A. D. DESAI, C. V. RANE, J. ( 1 ) IN all these appeals which are referred to us the question raised for our determination is whether the right of maintenance and residence which a Hindu widow whose husband has died prior to the coming into force of Hindu Women Rights to Property Act 1937 has can be held to be property possessed by her as a limited owner so as to attract the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). These appeals were argued together and we shall dispose of them by this common judgment. ( 2 ) IN order to understand the question at issue we will first state the facts of Second Appeals Nos. 209 of 1970 and 554 of 1970. The property in dispute therein is house bearing No. 2047 situated in Ward No. 3 Salabatpura Surat. This house originally belonged to one Thakordas who died in the year 1931 leaving behind him his widow Devkorben son Ganpatram Ganpatrams wife Kusumben and two daughters namely Umiaben and Taraben. Devkorben resided with her son Ganpatram. Umiaben and Taraben were got married. Ganpatram died on October 1 1962 leaving behind him his wife Kusumben and mother Devkorben. Ganpatram made a will dated September 4 1962 and gave the suit property to his wife subject to the conditions that she has a life interest therein and that if she re-married the suit property was to devolve upon his mother. Under the will Devkorben was also given only life interest. The suit property was ultimately given absolutely to the Surat Borough Municipality with the condition to use the same for the purposes of a school building or maternity home. It was provided in the will that during the time when the property was in possession of his wife Devkorben had right to reside in the house and she was to be maintained by his wife. The further direction in the will was that if Devkorben and his wife Kusumben could not reside together amicably in the house Devkorben was to be given a part in the house for residence and a specific amount for her maintenance. After the death of Ganpatram the two ladies resided amicably in the house. The further direction in the will was that if Devkorben and his wife Kusumben could not reside together amicably in the house Devkorben was to be given a part in the house for residence and a specific amount for her maintenance. After the death of Ganpatram the two ladies resided amicably in the house. Devkorben died on December 19 1963 She had made a will in the year 1950 and it was stated in the will that she had no interest in the suit property. Umiaben daughter of Devkorben filed Civil Suit No. 246 of 1967 in the Court of the Civil Judge Junior Division Surat alleging that the dwelling house is ancestral property that on the death of Thakordas the property had gone to Ganpatram that Ganpatram and Devkorben each had one half share in the house that on the death of Ganpatram share of Devkorben was 3/4 that on the death of Devkorben she and Taraben are entitled to succeed to the share of Devkorben in the suit house that Kusumben has one half share in the house and the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 has each one fourth share etc. It was also prayed that the property should be divided between the parties and they be given possession of the part of the property going to their respective shares. This claim in the suit was opposed by Kusumben as well as the Municipal Corporation of Surat. The trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff holding that Bai Devkorben had merely a right of residence in the suit house that she had no proprietary interest therein and that being so the plaintiffs claim to get partition of the suit property had no basis. Umiaben filed Civil Appeal No. 227 of 1968 which was allowed by the District Judge Surat holding that on coming into force of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act 1937 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1937) she had a right of residence in the suit house she had also a right of maintenance which was attached to the suit house and she held the share as a limited owner. He further held that the Act of 1937 was repealed by sec. 31 of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 and under the provisions of sec. He further held that the Act of 1937 was repealed by sec. 31 of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 and under the provisions of sec. 14 (1) of the Act the share which she was holding as limited owner assumed the character of ownership. He therefore decreed the suit of the plaintiff holding that the plaintiff and defendant had 1/6th share and Kusumben who was defendant No. 1 in the suit had 4/6th share in the suit house. Being aggrieved by this decree Kusumben has filed Second Appeal No. 209 of 1970 and the Municipal Corporation of the City of Surat has filed Second Appeal No. 554 of 1970. ( 3 ) THE answer to the question raised before us mainly depends upon the interpretation of sec. 14 (1) of the Act which is as follows:-14 (1):- Any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. EXPLANATION:--IN this sub-section property includes both moveable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person whether a relative or not before at or after her marriage or by her own skill or exertion. or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever and also any such property held by her as stridhan immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2):- Nothing contained in sub-sec. (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift will or other instrument or the decree order or award prescribed a restricted estate in such property. The object of the section is to extinguish the estate called limited estate or widows estate in Hindu law and to make a Hindu female who under the old law