JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, J. - This is a Plaintiff's second appeal from the reversing decision of the Sub Judge, Bolangir dismissing her suit for declaration of title to and recovery of possession of the suit lands after evicting the Defendants therefrom. 2. The Plaintiff's case may be briefly stated. She married Defendant No. 1 about 4 years back in Bandei form, a form of marriage sanctioned by caste custom. This marriage was preceded by a negotiation between Defendant No. 1 and the Plaintiff's father in which the latter insisted that the Defendant No. 1 should make a gift of the suit lands to the Plaintiff by way of security for her future as the Defendant No. 1 had already his first wife living. Defendant No. 1 agreed and after solemnization of his marriage with the Plaintiff executed the deed of gift on 19-8-1960. The recitals of the deed of gift, however, indicated as if Defendant No. 1 was making the gift of natural love and affection for the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff accepted the gift and remained in possession of the same for one year. In 1961, that is to say, after lapse of one year of the marriage Defendant No. 1 is alleged to have deserted the Plaintiff and prevented her from cultivating the suit land and finally, on 29-11-1963, he refused to part with the suit land. This action on the part of the Defendant No. 1 has compelled her to file the present suit. 3. Defendant No. 2 is said to be the adopted son and Defendant No. 3, the first wife of Defendant No. 1. The Defendants 1 and 3 contested the suit. They deny the plaint allegation of marriage between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 and of their living together as husband and wife. They also contend that the alleged gift deed by Defendant No. 1 to the Plaintiff was never executed and is void in law. It is admitted that there were some negotiations for the marriage between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1, but the same fell through and the marriage never took place. In the alternative, it is pleaded that even if the marriage of the Plaintiff with the Defendant No. 1 were true, it would never the less be void because at the time of marriage, Defendant No. 1 had a wife living, namely, Defendant No. 3. In the alternative, it is pleaded that even if the marriage of the Plaintiff with the Defendant No. 1 were true, it would never the less be void because at the time of marriage, Defendant No. 1 had a wife living, namely, Defendant No. 3. The suit land originally belonged to Plaintiff's father who sold it to Defendant No. 1 and the consideration money for it was paid out of the joint family funds of the joint family comprising of the three Defendants and Defendant No. 1 had, therefore, no competency to alienate it by way of gift. 4. The trial Court found that,(a) the Plaintiff married Defendant No. 1, but the said marriage was Void ab initio, (b) the Defendant t No. 2 was not the adopted son of Defendant No. 1, (c) the suit land is' not the joint family property of the Defendants, but was the separate property of Defendant No. 1 and he was competent to transfer it by way of gift and that transfer could not be challenged by Defendants 2 and 3, and (d) the deed of gift was validly executed by Defendant No. 1 and was valid in law. Accordingly, the Plaintiff acquired good title to the suit property. On this findings he decreed the suit. 5. The lower appellate Court upheld the findings of the trial Court that there was a marriage, in fact, between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. I, but the said marriage was void, that Defendant No. 2 is not the adopted son of Defendant No. 1 and that the gift was voluntary. He, however, differed from the trial Court on the question of validity of the gift. According to him the object of the gift being illegal, the gift itself was, accordingly, invalid. In that view it thought it unnecessary to enter into the question whether there was a valid acceptance of the gift. Ultimately, he dismissed the suit. 6. The concurrent findings of fact are no longer open to challenge nor indeed, have they been impeached in this second appeal. In that view it thought it unnecessary to enter into the question whether there was a valid acceptance of the gift. Ultimately, he dismissed the suit. 6. The concurrent findings of fact are no longer open to challenge nor indeed, have they been impeached in this second appeal. The only question for consideration is whether the gift having been made pursuant to an agreement the object or consideration of which was unlawful as defined by Section 23 of the Contract Act was prohibited by Section 6(h)(2) of the Transfer of Property Act and as such, was void and whether, the Plaintiff should be non suited on the doctrine of 'in pari delicto' or 'in particeps crimims'. The lower appellate Court on a perusal of the deed of gift (Ex. 2) concluded that the recitals by themselves did not indicate that the object of the gift was to second marriage of the Plaintiff with the Defendant No. 1, which, in fact, was a void marriage, by reason of it having been performed in clear contravention of Clause (i) of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955. He relied upon the allegations of the plaint itself to hold that the object of the gift was the second marriage which was a void marriage. There are clear recitals in the plaint that originally the suit land belonged to Plaintiff's father and