JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - The Petitioner was appointed as a chairman in the office of the District Statistical Officer, Koraput by order dated 27-12-1965. The District Statistical Officer, Koraput, by order dated 10-3-1969 terminated his service. That termination is challenged as contrary to law in this writ application. 2. According to the Petitioner while the Petitioner had been entrusted to give bath to a young daughter of the District Statistical Officer on 9-3-1969, she started crying. The opposite party No. 3, the District Statistical Officer, wanted to find out the reason as to why she was crying. The Petitioner contends that he indicated to him that possibly because soap water had got into her eyes he had been crying. The opposite party No. 3 is alleged to have lost temper and slapped the Petitioner on his back. When the Petitioner wanted to find out as to why he was being unnecessarily assaulted, the opposite party No. 3 took out his right slipper and gave a beating with it to the Petitioner and directed the Petitioner to leave his house. On 10.3.1969, when the Petitioner went to attend office he was served with the impugned order of termination of service. 3. In the counter affidavit of the opposite party No. 3 all these allegations have been specifically denied. On the other hand it has been indicated that ?the Petitioner?s service was not found satisfactory for quite sometime ?prior to the date of termination. He was being warned from time to time. On one occasion he had been fined. It was found that on 9.3-1969 the Petitioner showed very disobedient conduct when he was directed to call one establishment clerk in connection with some official work. On 10-3-1969, his services were accordingly terminated. In a separate counter affidavit on behalf of the opposite parties 1 and 2 the details of the unsatisfactory service of the Petitioner had been furnished. 4. The order of termination is as follows: The service of Sri Radha Mohan Padhi appointed as a temporary peon in this office is hereby terminated with effect from 10-3-1269 A.N. He should deposit all Government articles issued to him or lying in his custody, if any, immediately In the face of it toe order is innocuous and does not (sic) any stigma. Mr. Mr. Dora for the Petitioner, however, captains that the order is founded upon in disciplined conduct of toe Petitioner and we should look behind the order to find out where of the termination has been brought about by an innocuous order or as a measure of punishment. The learned Government Advocate for the opposite parties takes the stand that, the Petitioner was a temporary employee and had no right to the office. His conduct for more than a year had been very unsatisfactory. He had been several times warned and on one occasion had been fined. Improvements were expected, but when his conduct was found to be incorrigible his services were done away with. According to him unsatisfactory work may have been motive for the termination. But as toe order is innocuous we are not to delve into the background of the matter. 5. Mr. Dora for the Petitioner has relied upon two decisions of toe Supreme Court being Dubesh Chandra Das v. Union of India 1969 S.L.R. 485 and Madan Mohan v. State of Bihar 1973 (1) S.L.R. 630 . He has also placed reliance upon some decisions of toe Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir High Courts. The learned Government Advocate relies upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Nepal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1974 (1) S.L.R. 326. According to him this case is squarely covered by the third test indicated and as such does not justify our interference. 6. Mr. Dora concedes that the allegations upon which the application has been filed having, been seriously disputed are not to be examined by us as providing the foundation for the termination. He, however, relies upon the facts stated in the counter affidavits of the opposite parties as also a report of the opposite-party No. 3 to the opposite party No. 2 on an appeal made by the Petitioner challenging his termination. Undoubtedly in these documents the unsatisfactory service of the Petitioner spread over a period has been highlighted. We are however, of the view that merely because an analysis of the past unsatisfactory service of the Petitioner has been given the ?innocuous order of termination cannot be taken to have been founded upon unsatisfactory conduct. The cases relied upon by Mr. Dora had peculiar features which, in our view, are wanting in the present case. We are however, of the view that merely because an analysis of the past unsatisfactory service of the Petitioner has been given the ?innocuous order of termination cannot be taken to have been founded upon unsatisfactory conduct. The cases relied upon by Mr. Dora had peculiar features which, in our view, are wanting in the present case. Admittedly the Petitioner had no right to the post because he was continuing as a temporary employee. Law is settled that a temporary-employee is entitled to the protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The order of termination certainly brings about an end to the service. If it is made as a measure of punishment, certainly Article 311(2) of the Constitution is attracted and the impugned order would be justified if it came at the end of a disciplinary action. Admittedly no proceedings have been taken. But law is fairly settled that unless an order of termination in the case of a temporary servant is passed in innocuous terms as a camouflage for an order of dismissal and stigma is latent in the order, it is not open to the Court to require the disciplinary authority of a civil servant to resort to Article 311(2) of the Constitution as a condition precedent to termination of service. Merely because in answer to the writ application the unsatisfactory conduct of the Petitioner was referred to, we cannot hold that the impugned order of termination was actually one of dismissal from service. The employer is entitled to look into the service records or the conduct of a temporary employee with a view to determine as to whether he should be continued in service. This is a necessary incidence of a public employment; otherwise public employment cannot be efficient and the purpose for which employment is given would not really be met. Certain guarantees have been afforded to public servants so that they may have security of service and be in a position to render service and discharge their work appropriately. Affording of guarantees or security is not an end in itself. The need of the society is paramount and guarantee in respect of service of public servants has been afforded to ensure that end. A balance has got to be struck between the social purpose and the security to be afforded to the civil servant. 7. On giving our anxious consideration to the contentions of Mr. The need of the society is paramount and guarantee in respect of service of public servants has been afforded to ensure that end. A balance has got to be struck between the social purpose and the security to be afforded to the civil servant. 7. On giving our anxious consideration to the contentions of Mr. Dora we are not satisfied that this is a fit case where, merely because in the counter affidavits in to is proceeding or in the report by the opposite party No. 3 to the opposite party No. 2 the unsatisfactory service of the Petitioner had been indicated, we should, hold that the impugned termination is actually a dismissal for misconduct. The past unsatisfactory service of the Petitioner verily provided the motive for the order and law is settled that on that ground an innocuous order of termination is not open to challenge. We accordingly dismiss this application. Admittedly the Petitioner rushed to the Court on a set of allegations which he has failed to establish. Ordinarily while dismissing such an application we would have awarded costs to the opposite parties. But as we find that the Petitioner has lost his service we do not propose to saddle costs against him. B.K. Ray J. 8. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed