JUDGMENT : H. L. Agarwal, J. In this application in revision by the petitioner, the question for decision is whether she is entitled to grant of maintenance under Section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code'). 2. The short facts giving rise to the present application are these. The petitioner made an application in the court below for grant of maintenance under Section 488 of the Code on the allegations that she was the lawfully married wife of the opp. party and when she went to her husband's place in the year 1958 and lived there for a few months, she was several times assaulted and was denied food and ultimately turned out. She further alleged that in the year 1959, the opposite party again took her to his house and she lived there till March 1960, but again she was subjected to ill-treatment and assault and was turned out. In 1960, she again went to live with the opposite party, but she was not allowed to enter into the house. In May 1962, she was taken by her maternal uncle to the house of the opposite party and she remained with her husband for a few days, but again she was turned out. During all these periods, she lived at her father's place, but the opposite party never took care of her nor gave anything for her maintenance and in the year 1964, he married another lady. Learning about the second marriage, the petitioner again went to the house of the opposite party, but she was not allowed to enter into it. She claimed maintenance at the rate of Rs. 50/- a month. 3. The opposite party in his show cause denied all the allegations of the petitioner and his case was that although his marriage with the petitioner took place in 1952, she did not come to live with him till 1968. He denied the allegations of ill-treatment and neglect to the petitioner from his side. He also denied the allegation of taking another wife. He further pleaded that in any view of the matter, he had not sufficient means to pay maintenance to the petitioner. 4. The petitioner examined eight witnesses, including herself, and three witnesses were examined on behalf of the opposite party in the court below. He also denied the allegation of taking another wife. He further pleaded that in any view of the matter, he had not sufficient means to pay maintenance to the petitioner. 4. The petitioner examined eight witnesses, including herself, and three witnesses were examined on behalf of the opposite party in the court below. The learned Magistrate on a consideration of the respective evidence adduced by the parties, accepted the married another lady. He, however, came to the conclusion that the evidence adduced by the petitioner did not prove any neglect or refusal on the part of the opposite party to maintain her. The learned Magistrate took the view that in absence of the proof of neglect or refusal on the part of the opposite party to maintain the petitioner, the petitioner could not maintain her claim. The learned Magistrate has rejected the claim of the petitioner also on the ground that she had made delay in coming to the Court for maintenance. 5. The last ground given by the learned Magistrate, that is, the ground of delay in coming to Court, cannot be sustained as there is no period of limitation prescribed for a wife to apply under Section 488 of the Code before the appropriate authority for her maintenance or of any while. 6. Section 488 of the Code prescribes that “if any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or his legitimate or illegitimate child unable to maintain itself, the District Magistrate, a Sub Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, ORDER :such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, at such monthly rate, not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate from time to time directs". As already stated above, the learned Magistrate has not accepted the case of the petitioner that the opposite party had neglected or refused to maintain the petitioner. 7. Mr. Girjapati Sanyal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, urged that inspite of the above finding being against the petitioner the petitioner was entitled to get maintenance on the sole ground that the opposite party has taken a second wife. 7. Mr. Girjapati Sanyal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, urged that inspite of the above finding being against the petitioner the petitioner was entitled to get maintenance on the sole ground that the opposite party has taken a second wife. He placed reliance upon the first proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 488 of the Code. The said proviso lays down that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her and make an ORDER :under this Section not withstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing. The very fact that a husband has contracted marriage with another wife or keeps a mistress has been prescribed to be a just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him. With reference to this provision, learned counsel submitted that the petitioner was perfectly justified an entitled to claim maintenance. 8. It is difficult to accept this contention. The scheme of the Section as it seems to me, is that a wife to receive an allowance for her maintenance from her husband, should not live in adultery and, without any sufficient reason, should not refuse to live with her husband. That is, a wife is bound to be willing to serve her husband faithfully. If she acts otherwise, she renders herself disentitled to the privilege of the right to claim maintenance. This is a jurisdictional fact for the Court to make an ORDER :of maintenance. The circumstances contemplated by the proviso to Sub-section (3) are not relevant at this stage and come into play when the husband, after passing of the ORDER :against him under Sub-section (1), refuses to comply with the same on the plea that the wife has deserted him. In that situation, the fact of the husband's taking a second wife or keeping a mistress will be a just ground for the wife in refusing to live with him and the husband cannot be absolved from his obligation to carry out the ORDER :of maintenance. The proviso referred to by the learned counsel may be an answer to the husband's refusal to pay the maintenance on the wife's refusal to live with him when the husband has already contracted a second marriage or keeps a mistress. The proviso referred to by the learned counsel may be an answer to the husband's refusal to pay the maintenance on the wife's refusal to live with him when the husband has already contracted a second marriage or keeps a mistress. This provision does not advance the case of wife any further, and the main condition stated in Sub-section (1) of Section 488, that is, neglect or refusal of the husband to maintain his wife has to be satisfied in each case. Learned counsel also placed reliance upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in (1) Tejabai V. Shankarrao Baswanappa (A.I.R. 1966 Bombay 48). In this case the wife was held to be entitled to get maintenance from her husband who had taken a second wife, but there is no discussion of the ground of neglect or refusal on the part of the husband to maintain the wife. Learned counsel also referred to another decision in the case of (2) Smt. Bhanwari Bai vs. Bheroon Lal (1873 Criminal Law Journal 804). In this case the position was similar to the case of (1) Tejabai (supra) and the Court was considering the question of the wife's obligation to live with her husband and render conjugal obligations on account of his having taken another wife. It was held that the husband in these circumstances, cannot insist on the wife for residing with him as a condition for giving her maintenance and she was entitled to claim maintenance allowance even though she was not willing to reside with him. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on examining the provisions of Section 488 of the Code, I feel inclined to take the view that I in ORDER :to maintain an action by a wife against a husband for maintenance, she must allege and prove that the husband has neglected or refused to maintain her. The mere fact that a husband takes a second wife or keeps a mistress may not ipso facto be either a proof of the neglect or refusal on the part of the husband to maintain his first wife or a ground for an ORDER :for maintenance, as a Hindu husband before the passing of the Hindu Marriage Act was entitled to marry and keep more than one wife, and still might not refuse to maintain his first wife. In the case of (3) Subhagi Devi V. Murli Pradhan (A.I.R. 1968 Patna 138), it was held that the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court to make an ORDER :of maintenance against a person having sufficient means arises only upon proof of neglect or refusal on his part to maintain his wife, in the absence of which it was not open to make any such ORDER :. Therefore, in the absence of the proof of neglect or refusal to maintain on the part of the husband, the wife is not entitled to get any maintenance under Section 488 of the Code. I am also supported in my view by a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in (4) Sm. Bela Rani Chatterjee V. Bhupal Chandra Chatterjee (A.I.R. 1956 Calcutta 134). In this case the husband had taken another wife and maintenance was claimed by the first wife on the allegation of ill-treatment and cruelty etc. The trial court in that case did not accept the case of ill-treatment and cruelty, although the case of second marriage by the husband was accepted. It was held that the mere fact that a husband has contracted a marriage with another wife or keeps a mistress cannot, without more, be said to amount to neglect or refusal on the part of the husband to maintain his first wife within the meaning of Sub-section (1) of Section 488 of the Code. Taking this view, the learned Judges dismissed the claim of the wife for maintenance. 9. The findings of the learned Magistrate in the present case are almost similar to those of the Calcutta case referred to above, and in respectful agreement with the views expressed in the said decision. I do not feel satisfied that this application has got any merit. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner has got no substance. The application, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. Application dismissed.