would be a limited owner a full owner of the property with all the powers of disposition and to make the estate heritable by her own heirs and not revertable to the heirs of the last male holder. The legislature desired equality of rights to all males and females. The legislature desired equality of rights to all males and females. In cases where a Hindu male was entitled to obtain full ownership of a property a Hindu female could not be condemned to hold the property only as a limited owner. It is to be noted that it is not the object of the Act that in cases where a Hindu male can hold property only as a limited owner a Hindu female should hold the property as a full owner. Sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 of the Act enlarges the right of limited ownership of a Hindu female and sub-sec. (2) thereof has been enacted to provide that in cases falling thereunder a Hindu female is not to get a higher right than a Hindu male. The two sub-sections of sec. 14 have to be read together. To put in other words the section has to be read as a whole in order to understand the legislative intent. In order that sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 may apply the following 3 conditions must be satisfied:- (1) the property must be possessed by a Hindu female (2) the property possessed by her must have been acquired and (3) she must have been a limited owner thereof. The expression possessed by used in sec. 14 (1) came for interpretation before the Supreme Court in Mangal Singh and others v. Smt. Rattno and another A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1786 and the Court pointed out that the expression used in the section is possessed by and not in possession of. The Court pointed out that word possessed in sec. 14 has been used in broad sense and in the context means the state of owning or having in ones power. The words covered cases wherein a Hindu widow was in actual or constructive possession of the property. It also covered a case wherein a Hindu female may not be in actual or physical or constructive possession but she has a right to recover actual possession or constructive possession because her case then will be covered by the expression the state of owning. What the Court held was that the word possessed covered the cases wherein a Hindu female has the actual or constructive possession or has possession in any form recognised by law. What the Court held was that the word possessed covered the cases wherein a Hindu female has the actual or constructive possession or has possession in any form recognised by law. This decision of the Supreme Court was followed in Badari Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi A. I. R. 1970 S. C. 1963. In the later decision the Court also held that the word acquired used in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 has also to be given widest possible meaning because of the explanation attached to the sub-section. Now the word acquired implies that a Hindu female got property or that the property came to her or the property fell to her with some right title or interest by virtue of which she could claim exclusive possession. Explanation 1 to sub-sec. (1) has to be noticed. The said explanation sets out various modes of acquisition of property by a female Hindu. It indicates that the section applies only to property to which a Hindu female has acquired some kind of title or interest however restricted nature of her interest may be. The expression in any other manner whatsoever itself suggests that the expression has not to be construed on the basis of the principle of ejusdem generis or that the words must take colour from previous expression used in the section but has to be construed widely. In short sec. 14 contemplates cases in which a female Hindu has acquired the property under some vestage of title however restricted it might be. The decisions of the High Courts were not unanimous as to what cases can fall under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 and what cases shall fall under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14. But this point is now finally settled by the Supreme Court in Badri Pershad case (supra ). The Court observed that sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 is more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-sec. (1) and comes into operation only if acquisition in any of the methodsindicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of property. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 would apply to cases in which the instrument mentioned therein is the source or foundation of the right or title to the property. It must be noticed that the explanation appended to sub sec. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 14 would apply to cases in which the instrument mentioned therein is the source or foundation of the right or title to the property. It must be noticed that the explanation appended to sub sec. (1) of sec. 14 assumes that the property acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance is a property of limited ownership. This explanation is important because of sec. 4 of the Act provides so far relevant that save as otherwise expressly provided any text rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in this Act. ( 4 ) HAVING considered the provisions of sec. 14 we shall consider what is the right of a Hindu widow whose husband has died prior to the Act of 1937 in the coparcenary property or in the separate property of her husband. The law on the point is well settled. Justice Westropp in his classical judgment in Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi and another v. Satyabhamabai widow of Govind Narayan I. L. R. 2 Bom. 494 observed