JUDGMENT P. Subramonian Poti, J. 1. An important question relating to the application of certain provisions of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 arises for decision in this appeal. Whether the employees in the various sales depots of the respondent concern which is running a rubber factory at Changanacherry come within the scope of coverage of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (in short, the Act) is the question so arising in this case. The respondent in the appeal, the Ruby Rubber Works Limited, filed an application under section 75 of the Act for a declaration that the persons employed in their sales depots were not covered under the Act. Such sales depots are situate in various parts of India. The Regional Director of the Employees State Insurance Corporation (referred to as Corporation hereinafter) called upon the respondent to register such employees too and to pay contribution in respect of them. It was then that the application was filed by the respondent. The claim for such coverage was only for the period from 28th January 1968 on which date the amendment of the definition of the term 'employee' in the Act came into force. According to the Corporation the employees in the sales depots were also brought within the scope of coverage by reason of the said amendment. The respondent application was allowed by the Employees Insurance Court, Alleppey and that court made a declaration that the personnel employed in the sales depots were not liable to be insured since the depots were not factories. This is challenged by the Corporation in this appeal. 2. The Employees State Insurance Act was enacted by Parliament to provide for benefits to the working class in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to confer on them disablement and medical benefits. The benefits so conferred by the Act extend to employees as defined in section 2 (9) (i) of the Act and that is the class of persons who are covered by the Act. That is evident from section 38 of the Act which provides that : "Subject to the provisions of this Act, all employees in factories, or establishments to which this Act applies shall be insured in the manner provided by this Act." How such employees are to be insured is provided for in section 39 and section 40. That is evident from section 38 of the Act which provides that : "Subject to the provisions of this Act, all employees in factories, or establishments to which this Act applies shall be insured in the manner provided by this Act." How such employees are to be insured is provided for in section 39 and section 40. It is to be by payment of contribution payable by the employer and the employee at the specified rates. The contribution payable by the employee is also payable in the first instance by the principal employer. 3. There was controversy as to the scope of the term employee as defined in section 2 (9) of the Act. That definition read: "2(9) employee means any person employed for wages in or in connection with the work of a factory or establishment to which this act applies and- (i) who is directly employed by the principal employer on any work of or incidental or preliminary to or connected with the work of the factory or establishment, whether such work is done by the employee in the factory or establishment or elsewhere ; or (ii) who is employed by or through an immediate employer on the premises of the factory or establishment or under the supervision of the principal employer or his agent on work which is ordinarily part of the work of the factory or establishment or which is preliminary to the work carried on in or incidental to the purpose of the factory or establishment; or (iii) whose services are temporarily lent or let on hire to the principal employer by the person with whom the person whose services are lent or let on hire has entered into a contract of service; � This was how the definition stood prior to amendment by Act 44 of 1966. That Act added an inclusive clause to the definition and the portion so added read: and includes any person employed for wages on any work connected with the administration of the factory or establishment or any part, department or branch thereof or with the purchase of raw materials for, or the distribution or sale of the products of the factory or establishment ; but does not include � The amendment came into force with effect from 28th January 1968. 4. 4. Evidently the stand taken by the Corporation which directed coverage of the employees in sales depots with effect from 28th January 1968 was that though such employees might not have been within the scope of the definition of the term prior to the amendment, the amended definition would cover them also and therefore the Corporation could claim contribution in respect of such employees too. It was this that was the core of controversy between the parties. According to the respondent that would not be the case because notwithstanding the amendment of the definition of the term employee, there would be no enlargment of the scope of section 38 of the Act which applied only to employees in factories or establishments to which the Act applied and not to all employees. 5. It may be necessary for the purpose of this appeal to consider the scope of the amendment to the definition of the term employee by Act 44 of 1966. As the definition stood prior to the amendment there was controversy as to the scope of the meaning of the term, as we noticed earlier. But we think we need not refer to this in any detail because the decision of the Supreme Court in N.E.L.P. Co. v.E.S.I. Corporation A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1364 has placed the matter beyond doubt. Dealing with this question the Supreme Court said: "The object of the Factories Act is to secure the health, safety, welfare, proper working hours, leave and other benefits for workers employed in factories. The benefit of this Act does not extend to field workers working outside the factory, see the State of Uttar Pradesh v. M. P. Sing [(I960) 2 S.C.R. 605]. The object of the Employees State Insurance Act is to secure sickness, maternity, disablement and medical benefit to employees of factories and establishments and dependants benefits to their dependants. The benefit of this Act extends inter alia to the employees mentioned in section 2 (9) (i) whether working inside the factory or establishment or elsewhere. 