JUDGMENT B. D. Singh, J. This appeal under section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Code’,) by the sole appellant Pachkauri Singh, who was the complainant in the court below, is directed against the judgment and order of the Munsif Magistrate, 1st class, Aurangabad, acquitting the five respondents and also one Bechu Gope who died before the matter came to this Court. All the respondents were tried for an offence under section 379 of the Indian Penal Code and respondents 1 to 3 and 5 were further tried for an offence under section 147 whereas respondent no. 4 was also tried for an offence under section 148, Indian Penal Code. Lastly, respondent no. 5 was also tried for an offence under section 323 of the Indian Penal Code for causing injury on the complainant, namely, P.W. 4. 2. The case of the appellant, in brief, was that he was the Gomasta of the ex-landlord Kali Prasad and Mathura Prasad. On 15th August, 1966 at about 11 A. M. he was supervising the uprooting of paddy seedling on behalf of his landlords in plot no. 1092 in village Barwan Toli Badribigha, police station Obra in the district of Aurangabad. The appellant was incharge of looking after the cultivation there. At that point of time the respondents along with Bechu Gope and one another, namely, Tulsi Gope arrived there duly armed and they wanted the appellant to stop the uprooting of the paddy seedling in the said plot. The appellant refused to do so. There upon respondent no. 1 told the appellant that his landlords did not sell the land with the respondents in spite of their request, and ordered to assault the complainant (P.W. 4). Hearing this all the labourers fled away from the field. Accused Tulsi (who is since dead) and respondent no.5 assaulted P.W. 4 with lathi and fists. Respondents 2 to 5 and the other two accused persons carried away five bojhas of paddy seedling and some antias worth Rs. 50/- whereas respondent no.1 took away a thali, a lota and a bucket worth Rs. 25/-. According to the case of the appellant, the accused were annoyed because they wanted that the employers of P.W. 4 should sell their land to the accused persons, and since they had refused to do so, they (the accused) committed the offences as mentioned above. 25/-. According to the case of the appellant, the accused were annoyed because they wanted that the employers of P.W. 4 should sell their land to the accused persons, and since they had refused to do so, they (the accused) committed the offences as mentioned above. After the aforesaid occurrence P.W. 4 went to village Obra and there he met his employers and under their orders he instituted a complaint (exhibit 1) on 16th August, 1966 in the court of the Subdivisional Magistrate who was pleased to refer the matter to the local police at police station Obra where an F.I.R. (exhibit 3) was drawn on the basis of which investigation ensued and on completion of the investigation chargesheet was submitted against the respondents and the two other accused persons. After cognizance was taken the case was transferred by the Subdivisional Magistrate for disposal which ultimately came before the learned Munsif Magistrate. Before him as many as eight witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution to establish its case including the complainant (P.W. 4). On behalf of the respondents as well three witnesses were examined as D.Ws. 1 to 3. The case of the respondents, in brief, was that the disputed land, namely, the land under plot no. 1092 was in their possession and P.W. 4 on behalf of his employers wanted to dispossess them. Therefore a false case was instituted against them. According to them, they were innocent. They had also denied the occurrence itself. 3. Mr. Nageshwar Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has assailed the judgment and the order of the learned Munsif Magistrate acquitting the respondents. Learned counsel pointed out that the learned Magistrate has disbelieved the prosecution case regarding the occurrence not on valid grounds. He submitted that he has also erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove that the paddy seedling was grown in the said plot by the prosecution. On the other hand, Mr. Jyoti Narayan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, before answering on the points of merit, has raised a preliminary question before me. According to him, the appeal filed by the appellant under section 417(3) of the Code is not maintainable as in the instant case, the case was instituted as an F.I.R. case from the begining till cognizance was taken. According to him, the appeal filed by the appellant under section 417(3) of the Code is not maintainable as in the instant case, the case was instituted as an F.I.R. case from the begining till cognizance was taken. He submitted that even the trial of the case was under section 251A of the Code. In this connection he drew my attention to the order-sheet of the Subdivisional Magistrate in G. R. 586/66/501C of 1966. The relevant portion of the order on the various dates reads : "1/16-8-66. None responds. Tomorrow. Sd. Illegible. 16-8. Later. The complainant appears at this stage. The complaint discloses cognizable offence. Send this to O.C. Aurangabad for instituting a case and submitting f. f. To 19.8.66. Sd. Illegible 16/8 2/19-8-66. Seen F.I.R. Put up with f. f. on 19-9-66. Sd. Illegible, S.D.O. 3/19-9-66. F. F. not received. Await. Put up on 12-10-66. Sd. Illegible. S.D.O. 4/12-10-66. Chargesheet against the accused persons (1) Kauleshwar Ahir, (2) Ram Chandra Ahir (3) Ghura Yadav (4) Nathun Yadav (5) Srichand Yadav (6) Tulsi Yadav (7) Bechu Yadav u/s 147, 148, 323 I.P.C. received. Cognizance taken u/s. . Case ready. To Sri M.P. Singh, Munsif Magt., 1st Class for disposal. Sd. Illegible, S.D.O." Before the Munsiff Magistrate also it was headed as G.R. 586/66,106/68 and it was listed as State-versus-Kauleshwar Gope and others. Among others the A.D.P. also appeared. Mr. Narayan submitted that the order which the learned Subdivisional Magistrate had passed on 16th August, 1966, referred to above, was one under section 156(3) of the Code. Reading the entire order passed on various dates, it is clear that it was not a complaint case rather it was an