as under :-THIS right of survivorship on the other hand is fully recognized by the Mitakshara as excluding the widow and the other heirs in the enumeration of Yajnavalkya when there are undivided co-parceners to take the estate. The rule is a consequence of the doctrine that the right of each co-parcener extending to the whole estate it is fully owned as to every part notwithstanding the death of one of the joint-tenants. If the co-parceners of the deceased were his sons they as in Bengal take in pre ference to all other pretenders. If they make a division of the estate they must allot to their mother an equal share and the same to any sonless widow of their father but this does not of necessity invest the widows here any more than in Bengal with a proprietorship in the estate before its partition. The sons must from the moment of their fathers death be regarded as sole owners yet with a liability to provide for the widows maintenance and with a competence on the widows part to have the estate made answerable. The learned Judge further observed: -. . . . . . The sons must from the moment of their fathers death be regarded as sole owners yet with a liability to provide for the widows maintenance and with a competence on the widows part to have the estate made answerable. The learned Judge further observed: -. . . . . . THE widow set up a claim to a moiety of the dwelling but the Shastris answer is :-A son after the death of his father acquires a perfect right to the pro perty and while sons are alive the widow has no claim to his property. She cannot therefore claim any share of the house. It seems opposed therefore both to the text of the Mitakshara and to the construction of the local interpreters to regard the widows maintenance a charge on the inheritance taken by the son in the sense of a perfect right in re. Further observations of the learned Judge on this point are:-THE widows claim being strictly to maintenance and maintenance only without any defined share in the estate even on partition and the kind of maintenance even that she can claim being dependent on the perhaps fluctuating circumstances of the joint family it appears that although she may at her will get her claim recognized as chargeable on the estate in the hands of the co-parceners reduced to certainty and secured as a specific charge on the estate or as Katyayana says by the allotment of a share for her life yet if she should refrain from that course in the hope of sharing the improving circumstances of the family or through mere carelessness she leaves to the co-parceners as unlimited estate to deal with at their discretion and must share their ill as well as their good fortune. This case was considered by Full Bench of Madras High Court in Ramanadan v. Rangammal I. L. R. 12 Madras 260 The learned Judges of the Madras High Court were considering the claim of right of residence of a Hindu female in a dwelling house as against a purchaser thereof and relying on the aforesaid Bombay judgment Muttusami Ayyar J. observed as under:-IT must be observed here that though the mother living with and under the protection of her sons submits to their dealing with ancestral property the submission is under Hindu law subject to this condition viz. that the managing coparcener who deals with the property must act either really or to the purchasers knowledge within the scope of his authority as the manager of a joint fund. As to the mothers right of residence in the family house it is a right inherent in her and an incident of her status as mother and the son cannot arbitrarily eject her from it. There is no indefiniteness as to the specific property to which it is referable and as the residence females in family houses is a fact well known in this country a purchaser was held not entitled to eject her unless he showed that the sale bound that interest. The reason for the distinction between a jus in re cover a general fund and a charge on a specific part of that fund did not extend to the right of residence in the family house and it was therefore held with special reference to the mode in which the theory of a charge in the nature of an existing proprietary right was developed that the equity of a purchaser for value did not extend to the mothers right of residence in specific property viz. the family house unless the sale was binding on herthe Privy Council in Pratapmull Agarwalla v. Bhanabai Bibi I. A. 33 (1936) 36 I. A. 33) has also considered the right of a Hindu female governed by Mitakshara Law prior to the Act of 1937. After referring to various decisions of the Courts on the point it was held that according to the Mitakshara law the wife mother or grand-mother is entitled to a share when there is a partition by division of the family estate between coparceners but she cannot be recognised as the owner of such share until the partition is actually made as she has no pre-existing right in the estate except a right of maintenance. There is nothing in the Mitakshara law from which it can be inferred that upon a mere severance of the joint status of the family any of the above mentioned females can claim a share. It will not be necessary to refer to other decided cases which repeat the said legal position. There is nothing in the Mitakshara law from which it can be inferred that upon a mere severance of the joint status of the family any of the above mentioned females can claim a share. It will not be necessary to refer to other decided cases which repeat the said legal position. Thus it is clear that in the Mitakshara law a widow was entitled to a share on partition between the sons but she was not entitled to claim her share till partition was effected. She was entitled to maintenance and residence but she got 4 no