10. The definition of employee� in section 2 (9) deals with three classes of employees. We are concerned with the class of employees mentioned in section 2 (9) (i). The benefit of this Act extends inter alia to the employees mentioned in section 2 (9) (i) whether working inside the factory or establishment or elsewhere. 10. The definition of employee� in section 2 (9) deals with three classes of employees. We are concerned with the class of employees mentioned in section 2 (9) (i). The courts below concurrently found, and in our opinion, rightly, that all the workers of the disputed categories are persons employed for wages in or in connection with work of the company factory and are directly employed by the company or work of or incidental to or connected with the work of the factory. Some of them do the work in the factory and some work elsewhere, but they are all employees within the meaning of section 2 (9) (i). Take the case of the workers mentioned in Appendix III. The assistant engineers, supervisors, electricians and overseers are engaged in the erection and maintenance of the electricity supply lines connected with transmission of power. The cable jointer, mistries, linemen, coolies, and wiremen are employed for inspection of the supply lines, digging pits, erecting poles for laying distribution mains and service lines. The masons attend to the masonry work of the building. The attendants in-charge of the substations look after the transformation and transmission of power. The motor drivers and cleaners are employed for carrying materials and tower ladders in trucks for maintenance of the supply lines. The clerks, draughtsmen and main office peons help the assistant engineers. The store-keepers and clerks with the assistance of coolies issue stores to all the departments and keep accounts relating to stock. The deputy meter superintendent, meter mechanics and meter testers mentioned in items 1 to 4 of Appendix IV attend to the testing caliberation and repairs of the meters. Let us now take the case of the staff mentioned in items 2 to 6 and 9 to 11 of Appendix V. The clerks in the accounts, time-keeping and filing departments are employed to maintain accounts, attendance registers, muster rolls, pay-sheets, typing, filing and despatching documents required in connection with all the departments including the receiving station and the workshop. The telephone operators attend to the telephone calls for all the departments. The menial staff is required, to do miscellaneous work including the cleaning of the office compound. The telephone operators attend to the telephone calls for all the departments. The menial staff is required, to do miscellaneous work including the cleaning of the office compound. The motor car staff is employed to look after the cars employed in the administration section. All these employees, clerical or otherwise, are employed in connection with the work of the factory, that is to say, in connection with the work of transforming and transmitting electrical power. Some of the employees are clerks; they are not engaged in manual labour. But a person doing non-manual work can be an employee within the meaning of section 2 (9) (i) if he is employed in connection with work of the factory. The duties of the administrative staff are directly connected with the work of the factory."� Again in paragraph 11 of the same judgment the court said: "Some of the employees work outside the factory but their duties are connected with the work of the factory. They are therefore employees within the meaning of section 2 (9) (i). Some are employed in the sub-stations. It is common case that the sub-stations are not independent factories. The sub-stations attendants attend to work which is directly connected with the work of the factory at the main station. They are therefore employees within the meaning of section 2 (9) (i)."� Therefore as the definition stood prior to 28th January 1968 the term covered not only employees doing manual work in the factories but also the clerical or administrative staff working in or in connection with the work of the factories. The scope of the term was not confined to those who were working within the factory premises but extended even to those working outside such premises but whose duties were connected with the work of the factory. The term "employment in or in connection with"� in the definition indicated the nexus as the work of the factory and not merely work inside the factory premises. 6. Possibly the definition of the term employee as interpreted by the Supreme Court (the definition prior to the Amendment) may not cover employees like those in sales depots of factories, for, it may not be possible to say that the employees engaged in the work of distribution or sale in sales depots are engaged in or in connection with the work of the factory. Therefore possibly such persons were then outside the coverage of the Act. It would appear from the objects and reasons for the amendment of the, definition of the term employee by Act 44 of 1966 that such persons were sought to be included within the scope of coverage under the Act. It may be useful in this context to refer to the relevant portion in the statement of objects and reasons: "The existing definition of the term 'employee does not cover administrative staff engaged in sale, distribution and other allied functions. The definition is being amended to cover such employees."