F.I.R. case. Therefore, according to him, an appeal under section 417(3) of the Code was not maintainable. In order to find support to this contention learned counsel referred to the case of Gopal Das Sindhi and others v. State of Assam and another, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 986 where their Lordships observed that provisions of section 190 did not mean that once a complaint was filed, a Magistrate was bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclosed the commission of any offence. The word 'may' in section 190 could not be construed to mean 'must'. The reason was obvious. The word 'may' in section 190 could not be construed to mean 'must'. The reason was obvious. A complaint disclosing cognizable offences might well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint under section 156 (3) to the police for investigation. There was no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences was with the police. On the other hand, there may be occasions when the magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. If he did so then he would have to proceed in the manner provided by Chapter XVI of the Code. Learned counsel then drew my attention to a more appropriate case of the Supreme Court in Jamuna Singh and others v. Bhadai Sah, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1541 where their Lordships inter alia, were dealing with an appeal under section 417 (3) of the Code, and have laid down the test to find out which cases would be governed by the provisions contained in section 417 (3) of the Code. Their Lordships observed that the right of appeal under section 417 (3) was limited only to cases instituted upon a complaint. The Code did not contain any definition of the words 'institution of a case'. An examination of provisions of section 190, 193 and 194 made it clear that when a Magistrate took cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constituted such offence, a case was instituted in a Magistrate's court and such a case was one instituted on a complaint. Again, when a Magistrate took cognizance of any offence upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police-officer, it was a case instituted in the Magistrate's court on a police report. When on a petition of complaint being filed before him the Magistrate applied his mind for proceeding under the various provisions of Chapter XVI of the Code, he must be held to have taken cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint. When, however, he applied his mind not for such purpose but for purposes of ordering investigation under section 156 (3) or issued a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, he could not be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. Learned counsel has laid emphasis on this latter part of the observation. When, however, he applied his mind not for such purpose but for purposes of ordering investigation under section 156 (3) or issued a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, he could not be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. Learned counsel has laid emphasis on this latter part of the observation. Their Lordships, among other cases have also referred to A.I.R. 1961 Supreme Court 986 (supra). Learned counsel pointed out that the order sheet of the Subdivisional Magistrate, referred to above, clearly 'shows that the appellant was not examined on solemn affirmation under section 200 of the Code. On the, other hand, Mr. Nageshwar Prasad contended that the order dated 16th August, 1966 clearly indicated that the purpose of the Subdivisional Magistrate in sending the complaint to the police officer was to make enquiry. According to him, as soon as the complaint was filed by the appellant on 16th August, 1966 it should be treated as institution of the complaint. 4. In view of the discussions made above and in the light of the observation of the Supreme Court in the two cases, I am unable to accede to the contention of Mr. Nageshwar Prasad. After due consideration, in my opinion, the appeal was not maintainable under section 417 (3) of the Code. However, since it was admitted by this Court and since arguments were also .advanced on merit, I now propose to consider the appeal on merit. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant is apprehensive for the reason that the findings of the learned Munsif Magistrate regarding possession over the land in plot no. 1092 might affect future litigation between the parties. I have perused the judgment. No where the learned Munsif Magistrate has given a definite finding regarding possession of either party on the land in plot no. 1092. For the purpose of the present case only he has simply tried to find out as to which party had grown the paddy seedling in the disputed field. No doubt, as mentioned earlier, he has held that the prosecution has failed to establish that it was grown by the prosecution. He has also disbelieved the prosecution case of the occurrence. In my opinion, he has given good reasons for coming to conclusions and they are based on the evidence. No doubt, as mentioned earlier, he has held that the prosecution has failed to establish that it was grown by the prosecution. He has also disbelieved the prosecution case of the occurrence. In my opinion, he has given good reasons for coming to conclusions and they are based on the evidence. Even if I differ from his reasonings and the appreciation of the evidence on these points, sitting as a court of appeal in a case against acquittal, it is well established that I cannot substitute my own views. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Khedu Mahto and others v. State of Bihar, 1972 B.L.J.R. 358 as also a later decision of the Supreme Court in Bhim Singh. Rup Singh v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 286 where their Lordships have observed that if two reasonable conclusions would be possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of the trial Court. In that view of the matter, even on merit, I am not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the trial court. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed and the judgment and the order of the court below are affirmed. Appeal dismissed.