( 1 ) THESE three petitions are disposed of together by a Commpn order as, they are directed agaist a common committal order made under S. 207a, crpc by the Judicial Magistrate, I Class (I Court), Bangalore City in CC no. 5201 of 1969 on his file. They have been preferred by the 1st, 5th and the 2nd accused respectively. ( 2 ) THE petitioners were charge sheeted by Delhi Spl. Police Establishment for offences under Ss. 120b 409, 420, 477a read with Ss. 109 and 34 IPC. The facts of the case are In the year 1953 an educational institution by name Chandrashekhar Education Society was established in Yadgir gulbarga Disk and in the name of the Society a College off Arts and Science by name Shankar College was started. This institution was originally managed by a governing body of which A1, A. Konappa alias Nadagouds was the vice chairman and the college was then affiliated to Osmania University and after reorganisation of States the society was registered in mysore State and the College was affiliated to Karnataka University. 'a1 became the chairman of the society and continued to be so till the filing of the charge sheet. In 1057, A3 Rangaswamy was the principal and sometime later A2 Ramalingaiah was appointed as principal and he continued to be so till August, 1962. Again the 3rd accuse4 Rangaswamy succeeded him as principal till the final closure of the college. A4 Bendi was a clerk-cum-accountant in the said college. At the inception the Shankar College was was a Junior College and the Society had no proper building and equipment for running the college. In about a year 1958 the Registrar of Karnatak university Dharwar recommended for the grant of Rs. 32,500 against an estimated grant of Rs. 48,000 to the Ministry of Education. Govt. of India, on the application by Shankar College, Yadgir, for the construction of a recreation hall-cum-auditorium in the premises of the college. In 1959, the University Grants Commission approved the grant of Rs. 32,500. The govt. of India released the first and the second instalments of Rs. 10,500 each in the month of March, 1960 and August 1960 respectively. The conditions of the grant are embodied in Ext. P24 a letter dt. 16-1-1959 from the university Grants Commission to the Registrar, Karnataka University, dharwar. 32,500. The govt. of India released the first and the second instalments of Rs. 10,500 each in the month of March, 1960 and August 1960 respectively. The conditions of the grant are embodied in Ext. P24 a letter dt. 16-1-1959 from the university Grants Commission to the Registrar, Karnataka University, dharwar. The College authorities failed to abide by the terms and conditions in respect of the above grant and they also failed to construct the recreation hall-cum-auditorium in the premises of the College As Shankar college was a junior College and the University Grants Commission under its scheme of grants for development of such institutions considered an application by the said institution through the 'karnataka University, Dharwar for a central grant for introduction of three years degree course and approved a total non recurring expenditure for the introduction of three years degree course as noted under : (1) University Grants Commission Share. . Rs. 50,000 (2) State Government's Share. . Rs. 40,000 (3) College Management Share. . Rs. 40,000 ( 3 ) THE Karnataka University released Rs, 1,20,000 from out of University grants Commission and the State Government's share to the college during the period from 16-5-1959 to 29-6-1962. The College submitted a statement of expenditure for Rs. 1,61,177-88 Ps. on ,15-1-1963. The certificate was signed by A3, C. V. Rangaswamy, who was the then principal of the college. The certificate -was countersigned by the Registrar of Karnatak university. The statement contained a certificate which stated inter alia that certified that the expenditure shown "in Column 6 was incurred on the approved lines for the implementation of the three years degree scheme". The expenditure statement reveals that the entire University Grants Commission share of Rs. 80,000 was released to the College, Since a valuation cerificate issued by the Executive Engineer in the year 1964 for Rs. 54,300 was not duly signed by him, it was sent back to the college authorities to obtain signature. Inspite of several reminders to obtain signature of the concerned engineer, the same was not complied with by the college authorities. That excited the suspicion of the University authorities and a third installment of the grant was withheld. Tn 1964, a Committee was appointed by the University to go into the affairs of the College. The Committee reported that the College, had not, made much progress in the construction of the College building. That excited the suspicion of the University authorities and a third installment of the grant was withheld. Tn 1964, a Committee was appointed by the University to go into the affairs of the College. The Committee reported that the College, had not, made much progress in the construction of the College building. The Karnatak University Syndicate; appointed another Committee to hold a spot enquiry. On 23-12-1964 the Committee reported that no progress was made in the construction work except completion of plinth and some signs of trenches haying been dug. The committee was of the opinion that an amount of only Rs. 10,000 might have been spent as against Rs. 84,602 claimed to have been expended by the College. As a result of the aforesaid report a Technical Audit Cell of the PWD was asked to go through the affairs of the College. The said Committee (Cell) submitted a report in Feby. 1965 to the effect that hardly a sum of Rs. 13,500 had been spent as against the amount of Rs. 84,692 claimed to have been expended on the College building, and a sum of rs,58,799 as against a sum of Rs. 73,308 claimed to have been expended on equipment and library. The findings of these three Committees reveal that the statement of expenditure submitted by the College authorities were incorrect and false. Consequently the Karnatak University disaffillated the college with effect from 16-6-1. 966. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER the matter was referred to the Central Bureau of Investigation for Home Affairs, Govt. of India which then referred the matter to the Spl. Police Establishment, Eastern Divn. Bangalore, which registered a crime in RC. 1911967 dt. 8-8-1967 for offences under Ss. l20b, 406 and 477a of the IPC against the governing body of Shankar College Yadgir, gulbarga Dist. Mysore State and others, and sent the First Information report to the Spl. Judge (Prl. Dist. and Sessions Judge, Bangalore) on 8-8-1967. The Spl. Police Establishment investigated the case and filed the charge sheet against five accused formulating 13 charges against them. The prosecution filed two applications, viz. one under S. 337 Crpc to grant pardon to the 3rd accused Rangaswamy and another application us. 207a, crpc to follow the procedure in inquiries preparatory to commitment in view of the nature and gravity of the offences complained of. The Spl. Magistrate by an order dt. The prosecution filed two applications, viz. one under S. 337 Crpc to grant pardon to the 3rd accused Rangaswamy and another application us. 207a, crpc to follow the procedure in inquiries preparatory to commitment in view of the nature and gravity of the offences complained of. The Spl. Magistrate by an order dt. 18-1-1973 granted pardon to A3 Rangaswamy and allowed the prosecution to proceed with the case as a committal inquiry. Tie first accused was the Chairman of the Governing Body of the College, a2 and A3 were the principals of the Cpllege during the relevant period, A4 was the Clerk of the