� 7. Whatever might have been the position prior to 28th January 1968, in view of the inclusion of persons employed on any work connected with the distribution or sale of the products of the factory within the scope of the term employee those in the sales depots would necessarily be brought within the definition. It has not been argued before us that the amendment which served to include a class of persons within the scope of the term employee was only clarificatory in nature and did not add to the class already covered by the definition. Not that we would have found any difficulty to answer that point, for, it appears to us to be quite evident, apart from the statement of objects and reasons to which we have adverted, that the inclusive clause in the definition was intended to enlarge the class of persons which could be brought within that definition. While the definition, as it stood earlier, covered only persons employed in or in connection with the work of a factory or establishment, this was extended in the inclusive clause to persons not only employed in or in connection with the work of the factory itself but with its administration, with the purchase of raw materials for the factory and with the distribution or sale of the products of the factory, which are all phases of activities that might not have been covered by the scope of the definition prior to its amendment. 8. In the light of the definition of section 2 (9) we find no difficulty in holding that the employees in the sales depots of the respondent are employees within the meaning of the Act. 9. 8. In the light of the definition of section 2 (9) we find no difficulty in holding that the employees in the sales depots of the respondent are employees within the meaning of the Act. 9. According to respondent learned counsel Sri Pathrose Mathai, the appellant may not succeed merely because the term employee covers the employees in sales depots also. The definition clause cannot confer any rights or impose any obligations by itself. That of course is so. But the definition is for the purpose of construing the provisions of the Act where the term defined occurs. Section 38 is the section which provides for insuring all employees in factories or establishments to which the Act applies. The respondent counsel formulated his argument before us this way: Even though the employees in sales depots may be employees within the meaning of the Act they are not employees in factories and therefore section 38 will have no application to them. Section 1 (4) of the Act makes the Act applicable, in the first instance, to all factories. The Act is applicable also to establishments which have been treated in section 1 (5) as distinct from factories. But in the case of such establishments the Government has to notify to bring them within the scope of the Act. Therefore, the employees of the factories and employees of establishments are treated differently under the Act. The employees of sales depots are employees of establishments who could be brought within the coverage of the Act by the one and only process of notification under section 1 (5) making the Act applicable to such establishment. So long as no such notification has been issued under section 1 (5) the Act cannot be applied to that class of employees. This, in short, is the case of the respondent. 10. The question of scope of section 38 may be considered first. We have already indicated the object of the amendment of the definition clause in section 2 (9). We have also adverted to the purpose of the legislation. Such legislation, intended to better social welfare, has always to be construed in a manner conducive for the promotion of the objects of the Act. That is so even where the consequence of the application of the provisions may be to impose a pecuniary obligation. We have also adverted to the purpose of the legislation. Such legislation, intended to better social welfare, has always to be construed in a manner conducive for the promotion of the objects of the Act. That is so even where the consequence of the application of the provisions may be to impose a pecuniary obligation. Section 38 (i) might not have, prior to the amendment, covered the class of employees such as those engaged in the work of sale or distribution of the products of the factories in the sales depots. It is true that the section remains the same. But that is no reason to say that the scope of the section also must remain the same when the term employee' occurring in the section has received legislative treatment and consequently has an enlarged meaning. Of course, counsel for respondent, realising the situation wants nevertheless to limit the scope of section 38 by reference to the term in section 38. According to learned counsel it is not all employees as the term is defined in the Act that would be covered by section 38 but only such classes of employees among them as would satisfy the further requirement of the section. It would only be all employees who are in factories� (leaving out establishments for the moment) that shall be insured under the section and all employees in factories would necessarily mean all employees working in the factory premises. In, it is urged, must receive its literal meaning and must refer to operation within the premises. The argument is that the nexus between employees referred to in section 38 and the factories referred to therein must be found in the term in which refers to the connection of the employee with the premises. Employees in sales depots, it is said, cannot be said to be employees in the factory in that sense. They are working elsewhere and so long as that is the case they are not employees in factories. The answer to this, it appears to us, is quite simple. The Supreme Court, in the decision to which we have adverted earlier, in