some 6 to 7 years before suit, Defendant No. 1 wanted to purchase the land from Plaintiffs father and also to marry his daughter. In this marriage negotiation between the Plaintiff's father and Defendant No. 1, the former finding that the latter had already a wife living insisted that Defendant No. 1 should make a gift of the suit land, which he agreed to sell to the Defendant No. 1 and ultimately sold, to the Plaintiff for her future safeguard. Defendant No. 1 agreed to this term and marriage between Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 took place in due Course. Subsequently, after 2 to 4 months of the marriage, the Defendant No. 1 executed and registered a deed of gift in respect of the suit land on 19-8-1960 as a measure of securing the Plaintiff's future on the request of the Plaintiff who said that she apprehend future danger. Subsequently, after 2 to 4 months of the marriage, the Defendant No. 1 executed and registered a deed of gift in respect of the suit land on 19-8-1960 as a measure of securing the Plaintiff's future on the request of the Plaintiff who said that she apprehend future danger. He also put the Plaintiff in possession of the suit land as a token of his affection for the Plaintiff and to satisfy her. The Plaintiff has deposed that she was aware of this term of the marriage contract which was made to ensure her safety against her future neglect by Defendant No. 1 which was apprehended on account of the existence of his first wife. The lower appellate Court, therefore, held that the object of the gift being to contract a second marriage with the Plaintiff which was prohibited under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, was unlawful. 7. Section 6(h)(2) of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that: No transfer can be made for an unlawful object, or consideration within the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act provides that: The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the persons or property of another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object of consideration is unlawful, is void. 9. Consideration is defined in Section 2(d) of the Contract Act as: When, at the desire of the promise, the promise or any other person has done or abstained from doing order or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise. 10. Section 4 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that the chapters and sections of this Act which relate to contracts shall be taken as part of the Indian Contract Act. 1872 (IX) of 1872. 11. 10. Section 4 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that the chapters and sections of this Act which relate to contracts shall be taken as part of the Indian Contract Act. 1872 (IX) of 1872. 11. The reference to the Contract Act in the Transfer of Property Act is for determining whether the object or consideration of the agreement or the transaction of transfer is lawful or unlawful, the tests for it being provided in Section 23 of the Contract Act. If the object or consideration is found to be unlawful, the resulting transfer is treated as a void transaction and no estate passes thereunder. That is clear from the wording of Section 6(h)(2) of Transfer of Property Act which flays that in such cases no transfer can be made. If a transferor has transferred property for an object or consideration which is unlawful, the estate never passes to the transferee and the property remains with the owner, and if the transferor has parted with possession in pursuance of such a transfer, he cannot recover the property from the transferee. Similarly if the transferor having made such a void transfer has not parted with possession, the transferee cannot sue for possession on the footing of such transfer. The reason for this rule which has been evolved by Courts of law has been discussed in the case of Pranballav Saha and Another Vs. Sm. Tulsibala Dassi and Another. In that case, the owner bad let out his property for the immoral purpose of running a brother and upon the owner's death the Plaintiff executors and trustees of the will of the owner had sued to recover possession. They were met with the plea that since the owner having transferred his property for immoral purpose could not seek the assistance of the Court for its recovery, the executors and trustees under his will can not, for the same reason, recover possession. Their Lordships discussed the evolution of the principle on which the defence plea was founded in great detail and I will extract copiously from their judgments. 12. Their Lordships discussed the evolution of the principle on which the defence plea was founded in great detail and I will extract copiously from their judgments. 