Judgment :- 1. There is a common question raised in all these petitions and that is the reason why they are beard and disposed of together. These are applications for bail and apart from the contention on the merits of the respective cases there is a common question raisee by all the petitioners herein. The petitioners are in custody for more than 60 days. Investigation has not been completed in any of the cases. Under these circumstances the petitioners claim that they have to be released on bail. For this they rely on S.167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In this new Code there is a provision, for which there is no corresponding provision in the Code which has been repealed. It may be necessary to extract sub-ss. (1) and (2) with the proviso thereto, of S.167 of the new Code in this context. "167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours. (1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by S.57, ana there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer-in-charge of the Police Station or the Police Officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of Sub Inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that (a) The Magistrate may authorise detention of the accused person, otherwise than in custody of the Police, beyond the period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this section for a total period exceeding sixty days, and on the expiry of the said period of sixty days, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail; and every person released on bail under this section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that chapter; (b) No Magistrate shall authorise detention in any custody under this section unless the accused is produced before him; (c) No Magistrate of the Second Class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the Police. Explanation. If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under paragraph (b), the production of the accused person may be produced by his signature on the order authorising detention," 2. Sub-s. (1) evidently specifies the duty of the Police Officer making the investigation or the officer in charge of the Police Station to forward the accused to the nearest Judicial Magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest. The Magistrate to whom the accused person is so forwarded may be a Magistrate who has no jurisdiction to try the case, but the accused has been forwarded to him only because he is the nearest Magistrate or it may be that he is the Magistrate who has also jurisdiction to try the case. In either case he can authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as he thinks fit. In either case he can authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as he thinks fit. But that shall not be for a period of exceeding 15 days. It may so happen that the 15 days may expire and further orders may have to be passed with regard to the release or further detention of the accused. If the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit the case for trial there is a proviso to sub-s. (2) in the new Code. The proviso is different from the proviso to S.167(2) of the repealed Code. The proviso as it stood in the section of the repealed Code read: "Provided that no Magistrate of the Third Class and no Magistrate of the Second Class not specifically empowered in this behalf by the State Government shall authorise detention in the custody of the police." 3. It is the case of the petitioners that under the proviso to sub-s. (2) of S.167 of the Code of 1973 the Magistrate is not empowered to authorise the detention of the person in custody under S.167 beyond the period of 60 days. On the expiry of that period he has to be released on bail if he is prepared to furnish such bail. Therefore petitioners contend that unless investigation is completed within 60 days of the date of arrest the accused can, as of right, claim bail and there is no discretion in the Magistrate to refuse such bail. 4. It may be noticed here that S.167 as it stood in the repealed Code was understood to deal with orders as to custody to be passed by the Magistrate pending investigation. Provision was made under S.344 of the Code of 1898 relating to adjournments and orders to be passed regarding the custody of the accused pending adjournments of the trial. S.344 in the repealed Code read: "S. 344. Power to postpone or adjourn Proceedings, (1) In every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. (1A) If from the absence of a witness, or any other reasonable cause, it becomes necessary or adviceable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, the court may, if it thinks fit, by order in writing, stating the reasons therefor, from time to time postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody: Remand Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time: Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing. (2) Every order made under this section by a court other than a High Court shall be in writing signed by the presiding judge or Magistrate. Reasonable cause for remand Explanation If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand.' Sub-s. (1A), it may be noticed, was introduced into the original enactment by the amending Act 26 of 1955. That section enabled the court to remand the accused if he was in custody if it became necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any enquiry or trial. The proviso to this subsection specified that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding 15 days at a time. Sub-s. 1A standing by itself may be read as relating to cases of remand of an accused person to custody after the court has taken cognizance of the offence. That is because sub-s. 1A refers to postponing the commencement of, or adjournment of any enquiry or trial. To adjourn any enquiry or trial the case should have been posted for enquiry or trial. Even to postpone the commencement of a trial the commencement should have been decided upon and the case posted to a date for that purpose. That could only be where the court has taken cognizance of the case. Therefore, sub-s. 1A would apply to a case where the accused had been charge sheeted. Even to postpone the commencement of a trial the commencement should have been