College who maintained accounts, A5 was the auditor of the College from April, 1961. A3, the approver has been examined as PW. 1 in the committal proceedings. No other witness was' examined. ( 5 ) THE learned Spl. Magistrate on considering the oral evidence and the documents produced by the prosecution under S. 173 Crpc committed the petitioners to take their trial before the Court of Session at Gulbarga on the charges punishable under Ss. l20b, 408, 409 read with 34, 420, 420 read with 109 and 477a IPC. In regard to each of these petitioners, he concluded that a prima facie case had been made out against each of them as follows : regarding A1 the charges are under Ss. 120b, 409 read with S. 34 IPC. (six counts ). Regarding A2 the charges are under Ss. 120 B, 409 read with S. 34 IPC (three counts), 420 read win S. 34 IPC. Regarding A4 the charge framed was under S. 477 IPC. Regarding A5, the charges are under Ss. 120b, 420 read wih S. 109 IPC (two counts ). A4 has not challenged the impugned order passed against him. Therefore the committal order against him is final. ( 6 ) IN these petitions we are concerned with the committal order passed against A1, A2 and A5, by the Spl, Magistrate, Bangalore. Before proceeding to examine the contentions urged it is relevant to refer to the scope and ambit of the power of the High Court under s. 561a Crpc with reference to certain enunciations of the Supreme Court in Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR. 1960 SC. Before proceeding to examine the contentions urged it is relevant to refer to the scope and ambit of the power of the High Court under s. 561a Crpc with reference to certain enunciations of the Supreme Court in Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR. 1960 SC. 866, the Court has stated the position thus in para 6 of the above report: the said section saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or Otherwise to secure the ends of justice. There is np doubt that this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. In the present case the Magistrate , before whom the police report has been filed under S. 173 of the Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits of the said report and it may be assumed in favour of the appellant that his request for the quashing of the proceedings is not at the present stage covered by any specific provision of the Code. It is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. ( 7 ) ORDINARILY criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions pf the Code, and the High court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of case where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of the justice. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of the justice. If the criminal proceedings in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceedings the High Court would ba justified in quashing the proceedings on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such, cases it would be legitimate for the high Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to. allow the process of the Criminal Court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which inherent jurisdiction of the High court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In causes falling under this category the allegations made against accused persons do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to beef in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal. evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusations in question. In exercising its jurisdicion under S. 561 (A) the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusations in question. In exercising its jurisdicion under S. 561 (A) the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. ( 8 ) IN Khushiram v. Hashim AIR. 1959 SC. 542 it is enunciated in para 3 of the report thus ; the distinction must always be drawn between absence of legal evidence and absence of reliable evidence. If it could be said with justification that there was no legal evidence at all in support of the prosecution case it may lead to the inference that the commitment was bad in that it was not based on any legal. evidence at all. But on the other hand where circumstances are relied upon to show that the evidence may perhaps not be believed, they do not lead to the inference that there is no legal evidence on record. On a consideration of the above and other decisions the Court in Hazarimal v. Rameshwar prasad AIR. 1972 SC 484, has in para 13 of the said report, summarised, the position thus : the inherent power of the High Court under S. 561a Crpc has been considered by this Cqurt in Kapur v. State of Punjab ( (1960) 3 scr 388 = air 1960 SC 866 ) and State of WB. v, Basak ( (1963) 2 scr 52 - AIR 1963 SC 447 ). In exercising jurisdiction under S. 561 A, crpc the High Court can quash proceedings if there is no legal evidence or if there is any impediment to the institution or continuance of proceedings but the High Court does not ordinarily enquire as to whether the evidence is reliable or not. Where again investigation into the circumstances of an alleged cognisable offence is carried on under the provisions of the Crpc the High Court does not interfere with such investigation because it would then be impeding investigation and jurisdiction of statutory authorities to exercise power in accordance with the provisions of the Crpc. Where again investigation into the circumstances of an alleged cognisable offence is carried on under the provisions of the Crpc the High Court does not interfere with such investigation because it would then be impeding investigation and jurisdiction of statutory authorities to exercise power in accordance with the provisions of the Crpc. Keeping the above principles in view we shall propeed to examine the several contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners. ( 9 ) FIRST and the foremost we shall deal with a contention of mixed fact and law which is common to all the petitions. Before elaborating the respective contentions it is necessary to set out the few relevant facts bearing on it. We have earlier adverted to the fact that the prosecution has been launched by the Delhi Spl. Police Establishment by virtue oi the jurisdiction conferred under Ss. 5 and 6 of the Delhi Spl. Police Establishment Act 1946 (Act XXV of 1946) (Delhi Act) read with the notifications relevant thereto issued under Ss. 3 and 5 thereof. Since the only point in controversy hinges on the fact whether the State Govt. has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Delhi Spl. Police Establishment as per the provisions of S. 6 of the Delhi Act, it is relevant to sat out the said section in full. But before setting out the said provision, it may be mentioned that this requirement has been enjoined on account of the fact that the power conferred on the Parliament to extend the jurisdiction as such, has been hedged in by a restriction as can be seen from Entry 80 of List I of the VII Sch. to the Constn. possibly with a view to avoid any conflict with the power exercisable by a State as per Entry 2 o,f List II thereof. S. 6 of the Delhi act reads thus : consent of State Govt. to exercise of power and jurisdiction :- nothing contained in S. 5 shall be deeded to enable any member of the Delhi Spl. Police Establishment to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area (a State, not being a Union territory or railway area) without the consent of the Govt. of that State,. to exercise of power and jurisdiction :- nothing contained in S. 5 shall be deeded to enable any member of the Delhi Spl. Police Establishment to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area (a State, not being a Union territory or railway