Judgment 1. The petitioner has made this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ quashing an order passed fey the Secretary, Board of Secondary Education giving to the 6th respondent a higher scale of pay than that of the petitioner and asking the petitioner to wait for next vacancy. 2. The case of the petitioner is that she is an assistant teacher in the State Subsidised Girls High English School at Hajipur. The 6th respondent is also a teacher there. The petitioner had joined the school in the year 1961, whereas the 6th respondent in 1958. But at the time of appointment the petitioner was already a graduate having graduated that very year whereas the 6th respondent had only passed I.A. examination and become a graduate much later in the year 1968. Again, the petitioner obtained a Diploma in Education in the year 1968 whereas the 6th respondent did so in the year 1970. The petitioner was confirmed in her Post on the 1st of January, 1970, whereas the 6th respondent was confirmed on the 1st of January, 1971. The petitioner and the respondent aforesaid both appeared at the M. A. examination in the year 1971 and both passed in the second division. The result of the 6th respondent who had taken History as her subject in M.A. was published on the 16th December, 1971, whereas the result of the petitioner who had taken Hindi as her subject was published on the 29th March, 1972. This had happened because the results were published "subject-wise" and therefore on different dates. It is said that in the eye of law there should be no difference on account of the publication of the results on different dates because both were admitted to post-graduate degree the same day and the results were published on different dates for reasons beyond the control of the petitioner. Further case of the petitioner is that government had sanctioned two posts of assistant teachers having the post-graduate degree and trained - one for Science and one for Arts. As a result of this the question was as to whether it was the petitioner or the 6th respondent who was entitled to get a higher pay scale meant for M. A. trained teachers. As a result of this the question was as to whether it was the petitioner or the 6th respondent who was entitled to get a higher pay scale meant for M. A. trained teachers. Both of them had made applications but the managing committee was not able to decide the matter and had therefore referred, the matter to the Board. The Board however returned the reference and asked the managing committee to make its own recommendations. The managing committee however did not do so and again sent the matter to the Board through the 4th respondent, the District Inspectress of Schools. The aforesaid respondent forwarded the letter to the managing committee with her own comments in which it was said that respondent No. 6 was senior to the petitioner because of tha earlier publication of the result. As against this, the petitioner made a representation to the Board through the District Inspectress of Schools and the Inspectress of Schools (Respondent No. 3). As a result the Inspectress of Schools called for a report from the District Inspectress of Schools and the latter sent , her comments to the Inspectress by a letter dated 13th of July, 1973, in which she said that in view of the earlier publication of the result of 6th respondent she became senior to the petitioner, but in this matter there was no fault of the petitioner and both of them had appeared at the examination together and the result had been published on different dates on account of the arrangement of the University. It was further pointed out that the petitioner had become a trained graduate earlier. On the 25th of July, 1973, the District Inspectress of Schools forwarded the representation of the petitioner with her comments suggesting that the petitioner was senior. Meanwhile on the 14th of July, 1973, the Board had passed an order giving to the 6th respondent the pay scale of one of the two posts sanctioned, on the basis of the earliest recommendation of the District Inspectress of Schools. The Board did not pass any order on the representation of the petitioner and the latter therefore requested the Board to reconsider the matter. By a letter dated the 10th August, 1973. The Board did not pass any order on the representation of the petitioner and the latter therefore requested the Board to reconsider the matter. By a letter dated the 10th August, 1973. (Annexure "6") the Board said that since the 6th respondent was available at an earlier point of time as trained M. A. she had been allotted one of the posts aforesaid with higher scale of pay. It was mentioned in the memo to the petitioner that her case would be considered when there was another vacancy in the post of trained M. A. or assistant Head Mistress of the School. 3. Being aggrieved by this decision the petitioner has come up to this Court for quashing of the orders passed in Annexures 3 and 6 and for a direction to the Board to declare the petitioner as senior to respondent No. 6 or to direct the Board to dispose of the petitioners representation. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has challenged the order of the Board on two grounds; firstly, that the case of the petitioner in respect of her seniority has not been considered and secondly that there has been violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as the order was passed ex parte. 5. With regard to the first point there is absolutely no merit in it. It is obvious from the order itself that the question of seniority has been considered inasmuch as it has been held that as the 6th respondent had become available as a trained M. A. at an earlier point of time she had been given the pay scale meant for M. A. trained teacher. The grievance made during the course of argument was not so much non-consideration of the case of seniority as of the decision in this respect being wrong. It was urged that the results having been published on different dates it ought not to have made any material difference with regard to the seniority because the results were published subject wise and this was an arrangement of the University and the petitioner was not at fault. It was urged that the results having been published on different dates it ought not to have made any material difference with regard to the seniority because the results were published subject wise and this was an arrangement of the University and the petitioner was not at fault. It is not necessary for me to express any opinion on the question because it is well settled that in its writ jurisdiction this Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal and it cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the authority concerned provided that the authority is acting within its jurisdiction and not in excess thereof or that it is not acting ultra vires or mala fide. In the present case learned Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to place before me any rules laying down the considerations which have to be kept in view in the matter of deciding the question of seniority of teachers. Learned Counsel has pointed to si Government Resolution No. II/RI-015/64-E-891 dated the 24th March, 1967 and the