decided upon and the case posted to a date for that purpose. That could only be where the court has taken cognizance of the case. Therefore, sub-s. 1A would apply to a case where the accused had been charge sheeted. But the sub-section was read differently in certain judicial decisions, because of the explanation to the section. Read along with the said explanation sub-s. 1A was held to refer even to cases where no charge-sheet had been filed. The Law Commission recommended amendment to sub-s. 1A so as to make it clear that the said sub-section refers only to remand to custody after the court has taken cognizance of the offence. In its 41st Report at page 211 the Law Commission said in this context: "24.58. S.344(1A) provides for the postponement of the commencement of an inquiry or trial and for adjournment during the inquiry, or trial. It empowers the court to remand the accused, if in custody, for not more than 15 days at a time. The explanation at the end of section states that if sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand, mainly because of the explanation in these terms, the view has been taken that remands can be given by Magistrates under S.344 even at the stage of investigation and even before a court has taken cognizance of the offence on a a police report. 24.59. In our opinion, this reliance on S.344 is not correct, as the explanation cited above is only an explanation to that section and cannot be read into S.167, This lax view of the two sections seems to have been taken in order to avoid the practical difficulty that arises in cases where investigation is prolonged, the accused has been arrested and detained in custody, and the maximum period of 15 days allowed for such detention under S.167(2) is found to be inadequate. The Code, however, makes a clear distinction between detention in custody before taking cognizance and detention in custody after taking cognizance. The former is covered by S.167 and the latter by S.344. The Code, however, makes a clear distinction between detention in custody before taking cognizance and detention in custody after taking cognizance. The former is covered by S.167 and the latter by S.344. The two are, in our opinion, mutually exclusive and ought to be kept so. 24.61. In order to make it very clear that remands under S.344(1 A) can only be given after cognizance has been taken of the offence and not at the stage of investigation, we recommend that the opening words of this section should be altered to read: If the court, after taking cognizance of an offence finds it necessary or advisable to postpone, etc." Evidently this has been noticed by the Parliament in enacting the new Code. S.309 of the present Code which materially corresponds to S.344 of the repealed Code reads as follows: "309. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings. (I) In every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. (2) If the court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody: Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time: Provided further that when witnesses are in attendance, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted, without examining them, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing. Explanation 1. If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand. Explanation 2. Explanation 1. If sufficient evidence has been obtained to raise a suspicion that the accused may have committed an offence, and it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained by a remand, this is a reasonable cause for a remand. Explanation 2. The terms on which an adjournment or postponement may be granted include, in appropriate cases, the payment of costs by the prosecution or the accused." Evidently the charge in the language of sub-S. (2) of S.309 which substantially corresponds to sub-section 1A of S.344 of the repealed Code makes it clear that the power to order remand of the accused to custody under the sub-section is limited to cases where the court has taken cognizance of an offence. In other words sub-S. (2) of S.309 is specific that it does not apply to a case when investigation is still in progress. Possibly this amendment was necessitated because the courts in this country interpreted the section to apply even to cases where investigations were not over and charge-sheets had not been laid. 5. In this context it may be useful to refer again to the 41st Report of the Law Commission of India See page 76 of Volume I. Dealing with S.167 the Law Commission observed thus: "11.19. S.167 provides for remands. The total period for which an arrested person may be remanded to custody police or judicial is 15 days. The assumption is that the investigation must be completed within 15 days, and the final report under S.173 sent to court by them. In actual practice, however, this has frequently been found unworkable. Quite often a complicated investigation cannot be completed within 15 days and if the offence is serious, the police naturally insist that the accused be kept in custody. A practice of doubtful legal validity has therefore grown up. The police file before Magistrate a preliminary or 'incomplete' report, and the Magistrate purporting to act under S.344, adjourns the proceedings and remands the accused to custody. In the Fourteenth Report, the Law Commission doubted if such an order could be made under S.344, as that section is intended to operate only after a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence, which can be properly done only after a final report under S.173 has been received and not while the investigation is still proceeding. In the Fourteenth Report, the Law Commission doubted if such an order could be made under S.344, as that section is intended to operate only after a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence, which can be properly done only after a final report under S.173 has been received and not while the investigation is still proceeding. We are of the same view and to us also it appears proper that the law should be clarified in this respect. The use of S.344 for a remand beyond the statutory period fixed under S.167 can lead to serious abuse, as an arrested person can in this manner be kept in custody indefinitely while the investigation can go on in a