area) without the consent of the Govt. of that State,. In the context of the above constitutional and statutory provisions and also the reorganisation of States under the States Reorganisation Act, as a result of which the new State of Mysore (now Karnataka) came to being, the central Govt. appears to have sought for a fresh consent from such new state. An Under Secretary to Govt. of the State communicated the said consent in the under-mentioned manner. The letter in question reads thus : government of Mysore No. HA. 141/pol. (GI.)"the Mysore Govt. Sectt. (Home Dept.) from, The Secty. to the Govt. of Mysore Home Dept. To, Shri K. B. Mandlekar, Under Secty to the Govt. of India Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, sir, with reference to your letter No. 6/45/56 AVD dt. 6-11-56 requesting to convey the fresh consent of this Govt. for the functioning of the delhi Spl. Police Establishment, I am directed to convey the consent of this Govt for the functioning of the Delhi Spl. Police Establishment within the territory of the Mysore State. Yours faithfully, sd. P. Bharaniah, for Secty to Govt. Home Dept. " ( 10 ) THE entire contention in question is principally based on the form and manner in which the communication is worded and signed. At this stage, a minor contention as to the capacity of an Under Secty. to Govt. to act as per the Rules of Business framed under Art. 166 (3) may be disposed of. It was contended that an Under Secty. was not compteent to act as par the Rules of Business in force at the time. On behalf of the respondent, mr Advocate General placed the relevant Rules of Business before us and we are satisfied that an Under Secty. to Govt. was competent to authenticate the orders and instruments of Govt. for and on behalf of the Governor. We shall not, therefore advert to this aspect again in the course of this order. ( 11 ) WE shall now turn to the contention of the petitioners. Briefly, the contention in outline is this: The consent of the State Govt. to Govt. was competent to authenticate the orders and instruments of Govt. for and on behalf of the Governor. We shall not, therefore advert to this aspect again in the course of this order. ( 11 ) WE shall now turn to the contention of the petitioners. Briefly, the contention in outline is this: The consent of the State Govt. enjoined under s. 6 of the "delhi Act is the result of an executive decision of the Govt. which ought to be taken in accordance with Art. 166 (1) and authenticated as per the Rules of Business framed by the Governor under Art. 166 (3) of the Constn. In the absence of proper authentication such a decision or order will not enjoy the immunity provided for under Art. 166 (2) thereof. Since the petitioners have challenged the very existence of such a consent by the State Government it was the clear duty of the respondent to have placed reliable and creditworthy material by way of evidence showing that a decision bearing on such consent had been in -fact taken by the state Govt. in accordance with the appropriate Rules of Business. In the absence of proof of such consent the Delhi Spl. Police Establishment would not have jurisdiction to investigate into the offences in point and, therefore the charge sheet placed by such police would not be a police report within the meaning of the provisions of S. 173 Crpc. Once such a position is not established, the committal Court has no jurisdiction to adopt the procedure prescribed under S. 207a Crpc, which is the situation in the case on hand. The order of commitment, therefore is clearly one without jurisdiction and therefore requires to be quashed. A further submission, ancillary to the above argument, is made that the letter of the Under Secty. reproduced earlier did not prima facie disclose that a decision to accord consent was taken by any one, and muchless by the State Govt. and also there is a total absence of authentication as enjoined by Art. 166 of the constn. In these circumstances the communication of consent in point must be attributed to an Under Secty. in his personal capacity and not as representing the State Govt. and also there is a total absence of authentication as enjoined by Art. 166 of the constn. In these circumstances the communication of consent in point must be attributed to an Under Secty. in his personal capacity and not as representing the State Govt. Reliance in this regard, was placed on saveral reported decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Counts (Vide air 1959 SC 65 ; AIR 1963 SC 1323 ; AIR 1963 SC 151 ; 1969 Delhi 330; 1967 sc 1145; 1952 SC 317; 1964 SC 1823; 1970 SC 1126; 1959 All 82; and 1961 sc 1762 ). At one stage a contention was sought to be raised that Delhi police had no authorisation under the Delhi Act to investigate into offences punishable under Ss. 120b, 409, 420 and 477a. On being shown the necessary notification, this contention was not pressed. ( 12 ) MR. Advocate General on behalf of the respondent in rebuttal of the above contention urged a five fold contention. He, however, did not dispute the proposition that in case orders and instruments which require to be authenticated under Art. 166 had not been so authenticated, it would be open to the Gpvt. or any one relying on such a fact, to prove by evidence aliunde that in fact such executive action has been taken by the Govt. in accordance with the Rules of Business in force. He has also taken note of the fact that there has been nq affidavit from any one competent to speak to that fact, on behalf of the State Govt. But his submission is that the state Govt. was not a party to the proceedings at all, respondent herein has dons its best to place such material as was in its possession in support of its case that such consent had been in fact accorded and the same had been acted upon both by the Central and State Govts. ever since 1956 and even prior to it. These circumstances are also to be borne in mind while adjudging the question posed before us. ( 13 ) WE shall npw turn to (he contentions of the learned Advocate General. ever since 1956 and even prior to it. These circumstances are also to be borne in mind while adjudging the question posed before us. ( 13 ) WE shall npw turn to (he contentions of the learned Advocate General. Briefly, they are: (1) The question whether'a letter as the one we are concerned herewith amounts to a proper compliance with Section 6 of the Delhi Act is no longer res Integra in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Major Barsay v. State of Bombay AIR. 1961 SC. 1762. (2) In any event there is ample evidence in the shape of Notifications issued by the Slate Govt. which would clearly give rise to an inference that the State Govt. had indeed accorded consent as per the provisions of S. 6 of the Delhi Act. (3) The illegality, it any, in the investigation does not affect the jurisjdictaon of the Court, as such to try a case as one instituted on a police report. The officers of the Delhi Police Establishment are also police officers governed by the provisions of Crpc. In other words, even if the invegtigation had been made in breach of S. 6 of the Delhi Act it would not vitiate the trial, unless it is shown to have resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, to accede to the Contention of the petitioners (accused) to the contrary would mean that a person would have a vested right to. choose the investigating agency or claim that a particular authority or person alone should investigate into offences with which he might be accused of. No one could lay claim to, such a right in law (Cases relied on: AIR 1955 SC 196 ; 1964 SC 221 1969 AP 66; 1959 All 82; and 1973 SC 917 ). (4) That consent envisaged under Entry 80 of List I of Sch. VII and s. 6 of