JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal by the defendant, State of Madhya Pradesh, against a decree for injunction restraining it to demolish certain constructions of the plaintiff in pursuance of an order passed by the Additional Collector, Jabalpur. ( 2. ) THE facts are that the plaintiff Haji Abdul Gafoor Khan was granted nazul land measuring 680 sq. ft. out of plot No. 77 Block No. 43 situated in hanumantal area, Jabalpur. The plaintiff held this land under two licences which are Exs. P-1 and P-2. The first licence, Ex. P-1, was executed on 30th october 1957 and the second licence, Ex. P-2, was executed on 13th June 1959. The parties to these documents are the Governor of Madhya Pradesh, called the grantor, and Haji Abdul Gafoor Khan, the plaintiff, called the licensee. The terms of the two licences are identical. The plaintiff was authorised under these licences to make constructions upon the land. The grantor, however, had reserved the power to terminate the licences under certain conditions. The relevant clauses in that respect arc clauses (i) and (iv) (a) which read as follows : " (i) The said construction shall be maintained and permitted to remain over / above upon the said land only so long as the said land is not required by the grantor for his own or a public purpose. (iv) (a) When the said land is required by the grantor for his own or a public purpose, of which the grantor shall be the sole judge, the grantor may require the licensee to remove the said construction within thirty days of the receipt by him of a notice in that behalf and thereupon the licensee shall remove the said construction and this licence shall terminate. If within the period allowed by the notice the licensee fails to remove the said construction, it shall be lawful to the grantor to have the same removed at the cost of the licensee in accordance with the provisions of section 219, Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917, section 64, Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928. " The aforesaid two licences were signed by the Additional Collector, Jabalpur, on behalf of the grantor. " The aforesaid two licences were signed by the Additional Collector, Jabalpur, on behalf of the grantor. It appears that on 20th June 1960 the Additional collector issued an order terminating the licences and for demolition of the constructions on the ground that the plaintiff had made permanent constructions contrary to the terms of the licences. An appeal against this order was preferred by the plaintiff which was decided by the Divisional Commissioner, jabalpur, on 9th December 1960. The Commissioner held that the appeal was not maintainable under the Land Revenue Code and so he dismissed it. But in exercise of his power of superintendence as an administrative superior he gave certain directions. One of the directions was that the Additional collector was wrong in construing the licences that they were meant to authorise only temporary structures and not permanent constructions that were made by the plaintiff. It was also observed that the site could be vacated only in case the Additional Collector found that it was required for a public purpose or for bona fide use by the Government. The Commissioner also stressed the necessity of giving a specific finding to that effect after taking evidence and enquiring into the matter whether the land was required for any of the above purposes. Subsequently, a notice was issued by the Additional Collector on 22nd October 1962 to the plaintiff terminating the licences and directing him to remove all constructions within a month on the ground "that the lands are immediately required for public purpose. " This notice is Ex. P-5. ( 3. ) THE plaintiff then commenced the suit giving rise to this appeal for a declaration that the aforesaid order of the Additional Collector was illegal and void and not binding on him. He also prayed for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-State from giving effect to that order. The plaintiffs case was that after the order of the Commissioner the Additional Collector did not make any inquiry whether the land was required for any public purpose and the order was not made in good faith. It was also alleged that the plaintiff acting upon the licences had invested Rs. 20,000 in making permanent constructions and the licences could not be revoked. It was also alleged that the plaintiff acting upon the licences had invested Rs. 20,000 in making permanent constructions and the licences could not be revoked. In the written statement it was pleaded that the Additional Collector, after examining the matter thoroughly, came to the conclusion that the land in question was required for public use by the people of the locality for their religious and social purposes and that the land was also required for the purpose of a urinal and a tap. The plaintiff led evidence to show that the land was never in public use for any religious or social purpose and that no member of the public desired to use the land for any such purpose. Evidence was also led that there was no necessity of a urinal or a tap upon the land. The defendant-State did not lead any evidence. Even the Additional Collector was not examined. ( 4. ) THE trial Court decreed the suit on two grounds. It was held that as the plaintiff acting upon the licences had made permanent constructions, the licences were irrevocable under section 60 (b) of the Easements Act, 1882. It was also held that the land was not at all needed for any public purpose and on this ground also the licences could