JUDGMENT 1. THE Court : In this Writ application the petitioner has challenged the validity of an order dated January 8, 1973 whereby the Director-General, Supplies and Disposals, Vigilance section, has proposed to start inquiry proceedings against the petitioner on the ground of some allegations mentioned in the said order, The facts of the case may briefly be stated as follows: 2. ON February 23, 1960, the petitioner joined the post of Examiner of stores, Engineering, at the office of the director of Inspector, Government of India. Sometime between July and august, 1962 according to the respondents the petitioner committed certain acts of misconduct. On July 1965 the director-General, Supplies and Disposals, govt. of India proposed to hold an enquiry against the petitioner under central Civil Services Conduct Rules, 11964, in respect of those alleged acts of misconduct. According to the respondents, similar acts of misconduct were also committed by one Mr. Swaminathan. On or about December 9, 1966 disciplinary proceedings were started against the petitioner and Swaminathan and a joint enquiry was held by the inquiry Officer on December 24, 1966, the Inquiry Officer found that the charges against the petitioner and Mr. Swaminathan were proved. On December 12, 1967, the Director-General, Sup plies and Disposals proposed to impose penalty of removal of the petitioner and asked him to make representation why the penalty should not be imposed. On february 8, 1968, the Director-General, supplies and Disposals decided to take disciplinary action against the petitioner and Swaminathan. On March 7, 1968, the petitioner was removed from service with immediate effect. The said Swaminathan was also compulsorily retired from the service on the basis of the findings of the said Inquiry Officer. Mr. Swaminathan, however, moved an application under Art. 226 for quashing the said order Mukharji J. on July 20, 1971, has decided in favour of Mr. Swaminathan and made the rule absolute. The material portions of the said judgment read as follows : therefore, the proceedings beginning with the charge-sheet dated 19th July, 1965, enquiry report dated 24th December, 1965 and the final order dated 18th May, 1968 are hereby quashed and set aside. . . . . . . . . This order will not prevent the respondents from proceeding afresh with a fresh enquiry against the petitioner in accordance with law, if they are otherwise entitled to in law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . This order will not prevent the respondents from proceeding afresh with a fresh enquiry against the petitioner in accordance with law, if they are otherwise entitled to in law. . . . . . . . " As stated earlier, the allegations against the petitioner and Mr. Swaminathan were enquired into jointly by the Inquiry Officer on December 9 1966. But the petitioner unlike Mr swaminathan, did not choose to move the Writ Court for quashing the order of removal against him. After the rule was made absolute in favour of Mr. Swaminathan the petitioner made re presentation to the respondents on September 6, 1971, for reconsideration of his case in the light of the said High court decision in favour of Mr. Swaminathan. On March 13, 1972, the respondents after consideration of the said representation withdrew the original order of removal of the petitioner dated march 7, 1968. The petitioner there after reported for duty on March 17, 1972. On January 8, 1973, the impugned order was made 1973 whereby the Director-General, Supplies and Disposals in formed the petitioner that a fresh enquiry would be held against the petitioner. 3. MR. B.C. Dutt, counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the petitioner was removed from service by the respondent after termination of disciplinary proceedings against him. The respondents thereafter withdraw the said order of removal and reinstated the petitioner. A second enquiry with respect to the same allegations which took place in 1962 is not permissible in law. Reliance has been placed by him on (55) K. R. Deb v. The Collector of Central excise Shillong A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1447, (3) Dwarkachand v. State of Rajasthan A.I.R. 1958 Raj. 38. His second contention is that as a result of the withdrawal of the order of removal on march 13, 1972, the petitioner who was working in other private concern had to leave the job and joined his original post. The respondents, having now decided to start a second enquiry against the petitioner on the basis of the previous allegations, are estopped from initiating again any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. 4. MR. Bachawat, counsel on. The respondents, having now decided to start a second enquiry against the petitioner on the basis of the previous allegations, are estopped from initiating again any disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. 4. MR. Bachawat, counsel on. behalf of the respondents, has submitted that in the facts of this case there is no legal bar under the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules to initiate a second enquiry on the identical allegation-which prompted the first enquiry. Mr bachawat also contended that the question of estoppel cannot be raised in this case as no specific ground has been pleased in. the petition. In my view, a second enquiry is not permissible in law on the identical allegations subject to this condition that the disciplinary authority after the first enquiry has decided the allegations of merits. In this case the allegation 5 against the petitioner had been decide 5 on merits by the Enquiry Officer. The enquiry Officer found him guilty and on that basis the disciplinary authority removed him from service. The petitioner accepted the said position an 3 did not complain against the order of removal dated May 18, 1968. There s some force in the contention of Mr dutt that as the said order of removal was unconditional, a second enquiry before the Inquiry Officer should not be held in view of the fact that the first inquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority have already decided against him on the basis of the same allegations but in this particular case there are certain special facts which have got to be considered before deciding the question