the Delhi Act would not require authentication as enjoined under art. 166 (2) of the Constn. , as it is not an 'order or instrument of the kind referred to therein. Consent would mean acquiescence on the part of a party required to consent and therefore does not require a conscious decision as such (vide Dattatreya v. State of Bombay (AIR 1962 SC 161 and' meaning of the word 'consent' in Shorter Oxford Dictionary and Webster's ). Consent would mean acquiescence on the part of a party required to consent and therefore does not require a conscious decision as such (vide Dattatreya v. State of Bombay (AIR 1962 SC 161 and' meaning of the word 'consent' in Shorter Oxford Dictionary and Webster's ). (5) That the communication by the Under Secty to Govt. will give rise to a presumption that the official acts referred to therein have been regularly done or performed which, if unrebutted by acceptable material placed on refcord, by those interested in challenging such acts, must previal as any other conclusive fact. There is no such material placed on behalf of the petitioners. Hence, it must be held that the consent envisaged in S. 6 of the Delhi Spl. Police Establishment Act, and as adumbrated in the letter of the Under Secty. in question, had been duly accorded by the state Govt. in accordance with the procedure established by law. On a careful examination of the contentions, we are of the view that the first two contentions of the respondent must prevail. In that view, we do not consider it necessary to examine the remaining contentions, although, in our opinion, prima facie, they too are not altogether devoid of force. We are not therefore inclined to agree with the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners. ( 14 ) IN Major Barsay's case (4), which has been made the sole basis for the first of the above contentions of the respondent the Supreme Court was concerned with a similar question in the context of consent to be accorded under S. 6 of the Delhi' Act. The actual letter of consent concerned therein reads thus : i am directed to state that this Govt. reaffirms, with reference to S. 6 of the Delhi Spl. Police Establishment Act, 1946 the consent given for an indefinite period under its letter No. 5042/4-D,"dated the 6th November, 1946, to the members of the Delhi Spl. Police Estabishment exercising powers and jursdiction in the area of the province of Bombay. "the Court, in the context of a contention that such a consent must be in respect of every individual member 'of the police force, has observed thus : the authorisation filed in this case sufficiently complies with the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Delhi Spl. Police Establishment Act, 1946 and there are no merits in this contention. "the Court, in the context of a contention that such a consent must be in respect of every individual member 'of the police force, has observed thus : the authorisation filed in this case sufficiently complies with the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Delhi Spl. Police Establishment Act, 1946 and there are no merits in this contention. Based on the above enunication it is contended for the respondent that the authorisation herein, which is substantially similar to the one concerned in that case must be held to have similarly complied with S. 6 of the Delhi Act in regard to each and every aspect of consent. In regard to the argument for the petitioners that that case was nqt concerned with a question of existence or otherwise of consent and therefore clearly distinguishable, our attention was drawn to an enunciation of the Supreme Court in the case of Samawanthi v. State of Punjab AIR. 1963 SC. 151. where it was held, inter alia, that the binding effect of a decision did not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or nqt, provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided. We are therefore not inclined to accept the distinction pointed out on behalf of the petitioners. We, therefore, hold that the letter in question substantially complies with the requirement regarding consent enjoined in Sec. 6 of the Delhi Act. ( 15 ) WE now turn to the 2nd contention. Even if it be assumed that the above conclusion of ours is unacceptable in our opinion, there is ample evidence produced on behalf of the respondent which would indicate that the State Government subsequent to the letter of earlier reproduced, had been responsible for certain acts which would have had any legal effect had there not been a consent as per S. 6 of the Delhi Act, had in fact in mind the earlier consent accorded by it. In this context , it is relevant to observe that this material has been made available for the first time before this Court. In this context , it is relevant to observe that this material has been made available for the first time before this Court. But the obvious explanation is that the pleas raised in this regard on behalf of the petitioners in the Court below were vague and indefinite, and embodied in memos by Counsel, without and affidavit filed in support of it Be that as it may we think this evidence which is mostly in the shape of statutory notifications ought to be allowed. It may also be stated that the was not any serious objection taken on behalf of the petitioners on this score. ( 16 ) IT is undisputed that the Central Govt. had extended the jurisdiction of the Delhi Spl. Police to the State of Mysore (now Karnatak) by means of an appropriate notification issued under S. 5 of the Delhi Act. By two notifications, both dt. 3-2-1959, the State Govt. appointed the City Magistrate bangalore, who is the one who has made the committal order in question, as Spl. Magistrate to try offences investigated and instituted by the Delhi Spl. Police Establishment, in exercise of the power conferred on it under S. 14 Crpc and the Sessions Judge, Bangalore, as a Spl. Judge to try the cases instituted by the Spl. Police Establishment. In order to, appreciate the specific nature of the appointment, it is sufficient if one of such notifications is reproduced. It reads as follows : government of Mysore No. HD 22. CIP 58 mysore Govt. Sectt. (Home Dept.), Bangalore, dt. 3rd Feb' 1959 notification in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 14 of the Crpc. 1898 (Central Act V of 1898 ). the Govt of Mysore herebv appoints the City magsitrate, Bangalore, as a Spl. Magistrate to try the offences investigated arid instituted bv the Delhi Spl. Polict Act. 1946 (Central Act XXV of 1946) and defines that jurisdiction shall extend throughout the State. By Order and in the name of the Governor of Mysore, sr. R. J. Rego Secty. to Govt. Home Dept. " the conduct of be Govt. in issuing these notifications cannot be explained except on the bypothesis that the Govt had already consented to or acouiesred in the exercise of jurisdiction bv the Delhi Police Establishment in this State. There is also another notification dt. R. J. Rego Secty. to Govt. Home Dept. " the conduct of be Govt. in issuing these notifications cannot be explained except on the bypothesis that the Govt had already consented to or acouiesred in the exercise of jurisdiction bv the Delhi Police Establishment in this State. There is also another notification dt. 2-11-1960 hearing No. HD 60 PFG 59 and issued under S. 6 of the Mysore Police Act, 1908. and similar enactments in force in the integrating areas. whereby a clear implication arises that there has been such consent accorded. The material portion reads as follows : the Govt. of Mysore hereby directs that whenever a member of the Delhi Police Establishment of or above the rank of Sub-Inspector investigates at anv place in the said area any offence specified he shall be deemed to be an officer in charge