ownership in the property of her husband until it was actually divided. Till then the right of widow was an inchoate or imperfect. A complete right of maintenance includes in it the right of residence. Various Courts have also considered cases in which a last male holder leaves behind him amongst other properties a dwelling house or a dwelling house alone. So far as a dwelling house belonging to a Hindu family is concerned the general rule of law is enunciated in Bai Devkor v. Sanmukhram I. L. R. 13 Bom. 101. The Court in that case held that under the general rule of Hindu law prevailing in the Bombay Presideney a co-parceners widow was in the absence of any special circumstances entitled to residence in the family dwelling house. The right of residence given to a widow in the dwelling house belonging to Hindu joint family is the general right of residence. In the case of Ramanadan (supra) the Full Bench of the Madras High Court was considering the extent of right of a Hindu widow as against a stranger and it is in this light that the court had made the observations cited hereinbefore. The said decision laid down a rule of evidence and pointed out that the purchaser shall be deemed to have know ledge of the right of residence of a Hindu widow in the family house. This decision does not lay down any other principle of law. Even in a case where a Hindu dies leaving a sole dwelling house and his heirs namely a widow and a son the widow has a right of residence but her right of residence is a general right. This decision does not lay down any other principle of law. Even in a case where a Hindu dies leaving a sole dwelling house and his heirs namely a widow and a son the widow has a right of residence but her right of residence is a general right. The right of residence of a Hindu widow is curtailed (1) by restricting to cases where the debt for which the property is sold is not contracted for necessity (2) by the rule that she cannot claim a right of residence in the whole of the premises if a portion of the house could be set apart for her and would afford reasonably sufficient accommondation and (3) that if other reasonable accommodation even outside the family dwelling house is offered she may be bound to accept such a substitute at least in certain circumstances vide P. Suriyanarayana Rao Naidu v. P. Bhalasubramania Mudali and others I. L. R. 43 Madras 635 After death of her husband if the widow resides with her son she does so in exercise of her general right of residence. The net effect of these decisions is that so far as the right of residence of a Hindu widow in a dwelling house is concerned it stands on the same footing as her right of maintenance out of her husbands property. Both these general rights of a Hindu female are inchoate indefinite and imperfect. But the question that arises is whether when a particular property is allocated to a Hindu widow or other female in lieu of her right of maintenance or right of residence any proprietary interest is created therein. This allocation to her may be by contract or by reason of a decree of the Court. The allocation of a particular property in lieu of the right of maintenance or residence of a Hindu widow or other female may be established by documentary evidence or an oral evidence or the circumstances of the case may lead to that conclusion. In the case of Pirdhandas Parsumal and another v. Hajrabai Mahamad and others 9 G. L. R. 24 a Division Bench of this Court considered the said question while dealing with the case of parties who were Cutchi Memons governed by Hindu Law. The facts of the case are that one Shakur Haji Suleman was the owner of the suit house. The facts of the case are that one Shakur Haji Suleman was the owner of the suit house. He died in the year 1947 leaving behind him his son Sitar Haji Shakur and his widow Hajrabai. On partition of India Sitar left for Pakistan and was declared as an evacuee. His properties including suit property were declared as evacuee property by the Assistant Custodian of the Evacuee Property. Hajrabai thereupon preferred an appeal to the Custodian of the Evacuee Property. The Custodian of the Evacuee Property held that Hajrabais claim to the suit property of Shakur Haji was only that of a right of residence At a date when Sitar migrated to Pakistan Hijrabai was residing in 2 rooms and the right of residence of Hajrabai to reside in the said two rooms as the widow of Shakur Haji Suleman was recognized by the Custodian of Evacuee Property. Hajrabai continued to occupy the said rooms and on November 14 1953 the Assistant Custodian of the Evacuee Property issued an order fixing the rent of the premises in possession of Hajrabai at Rs. 20/per month and required her to pay Rs. 680/as and by way of arrears of rent. Hajrabai appealed against the said order and in appeal it was held that it was not proper to ask Hajrabai to pay rent for the portion of the house in her possession because she was granted a right of residence in the premises. On June 8 1955 the Central Government in exercise of its power under sec. 12 (1) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1954 issued a notification to the effect that the Central Government had decided to acquire the Evacuee Property mentioned therein which included all urban immovable properties situated within the limits of a Municipality. By virtue of this notification the right title and interest of Sitar in the suit house vested absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances under sec. 12 (2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1954 The Central Government thereafter in exercise of power sold the suit house by public auction and the same was purchased by defendants Nos. 5 and 6 of that suit. The Central Government was of the view that acquisition of the suit house by the Central Government had an effect of extinguishing the right of residence and maintenance of Bai Hajrabai. 