of Lords; (3) the Court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if it is satisfied that the decision was given per incuriam, e.g., where a statute or a rule having statutory effect which would have affected the decision was not brought to the attention of the earlier Court." Now, in the matter before us it is not possible to say that the decision of the Division Bench in Kalawati's case can be considered as given per incuriam. This was very fairly conceded by Mr. Nain. A decision cannot be treated as given per incuriam merely because the Court had not the benefit of a full and exhaustive argument, and as a general rule the only cases in which decisions should be held to be given as per incuriam are those given in ignorance of some inconsistent statutory provision or binding authorities. In the matter before us it cannot be said that the Division Bench in Kalawati's case has given its decision either in ignorance of the' provisions of any statute or binding authorities i.e. the judgments of the Supreme Court. It was, however, contended that the Division Bench in Kalawati's case had wrongly understood Sabharwal's case and thereby erroneously came to the conclusion that the decision in Satpalsing's case, which was binding, being a decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, was no longer good law. It was, however, contended that the Division Bench in Kalawati's case had wrongly understood Sabharwal's case and thereby erroneously came to the conclusion that the decision in Satpalsing's case, which was binding, being a decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, was no longer good law. But then, it is equally well settled that an interpretation (and equally a misinterpretation) of a binding decision of the Supreme Court will itself be binding subsequently on co-ordinate Courts and must be got corrected by a higher Court, and no co-ordinate Court on that ground may refuse to follow an earlier decision, opining that in its view the laid earlier decision had wrongly understood or improperly applied a decision of a higher Court. The proposition of law as to be found in Halsbury's Laws of England, (third edn..) vol. 22, at p. 800 reads as follows: “Even if a decision of the Court of Appeal bas misinterpreted a previous decision of the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal must follow its previous decision and leave the House of Lords to rectify the mistake." 6. In our opinion, the same salutory principle must be adopted and applied here. Both as to the true ratio of D. M. Co-op. Bank's case and the effect of Sabharwal's case we must follow and apply what has been laid down by a co-ordinate Court viz. the Division Bench which decided Kalawati's case, UMI any aggrieved party must be referred to the Supreme Court for the correction of errors (or what it contends are the errors) in the earlier decision. 7. As stated earlier, a reference must now be made to the decision of Deshpande and Vaidya JJ. in Smt. Chandra Chetanram Shivdasani v. Chander Shekhar Sheth7. That was also a dispute between a licensor and a licensee. 7. As stated earlier, a reference must now be made to the decision of Deshpande and Vaidya JJ. in Smt. Chandra Chetanram Shivdasani v. Chander Shekhar Sheth7. That was also a dispute between a licensor and a licensee. Going through the judgment it is found that before the agreement of leave and licence was executed, the licensor and the licensee had jointly applied to the co-operative housing society to admit the proposed licensee as a nominal member of the said society, and in that application the licensee had stated, inter alia, that on the termination of the agreement of leave and licence he would peacefully leave the said flat; he had also agreed and undertaken to vacate the said flat in favour of the licensor or the managing committee of the society, as directed by the society, in the case of the licensor receiving any notice from the society for any breach of the terms and bye-laws of the society. It also appears that certain shares were applied for to be issued in the joint names of the licensor and the licensee by the society. Thereafter the period of licence, as extended from time to time, expired and as on the expiry of such period the licensee failed to vacate the premises, the licensor served a notice on the licensee. The co-operative housing society also objected to the occupation of the flat by the licensee beyond the period of the licence. Finally, a perusal of the facts as stated in the said judgment indicates that both the licensor and the co· operative housing society had preferred a claim before the District Deputy Registrar, praying that the dispute should be admitted and referred under section 91 to 96 of the Co-operative Societies Act and that tl1e licensee should be ordered to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the flat and pay arrears of compensation and mesne profits. It is in these special circumstances that the Division Bench in Kalawati's case observed that the conclusion of the earlier Division Bench (of Deshpande and Vaidya JJ.) that this was a dispute within the purview of section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act was fully justified. It is in these special circumstances that the Division Bench in Kalawati's case observed that the conclusion of the earlier Division Bench (of Deshpande and Vaidya JJ.) that this was a dispute within the purview of section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act was fully justified. In the earlier case, initially at the stage of granting leave and licence specific approval of the co-operative homing society had been sought, and in the entire transaction and even in the ultimate filing or the dispute the co-operative housing society appears to have been effectively interested. The facts as set out in the earlier judgment clearly ran within the categories indicated in Kalawali’s case and satisfy all the tests laid down by the later Bench which are required to be satisfied before it could be properly said that a dispute arises which is one within the meaning of section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act. 8. There is, however, a still later judgment of a Division Bench of this Court, to which reference may now be made; that is in Ramesh Himmatlal v. Harsukh8 decided by Bhole and Mukhi JJ. on October 31, 1973. That Letters Patent appeal was from a decision of Vaidya J. (which is reported in Harsukh Jadhavji v. Ramesh9), and the said Division Bench expressed agreement with the view of Vaidya J. as well as a similar view expressed by Vimadalal J. in a matter arising on the Original Side in M/s. Kaluram Puranmal v. S. S. Malpathak10. Now, in Ramesh Himmatlal v. Harsukh the Division Bench was considering the validity of a warrant of attachment of Flat No.9 in a building belonging to Paresh Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Pursuant to this attachment, a sale ultimately took place and the flat, was sold to one Bhupendra Shah in the amount of Rs. 24,000. Before the sale was confirmed, however, the judgment-debtor took out proceedings for setting aside the warrant of attachment and proclamation of the sale on the ground that the flat being a flat in a co-operative housing society was not liable to be attached and sold. Vaidya J., sitting singly, and the Division Bench considered the scheme of the Co-operative Societies Act and the rules and bye-laws applicable to co-operative housing societies thereunder, and came to the conclusion that the order of attachment and the subsequent auction sale were clearly illegal and could never be sustained. 