leisurely manner." It is, therefore, desirable, as was observed in the Fourteenth Report, that some time-limit should be placed on the power of the police to obtain a remand, while the investigation is still going on; and if the present time limit of 15 days is too short, it would be better to fix a longer period rather than countenance a practice which violates the spirit of the legal safeguard. Like the earlier Law Commission, we feel that 15 days is perhaps too short and we propose, therefore to follow the recommendation in the Fourteenth Report that the maximum period under S.167 should be fixed at 60 days. We are aware of the danger that such an extension may result in the maximum period becoming the rule in every case as a matter of routine; but we trust that proper supervision by the superior courts will prevent that. We propose accordingly to revise sub-sections (2) and (4) of S.167 as follows: "(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days at a time and sixty days in the whole. If he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that (a) no Magistrate shall authorise detention in any custody under this section unless the accused is produced before him; (b) no Magistrate of the Second Class not specifically empowered in this behalf by the High Court shall authorise detention in the custody of the Police; (c) Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate". 6. Prior to the repeal of the Code of 1898, S.167 as it stood read along with S.344 had been understood by the courts to confer power upon the court which had jurisdiction to try a case to extend the period of custody of the accused person beyond the period of 15 days by 15 days at a time whether it be that the investigation was complete or it was not. S.167 of the Code was understood as enabling the Magistrate acting under that section to authorise the detention of an accused person only for a period of 15 days on the whole, There was no power under that section to order detention beyond the period of 15 days. If S.344 referred only to cases of persons charge-sheeted, then the right to remand the accused person to custody beyond the period of 15 days would be limited to cases where the investigation was complete. In such cases S.344 may be taken to authorise further detention as long as it was necessary subject only to the conditions that the court could authorise such detention only for 15 days at a time. If S.344 was understood in that way there would be a vacuum as there would be no provision to cover cases where the accused person has to be detained beyond 15 days for the purpose of investigation, for S.344 if it operates only to case where the court take cognizance of the offence it may not apply to cases where the case is under investigation. If S.167 is to apply to such cases the period for which detention can be ordered under that section would be 15 days only. If S.167 is to apply to such cases the period for which detention can be ordered under that section would be 15 days only. This situation was met by reading the explanation to S.344 as enlarging the scope of sub-section 1A of that section. It was said that the explanation deals with a case where further evidence has to be obtained by a remand and sufficient evidence has not been obtained and this could only be a stage prior to laying the charge. Therefore it was said that the explanation contemplates a case prior to the investigation, that there are no words in sub-s. 1A which limits its application to cases where charge has been laid and therefore it is possible to read sub-s. IA in such a manner as to cover also cases where investigation was not complete. I need not refer to the decisions of the various High Courts on this question, for, the matter has been considered by the Supreme Court and I shall refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court in this context. In A. Lakshmanroo v. Judicial Magistrate, Parvatipuram AIR. 1971 S.C.186 Dua J. dealing with this question, said thus: "10. The second limb of the challenge is based on the contention that S.344 falls in Chap.24, Criminal P.C. which contains general provisions as to inquiries and trials. According to this submission this section cannot apply to a case which is at the stage of investigation and collection of evidence only. This argument appears to us to be negatived by the express language both of sub-section (1A) and the explanation. Under sub-s. (1A) the commencement of the inquiry or trial can also be postponed. This clearly seems to refer to the stage prior to the commencement of the inquiry. The explanation makes it clear beyond doubt that reasonable cause as mentioned in sub-section (1A) includes the likelihood of obtaining further evidence during investigation by securing a remand. The language of S.344 is unambiguous and clear and the fact that this section occurs in Chap.24 which contains general provisions as to inquires and trials does not justify a a strained construction. Indeed, postponement of an inquiry also seems to be within the contemplation of the general provisions as to inquiries and trials. So this challenge also fails. 11. The language of S.344 is unambiguous and clear and the fact that this section occurs in Chap.24 which contains general provisions as to inquires and trials does not justify a a strained construction. Indeed, postponement of an inquiry also seems to be within the contemplation of the general provisions as to inquiries and trials. So this challenge also fails. 