not be terminated. On these findings the trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit. It is against this decree that the present appeal has been filed. The plaintiff-respondent died during the pendency of this appeal and his legal representatives were substituted in his place. ( 5. ) LEARNED Government Advocate, who appeared for the appellant state, contended before us that as a power to revoke the licences was reserved under the agreements conferring the licences, section 60 (b) of the Act was inapplicable and the licences could be revoked. This contention must be accepted. Section 60 of the Easements Act, in so far as is relevant for this case, provides that "a licence may be revoked by the grantor, unless- (b) the licensee, acting upon the licence, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution. " Therefore, generally, when the licensee has, under the terms of the licence, made permanent constructions, the licence is irrevocable. " Therefore, generally, when the licensee has, under the terms of the licence, made permanent constructions, the licence is irrevocable. But parties may contract otherwise and if the agreement conferring the licence provides that the licence can be terminated even though the licensee has made permanent constructions, section 60 (b) will not be a bar for the licensor to terminate the licence in accordance with the agreement. This legal position is supported by authorities: [muhammad Ziaul Haque v. Standard Vacuum Oil Company (55 CWN 232.) Ganga Sahai v. Badrul Islam (AIR 1942 All. 330) and Chotey lal v. Durga Bai ( AIR 1950 All. 661 .)]. The trial Court was not right in holding that the Additional Collector could not terminate the licences in exercise of the power reserved in that behalf under the agreements. ( 6. ) LEARNED Government Advocate then contended that under the terms of the licences the question whether the land was required for a public purpose was not justiciable as the grantor was the sole judge of that fact and since the additional Collector was of the opinion that the land was so required, the revocation of the licences could not be challenged. ( 7. ) WE have already quoted the relevant terms of the licences. Under clause (iv) (a) the licence can be terminated and the licensee can be called upon to remove the constructions "when the-land is required by the grantor for his own or a public purpose, of which the grantor shall be the sole judge. " it is pertinent to note that the licences are not revocable on the mere will of the grantor; they can only be terminated when the land is required for the purpose of the grantor or for a public purpose However, the grantor has been made the sole judge of the fact whether the land is so required. The question is what is the scope of interference when a power under this clause is exercised by the grantor. The licensee is authorised to make permanent construction and acting upon the terms of the licences he has made permanent constructions costing Rs. 20,000. Such licences cannot be revoked except under a power reserved under them. Therefore, it is open for the Court to see whether the revocation has been made in conformity with clause (iv) of the licence which confers the power of revocation. 20,000. Such licences cannot be revoked except under a power reserved under them. Therefore, it is open for the Court to see whether the revocation has been made in conformity with clause (iv) of the licence which confers the power of revocation. For example, if the grantor revokes the licence not on the ground that the land is required for the purpose mentioned in this clause but simply because the grantor so desires, the exercise of power would be invalid. If, however, the grantor is of opinion that the land is required for the purposes mentioned in clause (iv) and revokes the licence, there will be no scope for interference, provided that the opinion formed by the grantor is honest. The grantor has been made the sole judge of the fact whether the land is required for the purposes mentioned in clause (iv ). This in itself implies that the grantor must judge honestly and fairly. If he acts honestly and fairly, his opinion is final, for he is the sole judge. But if the opinion of the grantor is not formed honestly or if he acts on mere whim or caprice, it will be said that he has not exercised his judgment as contemplated by clause (iv) and a revocation of the licence on the basis of such a judgment or opinion will be held invalid, being in excess of the power conferred by the agreement. ( 8. ) IT is settled law that when a power is conferred under a statute the power must be exercised in good faith for furtherance of the object for which it is conferred ; [padfield v. Minister of Agriculture etc. ( (1968) 1 Aller 694 (H. L.)) and Rohtas Industries ltd. v. . S. D. Agarwal ( AIR 1969 SC 707 .)]. Similar principle has been applied when a power is conferred under a contract. Where a carriage was ordered to be made on the agreement that it would be paid for if it should meet the approval of the defendant, the defendant was held entitled to refuse to accept the carriage on the ground that it did not meet his convenience and taste, provided that he acted bona fide and not capriciously : [andrews v. Belfield (109 Revised Reports 885, p. 891.)]. Similarly, in a contract for the purchase of a lease made subject to the approval of the title by the purchasers solicitor, the disapproval of the purchasers solicitor would be effective in the absence of mala fide or unreasonableness: [hudson v. Buck (7 Ch. D. 683.)]