N.E.L.P. Co. v. E.S.I. Corporation A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1364 had occasion to advert to the definition of the term employee prior to its amendment. The answer to this, it appears to us, is quite simple. The Supreme Court, in the decision to which we have adverted earlier, in N.E.L.P. Co. v. E.S.I. Corporation A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1364 had occasion to advert to the definition of the term employee prior to its amendment. It is in this context that the Supreme Court said that the employees falling within the scope of the definition as it then stood used not necessarily be employees doing manual work in the factory and they also need not be employees doing work within the premises of the factory. Further it is a well accepted canon of construction of a statute that the provisions of the statute have to be read together and a harmonious construction attempted. The legislature does not intend any part of the enactment as surplus age or otiose so much so any construction which would avoid such a result should be attempted. It is evident that the object of the amendment Act 44 of 1966 was to bring within the scope of coverage a class of employees who would not otherwise be covered by that Act. That being the case, unless the definition is given its full meaning in the operative provisions such as sections 38, 39 and 40, the amendment would make no sense. The purpose of the amendment may otherwise be defeated and the inclusive part of the definition may be rendered otiose. 11. It is not that we are saying that the language of the Act should be strained in any manner in getting at its proper import. The term in section 38 was evidently not intended to indicate the nexus between the employees and the factory by mere location. It was not the physical presence in the factory premises or working in the factory premises that was postulated, but a rational connection between the factory and the employment. The scope of such rational connection must necessarily depend upon the definition of the term employee and when that is enlarged to cover not only those engaged in or in connection with the work of the factory, but also those who are engaged in the work of the distribution or sale of the products of the factory necessarily the nexus indicated by the amended definition is to be reflected in the term in under section 38 of the Act. In other words, those working in sales depots are also to be found to be employees in factories in the light of the definition of the term 'employee'� in section 2 (9). 12. We will now advert to the contention of the respondent that in the absence of notification under section 1 (5) there is no scope for applying the Act to the employees in sales depots. It is true that section 1(4) makes the Act applicable only to factories. If the Act is to be applied to any establishment it has to be by notification. We are told at the Bar that no such notification has been issued and therefore the Act remains inapplicable to any establishment. Establishment is not a term defined in the Act. But all the same the respondent would say that the sales depot is an establishment and not a factory. May be it is not a factory in the sense in which the term factory is generally understood. That does not appear to us to be quite material, for, the Parliament has chosen to include a class of persons within the term 'Employee'� by the amendment and we are concerned with the definition so amended. That takes in employees working in connection with the distribution and sale of the products of a factory or establishment. In the case of employees concerned in the work of distribution or sale of the products of a factory the definition clearly indicates that they are employees of the factory, In other words where it is a case of a factory the amendment of the definition enlarges the scope of the term employee to include those engaged in the work of distribution or sale of the products of the factory. It is similar with the case of establishment, but with that we are not concerned here. Therefore if by the definition certain classes of employees such as those in sales depots of factories are defined as employees of factories, it is section 1 (4) that is to be applied to them and not section 1 (5). Hence there is no necessity of a notification under section 1 (5) to extend the coverage of the Act to such classes of employees. We do not think that there is any difficulty in construing the provisions of the Act in this manner. Hence there is no necessity of a notification under section 1 (5) to extend the coverage of the Act to such classes of employees. We do not think that there is any difficulty in construing the provisions of the Act in this manner. Leaving out the words which may not be necessary or relevant for the purpose, the definition in section 2 (9) should read: "employee means any person employed in or in connection with the work of a factory to which this Act applies and includes any person employed for wages on any work connected with the distribution or sale of the products of the factories. It may be noticed that there would be no purpose in an inclusive definition if that were merely to state that a person who is already an employee of an establishment is an employee of such establishment. Irrespective of the question whether such a person is an employee of an establishment or not (establishment, a term not defined) all classes of persons who are employed in the work of distribution or sale of the products of the factory become employees within the meaning of the Act. If so, no question of notifying any establishment under section 1 (5) for the purpose of making the Act applicable to such employees arises. In fact, once we have found that on the definition of the term employee as applied in section 38 there is coverage of this class of employees, the question whether