of the police station within the limits of which such place is situate. . . . . This notification would clearly imply that the Delhi Establishment were entitled to investigate into offences in the State when the State recognises this fact, it would follow that it has assented to the exereise of such jurisdiction by the Delhi Spl. Police. In addition to, the above material there is also an affidavit by an official of the Central Govt. the contents of which would show that the Central Govt had accepted and acted on the letter addressed by the State Govt. reproduced earlier. Therefore, whether or not eompliance with the provisions of Art. 166 of the Constn. was required in the circumstances, would not be of any materiality. Hence we reject this contention of the petitioners. ( 17 ) WE now turn to the merits of the case of each of these petitioners. Crp. 91/73-This petition is by A1. Mr. Appa Rao learned, Advocate for the first accusejd did not argue his client's case on merits and the only contention urged has been considered as above. Therefore it is unnecessary to deal with the committal of A1 on merits. Crp. 97/73-This is a petition by A2 on an examination of the material produced by the prosepution against a2, we are satisfied that the committal Magistrate is justified in passing the committal order against Al and it does not call for interference. Crp. 92/78-This petition is by A5. Crp. 97/73-This is a petition by A2 on an examination of the material produced by the prosepution against a2, we are satisfied that the committal Magistrate is justified in passing the committal order against Al and it does not call for interference. Crp. 92/78-This petition is by A5. The prosecution case against A5 is that he was a party to a criminal conspiracy between the period 1959 and 1964 to commit offences of cheating and dishonestly inducing the Registrar of the Karnatak University to release funds sanctioned by the Ministry of education Govt. of India the University Grants Commission, Delhi and the Govt. of Karnataka for introduction of three years degree course for the specific purpose of construction of Shankar College building and a recreadon-hall-cum-auditorium in the college campus, by issuing false expenditure certificates marked at Exts. P85 and P89 to A1 and A2, superseding the previous auditor one Aralimath, a charge sheet witness and the by committed offences punishable under Ss. 120b and 420 read with s. 109 (2 counts) IPC. ( 18 ) THE learned committal Magistrate, has observed in para 6 of his order, that on going through the evidence available in respect of each of the charges it is possible to conclude that each of the accused had misused his position and has intentionally abetted Al to commit criminal breach of trust in respect of the funds entrusted for the introduction of three years degree course and construction of college building and recreation-hall-cum- auditorium in the college campus. But there is no specific charge framed against A5 for abetting the commission of an offence of breach of trust under S. 409 read with S. 109 IPC. The learned committal Magistrate has reached the conclusion that from the year 1959 up to 1965 there was absolutely no progress in regard to the construction of the building and the certificates issued by A5 giving an axpendtiure for each year at different figures are clearly false certificates based upon no accounts bills, certificates, vouchers and invoices available in the College to support the expenditure made for construction of the building. The questions that arise for decision in this case are : (1) Whether the documentary evidence produced by the prosecution as required under S. 173 Crpc and the oral evidence of PW1 recorded by the committal Magistrate make out a prima facie case against A5 for offences under Ss. The questions that arise for decision in this case are : (1) Whether the documentary evidence produced by the prosecution as required under S. 173 Crpc and the oral evidence of PW1 recorded by the committal Magistrate make out a prima facie case against A5 for offences under Ss. l20b and 420 read with S. 109 (2 counts) IPC? and (2) Whether Ext. P85 and P89 are false certificates issued without any basis by A5 being a party to a criminal conspiracy to abet the commission of an offence of cheating?mr. Venkatashwara Rao learned Advocate for A5 contended that the figures menticped in Ext. P85 in respect of the items of expenditure such as furniture, laboratory and library are borne out by the audit statement given by'one Aralimath for the years ending 31-3-1939, 31-3-1960 and 31-3- 1961. The learned Advocate General does not dispute the correctness of these figures in Ex. P85 in respect of those items. What is seriously disputed by the learned Advocate General is with regard to the items of expenditure on building shown in Ex. P85 for the years 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61 making a total expenditure of Es. 64,692-31 Ps. The learned Advocate general urged that the figures shown in respect of expenditure of building in Ex. P85 are false and intentionally made by A5 to abet the offence of cheating by the other accused and, therefore, he urged that prima facie case is made out against the accused for the offences with which he stands charged. In view of the submissions made on behalf of A5 and the prosecution, we may conclude that the figures given in the expenditure certificate Ex:p85 in respect of furniture, laboratory equipment and library are not false figures and they are based upon relevant bills, certificates vouchers and invoices. ( 19 ) THE question for determination is whether Exts. P85 and P89 are false certifcates in respect of the building expenditure and that A5 at the time of issuing these certificates possessed mens rea which is an essential element in the offence of conspiracy? the relevant portion in Ext. P85 reads as under : we certify that the following amounts have been spent by the Management of the Shankar College, Yadgir, during the 3 years from 1-4-1958 to 31-3-1961. We have certified with reference to relevant bills certificates, vouchers and invoices. Building: 1958-59 Rs. 50,468-10, 1959-60 Rs. the relevant portion in Ext. P85 reads as under : we certify that the following amounts have been spent by the Management of the Shankar College, Yadgir, during the 3 years from 1-4-1958 to 31-3-1961. We have certified with reference to relevant bills certificates, vouchers and invoices. Building: 1958-59 Rs. 50,468-10, 1959-60 Rs. 6,590-62 and 1960-61 Rs. 7,633-50 total Rs. 64,692-31. Ext. P89 reads as under : we certify that the following amounts have been spent by the Management of the Shankar -College, Yadgir, in respect of 3 year degree course during the year 1961-62. We have verified with reference to relevant billscertificates, vouchers and invoices. Building Rs. 20,000 equipments Rs. 15,000 furnitures Rs. 1,000 books Rs. 4,000 Rs. 40,000mr. Venkateswara Rao, learned Advocate for A5 contended that the' figures relating to building in expenditure certificate Ex. P85 were based upon utilisation certificates issued by the Asst. Engineer, PWD, Yadgir, which were produced before A5 at the time of issuing Ex. P85. He invited. our attention to an extract of a report o,f the Technical Audit Cell of Mysore state PWD, which is an enclosure to draft paragraph relating to grant-in- aid to, Shankar College, Yadgir, Mysore State, under the central scheme campus work project and which has been produced by the prosecution. A portion of the extract of para 43 reads as "under : "as seen from the records on 17-1-1960 the Asst Engineer, PWD Yadgir, has certified that an expenditure of Rs. 12,879-27 p. has been incurred on this work. On 27-9-1960 (vide p. 42) the