clarification of that made in Government letter No. 3512 dated the 26th November, 1969 issued by the Director of Public Instruction, Bihar. It will however appear that the resolution and the clarification both relate to the subject of appointments of persons to the posts of Assistant Head Masters and Vice-Principals. Reliance was placed on one of the instructions contained therein viz., that if two assistant teachers were equally qualified and were drawing the same pay and were appointed on the same day, the person who became a trained graduate or got a post-graduate degree and was trained or became a graduate with honours and was trained earlier would be considered to be senior to the other and further that if they were equal even in this respect, the one who was senior in age would be deemed to be senior. Even if this part of the government resolutions were to apply to this case, it would enable the petitioner only to say that the person who became a trained M. A. first would be deemed to be senior. It is not the petitioners case that she became a trained m. A. earlier. Her case at best is that she and the 6th respondent both became trained graduates at the same time. It is not the petitioners case that she became a trained m. A. earlier. Her case at best is that she and the 6th respondent both became trained graduates at the same time. The question as to who is the senior in age has not been raised. In any case further consideration of this resolution is not necessary in view of the fact that this has no application to the present case. 6. The only other rule on which reliance was placed by learned Counsel, which reliance was also misplaced, is contained in "the rules for sanction of pay scales in selection grade to teachers of non-government Secondary and Higher Secondary Schools." The fourth rule which is relied upon lays down: "Selection of teachers for these pay scales will be made on the basis of seniority in the respective cadre and efficiency of the teachers to be judged on the basis of supervision report of the Heads of the institution and inspection reports of the inspecting Officers." Even if these rules were to apply to the present case it would appear that they would not favour he petitioner inasmuch as Rule 5 lays down the guidelines for determination of inter se seniority of the teachers and they are as follows: "(a) Among the teachers of similar qualification the one with longer period of service in a school or schools (in the State) will be deemed to be senior.......... (b) A teacher who has acquired qualification entitling him to the selection grade earlier will be deemed to be senior to a teacher with similar qualification but with longer period of service in a school or schools. (c) Among the teachers having similar qualifications and period of service the one elder in age will be deemed to be senior." If the first guideline was to be applied both the petitioner and the 6th respondent having equal qualification, the 6th respondent would be senior considering her longer period of service in the school. Clause (b) would not be applicable because the qualification of M. A. was obtained by both at the same time, assuming the petitioners argument to be correct. Clause (c) would also not be applicable because both of them have similar qualification though they do not have equal periods of service. In any case as stated above these rules have no relevance to the circumstances of the present case. Clause (c) would also not be applicable because both of them have similar qualification though they do not have equal periods of service. In any case as stated above these rules have no relevance to the circumstances of the present case. As pointed out earlier the petitioner has not drawn attention to any other rule providing for the determination of the question of seniority inter se of the teachers for the purpose of getting pay scale of M. A. trained teacher. 7. In the circumstances aforesaid, the Board appears to have adopted a principle of considering that person to be senior who has obtained the requisite qualification at an earlier date. It has been stated in the counter-affidavit on behalf of the first respondent that in all such similar cases they have adopted the principle of considering that person as senior whose result of the post-graduate examination was declared earlier and the same principle has been applied to the present case. It is therefore difficult to say that the principle adopted by the Board is so irrational or perverse that this Court ought to interfere in spite of the fact that the Board had jurisdiction to decide the matter. It is apparent that the Board has not acted in a manner which may be said to be ultra vires and it is not alleged that the Board has acted mala, fide. The order is thus neither in violation of any law nor is it in absence of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. Thus no ground has been made out by the petitioner to justify an interference with the order by this Court. 8. The second point raised is about the violation of the principles of natural justice. It is said that the petitioner had not been given a personal hearing. It will appear from the provisions of the Bihar High Schools (Control and Regulation of Administration) Act, 1960 that it has provided for vesting the control and regulation of administration of High Schools other than the schools owned by the State Government and for matters connected therewith The Board is entitled under Sec. 4 clauses (e) and (g) of the Act to issue directions to the managing committee of any high school which it may consider necessary in the interest of good administration and perform such other function as may be prescribed. Article 697 of the Bihar Education Code, 1961 which is more or less on the same line but more elaborate also deals with the powers of the Board. It is the admitted case of both parties that the Board had jurisdiction to decide the matter. Counsel for the parties also are agreed that the Board is issuing administrative orders in respect of the matters like the present one. The question as to whether the principles of natural justice apply to administrative orders had been in doubt in courts of law. One view was that the principles apply only to cases where the authority concerned passes a judicial or quasi-judicial order. The earlier cases both of the Courts in England and in India point in this direction. There has however been a development of law on the point in recent years and now the view has been propounded that principles of natural justice would apply even to cases of administrative orders because such administrative orders have to be just and fair. In a recent case Re H. K. (An infant) (1967) 2 WLR 962 an order of certiorari was prayed for to quash a decision of the Chief Emigration Officer refusing an infant admission into the United Kingdom on the ground that the Officer was exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers and ought to have given the boy, as principles of natural justice required, full opportunity to remove the impression of the officer that the boy was over 16 years for which reason admission had been refused. It was held that even in cases of actions which are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, the rules of natural justice applied to a limited ex-tenant. Lord Parker. C.J., said at 971-72: "That is not as I see it a question of acting or being required to act judicially but of being required to act fairly. It was held that even in cases of actions which are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, the rules of natural justice applied to a limited ex-tenant. Lord Parker. C.J., said at 971-72: "That is not as I see it a question of acting or being required to act judicially but of being required to act fairly. Good administration and an honest or bona fide decision must as it seems to me, require not merely impartiality, nor merely bringing ones mind to bear on the problem, but acting fairly: and to the limited extent that the circumstances of any particular case allow, and within the legislative framework under which the administrator is working, only to that limited extent do the so-called rules of natural justice apply, which in a case such as this is merely a duty to act fairly." The next spokesman of this point of view is Lord Denning Master of Rolls in the case of Schmidt V/s. Secretary of State for Home Affairs. (1969) 2 WLR 337 wherein his Lordship held that for the purpose of application of principles of natural justice distinction could not be validly made between judicial and quasi-judicial orders on the one hand and executive or administrative orders on the other. His Lordship said : "But that distinction is no longer valid. The speeches in Ridge V/s. Baldwin, (1964) AC 40 show that an administrative body may, in a proper case, be bound to give a person who is affected by their decision an opportunity of making representation". In this case, his Lordship was dealing with a case under the Aliens Order 1953. 9 Our Supreme Court also in the case of State of Orissa V/s. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 laid down that the principles of natural justice would apply even to a case of administrative order which involved civil consequence. In the case. A. K. Kraipak V/s. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 the Supreme Court said that since the aim of quasi-judicial as well as administrative enquiries is to arrive at a just decision, the rules of natural justice should apply to both and the former classical distinction between the administrative action on the one hand and judicial or quasi-judicial action on the other, was breaking down in modern jurisprudence. The Court noticed the recent trends of the English Court of Appeal (Reg V/s. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Ex Parte Lain, 1967-2 QB 864) (New Zealand the Court of Appeal of New Zealand and Dairy Board V/s. Okita Cooperative Dairy Co. Ltd.. 1953 NZLR 366) Hegde, J., speaking for the Court said as follows: "The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the role of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered "as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power," and again, "............ With the increase of the power of the administrative bodies it has become necessary to provide guidelines for the just exercise of their power. To prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism. Courts are gradually evolving the principles to be observed while exercising such powers. In matters like these public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to precedents. New problems call for new solutions. To prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism. Courts are gradually evolving the principles to be observed while exercising such powers. In matters like these public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to precedents. New problems call for new solutions. It is neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power." On the question whether the principles of natural justice apply to administrative proceedings his Lordship referred to the case in re: H. K. (An infant) (1967) 2 WLR 962 (Supra); AIR 1967 SC 1269 (supra) and then said at page 156: "............ If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries", and again. "............ What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case". 10. In the light of the aforesaid principles the question in the present case is whether the order could be passed ex parte. The principles of natural justice cannot be stretched so far as to say that in every case whether a personal hearing of the person concerned would be necessary or not he will have to be given a hearing. All that can be reasonably said is that in a case where the circumstances require that the person concerned need be given a hearing, it will be done. In the present case both the petitioner and the 6th respondent had filed their applications with all facts for being given the pay scale available to a M. A. trained teacher. They had placed all materials in this connection. It appears next that the petitioner had made a further representation to the Board. It appears further from what has been stated in the writ petition and the counter-affidavits that there is hardly any question of fact in dispute. They had placed all materials in this connection. It appears next that the petitioner had made a further representation to the Board. It appears further from what has been stated in the writ petition and the counter-affidavits that there is hardly any question of fact in dispute. The sole question which presented itself for decision was as to whether the petitioner should be given the higher scale of pay or the 6th respondent. It was contended by the petitioner that both of them having become M. A. at the same time, irrespective of the date of publication of the results, she should have been given the higher pay scale because of other considerations viz., her becoming a graduate and trained teacher earlier, her being given a higher pay scale at her appointment in view of the fact that she was graduate then and of her being confirmed earlier. These considerations did not weigh with the Board for obvious reasons that according to it the 6th respondent was available as M. A. trained earlier than the petitioner. In the circumstances of the case, therefore, there was no question of giving the petitioner any personal hearing in the matter. It cannot therefore be legitimately said that the Board has violated the principles of natural justice in passing the order without giving a hearing to the petitioner. The Board has considered all the relevant matters but adopted one principle for its decision viz. that the person who became M. A. trained earlier and was available as such earlier, be given the higher pay scale. In the present case there has been a consideration of the case of the petitioner and in fact it appears from annexure 6 that the Board has assured the petitioner that her case would be considered as soon as there would be another vacancy of M. A. trained teacher or Assistant Head Mistress of the school. There is thus no substance in the contention of learned Counsel regarding violation of principles of natural justice. 11. For the reasons aforesaid. I find that the petitioner has not been able to make out a case for any interference by this Court with the orders aforesaid. This application is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.