. On the same principle an Architects certificate is conclusive if so agreed provided the Architect acts honestly in accordance with the contract; [p. and M. Kaye Ltd. v. Hosier and Dickinson Ltd. ( (1972) 1 Aller 121.)]. In Secretary of State v. A. John arathoon (ILR 5 Mad. 173.)a contract was entered into to supply timber of a certain quality to be approved by the Superintendent of the Governments factory for which the timber was required and it was held that the Superintendent could not arbitrarily refuse approval, although if he acted honestly, his judgment was final. Muttusami Ayyar J. , in holding that a power whether conferred by contract, will or law must be exercised bona fide, observed as follows : "1 need hardly add that the principle laid down in Aleyn v. Belchier (White and Tudor Vol. I, p. 377.) that a power of appointment ought to be exercised bonafide for the end for which it is given is one of the first principles which apply to all powers, whether created by contract, or will, or law, and whether their object-matter is the nomination of an heir to a fund left by a testator, the sanctioning by a Sapinda of an adoption to be made by a Hindu widow, or any power to be exercised by one contracting party over the other. If the power is exercised bona fide and for the end for which it is given, an error of judgment, which, from the nature of the case, is a risk originally contemplated by the party bound and agreed to be submitted to, can be no valid defence. If, on the other hand, it is not exercised bona fide, or exercised for a collateral or sinister purpose, it is a fraud upon power and a ground of relief. " ( 9. ) THE legal position, therefore, is that if a restricted power conferred under a contract is not exercised honestly, the exercise of the power would be invalid. We have already stated that in the instant case the licences are not made revocable at the will of the grantor. " ( 9. ) THE legal position, therefore, is that if a restricted power conferred under a contract is not exercised honestly, the exercise of the power would be invalid. We have already stated that in the instant case the licences are not made revocable at the will of the grantor. They can be revoked only when the land is required for the purpose of the grantor or for a public purpose. Although the grantor is made the sole judge of the existence of the requirement, if the grantor does not act honestly in forming the opinion about the existence of the requirement, the revocation would be invalid, for in such a case it would be said that the grantor has not in fact judged as contemplated by the contract. But if the grantor acts honestly, his opinion would not be questioned in a Court of law on the ground that the land was not in fact required for the grantor or for any public purpose. Having regard to the legal principles discussed above, the only question that can be canvassed before us is whether the grantor honestly required the land for a public purpose on the basis of which the licences were sought to be revoked. ( 10. ) IT has already been seen that the grantor, according to the agreements embodying the licences, is the Governor of Madhya Pradesh, i. e. the state of Madhya Pradesh. It has not been shown to us as to how the Additional Collector has the power to take action under clause (iv) on behalf of the grantor. However, as the Additional Collectors authority to act on behalf of the Governor or the State has not been challenged before us, we will assume in favour of existence of authority. The question then is whether the additional Collector formed an honest opinion that the land was required for a public purpose. We have already stated that the Commissioner who is the administrative superior of the Additional Collector had directed that if the licences were intended to be terminated on the ground that the land was required for a public purpose, some inquiry should be made \and a finding should be recorded on that question before terminating the licences. The evidence produced by the plaintiff discloses that no inquiry, as directed by the commissioner, was held by the Additional Collector. The evidence produced by the plaintiff discloses that no inquiry, as directed by the commissioner, was held by the Additional Collector. The defendant-State has not examined the Additional Collector and has not led any evidence whatsoever that any inquiry was held. The material on which the Additional collector acted has also not been produced. Further, the evidence produced by the plaintiff discloses that the land was never previously used for any religious or social purpose by any one in the locality. There was a tap nearby and the land could not be normally required for keeping a tap there. Again, it looks unreasonable to say that 680 sq. ft. of land would be needed for putting a tap or constructing a public urinal. Having regard to all these circumstances and in the absence of any evidence from the other side, we are constrained to hold that the Additional Collector or any person acting honestly could not have formed the opinion that the land was needed for any public purpose. The opinion formed by the Additional Collector cannot be held to be formed in good faith. The revocation of the licences on the basis of such an opinion must be held to be invalid. We may, however, make it clear that it will be open to the appellant to revoke the licences if and when it honestly comes to the conclusion that the land is required for one of the purposes mentioned in clause (iv) of the agreements. ( 11. ) THE appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.