Asst. Engineer Yadgir, has recorded a certificate for having incurred an expenditure of Rs. 29,600. This has been forwarded to the Registrar, Karnatak University by the Principal, shankar College on 13-1-1960. ( 20 ) THE utilisation certificate dt. 17-1-1960 issued by the Asst. Engineer, pwd, Yadgir for an expenditure of Rs. 12,879 and referred to in the above extract is not forthcoming in the records, but, there is reference to it in the portion of the extract quoted above. Further a copy of 'the extract relating to recreation hall-cum-auditorium of Shankar College, yadgir, prepared by the Asst. Engineer, PWD, Yadgir, on 30-7-1960 for utilisation at Rs. 29,600 inclusive of the material at site such as brick, steel and cement is found in the records produced by the prosecution. In another certificate dt. 9-9-1961 the Asst. Engineer, PWD, Yadgir, has certified that upto. Engineer, PWD, Yadgir, on 30-7-1960 for utilisation at Rs. 29,600 inclusive of the material at site such as brick, steel and cement is found in the records produced by the prosecution. In another certificate dt. 9-9-1961 the Asst. Engineer, PWD, Yadgir, has certified that upto. the end of March, 1961, Rs. 64,692-31 p. has been utilised for the construction of College main building including laboratory, science hall dark room etc. in brick masonary with RCC roof (into double storeyed building ). The figures given in this utilisation certificate clearly tallies with the figures given in Ex. P85 towards the expenditure of the building construction. Mr. Venkateshwara Rao, learned Advocate for A5 placed strong reliance on these documents and contended that the certificate issued by A5 at Ex. P85, cannot be said to be based upon no bills, certificates, vouchers and invoices. He urged that the College authorities had produced certificates issued by the Asst. Engineer, PWD, Yadgir, at the time when expenditure certificate ex. P85 was issued. The contention of the learned Advocate General is that the last certificate issued by the Asst. Engineer, PWD, Yadgir is dt,9-9-1961 and it was not available when Ex. P85 was issued on 26-5-1961. His further contention is that if A5 had looked into the audit statements given by one Aralimath the previous Auditor, A5 would have come to know that litile or no money was spent on construction of buildings. Therefore he contended that Ex. P85 is a false certificate issued by A5. There is nothing on record to show that A1, A2 or A3 (PW. l) had produced before a5 the audit statements of Aralimath for the year 1960-61. Ex. P85 was issued on the basis of bills, certificates, vouchers and invoices and not on the basis of audit statement for the year 1960-61. It might have been suppressed by the other accused in order to obtain the expenditure certificate ex. 85 from A5 who was newly appointed. It is true that the utilisation certificate was issued on 0-9-61 some time after Ex. 85 was issued by A5. But we must remember that A5 had issued what is known as advance certificate before the accounts of the Shankar Collage were audited. The possibility of the Asst. Engineer, PWD, Yadgir, having issued a certificate similar to the one dt. 9-9-1961 in order to oblige Al, A2 and PW. 85 was issued by A5. But we must remember that A5 had issued what is known as advance certificate before the accounts of the Shankar Collage were audited. The possibility of the Asst. Engineer, PWD, Yadgir, having issued a certificate similar to the one dt. 9-9-1961 in order to oblige Al, A2 and PW. 1 (who was A3 in the case) even without any progress with regard to the construction of the campus building and recreation hall-oum-auditorium cannot be ruled out at any rate the utilisation certificates issued subsequently on 9-9-1961 do not render the figure of Rs. 64,692-31 false. It was the duty of the asst. Engineer, to. inspect the spot and give the progress report When those certificates were placed before A5 at the time of issue of expenditure certificate Ex. P85, his duty was to verify from those certificates and issue the expenditure certificate. He was not expected to inspect the spot and then issue the expenditure certificate as contended by Mr. Venkateswara Rao. PW. 1 who has been examined to prove conspiracy and creation of false documents in order to get the grants released from the Univesity authorities has not, stated on oath that there were no certificates issued by the asst. Engineer, PWD Yadgir. He could not have given such an evidence for fear of confrontation with the certificates issued by the Asst. Engineer which are referred to above and found in the documents produced by the prosecution. ( 21 ) THE learned Advocate General placed reliance on the admission of Al before the Technical Audit Cell and contended that there were no utilisation cerificates issued by the Asst. Engineer, PWD Yadgir. The statement of Al on the showing of the prosecution itself is factually incorrect. Mr. Venkateswara Rao contended that the statement made by A1 cannot be used against A5 as Al is also an accused. He also relied upon a decision in State v. Shankar Sakharam Jadhau AIR. 1057 Bom. 226. for the proposition that Where the confessional statements made by a co-accused are made after the object of criminal conspiracy is carried out and the confessional statements refer to past events such statement can have no relevance to any common intention animating the co-consipirators. He also relied upon a decision in State v. Shankar Sakharam Jadhau AIR. 1057 Bom. 226. for the proposition that Where the confessional statements made by a co-accused are made after the object of criminal conspiracy is carried out and the confessional statements refer to past events such statement can have no relevance to any common intention animating the co-consipirators. We do not want to express any opinion at this stage as to the relevancy or otherwise of Al's confessional statements said to have been made by him while determining the intention animating the co-conspirators. Suffice it to say that Al's statement about the absence of utilisation certificates is factually incorrect. ( 22 ) AS regards Ex. P89 the certificate issued by A5 on 26-4-1962 the contention is that it is also a false expenditure certificate issued by A5. But the certificate quoted above ex facie shows that it was issued after verification wih reference to relevant bills, certificates. vouchers and invoices. A5 has withdrawn this certificate by his letter dt. 18-2-1963, which is marked as Ex. P90, which reads as under we write to inform you that we withdraw our certificate dt. 26-4-1962 issued to you in respect of the sum of Rs. 40,000 which was stated to have been utilised by you towards building construction, equipments, furnitures and books during the year 1961-62 towards 3 year degree course, as we find after the audit of your college accounts that you have not spent so much. We also request you to kindly forward a copy of this letter to the authorities to whom you have submitted "the certificates. Hope you will take the necessary action immediately. The letter clearly states that after audit of the accounts' of the College, it was found that the management had not spent the amount of Rs. 40,000 which has been mentioned in Ex. P89 and, therefore, it was withdrawn by a5. He has also requested the Principal to whom it was addressed to forward the copy of the said letter to the authorities to whom it was submitted. The learned Advocate General argued that this withdrawal comes after the mischief has been done by the accused and that it was an afterthought on the part Off A5 in order to save his own skin. It is not possible for us accept the submission of the learned Advocate General. The learned Advocate General argued that this withdrawal