12. Justice P.B. Mookherjee who delivered the leading judgment in the aforesaid case said: The reason why ordinarily a person who has himself been a party to the immoral purpose or consideration is not allowed relief in Court is not because the transfer for immoral purpose is good, but because a person participating in immorality is not assisted by the Court to take the help of law to enforce his rights. It is a bar on his right of recovery with the aid of Court and not a legal sanction to transfer in breach of Statute. It has been put, explained, expounded and formulated in diverse ways. Behind the numerous justifications for this rule the one underlying recurring reason is not that what the law says to be void is not void, but that the Court does not allow its own procedure to be used by one who has himself been a party to the immoral purpose of consideration. An analysis of numerous cases on the point shows that the Court has justified its attitude either (1) on the ground of public policy, or (2) that the Courts do not aid a party to an illegal undertaking, or (3) that the la w does not permit a party deliberately to put his property out of his control for an immoral purpose and then seek intervention of the Court to regain the same after the immoral purpose is executed or accomplished, or (4) where both parties are equally guilty law leaves t he parties where it finds them and keeps itself comfortably aloof from the obligation to determine the rights as between the guilty parties, or (5) that a party who claims an equitable relief must come into Court with dear hands, or (6) that the party could not be allowed to be hot and cold, or (7) to let the mischief lie where it exists. An these justifications appear to be inspired by a variety of such miscellaneous maxims such as : (1) Ex. (sic) action (2) Ex. turpis cause (sic) condition Defendant is (3) Nullius commence caper (sic) and (4) Allegan contrarian (sic) audients. An these justifications appear to be inspired by a variety of such miscellaneous maxims such as : (1) Ex. (sic) action (2) Ex. turpis cause (sic) condition Defendant is (3) Nullius commence caper (sic) and (4) Allegan contrarian (sic) audients. Behind all these various justifications the Courts appear to have conceived, discovered and followed a ground of public policy of their own. A not unreasonable judicial sanctimoniousness helped them to reach the conclusion that it is against public policy that a party to the immoral consideration or object scheduled be aided by the Court. The learned Judge has visualised certain exceptions to the aforesaid procedural rule evolved by the Courts but need not extract them became the instant case is not one which is covered by such contemplated exceptions. 13. Justice Bachawat, the other learned Judge in the aforesaid Calcutta case has stated: In general Courts refuse to give relief to a party to an illegal contract who either founds his cause of action upon it or who has necessarily to disclose or plead its illegality to sustain his cause of action. An agreement the object or consideration of which is unlawful as defined by Section 23 of the Contract Act is unlawful and void. In general a (sic) cannot obtain refund of money paid under an unlawful agreement. In Indian law a transfer for an unlawful objector consideration within the meaning of Section 23 of the Contract Act is prohibited by Section 6(h), Clause 2 of the Transfer of Property Act. Such a transfer is void and need not be set aside. In Indian law the transferee cannot recover the property on the strength of such a transfer. He has also categorised exceptions to the general rule which need not be extracted as the present case does not fall within the am bit of the exceptions. 14. In the instant case, as will be seen from the recitals of fact found above, the deed of gift was executed by Defendant No. 1 pursuant to a marriage contract entered into by him with the Plaintiff's father. That contract comprise of reciprocal promises. 14. In the instant case, as will be seen from the recitals of fact found above, the deed of gift was executed by Defendant No. 1 pursuant to a marriage contract entered into by him with the Plaintiff's father. That contract comprise of reciprocal promises. The Plaintiff's father promised to sell the suit land to Defendant No. 1 and to give his daughter in bigamous marriage to him forbidden by Section 5(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act and in the return the Defendant No. 1 reciprocally promised to execute a deed of gift in favour of the Plaintiff in respect of the suit land. Therefore, the consideration of the Defendant No. 1 executing the deed of gift in favour of the Plaintiff was the latter being given in bigamous marriage to him. This consideration is unlawful as defined in Section 23 of the Contract Act and consequently no property passed under the deed of gift by reason of Section 6(h)(2) of Transfer of Property Act. The marriage contract which preceded the gift being void, the gift must per force be void. It will be further noticed that the marriage agreement was entered into with the full knowledge of the Plaintiff and it is at her instance to carry into effect the said agreement that the deed of gift was executed by Defendant No. 1 though innocuous recitals were made in the gift deed. It is also clear from the fact that the gift deed was executed within 2 to 4 months of the Plaintiff's marriage with Defendant No. 1 that the object in executing the gift deed; was continue marital relationship with the Plaintiff which being expressly prohibited by law was not only illegal but immoral. The Plaintiff was also a participator in this unlawful transaction, and the object was to permit carrying on of future illicit cohabitation by Defendant No. 1 with her. Thus, for the aforesaid 'reasons, the Plaintiff is bound to be non-suited not only because the gift deed is void but also because the Court will not lend its aid by reason of the operation of the doctrine of "pari delicto" or "particles criminal". In my opinion the suit has been rightly dismissed. 15. In the result, the appeal fails and dismissed But in the circumstances, there will be no order for costs of this Court. Final Result : Dismissed