notification under section 1 (5) is necessary may not arise at all. 13. Our attention has been drawn to the decision of the learned Judge Sri Ramaprasada Rao, J. of the High Court of Madras in the decision in Mettur Beardsell Ltd. v. E.S.I. Corporation 1973 (II) M.L.J. 195 . The petitioner in that case had a factory in a place where 67 persons were employed with an administrative office elsewhere where 30 persons were employed. After the legislative amendment to the term 'employee'� came into force, the authority under the Employees State Insurance Act sought to bring in the employees working in the administrative office also under the purview of the Act and it is in that context that the petitioner raised the plea that the Employees State Insurance Corporation did not have jurisdiction in the absence of a notification under section 1 (5) of the Act. Dealing with this question the learned Judge said: "4. If there is an establishment in which there is personnel working administratively as its staff, the question is, whether the Act could be applied to the said establishment without making the appropriate notification in the proper and prescribed form as contemplated in section 1 (5) of the Act. I have already referred to the purport of section 1 (5) and its force. In the instant case there has not been any such notification. It is therefore rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is total absence of jurisdiction in these cases when the respondent, without reference to the prescribed statutory pre-requisites under section 1 (5) has included employee in the establishment of their companies head offices, branch offices, etc. as being personnel who ought to be covered under the Act. 5. The fundamental principle of judicial interpretation is that every section of an Act of Parliament or of the State Legislature should be given effect to, and in certain circumstances, in conjunction with the other. If, by a mechanical understanding or interpretation of a particular section, a prima facie conflict arises in the matter of the application of that section with that of another, then, it becomes necessary for Courts while dealing with such a situation to harmonise the conflict and further the object of the legislature and avoid the mischief. If literally section 2 (9) of the Act, as contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent, has to be understood and implemented, then the force of section 1 has to be ignored. If section 1 and section 2 (9) have to be interpreted together and worked harmoniously, then the contention of the learned counsel for the Central Government cannot be accepted. 6. Again, the opening words of section (9) refer to factory or establishment to which this Act applies. Under section 1 (4), this Act has been made applicable to factories, but till the amendment was introduced this Act was not made applicable to establishments. It could only be done by adopting the procedure prescribed in section 1 (5). One accepted principle of interpretation is that when a thing has to be done in a particular or prescribed manner and if that prescription springs from the statute itself, it could be done only in the manner so ordained and not otherwise. It could only be done by adopting the procedure prescribed in section 1 (5). One accepted principle of interpretation is that when a thing has to be done in a particular or prescribed manner and if that prescription springs from the statute itself, it could be done only in the manner so ordained and not otherwise. No presumption or assumption is possible.� 14. Evidently the learned Judge has taken that view that if section 2 (9) of the Act which defines the term employee has to be understood to include the employees in the administrative office, then the force of section 1 has to be ignored. The learned Judge also holds that the opening words of section 2 (9) refer to factory or establishment to which the Act applies and therefore in the case of establishment if the Act is intended to be made applicable it is to be in the manner laid down in the Act itself, namely, by notification under section 1 (5) of the Act. It is not as if by reading the definition in the manner it was intended by the amendment, section 1 (5) will be rendered meaningless. Still there will be establishments, which could be brought within the scope of coverage under the Act only by notification. It is only a particular class of employees that have been additionally, brought within the scope of the definition of the term 'employee� by the amendment. Therefore there is evidently no conflict between section 1 (5) and section 2 (9) (i) of the Act. With great respect to the learned Judge we are unable to agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge of the Madras High Court 15. Our attention has been drawn by learned Counsel Sri C. Sankaran Nair, appearing on behalf of the Corporation, to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court taking the same view as we have taken here. A plain paper copy of the judgment of Kondaiah, J. and Venkararama Sastri, J. in appeal against Order No- 45/73 has been placed in our " hands by counsel and we note that the questions referred to in this judgment have been considered by the learned Judges of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. We, therefore, hold that the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 applies to the staff of the sales depots of the respondents and accordingly appeal has to be allowed. We, therefore, hold that the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 applies to the staff of the sales depots of the respondents and accordingly appeal has to be allowed. We do so. The declaration granted by the Court below is vacated and it is declared that the employees in the sales depots of the respondent company are covered by the Act. The appellant will get its costs from the respondent.