comes after the mischief has been done by the accused and that it was an afterthought on the part Off A5 in order to save his own skin. It is not possible for us accept the submission of the learned Advocate General. If A5 was a party to the conspiracy and had in any manner gained advantage as a result of the conspiracy A5 wquld not have the moral courage to send such a letter. Further, if A5 was a privy to the offence alleged to have been committed by the other accused, he would not have been spared by them. The records disclose that Al merely told A2 to file the letter and it was not submitted to the authorities as required by A5. ( 23 ) IT is relevant to state that the non-complience with the request of the university authorities to obtain the signature for the valuation certificate given by the Executive Engineer in 1964, excited the suspicion of the University authorities. It was thereafter that three Committees one after another were appointed in 1964 and 1965 to probe into this matter and eventually the SPE took up the investigation of this case. Therefore it may be too much to contend that A5 knew before he sent Ex. P90 that he had given a false certificate as per Ex. P89 and withdrew it in order to avoid himself being involved in this case. The learned Advocate General relied upon certain observations at page 64 of Harris Criminal Law (XXII Edn. Pub. by Ian Mclean and Peter Morrish), in support of his contention that quite a slight participation in the scheme of conspiracy will suffice and that there is no need that the conspirator should be an accomplice in the crime. The comments of the learned Authors read as under : there need be no direct communication between the members in order to constitute conspiracy, nor need it be proved that any particular accused concocted the scheme or was present at its origin. The conspirators may join in the conspiracy at various times any one of them may not know all the qther parties and any one may not know the full extent of the scheme to which he attaches himself. The conspirators may join in the conspiracy at various times any one of them may not know all the qther parties and any one may not know the full extent of the scheme to which he attaches himself. It is sufficient if it is proved that each conspirator knows that there is in existence or coming into existence a scheme which goes beyond the illegal acts which he, agrees to do, and attaches himself to the scheme. Quite a slight participation in the scheme will suffice. There is no need that the conspirator should be an accomplice in the crime. ( 24 ) THERE is no dispute about the proposition of law propounded by the learned authors as stated above. But 'this commentary relates to actus reus. Proof of actus reus is by itself not sufficient tq prove conspiracy without the proof of the mental element, mens rea which is an essential element in an offence of conspiracy. The learned authors in the next paragraph dealing with mens rea in the same book have stated thus : consiparcy to commit an unlawful act, even an offence of strict liability, requires mens rea. The Crown must prove not only an agreement amounting to a consipracy between the conspirators to carry out an unlawful purpose, but also an intention in the mind of the individual conspirator to carry out that unlawful purpose. In Churchill v. Walton Viscount Dilhorne delivering the opinion of the House of lords, said : ( 25 ) THE question is, ' What did they agree to do? ' If what they agreed to do was, on the facts known to, them, an unlawful act they are guilty of conspiracy and cannot excuse themselves by saying that, owing to their ignorance of the law, they did not realise that such an act was a crime. If, on the facts known to them, what they agreed to do was lawful, they are not rendered artificially guilty by the existence of the other facts, not known to them, giving a different and criminal quality to the act agreed upon. ( 26 ) WITH regard tq proof of consipracy the learned authors have further stated at page 65 as follows : only rarely will direct evidence of the agreement be available. ( 26 ) WITH regard tq proof of consipracy the learned authors have further stated at page 65 as follows : only rarely will direct evidence of the agreement be available. In the words of the House of Lords, therefore, proof of a conspiracy in most cases depends on inferences to be drawn from the conduct of the parties'. We are in respectful agreement with the above statement of law expressed by the learned authors in the book referred to above. It is clear from the passages quoted above that in order to sustain a charge of conspiracy the prosecution is required an law not only to proye the agreement between the conspirators to carry cut the unlawful purpose but also the intention in the mind of the individual conspirator to carry qut the unlawful purpose. Further proof of a conspiracy in most cases depends on inferences to, be drawn from the conduct Qf the, parties. If on the facts known to the alleged conspirator what he agreed to do was lawful he is not rendered artificially guilty by the existence of the other facts not known to him, giving a different and criminal quality to the act agreed upon. Mr. Venkateswara Rao, submitted that when A5 was approached by a1, A2 and A3 in the month of May. 1961 for the issue of an expenditure certificate as per Ex. P85 there was nothing prima jade to doubt the genuineness of the utilisation certificates issued by the Asst. Engineer, PWD, yadgir nor- was there anything to excite his suspicion to probe into the genuineness of these utilisation certificates. He further submitted that A5 issued the expenditure certificate Ex. P89 by verifying from the bills vouchers invoices and certificates which were in existence then and which are not available now for the reasons best known to the o. lher accused and not after auditing the accounts of the Shankar College. He urged that when the audit was taken up by him for the year 1961-62 he (A5) noticed some discrepancies about the expenditure which he had certified and it was for that reason that by his letter Ex. P90, he withdrew the certificate Ex. P89. According to Mr. Venkateswara Rao that was a time when nobody even suggested any improper utilisation of the several grants. He urged that the very fact that he withdrew the expenditure certificate at Ex. P90, he withdrew the certificate Ex. P89. According to Mr. Venkateswara Rao that was a time when nobody even suggested any improper utilisation of the several grants. He urged that the very fact that he withdrew the expenditure certificate at Ex. P90 beyond all doubt shows that he was not a party either to the conspiracy nor had possessed the mens rea which constitute an offence of conspiracy. He relied upon a decision reported in Limine Kingston Cot/on Mills Ltd. (1896) 2 Ch. 279 the relevant portion of the decision deals with the duties of an Auditor. Lopes LJ. at page 288 has observed thus : but in determining whether any misfeasence or breach of duty has been committed, it is essential to consider what the duties of an auditor are. They are very fully described in re, London and General bank (1895 (2) Ch. 673) to which judgment I was a party. Shortly they may be stated thus: It is the duty of an auditor to bring to, bear on the work he has to perform that skill, care and caution which a reasonably competent careful and cautious auditor would use. What is reasonable skill, care and caution must depend on the particular circumstance of each case. An auditor is not bound to be a detective, or as was said, to approach his work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there is something wrong. He is a watch-dog, but not a blood bound. He is-justified in believing tried servants of the, company in whom confidence is placed by the company. He is entitled to assume that they are honest, and to rely upon their representations, provided he takes reasonable care. If there is anything calculated to excite suspicion he should probe it to the bottom; but in the absence of anything of that kind he is only bound to be reasonably cautious and careful. ( 27 ) IT is not the duty of an auditor to take stock; he is not a stock expert; there are many masters in respect of which he must rely on the honesty and accuracy of others. He does not guarantee the discovery of all fraud. . . . . . . . The duties of auditors must not be rendered too onerous. He does not guarantee the discovery of all fraud. . . . . . . . The duties of auditors must not be rendered too onerous. Their work is responsible and laborious, and the remuneration moderate auditors must not be made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully laid schemes of fraud when there is nothing to arouse their suspicion, and when those frauds are perpetrated by tried servants of the company and are undetected for years by the directors. 