11. The suggestion that the explanation could not extend the substantive provisions of sub-section (1A) has merely to be stated to be rejected because the explanation merely serves to explain the scope of the expression 'reasonable casue' " In a latter case in Gouri Shankar v. State of Bihar AIR. 1972 S.C. 711 the Supreme Court said: "12. Thus, S.167 operates at a stage when a person is arrested and either an investigation has started or is yet to start, but is such that it cannot be completed within 24 hours. S.344, on the other hand, shows that investigation has already begun and sufficient evidence has been obtained raising a suspicion that the accused person may have committed the offence and further evidence may be obtained, to enable the Police to do which, a remand to jail custody is necessary. The fact that S.344 occurs in the Chapter dealing with inquiries and trials does not mean that it does not apply to cases in which the process of investigation and collection of evidence is still going on. That is clear from the very language of sub-s. (1A) under which the Magistrate has the power to postpone the commencement of the inquiry or trial. That would be the stage prior to the commencement of the inquiry or trial which would be the stage of investigation. [See A. Lakshmanarao v. Judicial Magistrate (AIR. 1971 S.C.186)]. Therefore, it is not as if the stage at which the Magistrate passed the remand orders was still the stage when S.167 applied and not S.344. The decision of the Orissa High Court in Artatran v. State of Orissa (AIR. 1956 Orissa 129) to the effect that S.344 does not apply at the stage of investigation and can apply only after the Magistrate has taken cognizance of and issued processes or for the production of the accused if he is not produced before him cannot, in view of A. Lakshmana Rao's case be regarded as correct. 1956 Orissa 129) to the effect that S.344 does not apply at the stage of investigation and can apply only after the Magistrate has taken cognizance of and issued processes or for the production of the accused if he is not produced before him cannot, in view of A. Lakshmana Rao's case be regarded as correct. The power under S.344 can be exercised even before the submission of the charge-sheet [Chandradip v. State (1935 BLJR. 323) and Ajit Singh v. State (1970 Crl. Q. 1075: AIR. 1970 Delhi 154)], that is, at the stage when the investigation is still not over." 7. Evidently, the Law Commission recommended that S.344(1A) required amendment so as to make it clear that it relates only to a stage after taking the cognizance of the offence. It is true that the explanation, which possibly is out of tune with the scheme of the section as it now stands, has been overlooked. Whatever that be the section which enables the remand of the accused to custody being sub-s. (2) of S.309 and the scops of that section having been limited specifically to cases where the court has taken cognizance of the offence as the matter now stands there is no scope for invoking S.309 to a case where the court has not taken cognizance of the offence. In other words, there is no provision in the section which enables the court to remand the accused to custody before the court has taken cognizance of the offence. Any provision in regard to this must necessarily be found in S.167 of the Code. 8. Consistent with the scheme of the new S.309(2) provision has been made in S.167(2) and particularly the proviso to enable the Magistrate to extend the period of detention beyond 15 days pending investigation. But that is subject to the limitation that detention without bail shall not be beyond 60 days. If investigation is not completed within 60 days the accused should as of right be entitled to bail. This appears to be quite evident from S.167(2) proviso. That this is the proper way of reading the section is not in dispute. But according to Sri C. S. Rajan, learned counsel appearing for the prosecution, the accused person could nevertheless be detained by order of the court in exercise of the power under S.309 of the Code. This appears to be quite evident from S.167(2) proviso. That this is the proper way of reading the section is not in dispute. But according to Sri C. S. Rajan, learned counsel appearing for the prosecution, the accused person could nevertheless be detained by order of the court in exercise of the power under S.309 of the Code. That is because according to learned counsel, the limitation of 60 days for detention in custody is for the order to be passed under S.167 only. He relies on the earlier decisions which held that the court had power under S.344 of the Code to extend the period of detention beyond 15 days even where the investigation was not complete. There was no time-limit specified under that section. Therefore, it is argued for the prosecution in this case that though the limit of time of 60 days would apply to a case of order fox detention under S.167 there was no such limit for an order of detention to be passed under S.344 of the repealed Code and since that section corresponds to S.309 of the new Code the section in the new Code must also be understood to cover cases of orders of remand both prior and subsequent to the framing of charges against the accused. My notice is drawn to the mention made in the proviso to sub-s.(2) of S.167 of the new Code to detention under "this section" and it is argued that the detention under S.309 corresponding to. the repealed S.344 would not be affected by the limitation provided in the proviso to S.167(2). 9. The reliance on S.309(2) is, I am afraid, misplaced. That, as the section now stands, does not apply to a case where the court has not taken cognisance of the offence and the crime is still under investigation. Any case where investigation is still in progress must be covered by S.167 and the limit of 60 days must apply to such case. S.309 (2) would apply to and only to cases where courts have taken cognizance of the offence. Change of the language of sub-s.(2) of S.309 from what it was under the corresponding sub-s. 1A or S.344 of the repealed Code is not without significance. The background of the change is furnish by the Law Commission Report which furnishes the reason why the amendments was made. Change of the language of sub-s.(2) of S.309 from what it was under the corresponding sub-s. 1A or S.344 of the repealed Code is not without significance. The background of the change is furnish by the Law Commission Report which furnishes the reason why the amendments was made. It is true that when the section stood differently earlier, courts had read the scope of the section also differently. It was evidently to meet this situation that the section was worded differently in the new Code. Therefore, I find that as the matter now stands in any case where investigation is not completed within a period of 60 days from the date the accused is arrested he is entitled to be released on bail. There is no power either under S.167 or under S.309 to remand him to custody for a further period without laying a charge against him. 10. As to why the explanation is retained notwithstanding the change in the language of S.309 (2) I need not consider here. The explanation cannot serve to alter the clear meaning -of the sub-section. Of course, it is,a matter for the Parliament to consider. I leave it there. 