5 and 6 of that suit. The Central Government was of the view that acquisition of the suit house by the Central Government had an effect of extinguishing the right of residence and maintenance of Bai Hajrabai. Hajrabai therefore filed a civil suit in the Court for a declaration that she had a right of maintenance and residence in the suit house for her life-time and the action of the Government in issuing notification and orders was illegal. It clearly appears from the facts that Hajrabai was in exclusive possession of the suit house in lieu of her right of residence and maintenance. To put in short the suit house was allotted to Hajrabai in lieu of her right of maintenance and residence and in these circumstances that the Court held that she had the proprietary interest in the suit house. The Court considered the Full Bench case of Madras High Court in Ramanadan v. Rangammal (supra) and observed as under:-THE right of residence of the widow in the family dwelling house is therefore enforceable against whoever is the owner of the house and it is no defence for a transferee of the house from the heirs to say that he is a bona fide purchaser of the house for value without notice of the said right. It the widow is disturbed in the exercise of her right of residence in the family house by any one she can enforce that right against the person causing the disturbance and she can conceivably sue a trespasser in the portion of the dwelling house in her occupation for injunction or damages. The right of residence of the widow in the family dwelling house is therefore a right available against the world at large and is a right. in rem and must therefore be held to be an interest in the house. If the right of residence were enforceable only against the heirs or against purchasers for value from in the heirs without notice of the right the right would have been of the nature of jus in rem which is a right in personam. In that event the right of residence would have come within the same class of legal rights in which for example a charge falls and that would not have amounted to an interest in the house. In that event the right of residence would have come within the same class of legal rights in which for example a charge falls and that would not have amounted to an interest in the house. But since the right of residence is enforceable against all it is an interest in the house. As a matter fact the right to enjoy possession of the house is one of the right which go to make up the bundle of ownership and when that right belongs to the widow owner of the house is excluded provided of course he is not a member of the family from the enjoyment of that right and that barrier is removed only on the death of the widow or the widow giving up her right of residence. Thus this court has taken the view that when specific property is allotted to a Hindu widow in lieu of her right of maintenance and residence she gets proprietary interest therein. The same view is taken in Lakhmi Chand and others v. Smt. Sukhdevi and others A. I. R. 1970 Raj. 285 and Bapusaheb Bhausaheb Patil and others v. Smt. Gangabai and others A. I. R. 1972 Bom. 16. The consequence is that in the case where a specific property is allotted to a Hindu widow in lieu of her right of maintenance and residence has acquires proprietary interest therein. She cannot be evicted and thus has an exclusive right of residence during her life time she can reside in the house but has no right of alienation. Thus the widow has got a limited ownership a concept not unknown to Hindu law. This limited right of the Hindu widow becomes an absolute interest in view of sec. 14 (1) and the explanation appended to it. ( 5 ) RELIANCE was sought to be placed on the decision in Bai Parsan Gapalji v. Bhagwandas Narsidas and others 13 G. L. R. 123 wherein S. H. Sheth J. took the view that a bare right of residence created no estate in favour of a Hindu widow and the provisions of sec. 14 of the Act were not attracted. According to the learned Judge the right of residence which a Hindu widow gets is non-transferable is a personal right and is merely right of residence which cannot be equated with the acquisition of the property with all necessary concomitants flowing therefrom. 14 of the Act were not attracted. According to the learned Judge the right of residence which a Hindu widow gets is non-transferable is a personal right and is merely right of residence which cannot be equated with the acquisition of the property with all necessary concomitants flowing therefrom. In respect of the property of a co-parcenary or the property belonging to the husband of the widow the widow had only right of residence therein and nothing more. The right of residence of a widow did not create a Hindu widows right and therefore the provisions of sec. 14 of the Act were inapplicable. The attention of the Court was not drawn to the decision of the Division Bench of the Court in Pirdhandass case (supra ). In our opinion with respect the observations made by the learned Judge are very wide. If the circumstances show that the property has been allotted to her in lieu of right of residence it can certainly be said that she an interest in the property and in such a case provisions of sec. 14 (1) of the Act do apply. ( 6 ) THERE is an alternative angle from which the question may be considered. Now the Hindu Succession Act 1956 has been enacted to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession amongst the Hindus. Sec. 4 thereof provides that save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act