whether a second enquiry is permissible in law. 5. MR. Swaminathan and the petitioner were, as stated earlier, tried jointly but Swaminathan was compulsorily retired from service on the basis of the findings of the same Inquiry officer. Mr. Swaminathan raised a question of law before this Hon'ble court and the learned Judge has held that the order compulsorily retiring him from service is invalid in law on the ground that Swaminathan could not be held liable under Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 for some misconduct in 1962. The learned Judge has held that the said Conduct Rules are prospective and, therefore, those rules could not be made applicable to the acts of omission and commission which took place in 1962. The learned Judge has held that the said Conduct Rules are prospective and, therefore, those rules could not be made applicable to the acts of omission and commission which took place in 1962. It was on the basis of this decision of Mukharji, J. that the petitioner made a written re presentation to the respondents who withdrew the said order of removal. The authorities must have felt that as the joint enquiry took place before the inquiry Officer, the order of removal of service of the petitioner is also not war ranted in law. But Mr. Dutt's contention is that the respondents having unconditionally withdrawn the order of removal a second inquiry for determining the correctness of the allegations against the petitioner would be unfair and illegal. As stated earlier, the petitioner accepted the order of removal of service and did not move this Court for quashing the proceedings against him. In the facts of this case the petitioner has been reinstated after about 4 years on the basis of the said judgment of Mukharji J. Mukharji, J. has not discussed the merits of the case of swaminathan; nor the petitioner was a party to the said proceedings before miukharji, J. Mr. Dutt has urged that his; client made the said representations to the respondents without an opportunity to examine the contents and the operative portion of the said judgment. The petitioner having not complained against his order of removal for about 4 years abided by the decision of the authorities. But as Swanunathan was reinstated on the aforesaid legal ground the petitioner took a chance to make a representation to the respondents to re consider his case. It is not unnatural to apprehend that the Inquiry Officer in the second enquiry would be prejudiced by the findings of the Inquiry Officer in the first enquiry and, as such, the second enquiry in this particular case would be very much prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner. As set out earlier Mukharji, J. has made the rule absolute in favour of Mr. Swaminathan but the learned Judge has added that the order will not prevent the respondents from proceeding afresh with a first enquiry against Swaminathan in accordance with law, "if they are other wise entitled to in law". The question to be decided now if the order for initiating a fresh enquiry against the petitioner is permissible in law. Swaminathan but the learned Judge has added that the order will not prevent the respondents from proceeding afresh with a first enquiry against Swaminathan in accordance with law, "if they are other wise entitled to in law". The question to be decided now if the order for initiating a fresh enquiry against the petitioner is permissible in law. 6. MR. Bachawat relying upon (2) Debendra Protap Narain Roy Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, A.I.R. 1862 S.C. 1334 has contended that there is nothing in the rule which prevents the appointing authorities to start a second enquiry if the decision of a court of law on the same subject-matter has not been made on merits. He has drawn my attention to the following observations of the Supreme Court at page 1336. "the binding effect of a judgment depends not upon any technical consideration of form, but of substance. The High Court in the appeal filed by the appellant in suit No. 163 of 1954 did not exonerate the appellant from the charges. The High Court decreed the suit on the ground that the procedure for imposing the penalty was irregular and such a decision cannot prevent a State from commencing another enquiry in respect of the same subject matter consistently with the provisions of Arts. 310 and 311. " Shah, J. distinguishing the Dwarkachand's case A.I.R. J. 958 Raj. 38 has made the following observations at the same page : "these cases do not lend support to the proposition that after an order passed, in an enquiry against a public servant imposing a penalty is quashed by a civil court, no further proceeding can be commenced against him even if in the proceeding in which the order quashing an enquiry was passed, the merits of the charge against the public servant concerned were never investigated. If the State Government was competent to order a fresh enquiry we see no reason why it would be incompetent to direct suspension of the appellant during the pendency of the enquiry". 7. THE proposition laid down in the said Supreme Court decision cannot be questioned but Mr. Dutt has argued that the facts of the present case are distinguishable from those in the Supreme Court. 7. THE proposition laid down in the said Supreme Court decision cannot be questioned but Mr. Dutt has argued that the facts of the present case are distinguishable from those in the Supreme Court. In the present case a decision was made by the appointing authorities after a proper enquiry and order of removal was passed against the petitioner on May 18, 1968. As stated earlier the petitioner obeyed the said order of removal. It appears from the statements in the petition that he joined other private firms to earn his live hood. Thus, it cannot be said that a final decision in this particular case has not been made by the appointing authority against the petitioner. I have already set out the circumstances under which the said order of removal was withdrawn but the fact remains that the petitioner was re-instead in his old post and without any condition. It was not stated in the said order that the petitioner would be dealt with in accordance with the operative portion of Mukherjee, J. nor was their any indication that a fresh enquiry would