11. There is a contention raised by the prosecution that the saving provision in the new Code will save the cases before me from the applicability of proviso to sub-S. (2) of S.167 of the new Code. Reference is made in this context to S.484 of the Code. Sub-s. (2) reads: "S. 484 (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, (a) if immediately before the date on which this Code comes into force, there is. Reference is made in this context to S.484 of the Code. Sub-s. (2) reads: "S. 484 (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, (a) if immediately before the date on which this Code comes into force, there is. any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending, then such appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898) as (hereinafter referred to as the old Code) this Code had not come into force: Provided that every inquiry under Chapter XVIII of the old Code, which is pending at the commencement of this Code, shall be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Code; (b) all notifications published, proclamations issued, powers conferred, forms prescribed local jurisdictions defined, sentences passed and orders, rules and appointments, not being appointments as Special Magistrates, made under the old Code and which are in force immediately before the commencement of this Code, shall be deemed respectively, to have been published, issued, conferred, prescribed, defined, passed or made under the corresponding provisions of this Code; (c) any sanction accorded or consent given under the old Code in pursuance of which no proceeding was commenced under that Code, shall be deemed to have been accorded or given under the corresponding provisions of this Code and proceedings may be commenced under this Code in pursuance of such sanction or consent; (d) the provisions of the old Code shall continue to apply in relation to every prosecution against a Ruler within the meaning of Art.363 of the Constitution." Any investigation which has been commenced under the repealed Code shall be disposed of in accordance with the said Code. Investigation, is defined as including all proceedings by way of collection of evidence conducted by a Police Officer or by any person other than a Magistrate who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf. It is contended for the prosecution that the arrest and detention is a process in investigation and, the question of investigation must be governed by the provisions of the old Code. If so, according to the prosecution there is no time limit for detention of the accused person in cases where investigation includes the collection of evidence. It is contended for the prosecution that the arrest and detention is a process in investigation and, the question of investigation must be governed by the provisions of the old Code. If so, according to the prosecution there is no time limit for detention of the accused person in cases where investigation includes the collection of evidence. But the arrest and detention of the accused person though no doubt necessary for the purpose of investigation is not a part of investigation itself. The arrest is not part of the process of collection of evidence nor is detention. Specific provision has been made in regard to these matters. The question of remand of an accused person pending investigation, even in cases where investigation has commenced prior to the commencement of operation of the new Code must be governed by the new Code after its commencement. 12. The accused persons in all these cases have been in custody for more than 60 days. The investigation is not complete. Therefore they are entitled to seek release on bail. I hereby direct that these persons shall be released on bail. 13. Now I come to the conditions of the bail. In Crl. M. P. 339 of 1974 the accused is said to have committed offences under S.489A to D read with S.120B of the IPC. The accused is a person belonging to Andhra Pradesh. According to the prosecution, he had an active part in a conspiracy to counterfeit currency notes. In the circumstances of the case, I direct that the petitioner in Crl M P. 339 of 1974 will be released on bail on his furnishing two solvent sureties for his appearance for Rs. 25,000 each to the satisfaction of the Judicial Magistrate of the Second Class, Kozhikode-1. He shall not leave the limits of the Calicut Corporation pending further orders of the court. He will also report once in a week to the Calicut Town Police Station. 14. In Crl. M. P. 345 of 1974 the petitioner is accused of murder of his driver It is said that two important witnesses are missing and the insinuation is that the petitioner is responsible for their disappearance. In the circumstances of the case I direct that the petitioners will be released on bail on his furnishing two solvent sureties for Rs. M. P. 345 of 1974 the petitioner is accused of murder of his driver It is said that two important witnesses are missing and the insinuation is that the petitioner is responsible for their disappearance. In the circumstances of the case I direct that the petitioners will be released on bail on his furnishing two solvent sureties for Rs. 25,000 each for his appearance to the satisfaction of the Judicial Magistrate of the Second Class, Kasaragod and also undertaking to reside within Calicut district and reporting to the Town Police Station, Calicut once in a week. In both the cases the petitioners will be free to attend the courts in which their cases are tried on the posting dates. 15. In Crl. M. P. No. 131 of 1971 the accused has been arrested in connection with an offence under S.489A to D read with S.120B IPC. The petitioner's husband is said to have procured paper for printing counterfeit notes. The accused is said to have been associated in this. In the circumstances I direct that the accused will be released on her furnishing two solvent sureties for Rs. 10,000/- each for her appearance to the satisfaction of the Judicial Magistrate of the 2nd Class, Kozhikode.