'so to hold would make the position of an auditor intolerable. ' ( 28 ) IN the instant case there was nothing to, excite the suspicion of A5 when he issued Exts. P85 and P39. When suspicion arose after A5 audited the accounts of the institution, he has promptly withdrawn the certificate issued at Ex. P89 by his letter at Ex. P90. Before Exts. P85 and P89 were issued several items of funds were released without observance of the conditions contained in Ex. P23, a letter from the University Grants Commission governing the release of grant towards the construction of recreation hall-cum-auditonum. It has been specifically stated therein that the audit report of the University auditors was a condition precedent for the release of the grant. None of the authorities have insisted upon such an audit report. It was not the duty of A5 to issue certificates of expendiure at Exts. P85 and P89 after any physical verification. That was the duty of an Engneer who issued utilisation certificates. It may be nqted that what A5 certified is only an expenditure certificate based upon bills, vouchers, certificates and invoices and not utilisation certificates which are entirely different and distinct from the certificate's of expenditure. It is unfortunate that the Asst. Engineer, PWD, Yadgir, who was expected to go to the spot and verify the work done and then issue the utilisation certificates has failed to do so. He must have obliged the College authorities for reasons best known to him. ( 29 ) AS observed in the decision reported in Limine Kingston Cotton Mills (7) a5 was not bound to, be a defective to approach his work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there was something wrong. He was merely a watch-dog, but not a blood hound. It was not his duty to take stock as he was not a stock expert. He was merely a watch-dog, but not a blood hound. It was not his duty to take stock as he was not a stock expert. He merely relied upon the honesty and accuracy of the Asst, Engineer, and the College authorities with regard to the utilisation certificates. He was entitled to assume that they were honest and to rely upon their representation. There is nothing to show that he was lacking in reasonable care, as there was nothing before him to excite suspicion to have a probe into the bottom. He cannot be made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully laid schemes of fraud when there was nothing to arouse suspicion. ( 30 ) IN the famous book entitled Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law 19th edn. edited by J. W. Cecil Turner at page 431 dealing with the topic mens red the learned author has stated as follows : since conspiracy is a crime at common law it follows that mens rea must be an essential element in it. Yet perhaps because of the vagueness of unlawful purpose' the decision of the Courts do not seem to have laid down exactly what it is that the accused person must have intended or foreseen. In his connection a statement made by the court of Crl. App. in R. v. Sorsky (A criminal conspiracy consists in the agreement to do an unlawful act without reference to the knowledge on the part of the accused of its illegality) must be read with caution. The case before the Court turned upon the interpretation of a statutory provision. The Court expresly alluded to a statement that it is a good answer to a charge of having committed a misdemeanour at common law to show that the accused acted under a belief in the existence of a state off facts which, if true would have exonerated him and added, ' We are In no, way controverting that general proposition of law'. It may be, however, that in the crime of conspiracy a claim of right is of no avail, in the same sense in which that claim is understood to provide a defence to a charge of malicious damage or of larceny; for in R. v. Sorsky it was also stated: ' It follows that, if Sorsky did act under any mistake at all it was a mistake of law and not of fact and ignorance of the law affords no excuse'. ( 31 ) FROM what we have already discussed relating to the circumstances in which A5 issued Exts. P85 and P89, we are clearly of the view, that it is not possible to infer that A5 was a party to the agreement to carry out the unlawful purpose and that he possessed the necessary mens rea' to carry out unlawful purpose said to have been perpetrated by the other accused. What we have alluded to above in respect of issue of an expenditure certificate by A5 discloses that the accused acted under a belief in the existence of state of facts which, if true would have exonerated him. In this view of the matter, we are of opinion, that the learned Magistrate without carefully scrutinising the paper produced by the prosecution to find out whether there ia enough material to prove mens rea on the part of A5, which is an essential' element to constitute an offence pf conspiracy with which he was charge sheeted has fallen into an error. As submitted by the learned advocate for A5 the learned committal Magistrate has reached the' conclusion that there is a prima facie case made out against A5, by surmises and imaginary inferences. Therefore, we hold, that the prosecution has failed to make out a prima facie case either for an offence of conspiracy or for abetment of the offence of cheating against A5. . Exts. P85 and P89 were issued by A5 on the facts known to him and that what he did 'in issuing those certificatees was lawful and he cannot be rendered artificially guilty by the existence of other facts not known to A5 giving a different and criminal quality to the act alleged against him. Therefore, the committal order and the charge framed against A5 are not sustainable in law and are liable to be set. aside. Therefore, the committal order and the charge framed against A5 are not sustainable in law and are liable to be set. aside. Accordingly, we quash the committal order and the charges framed against A5by the learned Magistrate and discharge A5. For the reasons stated above Cr. P. 93 of 1973 by A5 is allowed and crps. 91 and 97 of 1973 by Al and A2 are dismissed. ( 32 ) WE must however, warn the trial Court against drawing any inferences as to the guilt Or innocence of the other accused from any observations made in this order. The guilt or innocence of the accused is a matter which hag to be determined by the trial Court and no remarks made by us should be treated as prejudging the case. Such comments as have been made in this order exclusively bear on consideration of the case for quashing the charges and committal order against Al, A2 and A5. --- *** --- .