be started against him after he would resume his original post. Further it should be remembered that mukherjee, J. has made the rule also lute against Mr. Swaminathan. It is true that Mr. Swaminathan has been charged with the same offence with which the petitioner is also charged. It is also correct that the joint enquiry was held in respect of the allegations against Mr. Swaminathan and the petitioner. Mr. Bachawat is right when he said that Mukherjee, J. has not decided the merits of the allegations against Mr. Swaminathan. Mukherjee, J. has made the rule absolute only on the ground that offences alleged to have been committed during the period between July and August 1962 cannot be tried or enquired into under the Central Civil services (Conduct) Rules 1964. Thus, ordinarily the respondents would be at liberty to start a fresh enquiry as to the allegations against Swaminathan, but the petitioner before this Court is not Mr. Swaminathan. He naturally took a chance of making a representation to the respondent's asking them to consider his case for reinstatement on the basis of the said decision of Mukherjee, J. The respondents could have rejected the petitioner's representation on, the ground of delay or on other grounds and refused to withdraw the order of his removal. Swaminathan. He naturally took a chance of making a representation to the respondent's asking them to consider his case for reinstatement on the basis of the said decision of Mukherjee, J. The respondents could have rejected the petitioner's representation on, the ground of delay or on other grounds and refused to withdraw the order of his removal. The respondent about six months after the said representation decided to withdraw the said order of removal. It is clear from the said order of removal that the petitioner was allowed to join his original post without any reservation or condition thus, a decision has been made against the petitioner by the Enquiry Officer and on the basis of the said decision the appointing authority removed him from service. The petitioner accepted the said position, did not move the high Court against the said order of removal and yet the respondents reinstated him unconditionally. In these circumstances, if a fresh enquiry is started against the petitioner on the identical allegations, a second enquiry even if ordinarily permissible by the appointing authority in appropriate cases, would not be fair or proper. It is natural for the petitioner to apprehend that in the second enquiry he would also be found guilty in view of the fact that the guilt of the petitioner has not been set aside or confirmed by any court of law. 8. MR. Dutt has distinguished the case, (5) K.R. Deb v. The Collector of central Excise, Shillong, A.I.R. 1971 b. C. 1447 and has submitted that a second enquiry is at best permissible in law if a final order of punishment has not been passed as a result of the first enquiry. This decision relates to the construction of rule 15 of the Central civil Services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules 1957. It appears to me that this rule is substantially the same as rule 14 of the Central Services (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1965. According to Mr. This decision relates to the construction of rule 15 of the Central civil Services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules 1957. It appears to me that this rule is substantially the same as rule 14 of the Central Services (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1965. According to Mr. Bachawat the supreme Court has on a construction of rule 15 made the following observation at page 1449 which reads as follows : "it seems to us that rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one enquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the enquiry or some important wit nesses were not available at the time of the enquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the disciplinary authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence. But there is no pro vision in rule 15 for completely setting aside previous enquiries on the ground that the report of the enquiring Officer or officers does not appeal to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has enough powers to consider the evidence itself and come to his own conclusion under rule 9". In that case no final order of punishment was made by the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that some more evidence would be required and accordingly, the disciplinary authority directed a "further enquiry" which, in substance, means a continuation of the first enquiry. As stated earlier, in the present case that is not the position. The disciplinary authority passed its final order of removal by way of punishment, and naturally a second enquiry cannot be held to be permissible unless the rules provide so. Counsel for the respondents has not been able to specify any particular rule which empowers (he appointing authority to make a second enquiry. In this connection, reliance has been placed by Mr. Bachawat on Khem Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 687 in support of his contention that a second enquiry is contemplated under the said rules. In my view, this decision of the Supreme court has no application to the facts of this case. In that decision the Supreme Court has decided the constitutional validity of rule 12 (4) of Central civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. In my view, this decision of the Supreme court has no application to the facts of this case. In that decision the Supreme Court has decided the constitutional validity of rule 12 (4) of Central civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. The question whether a second enquiry is permissible in law or not has not been decided in the said decision. Referring to paragraph 18 of the said decision at page 692 Mr. Bachawat has argued that a second enquiry is permissible under certain circumstances. In the said paragraph the Supreme Court has construed rule 12 (3) of 1957 which is substantially the same as rule 10 (4) of: 1965 but it is clear from the said rule that it relates to only cases of suspension. Admittedly, in the instant case; the petitioner has not been suspended. Further, the final decision of the appointing authority punishing the petitioner by removing him from service has not been set aside in a Court of law and, as such the word a further enquiry" in rule 10 (4) cannot be made applicable to the case of the petitioner who has been directed to face a fresh enquiry - under rule 3 of the Central Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955 read with rule 25 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct rules, 1964. 