any text rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision is made in the Act. This Act has made for reaching changes in the structure of the Hindu Law of Succession. The traditional restricted power of a Hindu widow or other females in respect of disposition no longer exists and the Act confers upon on a Hindu female full right of ownership. By enacting sec. 4 the legislature intended to supersede the Hindu Law in all matters in respect of which there is made an express provision in the Act and it is from this point of view that explanation I to subsec. (1) of sec. 14 requires to be noticed. By enacting sec. 4 the legislature intended to supersede the Hindu Law in all matters in respect of which there is made an express provision in the Act and it is from this point of view that explanation I to subsec. (1) of sec. 14 requires to be noticed. The explanation provides that in the sub-section property includes both movable and immovable acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance or device or partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person or by her own skills exertion or by purchase or by proscription or in any other manner whatsoever meaning thereby that a Hindu female gets proprietary interest in the property given to her in lieu of maintenance. To put in short the effect of the explanation is that when a property is allotted to Hindu female in lieu of maintenance she is regarded as holding proprietary interest therein. So also when a female is given by an act of parties or a decree of the Court certain property for residence in lieu of her right of residence she gets proprietary interest therein. This is so because of the expression in any other manner whatsoever used in the explanation. The proprietary interest which a Hindu female thus gets is undoubtedly a limited interest because if it is regarded that she gets absolute interest there was no purpose in enacting the explanation. Even in cases where a Hindu female may not be held to be a limited owner of the property as in a case come ing in possession of the property in lieu of maintenance or residence still because of the inclusive definition of the word property given in the explanation she will be a limited owner for the purpose of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 of the Act. The explanation recognizes that when a property is assigned to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance or residence she would be regarded as holding the property allocated to her as a limited owner. This being the specific provision in the explanation the ordinary Hindu Law must give way to this express provisions and to that extent this express provision of the Act overrides the ordinary rule of the Hindu Law. This being the specific provision in the explanation the ordinary Hindu Law must give way to this express provisions and to that extent this express provision of the Act overrides the ordinary rule of the Hindu Law. In this view of ours we are supported by the decisions in Sheojee Tiwary and another v. Prema Kuer and others A. I. R. 1964 Patna 187 Bindbashni Sing and another v. Smt. Sheerati Kuer and another A. I. R. 1971 Patna 104; Bapusaheb Bhausaheb Patil and another v. Smt. Gangabai and others A. I. R. 1972 Bom. 16; Smt. Gaumati and others v. Shanker lal A. I. R. 1974 Raj. 147 and Raj Kumar and others v. Sardarni Prem Parkash Kaur and another A. I. R. 1972 Punjab 458. ( 7 ) HAVING thus considered the legal position we will consider the facts of the case. After the death of Thakordas Ganpatram his wife Kusumben and Devkorben resided in the family house which was the only property left by Thakordas. There is no dispute on this point before us. Devkorben therefore was exercising her general right of residence in the house. The property was not allocated to her in lieu of her right of residence. She stayed in the house in exercise of her general right of residence. It is one thing to say that a widow remains in joint possession with her son in exercise of her general right of residence and quite another thing to say that the property is allocated to her. The general right of residence of Bai Devkoraben was indefinite inchoate and imperfect. Ganpatram could have provided only a suitable residence to her and thus could have prevented her from enjoying the entire house. Devkorben resided in the suit property with consent of her son in exercise of-her general right of residence. She was not given any property in lieu of her right of residence. Her right of residence in the house cannot be equated to a share in the property; the two things being quite separate. She had a right to enjoy the entire house and no specific part of the property was allocated to her. Her possession was not exclusive and her right of residence Was general. Hence the provisions of sec. 14 (1) cannot apply to the Case and it cannot be said that she became the absolute owner of the property. She had a right to enjoy the entire house and no specific part of the property was allocated to her. Her possession was not exclusive and her right of residence Was general. Hence the provisions of sec. 14 (1) cannot apply to the Case and it cannot be said that she became the absolute owner of the property. The provisions of the Act of 1937 Were inapplicable as Thakordas had died before coming into force of the said Act. The learned District Judge was in error in holding that Devkorben got a share in the Suit property by virtue of the provisions of the Act of 1937. For the reasons aforesaid decree passed by the appellate Court for partition cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. The decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit of the plaintiff is restored. Appeal allowed. .