9. Vaidya J., sitting singly, and the Division Bench considered the scheme of the Co-operative Societies Act and the rules and bye-laws applicable to co-operative housing societies thereunder, and came to the conclusion that the order of attachment and the subsequent auction sale were clearly illegal and could never be sustained. 9. Now, is it possible to read the observations in the judgment of the Division Bench in Ramesh Himmatlal v. Harsukh as being in conflict with the earlier decision of the Division Bench in Kalawati's case? In the first place, it has to be realised that the Division Bench in the Letters Patent appeal was dealing with a matter totally different from that being considered by the Division Bench in Kalawati's case. The Division Bench in Kalawati's case was laying down on a consideration of the applicable authorities of this Court and bf the Supreme Court, the tests and the requirements which had to be met bef6re it could be said that the dispute regarding the flat could be said to fall within the purview of section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act. In the later case the Division Bench was considering a totally different question viz. whether a flat in a building belonging to a co-operative housing society and in the occupation of a member thereof was liable to be attached and sold in pursuance' of a money decree. It is true that the scheme of the co-operative housing societies and the bash of occupation of the flats by members of such co-operative housing societies have been fully discussed in the later judgment; but those observations must be considered in their context and cannot be applied to a totally different context by the principle of logical extension. In State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra11, it has been observed that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. It would be impermissible, therefore, in our opinion, to utilise the observations in the later Division Bench judgment (in Ramesh Himmatlal v. Harsukh) for the purpose of applying them to a different set of facts and thereby coming to the conclusion that they were at variance with the conclusions of the Division Bench in Kalawati's case. It would be impermissible, therefore, in our opinion, to utilise the observations in the later Division Bench judgment (in Ramesh Himmatlal v. Harsukh) for the purpose of applying them to a different set of facts and thereby coming to the conclusion that they were at variance with the conclusions of the Division Bench in Kalawati's case. We have adverted to the later case at some length, because in a companion matter, which is to be heard by us immediately after the present matter, we find that the Maharashtra State Co-operative Tribunal has purported to follow the later decision of the Division Bench in Ramesh Himmatlal v. Harsukh in preference to the direct authority of the Division Bench in Kalawati's case. That appears to us to be an improper and impermissible approach. Again, it must be observed that the said Tribunal was, inasmuch as we are, bound by the decision of the Division Bench in Kalawati's case and it would not be proper on its part to question the conclusions of the said Division Bench or to find fault with its approach, reasoning or reading of any Supreme Court decision, and on that basis refuse to follow the same. 10. In the matter before us, it is the admitted position that at or before the time of granting leave and licence the co-operative housing society was not in the picture at all. Similarly (although the letter dated March 2, 1970 must not be lost sight of) the said society is not a co-disputant along with the licensor. On both the counts, therefore, the matter is one directly covered by the decision of the Division Bench in Kalawati's case, and following the said decision it will have to be held that the dispute which was sought to be raised by the disputant in Arbitration Case No. ABN IV. 83 of 1970 was not one falling within the purview of section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act. In this view of the matter, the decision of respondent No.3 rejecting the preliminary objection of the petitioner-licensee is liable to be quashed and set aside. 11. 83 of 1970 was not one falling within the purview of section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act. In this view of the matter, the decision of respondent No.3 rejecting the preliminary objection of the petitioner-licensee is liable to be quashed and set aside. 11. Before concluding this judgment we would like to express our opinion as to whether it would be proper at the trial or appellate stage to permit either the co-operative housing society to be added as a co-disputant or for the same to be transposed from an opponent to a co-disputant. In our view either of the courses is permissible only if all other tests and requirements postulated by Kalawati's case are otherwise satisfied, but the claim or statement of dispute is liable to be rejected by the mere technical defect of the co-operative housing society not being a co-disputant along with the licensor. If the transaction had been one arrived at between the licensor and the licensee with, the previous approval of the co-operative housing society and if the co-operative housing society is effectively interested in ensuring that possession of the premises is recovered back from the licensee-occupant, then it seems to us that an order for adding the said co-operative housing society as a co-disputant or, for transposing it from an opponent to a co-disputant would be in order. On the other hand, a dispute cannot be brought within the purview of section 91 of the Co-operative Societies Act merely by the idle formality of having the co-operative housing society as a co-disputant by the process of adding it as a party or by transposition. 12. We would like to state further that nothing in the foregoing discussion must be construed so as to affect the right of a co-operative housing society to institute a proceeding against a member and/or an occupant claiming through a member on the footing that in permitting the occupant to enter into and obtain possession of the flat, the member had contravened some binding regulations of the said co-operative housing society. This cause of action in favour of the society is quite different from the one being considered by us and would not appear to be covered by the requirements postulated in Kalawati's case. 13. This cause of action in favour of the society is quite different from the one being considered by us and would not appear to be covered by the requirements postulated in Kalawati's case. 13. In the result, the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (b) and the proceedings pending before the Officer on Special Duty (or his successor) will stand quashed. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties will bear their own costs of this special civil application. Rule made absolute.