9. THERE is another reason why in the facts and. circumstances of this case a second enquiry is not permissible in law. Mukharji, J. has already decided in the case of Sivaminathan that a person who has committed an act of misconduct in 1962 cannot be charged under Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964. In the present case the enquiry has again been started, as stated earlier, under rule 3 of the Conduct Rules of 1955 read with rule 25 of the Conduct Rules of 1964. Even assuming that there can be a second enquiry under the 1955 Rules the charge is also vitiated by the fact that the respondents are trying to initiate a second enquiry under the Conduct rules of 1964 which, according to mukharjee, J. is invalid in law. 10. FURTHER, Mr. Dutt has argued that a second enquiry is not permissible in law under the principle of estoppel. Mr. Bachawat has stated that no specific ground has been taken and the impugned order of suspension has not been challenged on the ground of law of estoppel. Mr. 10. FURTHER, Mr. Dutt has argued that a second enquiry is not permissible in law under the principle of estoppel. Mr. Bachawat has stated that no specific ground has been taken and the impugned order of suspension has not been challenged on the ground of law of estoppel. Mr. Dutt has relied upon Registrar, University of Madras v. Sundara Shetti and order A.I.R. 1956 Madras 309, 314, 315, kumari Akhtar v. Admission Committee A.I.R. 1959 Andhra Pradesh 493, 493 k. Jagannadham v. District Collector, ktrno. nl and Anr. A.I.R. 1966 Andhra pradesh 59, The Union of India and. ors v. M/s. Anglo Afghan Agencies a. T. R. 1968 S. C. 718, 727, Century spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and anr. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1021 and narinderchand Hemraj v. Lt. Governor administrator, Union Territory A.I.R 1971 S.C. 2399 at 2403. In my view this contention of Mr. Dutt should be accepted in the facts of the present case. The reasons, why I have come to the said conclusion are as follows : (A) In paragraph 32 (d) of the petition- it is stated that the petitioner had to join his original post after giving up the private service to his great disadvantage and there is likelihood of his getting no other job elsewhere. In this same paragraph it is also stated that by withdrawal of the previous order of removal from service there has been complete withdrawal of the charges for which previous enquiry was held. According to the petitioner the said withdrawal order was unconditional and it does neither contend nor indicate about holding of the second enquiry against the petitioner. Similar statement was also made in the last sentence of paragraph 31 of the petition. (B) By the order of the respondent dated 21.8.68 the period of absence of the petitioner from 19.3.62 to 25.5.13 b was treated as on duty. (C) By the order dated March 23, 1972 the petitioner has been transfer red to the Structural Section of the department from his original post. By an order dated March 29, 1972 the petitioner was allowed to draw provisional pay that he drew last with usual allowance with effect from March 17, 1972. (C) By the order dated March 23, 1972 the petitioner has been transfer red to the Structural Section of the department from his original post. By an order dated March 29, 1972 the petitioner was allowed to draw provisional pay that he drew last with usual allowance with effect from March 17, 1972. On April 15, 1972 the petitioner was asked to disclose how he earned his living during the period between 21.5.68 to 16.3.72 It was also decided by the respondent that in relation, to the period of absence from 21.5.68 to 16.3.72, the petitioner's salary would be paid after adjustment of the amount earned by him through employment during the period from : 21.5.68 to 21.10.68, 21.12.68 to 15.3.69 and 1.1.70 to 16.3.72. It is clear that on account of the unconditional withdrawal of the order of removal the petitioner gave up his previous job and rejoined his old post. Respondent, as stated earlier, should not have passed an unconditional order of removal and as a result of the said order the petitioner has changed his position in life and the respondent can not be allowed to take advantage of their own omission or negligence. 11. MR. Bachawat has argued that there cannot be estoppel against a statute, but he has not been able to specify any particular rule which provides that a second enquiry is permissible. He has also contended that the respondents have not made any representation to the petitioner at the time of the withdrawal of the order of removal that no second enquiry would take place. In my view the said order of removal and the subsequent facts allowing him to join the post unconditionally fixing his salary after adjustment of the amounts earned from his private employment clearly show that the respondents are estopped by conduct from initiating a second enquiry in the present case with respect to the same allegations on the basis of which he has been punished. Lastly, the alleged miss-conduct took place in 1962 and the respondents are now trying to start an enquiry proceedings in 1973 that is after about 11 years. This is not only unfair and improper but also a second enquiry at this stage facing charges against him under conduct rules 1955 read with Conduct Rules 1964 by another enquiry Officer is contrary to all principles of fair play and justice. This is not only unfair and improper but also a second enquiry at this stage facing charges against him under conduct rules 1955 read with Conduct Rules 1964 by another enquiry Officer is contrary to all principles of fair play and justice. For all the reasons stated above the Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs. There will be stay of the operation of the order for three weeks. Rule made absolute.